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BL    200    .R6    1878a 

Romanes,  George  John,  1848- 

1894. 
A  candid  examination  of 


4-  U^  4  «, 


THE 

ENGLISH  AND  FOREIGN 

PHILOSOPHICAL    LIBRARY. 


VOLUME  XIII. 


CANDID   EXAMINATION 


OF 


THEISM. 


BY 


PHYSICUS. 


BOSTON: 
HOUGHTON,    OSGOOD,    &    COMPANY. 

1878. 

[All  rights  reseiued^ 


CANST  THOU  BY  SEARCHING  FIND  OUT  GOD^ 


PREFACE. 


The  following  essay  was  written  several  years  ago ;  but  I 
have  hitherto  refrained  from  publishing  it,  lest,  after 
having  done  so,  I  should  find  that  more  mature  thought 
had  modified  the  conclusions  which  the  essay  sets  forth. 
Judging,  however,  that  it  is  now  more  than  ever  impro- 
bable that  I  shall  myself  be  able  to  detect  any  errors  in 
my  reasoning,  I  feel  that  it  is  time  to  present  the  latter 
to  the  contemplation  of  other  minds ;  and  in  doing  so,  I 
make  this  explanation  only  because  I  feel  it  desirable  to 
state  at  the  outset  that  the  present  treatise  was  written 
before  the  publication  of  Mr.  Mill's  treatise  on  the  same 
subject.  It  is  desirable  to  make  this  statement,  first, 
because  in  several  instances  the  trains  of  reasoning  in  the 
two  essays  are  parallel,  and  next,  because  in  other  in- 
stances I  have  quoted  passages  from  Mr.  Mill's  essay  in 
connections  which  would  be  scarcely  intelligible  were  it 
not  understood  that  these  passages  are  insertions  made 
after  the  present  essay  had  been  completed.  I  have  also 
added  several  supplementary  essays  which  have  been 
written  since  the  main  essay  was  finished. 

It  is  desirable  further  to  observe,  that  the  only  reason 
why  I  pubhsh  this  edition  anonymously  is  because  I  feel 
very  strongly  that,  in  matters  of  the  kind  with  which  the 
present  essay  deals,  opinions  and  arguments  should  be 


viii  PREFACE. 

allowed  to  produce  the  exact  degree  of  influence  to  whicli 
as  opinions  and  arguments  they  are  entitled :  they  should 
be  permitted  to  stand  upon  their  own  intrinsic  merits 
alone,  and  quite  beyond  the  shadow  of  that  unfair  pre- 
judication which  cannot  but  arise  so  soon  as  their 
author's  authority,  or  absence  of  authority,  becomes 
known.  Notwithstanding  this  avowal,  however,  I  fear 
that  many  who  glance  over  the  following  pages  will  read 
in  the  "  Physicus  "  of  the  first  one  a  very  different  motive. 
There  is  at  the  present  time  a  wonderfully  wide-spread 
sentiment  pervading  all  classes  of  society — a  sentiment 
which  it  would  not  be  easy  to  define,  but  the  practical 
outcome  of  which  is,  that  to  discuss  the  question  of 
which  this  essay  treats  is,  in  some  way  or  other,  morally 
wrong.  Many,  therefore,  who  share  this  sentiment  will 
doubtless  attribute  my  reticence  to  a  puerile  fear  on  my 
part  to  meet  it.  I  can  only  say  that  such  is  not  the 
case.  Although  I  allude  to  this  sentiment  with  all 
respect — believing  as  I  do  that  it  is  an  offshoot  from  the 
stock  which  contains  all  that  is  best  and  greatest  in 
human  nature — nevertheless  it  seems  to  me  impossible 
to  deny  that  the  sentiment  in  question  is  as  unreasonable 
as  the  frame  of  mind  which  harbours  it  must  be  un- 
reasoning. If  there  is  no  God,  where  can  be  the  harm 
in  our  examining  the  spurious  evidence  of  his  existence  ? 
If  there  is  a  God,  surely  our  first  duty  towards  him  must 
be  to  exert  to  our  utmost,  in  our  attempts  to  find  him, 
the  most  noble  faculty  with  which  he  has  endowed  us — 
as  carefully  to  investigate  the  evidence  which  he  has 
seen  fit  to  furnish  of  his  own  existence  as  we  investigate 
the  evidence  of  inferior  things  in  his  dependent  creation. 
To  say  that  there  is  one  rule  or  method  for  ascertaining 
truth  in  the  latter  case,  which  it  is  not  legitimate  to  apply 


PREFACE.  ix 

in  the  former  case,  is  merely  a  covert  way  of  saying  that 
the  Deity,  if  he  exists,  has  not  supplied  us  with  rational 
evidence  of  his  existence.     For  my  own  part,  I  feel  that 
such  an  assertion  cannot  but  embody  far  more  unworthy 
conceptions  of  a  Personal  God  than  are  represented  by 
any  amount  of  earnest  inquiry  into  whatever  evidence  of 
his  existence  there  may  be  present ;  but,  neglecting  this 
reflection,  if  there  is  a  God,  it  is  certain  that  reason  is 
the   faculty  by  which  he   has  enabled  man  to  discover 
truth,  and  it  is  no  less  certain  that  the  scientific  methods 
have  proved  themselves  by  far  the  most  trustworthy  for 
reason  to  adopt.     To  my  mind,  therefore,  it  is  impossible 
to  resist  the  conclusion  that,  looking  to  this  undoubted 
pre-eminence  of  the  scientific  methods  as  ways  to  truth, 
whether  or  not  there  is  a  God,  the  question  as  to  his 
existence  is  both  more  morally  and  more  reverently  contem- 
plated if  we  regard  it  purely  as  a  problem  for  methodical 
analysis  to  solve,  than  if  we  regard  it  in  any  other  light. 
Or,  stating  the  case  in  other  words,  I   believe  that  in 
whatever  degree  we  intentionally  abstain  from  using  in 
this  case  what  we  know  to   be   the  most    trustworthy 
methods  of  inquiry  in  other  cases,  in  that  degree  are  we 
either  unworthily  closing  our  eyes  to  a  dreaded  truth,  or 
we  are  guilty  of  the  worst  among  human  sins—"  Depart 
from  us,  for  we  desire  not  the  knowledge  of  thy  ways."     If 
it  is  said  that,  supposing  man  to  be  in  a  state  of  probation, 
faith,  and  not  reason,  must  be  the  instrument  of  his  trial, 
I  am  ready  to  admit  the  validity  of  the  remark ;  but  I 
must  also  ask  it  to  be  remembered,  that  unless  faith  has 
some  basis  of  reason  whereon  to  rest,  it  differs  in  nothing 
from  superstition ;  and  hence  that  it  is  still  our  duty  to 
investigate  the  rational  standing  of  the  question  before  us 
by  the  scientific  methods  alone.     And  I  may  here  observe 


X  PREFACE. 

parentlietically,  that  the  same  reasoning  appKes  to  all 
investigations  concerning  the  reality  of  a  supposed  reve- 
lation. With  such  investigations,  however,  the  present 
essay  has  nothing  to  do,  although  I  may  remark  that  if 
there  is  any  evidence  of  a  Divine  Mind  discernible  in 
the  structure  of  a  professing  revelation,  such  evidence, 
in  whatever  degree  present,  would  be  of  the  best  possible 
kind  for  substantiating  the  hypothesis  of  Theism. 

Such  being,  then,  what  I  conceive  the  only  reasonable, 
as  well  as  the  most  truly  moral,  way  of  regarding  the 
question  to  be  discussed  in  the  following  pages,  even  if 
the  conclusions  yielded  by  this  discussion  were  more 
negative  than  they  are,  I  should  deem  it  culpable 
cowardice  in  me  for  this  reason  to  publish  anonymously. 
For  even  if  an  inquiry  of  the  present  kind  could  ever  result 
in  a  final  demonstration  of  Atheism,  there  might  be  much 
for  its  author  to  regret,  but  nothing  for  him  to  be  ashamed 
of ;  and,  by  parity  of  reasoning,  in  whatever  degree  the 
result  of  such  an  inquiry  is  seen  to  have  a  tendency 
to  negative  the  theistic  theory,  the  author  should  not  be 
ashamed  candidly  to  acknowledge  his  conviction  as  to  the 
degree  of  such  tendency,  provided  only  that  his  convic- 
tion is  an  honest  one,  and  that  he  is  conscious  of  its  havin"" 
been  reached  by  using  his  faculties  with  the  utmost 
care  of  which  he  is  capable. 

If  it  is  retorted  that  the  question  to  be  dealt  with  is  of 
so  ultimate  a  character  that  even  the  scientific  methods 
are  here  untrustworthy,  I  reply  that  they  are  nevertheless 
the  hest  methods  available,  and  hence  that  the  retort  is 
without  pertinence :  the  question  is  still  to  be  regarded  as 
a  scientific  one,  although  we  may  perceive  that  neither  an 
afiirmative  nor  a  negative  answer  can  be  given  to  it  with 
any  approach  to  a  full  demonstration.     But  if  the  question 


PREFACE.  xi 

is  thus  conceded  to  be  one  falling  within  the  legitimate 
scope  of  rational  inquiry,  it  follows  that  the  mere  fact  of 
demonstrative  certainty  being  here  antecedently  impossible 
should  not  deter  us  from  instituting  the  inquiry.  It  is 
a  well-recognised  principle  of  scientific  research,  that 
however  difficult  or  impossible  it  may  be  to  'prom  a 
given  theory  true  or  false,  the  theory  should  nevertheless 
be  tested,  so  far  as  it  admits  of  being  tested,  by  the  full 
riccour  of  the  scientific  methods.  Where  demonstration 
cannot  be  hoped  for,  it  still  remains  desirable  to  reduce 
the  question  at  issue  to  the  last  analysis  of  which  it  is 
capable. 

Adopting  these  principles,  therefore,  I  have  endeavoured 
in  the  following  analysis  to  fix  the  precise  standing  of  the 
evidence  in  favour  of  the  theory  of  Theism,  when  the 
latter  is  viewed  in  all  the  flood  of  light  which  the  progress 
of  modern  science — physical  and  speculative — has  shed 
upon  it.  And  forasmuch  as  it  is  impossible  that  demon- 
strated truth  can  ever  be  shown  untrue,  and  forasmuch 
as  the  demonstrated  truths  on  which  the  present  examina- 
tion rests  are  the  most  fundamental  which  it  is  possible 
for  the  human  mind  to  reach,  I  do  not  think  it  pre- 
sumptuous to  assert  what  appears  to  me  a  necessary 
deduction  from  these  facts— namely,  that,  possible  errors 
in  reasoning  apart,  the  rational  position  of  Theism  as  here 
defined  must  remain  without  material  modification  as  long 
as  our  intelligence  remains  human. 

London,  1878. 


ANALYSIS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

EXAMINATION  OF  ILLOGICAL  ARGUMENTS  IN  FAVOUR 
OF  THEISM. 

SECT.  PAGE 

1.  Introductory i 

2.  Object  of  the  chapter 2 

3.  The  Argument  from  the  Inconceivability  of  SeK-existence  .  2 

4.  The  Argument  from  the  Desirability  of  there  being  a  God  .  3 

5.  The  Argument  from  the  Presence  of  Human  Aspirations    .  3 

6.  The  Argument  from  Consciousness 4 

7 .  The  Argument  for  a  First  Cause 6 


CHAPTER  IT. 

THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND. 

8.  Introductory .         .         .10 

9.  Examination  of  the  Argument,  and  the  independent  coin- 

cidence of  my  views  regarding  it  with  those  of  Mr.  MiU  .       10 

10.  Locke's  exposition  of  the  Argument,  and  a  re- enunciation 

of  it  in  the  form  of  a  Syllogism         .         .         .         .         .11 

11.  The  Syllogism  defective  in  that  it  cannot  explain  Mind  in 

the  abstract.     Mill  quoted  and  answered.     This  defect 

in  the  Syllogism  clearly  defined       .         .         .         .         .12 

12.  The  Syllogism  further  defective,  in  that  it  assumes  Intelli- 

gence to  be  the  only  possible  cause  of  Intelligence.  This 
assumption  amounts  to  begging  the  whole  question  as  to 
the  being  of  a  God.    Inconceivability  of  Matter  thinking 


dv  CONTENTS. 

5KCT.  .     ,  .  ,  PAGB 

no  proof  that  it  may  not  think.  Locke  himself  strangely 
concedes  this.  His  fallacies  and  self  -  contradictions 
pointed  out  in  an  Appendix 14 

13.  Objector  to  the  Syllogism  need  not  be  a  Materialist,  but 

assuming  that  he  is  one,  he  is  as  much  entitled  to  the 
hypothesis  that  Matter  thinks  as  a  Theist  is  to  his 
hypothesis  that  it  does  not        .         .         .         .         .         .16 

14.  The  two  hypotheses  are  thus  of  exactly  equivalent  value, 

save  that  while  Theism  is  arbitrary,  Materialism  has  a 
certain  basis  of  fact  to  rest  upon.  This  basis  defined  in 
a  footnote,  where  also  Professor  Clifford's  essay  on  "  Body 
and  Mind  "  is  briefly  examined.  Difficulty  of  estimating 
the  worth  of  the  Argument  as  to  the  most  conceivable 
being  most  likely  true 17 

15.  Locke's  comparison  between  certainty  of  the  Inconceiv- 

ability Argument  as  applied  to  Theism  and  to  mathe- 
matics shown  to  contain  a  virtual  though  not  a  formal 
fallacy 19 

16.  Summary  of  considerations  as  to  the  value  of  this  Argu- 

ment from  Inconceivability      ......       20 

17.  Introductory  to  the  other  Arguments  in  favour  of  the  con- 

clusion that  only  Intelligence  can  have  caused  Intelli- 
gence          21 

18.  Locke's  presentation  of  the  view  that  the  cause  must  con- 

tain all  that  is  contained  in  the  effects.  His  statements 
contradicted.  Mill  quoted  to  show  that  the  analogy 
of  Nature  is  against  the  doctrine  of  higher  perfections 
never  growing  out  of  lower  ones 21 

19.  Enunciation  of  the  last  of  the  Arguments  in  favour  of  the 

proposition  that  only  Intelligence  can  cause  Intelligence. 
Hamilton  quoted  to  show  that  in  his  philosophy  the 
entire  question  as  to  the  being  of  a  God  hinges  upon  that 
as  to  whether  or  not  human  volitions  are  caused     .         .       22 

20.  Absurdity  of  the    old    theory    of    Free-will.      Hamilton 

erroneously  identified  this  theory  with  the  fact  that  we 
possess  a  moral  sense.     His  resulting  dilemma        .         .       23 

21.  Although  Hamilton  was  wrong  in  thus  identifying  genuine 

fact  with  spurious  theory,  yet  his  Argument  from  the  fact 

of  our  having  a  moral  sense  remains  to  be  considered      .       26 

22.  The  question  here  is  merely  as  to  whether  or  not  the  pre- 

sence of  the  moral  sense  can  be  explained  by  natural 
causes.  A  priori  probability  of  the  moral  sense  having 
been  evolved.  A  posteriori  confirmation  supplied  by 
Utilitarianism,  &c .27 


CONTENTS.  XV 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN. 

lECT.  P'^e^ 

23.  Mill's  presentation  of  the  Argument  a  resuscitation  of 

Paley's.     His  criticism  on  Paley  shown  to  be  unfair        .  36 

24.  The  real  fallacy  of  Paley's  presentation  pointed  out    .         .  37 

25.  The  same  fallacy  pointed  out  in  another  way      ...  38 

26.  Paley's  typical  case  quoted  and  examined,  in  order  to  illus- 

trate  the  root-fallacy  of   his  Argument  from  Design. 
Mill's  observations  upon  this  Argument  criticised  .         .       40 

27.  Kesult  yielded  by  the  present  analysis  of  the  Argument 

from  Design.      The  Argument  shown  to  be  a  petitio 


prmcipii 


43 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS. 

28.  My  belief  that  no  competent  writer  in  favour  of  the  Argu- 

ment from  Design  could  have  written  upon  it  at  all, 
had  it  not  been  for  his  instinctive  appreciation  of  the 
much  more  important  Argument  from  General  Laws. 
The  nature  of  this  Argument  stated,  and  its  cogency 
insisted  upon 45 

29.  The  rational  standing  of  the  Argument  from  General  Laws 

prior  to  the  enunciation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Conserva- 
tion of  Energy.     The  Rev.  Baden  Powell  quoted    .         .47 

30.  The  nature  of  General  Laws  when  these  are  interpreted  in 

terms  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Conservation  of  Energy. 
The  word  "Law "  defined  in  terms  of  this  doctrine  .       52 

31.  The  rational  standing  of  the  Argument  from  General  Laws 

subsequent  to  the  enunciation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Con- 
servation of  Energy 53 

32.  The  self-evolution  of  General  Laws,  or  the  objective  aspect 

of  the  question  as  to  whether  we  may  infer  the  presence 
of  Mind  in  Nature  because  Nature  admits  of  being 
intelligently  interrogated 54 

33.  The  subjective  aspect  of  this  question,  according  to  the  data 

afforded  by  evolutionary  psychology        .        .         •        -57 


xvi  CONTENTS. 

SECT.  PAGE 

34.  Correspondence  between  products  due  to  human  intelligence 

and  products  supposed  due  to  Divine  Intelligence,  a 
correspondence  which  is  only  generic.  Illustrations 
drawn  from  prodigality  in  Nature.  Further  illustrations. 
Illogical  manner  in  which  natural  theologians  deal  with 
such  difficulties.  The  generic  resemblance  contemplated 
is  just  what  we  should  expect  to  find,  if  the  doctrine  of 
evolutionary  psychology  be  true 60 

35.  The  last  three  sections  parenthetical.     Necessary  nature  of 

the  conclusion  which  foUows  from  the  last  five  sections  .      63 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  LOGICAL  STANDING  OF  THE  QUESTION  AS  TO  THE 
BEING  OF  A  GOD, 

36.  Emphatic  re-statement  of  the  conclusion  reached  jn  the 

previous  chapter.  This  conclusion  shown  to  be  of  merely 
scientific,  and  not  of  logical  conclusiveness.  Preparation 
for  considering  the  question  in  its  purely  logical  form     .       64 

37.  The  logic  of  probability  in  general  explained,  and  canon  of 

interpretation  enunciated 66 

38.  Application  of  this  canon  to  the  particular  case  of  Theism  67 

39.  Exposition  of  the  logical  state  of  the  question     ...  67 

40.  Exposition  continued 69 

41.  Kesult  of  the  exposition;  "Suspended   Judgment"  the 

only  logical  attitude  of  mind  with  regard  to  the  question 

of  Theism 70 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY. 

42.  Statement  of  the  position  to  which  the  question  of  Theism 

has  been  reduced  by  the  foregoing  analysis      ...       72 

43.  Distinction  between  a  scientific  and  a  metaphysical  teleology. 

Statement  of  the  latter  in  legitimate  terms.  Criticism 
of  this  statement  legitimately  made  on  the  side  of 
Atheism  as  being  gratuitous.  Impartial  judgment  on 
this  criticism 74 


CONTENTS.  xvii 

SECT.  PAGE 

44.  Examination  of    the  question  as  to  whether  the  meta- 

physical system  of  teleology  is  really  destitute  of  all 
rational  support.  Pleading  of  a  supposed  Theist  in  sup- 
port of  the  system.  The  principle  of  correlation  of 
general  laws.     The  complexity  of  Nature        ...       78 

45.  Summary  of  the  Theist's  pleading,  and  judgment  that  it 

fairly  removes  from  the  hypothesis  of  metaphysical 
teleology  the  charge  of  the  latter  being  gratuitous        .      80 

46.  Examination  of  the  degree  of  probability  that  is  presented 

by  the  hypothesis  of  metaphysical  teleology,  comprising 
an  examination  of  the  Theistic  objection  to  the  scientific 
train  of  reasoning  on  account  of  its  symbolism,  and 
showing  that  a  no  less  cogent  objection  lies  against 
the  metaphysical  train  of  reasoning  on  account  of  its 
embodying  the  supposition  of  unknowable  causes.  Dis- 
tinction between  "inconceivability"  in  a  formal  or  sym- 
bolical, and  in  a  material  or  realisable  sense.  Reply  of 
a  supposed  Atheist  to  the  previous  pleading  of  the 
supposed  Theist.  Herbert  Spencer  quoted  on  inconceiv- 
ability of  cosmic  evolution  as  due  to  Mind       .        .        .      2)-^ 

47.  Final  judgment  on  the  rational  value  of  a  metaphysical 

system  of  teleology.  Distinction  between  "inconceiv- 
ability "  in  an  absolute  and  in  a  relative  sense.  Final 
judgment  on  the  attitude  of  mind  which  it  is  rational  to 
adopt  towards  the  question  of  Theism.  The  desirability 
and  the  rationality  of  tolerance  in  this  particular  case    .       93 


CHAPTER  VII. 

GENERAL  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS. 

48.  General  summary  of  the  whole  essay 102 

49.  Concluding  remarks no 

APPENDIX  AND  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSAYS. 

Appendix. 

A  Critical  Exposition  of  a  Fallacy  in  Locke's  use  of  the 
Argument  against  the  possibility  of  Matter  thinking  on 
grounds  of  its  being  inconceivable  that  it  should     .        .117 


xviii  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Supplementary  Essay  I. 

Examination  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  Theistical  Argu- 
ment, and  criticism  to  show  that  it  is;  inadequate  to 
sustain  the  doctrine  of  "Cosmic  Theism"  which  Mr. 
Eiske  endeavours  to  rear  upon  it 129 

Supplementary  Essay  II. 

A  Critical  Examination  of  the  Rev.  Professor  Flint's  work 
on  "Theism" 152 

Supplementary  Essay  III. 

On  the  Speculative  Standing  of  Materialism       .        .        .     181 

Supplementary  Essay  IV. 

On  the  Final  Mystery  of  Things  .         .        .        .        .189 


THEISM. 


CHAPTER  I. 

EXAMINATION  OF  ILLOGICAL  ARGUMENTS  IN  FAVOUR 
OF  THEISM. 

§  I.  Few  subjects  have  occupied  so  mucli  attention  among 
speculative  thinkers  as  that  wliich  relates  to  the  being  of 
God.  Notwithstanding,  however,  the  great  amount  that 
has  been  written  on  this  subject,  I  am  not  aware  that 
any  one  has  successfully  endeavoured  to  approach  it,  on 
all  its  various  sides,  from  the  ground  of  pure  reason  alone, 
and  thus  to  fix,  as  nearly  as  possible,  the  exact  position 
which,  in  pure  reason,  this  subject  ought  to  occupy. 
Perhaps  it  will  be  thought  that  an  exception  to  this  state- 
ment ouo-ht  to  be  made  in  favour  of  John  Stuart  Mill's 
posthumous  essay  on  Theism ;  but  from  my  great  respect 
for  this  author,  I  should  rather  be  inclined  to  regard  that 
essay  as  a  criticism  on  illogical  arguments,  than  as  a 
careful  or  matured  attempt  to  formulate  the  strictly 
rational  status  of  the  question  in  all  its  bearings.  Never- 
theless, as  this  essay  is  in  some  respects  the  most  scientific, 
just,  and  cogent,  which  has  yet  appeared  on  the  subject 
of  which  it  treats,  and  as  anything  which  came  from  the 
pen  of  that  great  and  accurate  thinker  is  deserving  of  the 
most  serious  attention,  I  shall  carefully  consider  his  views 
throughout  the  course  of  the  following  pages. 


2       EXAMINATION  OF  ILLOGICAL  ARGUMENTS 

Seeing  then  that,  with  this  partial  exception,  no  com- 
petent writer  has  hitherto  endeavoured  once  for  all  to 
settle  the  long-standing  question  as  to  the  rational  proba- 
hility  of  Theism,  I  cannot  but  feel  that  any  attempt,  how- 
ever imperfect,  to  do  this,  will  be  welcome  to  thinkers  of 
every  school — the  more  so  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
prodigious  rapidity  which  of  late  years  has  marked  the 
advance  both  of  physical  and  of  speculative  science,  has 
afforded  highly  valuable  data  for  assisting  us  towards  a 
reasonable  and,  I  think,  a  final  decision  as  to  the  strictly 
logical  standing  of  this  important  matter.  However,  be 
my  attempt  welcome  or  no,  I  feel  that  it  is  my  obvious 
duty  to  publish  the  results  which  have  been  yielded  by 
an  honest  and  careful  analysis. 

§  2.  I  may  most  fitly  begin  this  analysis  by  briefly 
disposing  of  such  arguments  in  favour  of  Theism  as  are 
manifestly  erroneous.  And  I  do  this  the  more  wilKngly 
because,  as  these  arguments  are  at  the  present  time  most 
in  vogue,  an  exposure  of  their  fallacies  may  perhaps  deter 
our  popular  apologists  of  the  future  from  drawing  upon 
themselves  the  silent  contempt  of  every  reader  whose 
intellect  is  not  either  prejudiced  or  imbecile. 

§  3.  A  favourite  piece  of  apologetic  juggling  is  that  of 
first  demolishing  Atheism,  Pantheism,  Materialism,  &c., 
by  successively  calling  upon  them  to  explain  the  mystery 
of  self-existence,  and  then  tacitly  assuming  that  the  need 
of  such  an  explanation  is  absent  in  the  case  of  Theism — 
as  though  the  attribute  in  question  were  more  conceivable 
when  posited  in  a  Deity  than  when  posited  elsewhere. 

It  is,  I  hope,  unnecessary  to  observe  that,  so  far  as  the 
ultimate  mystery  of  existence  is  concerned,  any  and  every 
theory  of  things  is  equally  entitled  to  the  inexplicable  fact 
that  something  is ;  and  that  any  endeavour  on  the  part  of 
the  votaries  of  one  theory  to  shift  from  themselves  to  the 
votaries  of  another  theory  the  onus  of  explaining  the 
necessarily  inexplicable,  is  an  instance  of  irrationality 
which  borders  on  the  ludicrous. 


'    IN  FAVOUR  OF  THEISM.  3 

§  4.  Another  argument,  or  semblance  of  an  argument, 
is  the  very  prevalent  one,  "  Our  heart  requires  a  God ; 
therefore  it  is  probable  that  there  is  a  God : "  as  though 
such  a  subjective  necessity,  even  if  made  out,  could  ever 
prove  an  objective  existence.i 

§  5.  If  it  is  said  that  the  theistic  aspirations  of  the 
human  heart,  by  the  mere  fact  of  their  presence,  point  to 
the  existence  of  a  God  as  to  their  explanatory  cause,  I 
answer  that  the  argument  would  only  be  valid  after  the 
possibility  of  any  more  proximate  causes  having  been  in 
action  has  been  excluded — else  the  theistic  explanation 
violates  the  fundamental  rule  of  science,  the  Law  of  Parci- 
mony,  or  the  law  which  forbids  us  to  assume  the  action 
of  more  remote  causes  where  more  proximate  ones  are 
found  sufficient  to  explain  the  effects.  Consequently,  the 
validity  of  the  argument  now  under  consideration  is 
inversely  proportional  to  the  number  of  possibilities 
there  are  of  the  aspirations  in  question  being  due  to 
the  agency  of  physical  causes;  and  forasmuch  as  our 
ignorance  of  psychological  causation  is  well-nigh  total,  the 
Law  of  Parcimony  forbids  us  to  allow  any  determinate 
degree  of  logical  value  to  the  present  argument.     In  other 

^  The  above  was  written  before  Mr.  universe  possible,  not  the  best  absol- 

Mill's  essay  on  Theism  was  imblisbed.  utely  :    that    the   Divine    power,    in 

Lest,   therefore,   my  refutation  may  short,  was  not   equal  to   making   it 

be  deemed  too  curt,  I  supplement  it  more  free  from  imperfections  than  it 

Avith   Mr.   Mill's   remai'ks   upon   the  is.     But  optimism,  prior  to  belief  in 

same    subject.       "  It    may    still    be  a  God,  and  as  the  groimd  of  that  be- 

maintained  that  the  feelings  of  mora-  lief,  seems  one  of  the  oddest  of  all 

lity  make  the  existence  of  God  emin-  speculative  delusions.    Nothing,  how- 

ently  desirable.     No  doubt  they  do,  ever,  I  believe,  contributes  more  to 

and  that  is  the  great  reason  why  we  keep  up  the  belief  in  the  general  mind 

find  that  good  men  and  women  cling  of  humanity  than  the  feeling  of  its 

to  the  belief,  and  are  pained  by  its  desirableness,  which,  when  clothed, 

being  questioned.     But,  surely,  it  is  as  it  very  often  is,  in  the  form  of  an 

not  legitimate  to  assume  that,  in  the  argument,  is  a  naive  expression  of  the 

order  of  the   universe,   whatever  is  tendency  of  the  human  mind  to  be- 

desirable   is   true.      Optimism,   even  lieve   whatever  is    agreeable    to    it. 

when  a  God  is  already  believed  in,  is  Positive  value  the  argument  of  course 

a  thorny  doctrine  to  maintain,  and  bas    none."      For  Mill's  remarks  on 

had  to  be  taken  by  Leibnitz  in  the  the   version   of  the   argument   dealt 

limited  sense,  that  the  universe  being  with  in  §  5,  see  his  "Three  Essays," 

made  by  a  good  being,  is  the  best  P-  204. 


4      EXAMINATION  OF  ILLOGICAL  ARGUMENTS 

words,  we  must  not  use  the  absence  of  knowledge  as 
equivolent  to  its  presence — must  not  argue  from  our 
ignorance  of  psychological  possibilities,  as  though  this 
ignorance  were  knowledge  of  corresponding  impossibilities. 
The  burden  of  proof  thus  lies  on  the  side  of  Theism,  and 
from  the  nature  of  the  case  this  burden  cannot  be  dis- 
charged until  the  science  of  psychology  shall  have  been 
fully  perfected.  I  may  add  that,  for  my  own  part,  I  cannot 
help  feeling  that,  even  in  the  present  embryonic  condition 
of  this  science,  we  are  not  without  some  indications  of 
the  manner  in  which  the  aspirations  in  question  arose ; 
but  even  were  this  not  so,  the  above  considerations  prove 
that  the  argument  before  us  is  invalid.  If  it  is  retorted 
that  the  fact  of  these  aspirations  having  had  proximate, 
causes  to  account  for  their  origin,  even  if  made  out,  would 
not  negative  the  inference  of  these  being  due  to  a  Deity 
as  to  their  ultimate  cause  ;  I  answer  that  this  is  not  to 
use  the  argument  from  the  presence  of  these  aspirations ; 
it  is  merely  to  beg  the  question  as  to  the  being  of  a  God. 

§  6.  ISText,  we  may  consider  the  argument  from  con- 
sciousness. Many  persons  ground  their  belief  in  the 
existence  of  a  Deity  upon  a  real  or  supposed  necessity 
of  their  own  subjective  thought.  I  say  "  real  or  supposed," 
because,  in  its  bearing  upon  rational  argument,  it  is  of  no 
consequence  of  which  character  the  alleged  necessity 
actually  is.  Even  if  the  necessity  of  thought  be  real,  all 
that  the  fact  entitles  the  thinker  to  affirm  is,  that  it  is 
impossible  for  him,  by  any  effort  of  thinking,  to  rid  him- 
self of  the  persuasion  that  God  exists ;  he  is  not  entitled 
to  affirm  that  this  persuasion  is  necessarily  bound  up  with 
the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  Or,  as  Mill  puts  it, 
"  One  man  cannot  by  proclaiming  with  ever  so  much  con- 
fidence that  he  perceives  an  object,  convince  other  people 
that  they  see  it  too.  .  .  .  When  no  claim  is  set  up  to 
any  peculiar  gift,  but  we  are  told  that  all  of  us  are  as 
capable  of  seeing  what  he  sees,  feeling  what  he  feels,  nay, 
that  we  actually  do  so,  and  when  the  utmost  effort  of 


IN  FAVOUR  OF  THEISM.  5 

which  we  are  capable  fails  to  make  us  aware  of  what  we 
are  told,  we  perceive  tliis  supposed  universal  faculty  of 
intuition  is  but 

'  The  Dark  Lantern  of  the  Spirit 
Which  none  see  by  but  those  who  bear  it.'  " 

It  is  thus,  I  think,  abundantly  certain  that  the  present 
argument  must,  from  its  very  nature,  be  powerless  as  an 
argument  to  anyone  save  its  assertor ;  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  alleged  necessity  of  thought  is  not  universal;  it  is 
peculiar  to  those  who  employ  the  argument. 

And  now,  it  is  but  just  to  go  one  step  further  and  to 
question  whether  the  alleged  necessity  of  thought  is,  in 
any  case  and  properly  speaking,  a  real  necessity.  Unless 
those  who  advance  the  present  argument  are  the  victims 
of  some  mental  aberration,  it  is  overwhelmingly  improb- 
able that  their  minds  should  differ  in  a  fundamental  and 
important  attribute  from  the  minds  of  the  vast  majority 
of  their  species.  Or,  to  continue  the  above  quotation, 
"  They  may  fairly  be  asked  to  consider,  whether  it  is  not 
more  likely  that  they  are  mistaken  as  to  the  origin  of  an 
impression  in  their  minds,  than  that  others  are  ignorant 
of  the  very  existence  of  an  impression  in  theirs."  No 
doubt  it  is  true  that  education  and  habits  of  thought  may 
so  stereotype  the  intellectual  faculties,  that  at  last  what 
is  conceivable  to  one  man  or  generation  may  not  be  so  to 
another  ;l  but  to  adduce  this  consideration  in  this  place 
would  clearly  be  but  to  destroy  the  argument  from  the 
intuitive  necessity  of  believing  in  a  God. 

Lastly,  although  superfluous,  it  may  be  well  to  point 
out  that  even  if  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  the  nega- 
tion of  God  were  an  universal  law  of  human  mind — 
which  it  certainly  is  not — the  fact  of  his  existence  could 
not  be  thus  proved.  Doubtless  it  would  be  felt  to  be 
much  more  probable   than   it   now  is — as  probable,  for 

1  The  words  "or  not  conceivable,"    relatively  conceivable,"  as  explained 
are  here  used  in  the  sense  of  "not    in  Chap.  vi. 


6      EXAMINATION  OF  ILLOGICAL  ARGUMENTS 

instance,  if  not  more  probable,  than  is  the  existence  of  an 
external  world; — but  still  it  would  not  be  necessarily 
true. 

§  7.  The  argument  from  the  general  consent  of  mankind 
is  so  clearly  fallacious,  both  as  to  facts  and  principles, 
that  I  shall  pass  it  over  and  proceed  at  once  to  the  last  of 
the  untenable  arguments — that,  namely,  from  the  exist- 
ence of  a  First  Cause.  And  here  I  should  like  to  express 
myself  indebted  to  Mr.  Mill  for  the  following  ideas:— 
"  The  cause  of  every  change  is  a  prior  change ;  and  such 
it  cannot  but  be;  for  if  there  were  no  new  antecedent, 
there  would  be  no  new  consequent.  If  the  state  of  facts 
which  brings  the  phenomenon  into  existence,  had  existed 
always  or  for  an  indefinite  duration,  the  effect  also  would 
have  existed  always  or  been  produced  an  indefinite  time 
ago.  It  is  thus  a  necessary  part  of  the  fact  of  causation, 
within  the  sphere  of  experience,  that  the  causes  as  well  as 
the  effects  had  a  beginning  in  time,  and  were  themselves 
caused.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  our  experience, 
instead  of  furnishing  an  argument  for  a  first  cause,  is 
repugnant  to  it ;  and  that  the  very  essence  of  causation, 
as  it  exists  w^ithin  the  limits  of  our  knowledge,  is  incom- 
patible with  a  First  Cause." 

The  rest  of  Mr.  Mill's  remarks  upon  the  First  Cause 
argument  are  tolerably  obvious,  and  had  occurred  to  me 
before  the  publication  of  his  essay.  I  shall,  however, 
adhere  to  his  order  of  presenting  them. 

"  But  it  is  necessary  to  look  more  particularly  into  this 
matter,  and  analyse  more  closely  the  nature  of  the  causes 
of  which  mankind  have  experience.  For  if  it  should  turn 
out  that  though  all  causes  have  a  beginning,  there  is  in 
all  of  them  a  permanent  element  which  had  no  beginning, 
this  permanent  element  may  with  some  justice  be  termed 
a  first  or  universal  cause,  inasmuch  as  though  not  sufficient 
of  itself  to  cause  anything,  it  enters  as  a  con-cause  into 
all  causation." 

He  then  shows  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Conservation 


IN  FAVOUR  OF  THEISM.  7 

of  Energy  supplies  us  with  such  a  datum,  and  thus  the 
conclusion  easily  follows — "  It  would  seem,  then,  that  the 
only  sense  in  which  experience  supports,  in  any  shape, 
the  doctrine  of  a  First  Cause,  viz.,  as  the  primaeval  and 
universal  element  of  all  causes,  the  First  Cause  can  be  no 
other  than  Force." 

Still,  however,  it  may  be  maintained  that  "  all  force  is 
will-force."  But  "  if  there  be  any  truth  in  the  doctrine  of 
Conservation  of  Force,  .  .  .  this  doctrine  does  not  change 
from  true  to  false  when  it  reaches  the  field  of  voluntary 
agency.  The  will  does  not,  any  more  than  other  agencies, 
create  Force :  granting  that  it  originates  motion,  it  has  no 
means  of  doing  so  but  by  converting  into  that  particular 
manifestation,  a  portion  of  Force  which  already  existed  in 
other  forms.  It  is  known  that  the  source  from  which  this 
portion  of  Force  is  derived,  is  chiefly,  or  entirely,  the  force 
evolved  in  the  processes  of  chemical  composition  and 
decomposition  which  constitute  the  body  of  nutrition: 
the  force  so  liberated  becomes  a  fund  upon  which  every 
muscular  and  every  nervous  action,  as  of  a  train  of 
thought,  is  a  draft.  It  is  in  this  sense  only  that,  accord- 
ing to  the  best  lights  of  science,  volition  is  an  originating 
cause.  Volition,  therefore,  does  not  answer  to  the  idea  of 
a  First  Cause ;  since  Force  must,  in  every  instance,  be  as- 
sumed as  prior  to  it ;  and  there  is  not  the  slightest  colour, 
derived  from  experience,  for  supposing  Force  itself  to 
have  been  created  by  a  volition.  As  far  as  anything  can 
be  concluded  from  human  experience,  Force  has  all  the 
attributes  of  a  thing  eternal  and  uncreated.  .  .  . 

"  All  that  can  be  affirmed  (even)  by  the  strongest  asser- 
tion of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  is  that  volitions  are 
themselves  uncaused  and  are,  therefore,  alone  fit  to  be  the 
first  or  universal  cause.  But,  even  assuming  volitions  to 
be  uncaused,  the  properties  of  matter,  so  far  as  experience 
discloses,  are  uncaused  also,  and  have  the  advantage  over 
any  particular  volition,  in  being,  so  far  as  experience  can 
show,  eternal.     Theism,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  it  rests  on 


8       EXAMINATION  OF  ILLOGICAL  ARGUMENTS 

the  necessity  of  a  First  Cause,  has  no  support  from  ex- 
perience." 

Such  may  be  taken  as  a  sufficient  refutation  of  the 
argument  that,  as  human  volition  is  apparently  a  cause  in 
nature,  and  moreover  constitutes  the  basis  of  our  concep- 
tion of  all  causation,  therefore  all  causation  is  probably  voli- 
tional in  character.  But  as  this  is  a  favourite  arcjument 
with  some  theists,  I  shall  introduce  another  quotation 
from  Mr.  Mill,  which  is  taken  from  a  different  work. 

"  Volitions  are  not  known  to  produce  anything  directly 
except  nervous  action,  for  the  will  influences  even  the 
muscles  only  through  the  nerves.  Though  it  were  granted, 
then,  that  every  phenomenon  has  an  efficient  and  not 
merely  a  phenomenal  cause,  and  that  volition,  in  the  case 
of  the  particular  phenomena  which  are  known  to  be  pro- 
duced by  it,  is  that  cause ;  are  we  therefore  to  say  with 
these  writers  that  since  we  know  of  no  .other  efficient 
cause,  and  ought  not  to  assume  one  without  evidence, 
there  is  no  other,  and  volition  is  the  direct  cause  of  all 
phenomena?  A  more  outrageous  stretch  of  inference 
could  hardly  be  made.  Because  among  the  infinite  variety 
of  the  phenomena  of  nature  there  is  one,  namely,  a  parti- 
cular mode  of  action  of  certain  nerves  which  has  for  its 
cause  and,  as  we  are  now  supposing,  for  its  efficient 
cause,  a  state  of  our  mind ;  and  because  this  is  the  only 
efficient  cause  of  which  we  are  conscious,  being  the  only 
one  of  which,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  we  can  be  con- 
scious, since  it  is  the  only  one  which  exists  within  our- 
selves ;  does  this  justify  us  in  concluding  that  all  other 
phenomena  must  have  the  same  kind  of  efficient  cause 
with  that  one  eminently  special,  narrow,  and  peculiarly 
human  or  animal  phenomenon  ?  "  It  is  then  shown  that 
a  logical  parallel  to  this  mode  of  inference  is  that  of  gene- 
ralising from  the  one  known  instance  of  the  earth  being 
inhabited,  to  the  conclusion  that  "  every  heavenly  body 
without  exception,  sun,  planet,  satellite,  comet,  fixed  star, 
or  nebula,  is  inhabited,  and  must  be  so  from  the  inherent 


IN  FA  VOUR  OF  THEISM.  9 

constitution  of  things."  After  which  the  passage  continues, 
"  It  is  true  there  are  cases  in  which,  with  acknowledged  pro- 
priety, we  generalise  from  a  single  instance  to  a  multitude 
of  instances.  But  they  must  be  instances  which  resemble 
the  one  known  instance,  and  not  such  as  have  no  circum- 
stance in  common  with  it  except  that  of  being  instances. 
.  .  .  But  the  supporters  of  the  volition  theory  ask 
us  to  infer  that  volition  causes  everything,  for  no  other 
reason  except  that  it  causes  one  particular  thing ;  although 
that  one  phenomenon,  far  from  being  a  type  of  all  natural 
phenomena,  is  eminently  peculiar ;  its  laws  bearing  scarcely 
any  resemblance  to  those  of  any  other  phenomenon,  whether 
of  inorganic  or  of  organic  nature."  •*• 

^  For  the  full  discussion  from  which  gation  of  the  sevei'ity  of  the  above 

the  above  is  an  extract,  see  System  of  statement,  the  closing  paragraphs  of 

Logic,  vol.  i.  pp.  409-426  (8th  eJ.).  my  supplementary  essay  on  "  Cosmic 

But,    substituting   "psychical"    for  Theism." 
' '  volitional, "  see  also,  for  some  miti- 


(      10      ) 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE  ARGUMENT   FROM   THE   EXISTENCE   OF   THE 
HUMAN    MIND. 

§  8.  Leaving  now  the  obviously  untenable  arguments, 
we  next  come  to  those  which,  in  my  opinion,  may  properly 
be  termed  scientific. 

It  will  be  convenient  to  classify  these  as  three  in  num- 
ber ;  and  under  one  or  other  of  these  heads  nearly  all  the 
more  intelligent  advocates  of  Theism  will  be  found  to 
range  themselves. 

§  9.  We  have  first  the  argument  drawn  from  the  exist- 
ence of  the  human  mind.  This  is  an  argument  which,  for 
at  least  the  last  three  centuries,  and  especially  during  the 
present  one,  has  been  more  relied  upon  than  any  other  by 
philosophical  thinkers.  It  consists  in  the  reflection  that 
the  being  of  our  own  subjective  intelligence  is  the  most 
certain  fact  which  our  experience  supplies,  that  this  fact 
demands  an  adequate  cause  for  its  explanation,  and  that 
the  only  adequate  cause  of  our  intelligence  must  be  some 
other  intelligence.  Granting  the  existence  of  a  condi- 
tioned intelligence  (and  no  one  could  reasonably  suppose 
his  own  intelligence  to  be  otherwise),  and  the  existence  of 
an  unconditioned  intelligence  becomes  a  logical  necessity, 
unless  Ave  deny  either  the  validity  of  the  principle  that 
every  effect  must  have  an  adequate  cause,  or  else  that  the 
only  adequate  cause  of  Mind  is  Mind. 

It  has  been  a  great  satisfaction  to  me  to  find  that  my 
examination  of  this  argument — an  examination  which 
was  undertaken  and  completed  several  months  before  Mr. 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  ii 

Mill's  essay  apppeared — has  been  minutely  corroborated 
by  that  of  our  great  logician.  I  mention  this  circumstance 
here,  as  on  previous  occasions,  not  for  the  petty  motive 
of  vindicating  my  own  originality,  but  because  in  matters 
of  this  kind  the  accuracy  of  the  reasoning  employed,  and 
therefore  the  logical  validity  of  the  conclusions  attained, 
are  guaranteed  in  the  best  possible  manner,  if  the  trains 
of  thought  have  been  independently  pursued  by  different 
minds. 

§  lo.  Seeing  that,  among  the  advocates  of  this  argument, 
Locke  went  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  by  it  alone  he 
could  render  the  existence  of  a  Deity  as  certain  as  any 
mathematical  demonstration,  it  is  only  fair,  preparatory  to 
our  examining  this  argument,  to  present  it  in  the  w^ords  of 
this  great  thinker. 

He  says : — "  There  was  a  time  when  there  was  no 
knowing  {i.e.,  conscious)  being,  and  when  knowledge 
began  to  be ;  or  else  there  has  been  also  a  knowing  being 
from  all  eternity.  If  it  be  said,  there  was  a  time  when 
no  being  had  any  knowledge,  when  that  eternal  being  was 
void  of  all  understanding,  I  reply,  that  then  it  was 
impossible  there  should  ever  have  been  any  knowledge  : 
it  being  as  impossible  that  things  wholly  void  of  know- 
ledge, and  operating  blindly,  and  without  perception, 
should  produce  a  knowing  being,  as  it  is  impossible  that 
a  triangle  should  make  itself  three  angles  bigger  than  two 
right  ones.  For  it  is  as  repugnant  to  the  idea  of  senseless 
matter,  that  it  should  put  into  itself,  sense,  perception, 
and  knowledge,  as  it  is  repugnant  to  the  idea  of  a  triangle, 
that  it  should  put  into  itself  greater  angles  than  two  right 
ones."  1 

Now,  although  this  argument  has  been  more  fully 
elaborate  by  other  writers,  the  above  presentation  contains 
its  whole  essence.  It  will  be  seen  that  it  has  the  great 
advantage  of  resting  immediately  upon  the  foundation 
from  w^hich  all  argument  concerning  this  or  any  other 

1  Essay  on  Uuderstanding— Existence  of  God. 


12  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

matter,  must  necessarily  arise,  viz., — upon  the  very  exist- 
ence of  our  argumentative  faculty  itself.  For  tlie  sake  of 
a  critical  examination,  it  is  desirable  to  throw  the  argu- 
ment before  us  into  the  syllogistic  form.  It  will  then 
stand  thus  : — 

All  known  minds  are  caused  by  an  unknown  mind. 
Our  mind  is  a  known  mind ;  therefore,  our  mind  is 
caused  by  an  unknown  mind. 

ISTow  the  major  premiss  of  this  syllogism  is  inadmis- 
sible for  two  reasons:  in  the  first  place,  it  is  assumed 
that  known  mind  can  only  be  caused  by  unknown 
mind ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  even  if  this  assumption 
were  granted,  it  would  not  explain  the  existence  of  Mind 
as  Mind.  To  take  the  last  of  these  objections  first,  in 
the  words  of  Mr.  Mill,  "  If  the  mere  existence  of  Mind 
is  supposed  to  require,  as  a  necessary  antecedent,  another 
Mind  greater  and  more  powerful,  the  difficulty  is  not 
removed  by  going  one  step  back:  the  creating  mind 
stands  as  much  in  need  of  another  mind  to  be  the  source 
of  its  existence  as  the  created  mind.  Be  it  remembered 
that  we  have  no  direct  knowledge  (at  least  apart  from 
Eevelation)  of  a  mind  which  is  even  apparently  eternal, 
as  Force  and  Matter  are :  an  eternal  mind  is,  as  far  as 
the  present  argument  is  concerned,  a  simple  hypothesis  to 
account  for  the  minds  which  we  know  to  exist.  Now  it 
is  essential  to  an  hypothesis  that,  if  admitted,  it  should  at 
least  remove  the  difficulty  and  account  for  the  facts.  But 
it  does  not  account  for  mind  to  refer  our  mind  to  a  prior 
mind  for  its  origin.  The  problem  remains  unsolved,  nay, 
rather  increased." 

ISTevertheless,  I  think  that  it  is  open  to  a  Theist  to 
answer,  "  My  object  is  not  to  explain  the  existence  of 
Mind  in  the  abstract,  any  more  than  it  is  my  object  to 
explain  Existence  itself  in  the  abstract — to  either  of 
which  absurd  attempts  Mr.  Mill's  reasoning  would  be 
equally  applicable ; — but  I  seek  for  an  explanation  of  my 
own  individual  finite  mind,  which  I  know  to  have  had  a 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  13 

beginning  in  time,  and  wliicli,  therefore,  in  accordance 
with  the  widest  and  most  complete  analogy  that  ex- 
perience supplies,  I  believe  to  have  been  caused.  And  if 
there  is  no  other  objection  to  my  believing  in  Intelligence 
as  the  cause  of  my  intelligence,  than  that  I  cannot  prove 
my  own  intelligence  caused,  then  I  am  satisfied  to  let  the 
matter  rest  here ;  for  as  every  argument  must  have  some 
basis  of  assumption  to  stand  upon,  I  am  well  pleased 
to  find  that  the  basis  in  this  case  is  the  most  solid  which 
experience  can  supply,  viz., — the  law  of  causation.  Fully 
admitting  that  it  does  not  account  for  Mind  (in  the 
abstract)  to  refer  one  mind  to  a  prior  mind  for  its  origin ; 
yet  my  hypothesis,  if  admitted,  does  account  for  the  fact 
that  my  mind  exists ;  and  this  is  all  that  my  hypothesis 
is  intended  to  cover.  Tor  to  endeavour  to  ex^plain  the 
existence  of  an  eternal  mind,  could  only  be  done  by  those 
who  do  not  understand  the  meaning  of  these  words." 

Now,  I  think  that  this  reply  to  Mr.  Mill,  on  the  part 
of  a  theist,  would  so  far  be  legitimate  ;  the  theistic  hypo- 
thesis does  supply  a  provisional  explanation  of  the  ex- 
istence of  known  minds,  and  it  is,  therefore,  an  explana- 
tion which,  in  lieu  of  a  better,  a  theist  may  be  allowed  to 
retain.  But  a  theist  may  not  be  allowed  to  confuse  this 
provisional  explanation  of  his  own  mind's  existence  with 
that  of  the  existence  of  Mind  in  the  abstract ;  he  must 
not  be  allowed  to  suppose  that,  by  thus  hypothetically 
explaining  the  existence  of  known  minds,  he  is  thereby 
establishing  a  probability  in  favour  of  that  hypothetical 
cause,  an  Unknown  Mind.  Only  if  he  has  some  indepen- 
dent reason  to  infer  that  such  an  Unknown  Mind  exists, 
could  such  a  probability  be  made  out,  and  his  hypotheti- 
cal explanation  of  known  mind  become  of  more  value 
than  a  guess.  In  other  words,  although  the  theistic 
hypothesis  supplies  a  possiUe  explanation  of  known  mind, 
we  have  no  reason  to  conclude  that  it  is  the  true  explana- 
tion, unless  other  reasons  can  be  shown  to  justify,  on  inde- 
pendent grounds,  the  validity  of  the  theistic  hypothesis. 


14  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

Hence  it  is  manifestly  absurd  to  adduce  this  explanation 
as  evidence  of  the  hypothesis  on  which  it  rests — to  argue 
that  Theism  must  therefore  be  true,  because  we  assume  it 
to  be  so,  in  order  to  explain  known  mind,  as  distinguished 
from  Mind.  If  it  be  answered,  We  are  justified  in 
assuming  Theism  true,  because  we  are  justified  in  assum- 
ing that  known  mind  can  only  have  been  caused  by  an 
unknown  mind,  and  hence  that  Mind  must  somewhere 
be  self-existing,  then  this  is  to  lead  us  to  the  second 
objection  to  the  above  syllogism. 

§  12.  And  this  second  objection  is  of  a  most  serious 
nature.  "  Mind  can  only  be  caused  by  Mind,"  and,  there- 
fore. Mind  must  either  be  uncaused,  or  caused  by  a 
creating  Mind.  What  is  our  warrant  for  making  this 
assertion?  Where  is  the  proof  that  nothing  can  have 
caused  a  mind  except  another  mind  ?  Answer  to  this 
question  there  is  none.  Tor  aught  that  we  can  ever 
know  to  the  contrary,  anything  within  the  whole  range 
of  the  Possible  may  be  competent  to  produce  a  self- 
conscious  intelligence — and  to  assume  that  Mind  is  so  far 
an  entity  sui  generis,  that  it  must  either  be  self-existing, 
or  derived  from  another  mind  which  is  self-existing,  is 
merely  to  beg  the  whole  question  as  to  the  being  of  a 
God.  In  other  words,  if  we  can  prove  that  the  order  of 
existence  to  which  Mind  belongs,  is  so  essentially  different 
from  that  order,  or  those  orders,  to  which  all  else  belongs, 
as  to  render  it  abstractedly  impossible  that  the  latter  can 
produce  the  former — if  we  can  prove  this,  we  have  like- 
wise proved  the  existence  of  a  Deity.  But  this  is  just 
the  point  in  dispute,  and  to  set  out  with  a  bare  affirma- 
tion of  it  is  merely  to  beg  the  question  and  to  abandon 
the  discussion.  Doubtless,  by  the  mere  act  of  consulting 
their  own  consciousness,  the  fact  now  in  dispute  appears 
to  some  persons  self-evident.  But  in  matters  of  such  high 
abstraction  as  this,  even  the  evidence  of  self-evidence 
must  not  be  relied  upon  too  implicitly.  To  the  country 
boor  it  appears  self-evident  that  wood  is  annihilated  by 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  15 

combustion ;  and  even  to  the  mind  of  the  greatest  philo- 
sophers of  antiquity  it  seemed  impossible  to  doubt  that 
the  sun  moved  over  a  stationary  earth.  Much  more, 
therefore,  may  our  broad  distinction  between  "  cogitative 
and  incogitative  being"!  not  be  a  distinction  which  is 
"  legitimated  by  the  conditions  of  external  reality." 

Doubtless   many   will   fall    back    upon    the    position 
already   indicated,    "It   is   as   repugnant  to  the  idea  of 
senseless  matter,  that  it  should  put  into  itself  sense,  per- 
ception, and  knowledge,  as  it  is  repugnant  to  the  idea  of 
a  triangle,  that  it  should  put  into  itself  greater  angles 
than  two  right  ones."     But,  granting  this,  and  also  that 
conscious  matter  is  the  sole  alternative,  and  what  follows  ? 
Not    surely  that   matter   cannot  perceive,  and  feel,  and 
know,  merely  because  it  is  repugnant  to  our  idea  of  it 
that  it  should.     Granting  that  there  is  no  other  alterna- 
tive in  the  whole  possibility  of  things,  than  that  matter 
must  be   conscious,   or   that    self-conscious   Mind  must 
somewhere  be  self- existing ;  and  granting  that  it  is  quite 
"  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  "  of  consciousness  as  an 
attribute  of  matter ;  still  surely  it  would  be  a  prodigious 
leap   to   conclude   that   for    this   reason   matter    cannot 
possess  this  attribute.     Indeed,  Locke  himself  elsewhere 
strangely  enough  insists  that  thought  may  be  a  property 
of  matter,  if  only  the  Deity  chose  to  unite  that  attribute 
with  that  substance.     Why  it  should  be  deemed  abstract- 
edly impossible  for  matter  to  think  if  there  is  no  God, 
and  yet  abstractedly  possible  that  it  should  think  if  there 
is  a  God,  I  confess  myself  quite  unable  to  determine; 
but  I  conceive  that  it  is  very  important  clearly  to  point 
out  this  peculiarity  in  Locke's  views,  for  he  is  a  favourite 
authority  with  theists,  and  this  peculiarity  amounts  to 
nothing  less  than  a  suicide  of  his  entire  argument.     The 
mere  circumstance  that  he  assumed  the  Deity  capable  of 
endowing  matter  with  the  faculty  of  thinking,  could  not 
have  enabled  him  to  concave  of  matter  as  thinking,  any 

^  Locke,  loc.  cit. 


i6  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

more  than  lie  could  conceive  of  this  in  the  absence  of  his 
assumption.  Yet  in  the  one  case  he  recognises  the  possi- 
bility of  matter  thinking,  and  in  the  other  case  denies 
such  possibility,  and  this  on  the  sole  ground  of  its  being 
inconceivable  !  However,  I  am  not  here  concerned  with 
Locke's  eccentricities :  1  I  am  merely  engaged  with  the 
general  principle,  that  a  subjective  inability  to  establish 
certain  relations  in  thought  is  no  sufficient  warrant  for 
concluding  that  corresponding  objective  relations  may 
not  obtain. 

§  13.  Hence,  an  objector  to  the  above  syllogism  need 
not  be  a  materialist;  it  is  not  even  necessary  that  he 
should  hold  any  theory  of  things  at  all.     ISTevertheless, 
for  the  sake  of  definition,  I  shall  assume  that  he  is  a 
materialist.     As  a  materialist,  then,  he  would  appear  to 
be  as  much  entitled  to  his  hypothesis  as  a  theist  is  to 
his — in  respect,  I  mean,  of  this  particular  argument.     Tor 
although  I  think,  as  before  shown,  that  in  strict  reasoning 
a  theist  might  have  taken  exception  to  the  last-quoted 
passage  from   Mill  in   its   connection  with  the  law  of 
causation,  that  passage,  if  considered  in  the  present  con- 
nection, is  certainly  unanswerable.     What  is  the  state  of 
the  present   argument  as  between  a  materialist  and   a 
theist?     The  mystery  of  existence  and   the  inconceiva- 
bility of  matter  thinking  are  their  common  data.     Upon 
these  data  the  materialist,  justly  arguing  that  he  has  no 
right  to  make  his  own  conceptive  faculty  the  uncondi- 
tional test  of  objective  possibility,  is  content  to  merge  the 
mystery  of  his  own  mind's  existence  into  that  of  Exist- 
ence in  general;  while  the   theist,  compelled  to  accept 
without  explanation  the  mystery  of  Existence  in  general, 
nevertheless  has  recourse  to  inventing  a  wholly  gratuitous 
hypothesis  to  explain  one  mode  of  existence  in  particular. 
If  it  is  said  that  the  latter  hypothesis  has  the  merit  of 
causing  the  mystery  of  material  existence  and  the  mystery 
of  mental  existence  to  be  united  in  a  thinkable  manner— 

^  See  Api^endix  A. 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND. 


17 


viz.,  in  a  self-existing  Mind, — I  reply,  It  is  not  so ;  for  in 
whatever  degree  it  is  unthinkable  that  Matter  should  be 
the  cause  of  Mind,  in  that  precise  degree  must  it  be 
unthinkable  that  Mind  was  ever  the  cause  of  Matter,  the 
correlatives  being  in  each  case  the  same,  and  experience 
affording  no  evidence  of  causality  in  either. 

§  14.  The  two  hypotheses,  therefore,  are  of  exactly 
equivalent  value,  save  that  while  the  one  has  a  certain 
basis  of  fact  to  rest  upon,i  the  other  is  wholly  arbitrary. 


1  Viz.,  the  constant  association 
within  experience  of  mind  with  cer- 
tain highly  peculiar  material  forms  ; 
the  constant  proportion  which  is 
found  to  subsist  between  the  quan- 
tity of  cerebral  matter  and  the  degree 
of  intellectual  capacity — a  propor- 
tion which  may  be  clearly  traced 
throughout  the  ascending  series  of 
vertebrated  animals,  and  which  is 
very  generally  manifested  in  indivi- 
duals of  the  human  species ;  the  effects 
of  cerebral  anaemia,  anaesthetics,  stim- 
ulants, narcotic  poisons,  and  lesions 
of  cerebral  substance.  There  can,  in 
short,  be  no  question  that  the  whole 
series  of  observable  facts  bearing 
upon  the  subject  are  precisely  such 
as  they  ought  to  be  upon  supposition 
of  the  materialistic  theory  being  true ; 
while,  contrariwise,  there  is  a  total 
absence  of  any  known  facts  tending 
to  negative  that  theory.  At  the 
same  time  it  must  be  carefully  noted, 
that  the  observed  facts  (and  any  addi- 
tional number  of  the  like  kind)  do 
not  logically  warrant  us  in  concluding 
that  mental  states  are  necessarily 
dependent  upon  material  changes. 
Nevertheless,  it  must  also  be  noted, 
that,  in  the  absence  of  positive  proof 
of  causation,  it  is  certainly  in  accord- 
ance with  scientific  procedure,  to 
yield  our  provisional  assent  to  an 
hypothesis  which  undoubtedly  con- 
nects a  large  order  of  constant  accom- 
paniments, rather  than  to  an  hypo- 
thesis which  is  confessedly  framed  to 
meet  but  a  single  one  of  the  facts. 


Professor  Clifford,  in  a  lecture  on 
"Body  and  Mind"  which  he  deli- 
vered at  St.  George's  Hall,  and  after- 
wards published  in  the  Fortnightly 
Review,  argues  against  the  existence 
of  God  on  the  ground  that,  as  Mind 
is  always  associated  with  Matter 
within  experience,  there  arises  a  pre- 
sumption against  Mind  existing  any- 
where without  being  thus  associated, 
so  that  unless  we  can  trace  in  the 
disposition  of  the  heavenly  bodies 
some  resemblance  to  the  conforma- 
tion of  cerebral  structure,  we  are  to 
conclude  that  there  is  a  considerable 
balance  of  probability  in  favour  of 
Atheism.  Now,  as  this  argument- 
if  we  rid  it  of  the  grotesque  allusion 
to  the  heavenly  bodies — is  one  that 
is  frequently  met  with,  it  seems  de- 
sirable in  this  place  briefly  to  analyse 
it.  First  of  all,  then,  the  validity  of 
the  argument  depends  upon  the  pro- 
bability there  is  that  the  constant 
association  of  Mind  with  Matter 
within  experience  is  due  to  a  causal 
connection  ;  for  if  the  association  in 
question  is  merely  an  association  and 
nothing  more,  the  origin  of  known 
mind  is  as  far  from  being  explained 
as  it  would  be  were  Mind  never  known 
as  associated  with  Matter.  But,  in 
the  next  place,  supposing  the  con- 
stant association  in  question  to  be 
due  to  a  causal  connection,  it  by 
no  means  follows  that  because  Mind 
is  due  to  Matter  within  experience, 
therefore  Mind  cannot  exist  in  any 
other  mode  beyond  experience. 
B 


1 8  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

But  it  may  still  be  retorted,  '  Is  not  that  which  is  most 
conceivable  most  likely  to  be  true  ?  and  if  it  is  more  con- 
ceivable that  my  intelligence  is  caused  by  another  Intelli- 
gence than  that  it  is  caused  by  ISTon-intelligence,  may  I 
not  regard  the  more  conceivable  hypothesis  as  also  the 
more  probable  one  ? '  It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  say  how 
far  this  argument  is,  in  tliis  case,  valid ;  only  I  think  it  is 
quite  evident  that  its  validity  is  open  to  grave  dispute. 
For  nothing  can  be  more  evident  to  a  philosophical 
thinker  than  that  the  substance  of  Mind  must — so  far  at 
least  as  we  can  at  present  see — '?^ecessar^/2/ be  unknowable; 
so  that  if  Matter  (and  Force)  be  this  substance,  we  should 
antecedently  expect  to  find  that  the  actual  causal  connec- 
tion should,  in  this  particular  case,  be  more  inconceivable 
than  some  imaginary  one :  it  would  be  more  natural  for 
the  mind  to  infer  that  something  conceivably  more  akin  to 
itself  should  be  its  cause,  than  that  this  cause  should  be  the 
entity  which  really  gives  rise  to  the  unthinkable  connec- 
tion. But  even  waiving  this  reflection,  and  granting  that 
the  above  argument  is  xalid,  it  is  still  to  an  indefinite 
degree  valueless,  seeing  that  we  are  unable  to  tell  how 
much  it  is  more  likely  that  the  more  conceivable  should 
here  be  true  than  that  the  less  conceivable  should  be  so. 

Doubtless,  from  analogy,  there  is  a  been  separately  refuted.     Doubtless 

presumption  against  the  hypothesis  Professor  Clifford  will  be  the  first  to 

that  the  same  entity  should  exist  in  recognise  the  cogency  of  this  criticism 

more  than   one  mode  at  the  same  — if  indeed  it  has  not  already  occurred 

time  ;    but  clearly  in  this   case  we  to  him ;  for  as  I  know  that  he  is  much 

are   quite   unable    to    estimate    the  too  clear  a  thinker  not  to  perceive 

value  of  this   presumption.      Conse-  the  validity  of  these  considerations, 

quently,  even  assuming  a  causal  con-  I  am  willing  to  believe  that  the  sub- 

nection  between  Matter  and  Human  stance  of  them  was  omitted  from  his 

Mind,  if  there  is  any,  the  slightest,  essay  merely  for  the  sake  of  brevity ; 

indications    supplied    by    any  other  but,  for  the  sake  of  less  thoughtful 

facts  of  experience  pointing  to  the  persons,  I  have  deemed  it  desirable 

existence  of  a  Divine  Mind,  such  in-  to  state  thus  clearly  that  the   pro- 

dications  should  be  allowed  as  much  blem  of  Theism  cannot  be  solved  on 

argumentative  weight  as  they  would  grounds  of  Materialism  alone.     [This 

have  had  in  the  absence  of  the  pre-  note  was  written  before  I   had  the 

sumi)tion  we  are  considering.    Hence  advantage     of    Professor     Clifford's 

Professor  Clifford's  conclusion  cannot  acquaintance,  but  I  now  leave  it,  as  I 

be  regarded  as  valid  until  all  the  other  leave  all  other  parts  of  this  essay — viz., 

arguments  in  favour  of  Theism  have  as  it  was  originally  written. — 1878.] 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  19 

§  15.  Eeturning  then  to  Locke's  comparison  between 
the  certainty  of  this  argument  and  that  which  proves  the 
sum  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  to  be  equal  to  two  right- 
angles,  I  should  say  that  there  is  a  virtual,  though  not  a 
formal,  fallacy  in  his  presentation.  For  mathematical 
science  being  confessedly  but  of  relative  significance,  any 
comparison  between  the  degree  of  certainty  attained  by 
reasoning  upon  so  transcendental  a  subject  as  the  present, 
and  that  of  mathematical  demonstrations  regarding  rela- 
tive truth,  must  be  misleading.  In  the  present  instance, 
the  whole  strain  of  the  argument  comes  upon  the  adequacy 
of  the  proposed  test  of  truth,  viz.,  our  being  able  to  con- 
ceive it  if  true.  Now,  will  any  one  undertake  to  say  that 
this  test  of  truth  is  of  equivalent  value  when  it  is  ap- 
plied to  a  triangle  and  when  it  is  applied  to  the  Deity. 
In  the  one  case  we  are  dealing  with  a  geometrical  figure 
of  an  exceedingly  simple  type,  with  which  our  experience 
is  well  acquainted,  and  presenting  a  very  limited  number  of 
relations  for  us  to  contemplate.  In  the  other  case  we  are 
endeavouring  to  deal  with  the  sumwMm  genus  of  all  mys- 
tery, with  reference  to  which  experience  is  quite  impos- 
sible, and  which  in  its  mention  contains  all  the  relations 
that  are  to  us  unknown  and  unknowable.  Here,  then,  is 
the  oversight.  Because  men  find  conceivability  a  valid 
test  of  truth  in  the  affairs  of  everyday  life — as  it  is  easy 
to  show  a  ^priori  that  it  must  be,  if  our  experience  has 
been  formed  under  a  given  code  of  constant  and  general 
laws — therefore  they  conclude  that  it  must  be  equally 
valid  wherever  it  is  applied;  forgetting  that  its  validity 
must  perforce  decrease  in  proportion  to  the  distance  at 
which  the  test  is  applied  from  the  sphere  of  experience.^ 

1  To  avoid  burdening  the  text,  I  angles.  In  other  words,  any  figure 
have  omitted  another  criticism  which  which  does  not  exhibit  this  pro- 
may  be  made  on  Locke's  argument,  perty  is  not  that  figure  which  we 
"Triangle"  is  a  word  by  which  we  designate  a  triangle.  Hence,  when 
designate  a  certain  figure,  one  of  the  Locke  says  he  cannot  conceive  of  a 
properties  of  which  is  that  the  sum  triangle  which  does  not  present  this 
of  its  angles  is  equal  to  two  right  property,   it  may  be  answered  that 


20 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 


§  1 6.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  I  think  it  is  transparently 
obvious  that  the  mere  fact  of  our  being  unable  to  conceive, 
say,  how  any  disposition  of  matter  and  motion  could 
possibly  give  rise  to  a  self-conscious  intelligence,  in  no 
wise  warrants  us  in  concluding  that  for  this  reason  no  such 
disposition  is  possible.  The  only  question  would  appear 
to  be,  whether  the  test  whch  is  here  proposed  as  an 
unconditional  criterion  of  truth  should  be  allowed  any  the 
smallest  degree  of  credit.  Seeing,  on  the  one  hand,  how 
very  fallible  the  test  in  question  is  known  to  have  proved 
itself  in  many  cases  of  much  less  speculative  difficulty — 
seeing,  too,  that  even  now  "  the  philosophy  of  the  con- 
dition proves  that  things  there  are  which  may,  nay  must, 
be  true,  of  which  nevertheless  the  mind  is  unable  to 
construe  to  itself  the  possibility ; "  ^  and  seeing,  on  the 


Lis  inability  arises  merely  from  the 
fact  that  any  figure  which  fails  to 
present  this  prox)erty  is  not  a  figure 
to  which  the  term  "  triangle  "  can 
apply.  Thus  viewed,  however,  the 
illustration  would  obviously  be  ab- 
surd, for  the  same  reason  that  the 
question  of  the  clown  is  absurd, 
"  Can  you  think  of  a  horse  that  is 
just  like  a  cow  ?  "  What  Locke  evi- 
dently means  is,  that  we  cannot  con- 
ceive of  any  geometrical  figure  which 
presents  all  the  other  properties  of  a 
triangle  without  also  presenting  the 
property  in  question.  Now,  even  ad- 
mitting, with  Locke,  that  it  is  as 
inconceivable  that  the  entity  known 
to  us  as  Matter  should  possess  the 
property  of  causing  thought  as  it  is 
that  the  figure  which  we  term  a  tri- 
angle should  possess  the  property  of 
containing  more  than  two  right  angles, 
still  it  remains,  for  the  purposes  of 
Locke's  supposed  theistic  demonstra- 
tion, to  prove  that  it  is  as  inconceiv- 
able for  the  entity  which  we  call 
Mind  not  to  be  due  to  another  Mind, 
as  it;  is  for  a  triangle  not  to  contain 
other  than  two  right  angles.  But, 
further,  even  if  it  were  possible  to 


prove  this,  the  demonstration  would 
make  as  much  against  Theism  as  in 
favour  of  it ;  for  if,  as  the  illus- 
tration of  the  triangle  implies,  we 
restrict  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"  Mind  "  to  an  entity  one  of  whose 
essential  qualities  is  that  it  should 
be  caused  by  another  Mind,  the 
words  "  Supreme  and  Uncaused 
Mind  "  involve  a  contradiction  in 
terms,  just  as  much  as  would  the 
words  "  A  square  triangle  having  four 
right  angles."  It  would,  therefore, 
seem  that  if  we  adhere  to  Locke's 
argument,  and  pursue  it  to  its  conclu- 
sion, the  only  logical  outcome  would 
be  this  : — Seeing  that  by  the  word 
"Mind,"  I  expressly  connote  the 
quality  of  derivation  from  a  prior 
Mind,  as  a  quality  belonging  no  less 
essentially  to  Mind  than  the  quality 
of  j)resenting  two  right  angles  belongs 
to  a  triangle ;  therefore,  whatever 
other  attributes  I  ascribe  to  tbe  First 
Cause,  I  must  clearly  exclude  the 
attribute  Mind;  and  hence,  what- 
ever else  such  a  Cause  may  be,  it 
follows  from  my  argument  that  it 
certainly  is — Not  Mind. 
^  Hamilton. 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  21 

other  hand,  that  the  substance  of  Mind,  whatever  it  is, 
must  necessarily  be  unknowable  ; — seeing  these  things,  if 
any  question  remains  as  to  whether  the  test  of  inconceiva- 
bility should  in  this  case  be  regarded  as  having  any  degree 
of  validity  at  all,  there  can,  I  think,  be  no  reasonable  doubt 
that  such  degree  should  be  regarded  as  of  the  smallest. 

§  17.  Let  us  then  turn  to  the  other  considerations  which 
have  been  supposed  to  justify  the  assertion  that  nothing 
can  have  caused  our  mind  save  another  Mind.  Nec^lectins; 
the  crushing  fact  that  "  it  does  not  account  for  Mind  to 
refer  it  to  another  Mind  for  its  origin,"  let  us  see  what 
positive  reasons  there  are  for  concluding  that  no  other 
influence  than  Intelligence  can  possibly  have  produced  our 
intelligence. 

§  18.  First  we  may  notice  the  argument  which  is  well 
and  tersely  presented  by  Locke,  thus  : — "  Whatsoever  is 
first  of  all  things  must  necessarily  contain  in  it,  and  actu- 
ally have,  at  least,  all  the  perfections  that  can  ever  after 
exist ;  nor  can  it  ever  give  to  another  any  perfection  that 
it  hath  not  actually  in  itself,  or  at  least  in  a  higher  degree  ; 
it  necessarily  follows  that  the  first  eternal  being  cannot 
be  Matter."  Now,  as  this  presentation  is  strictly  formal, 
I  shall  first  meet  it  with  a  formal  reply,  and  this  reply 
consists  in  a  direct  contradiction.  It  is  simply  untrue 
that  "  whatsoever  is  first  of  all  things  must  necessarily 
contain  in  it,  and  actually  have,  at  least,  all  the  perfections 
that  can  after  exist ; "  or  that  it  can  never  "  give  to  another 
any  perfection  that  it  hath  not  actually  in  itself."  In  a 
sense,  no  doubt,  a  cause  contains  all  that  is  contained  in 
its  effects  ;  the  latter  content  being  potentially  present  in 
the  former.  But  to  say  that  a  cause  already  contains 
actually  all  that  its  effects  may  afterwards  so  contain,  is  a 
statement  which  logic  and  common  sense  alike  condemn 
as  absurd. 

Nevertheless,  although  the  argument  now  before  us  thus 
admits  of  a  childishly  easy  refutation  on  strictly  formal 
grounds,  I  suspect  that  in  substance  the  argument  in  a 


22  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

general  way  is  often  relied  upon  as  one  of  very  consider- 
able weight.  Even  though  it  is  clearly  illogical  to  say 
that  causes  cannot  give  to  their  effects  any  perfection 
which  they  themselves  do  not  actually  present,  yet  it 
seems  in  a  general  way  incredible  that  gross  matter  could 
contain,  even  potentially,  the  faculty  of  thinking.  Never- 
theless, this  is  but  to  appeal  to  the  argument  from  Incon- 
ceivability; to  do  which,  even  were  it  here  legitimate, 
would,  as  we  have  seen,  be  unavailing.  But  to  appeal  to 
the  argument  from  Inconceivability  in  this  case  would  not 
be  legitimate;  for  we  are  in  possession  of  an  abundant 
analogy  to  render  the  supposition  in  question,  not  only 
conceivable,  but  credible.  In  the  words  of  Mr.  Mill, 
"  Apart  from  experience,  and  arguing  on  what  is  called 
reason,  that  is,  on  supposed  self-evidence,  the  notion  seems 
to  be  that  no  causes  can  give  rise  to  products  of  a  more 
l^recious  or  elevated  kind  than  themselves.  But  this  is  at 
variance  with  the  known  analogies  of  nature.  How  vastly 
nobler  and  more  precious,  for  instance,  are  the  vegetables 
and  animals  than  the  soil  and  manure  out  of  which,  and 
by  the  properties  of  which,  they  are  raised  up!  The 
tendency  of  all  recent  speculation  is  towards  the  opinion 
that  the  development  of  inferior  orders  of  existence  into 
superior,  the  substitution  of  greater  elaboration,  and  higher 
organisation  for  lower,  is  the  general  rule  of  nature. 
Whether  this  is  so  or  not,  there  are  at  least  in  nature  a 
multitude  of  facts  bearing  that  character,  and  this  is 
sufficient  for  the  argument." 

§  19.  We  now  come  to  the  last  of  the  arguments  which, 
so  far  as  I  know,  have  ever  been  adduced  in  support  of 
the  assertion  that  there  can  be  no  other  cause  of  our 
intelligence  than  another  and  superior  Intelligence.  The 
argument  is  chiefly  remarkable  for  the  very  great  pro- 
minence which  was  given  to  it  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton. 

This  learned  and  able  author  says  : — "The  Deity  is  not 
an  object  of  immediate  contemplation  ;  as  existing  and  in 
himself,  he  is  beyond  our  reach ;  we  can  know  him  only 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  23 

mediately  through  his  works,  and  are  only  warranted  in 
assuming  his  existence  as  a  certain  kind  of  cause  necessary 
to  account  for  a  certain  state  of  things,  of  whose  reality 
our  faculties  are  supposed  to  inform  us.  The  affirmation 
of  a  God  being  thus  a  regressive  inference  from  the  exist- 
ence of  a  special  class  of  effects  to  the  existence  of  a 
special  character  of  cause,  it  is  evident  that  the  whole 
argument  hinges  on  the  fact, — Does  a  state  of  things 
really  exist  such  as  is  only  possible  through  the  agency 
of  a  Divine  Cause  ?  For  if  it  can  be  shown  that  such  a 
state  of  things  does  not  really  exist,  then  our  inference  to 
the  kind  of  cause  requisite  to  account  for  it  is  necessarily 
null. 

"This  being  understood,  I  now  proceed  to  show  you 
that  the  class  of  phsenomena  which  requires  that  kind  of 
cause  we  denominate  a  Deity  is  exclusively  given  in  the 
phsenomena  of  mind, — that  the  phaenomena  of  matter 
taken  by  themselves,  (you  will  observe  the  qualification 
taken  by  themselves)  so  far  from  warranting  any  infer- 
ence to  the  existence  of  a  God,  would,  on  the  contrary, 
ground  even  an  argument  to  his  negation. 

"  If,  in  man,  intelligence  be  a  free  power, — in  so  far  as  its 
liberty  extends,  intelligence  must  be  independent  of  neces- 
sity and  matter ;  and  a  power  independent  of  matter  neces- 
sarily implies  the  existence  of  an  immaterial  subject, — that 
is,  a  spirit.  If,  then,  the  original  independence  of  intelli- 
gence on  matter  in  the  human  constitution,  in  other  words, 
if  the  spirituality  of  mind  in  man  be  supposed  a  datum  of 
observation,  in  this  datum  is  also  given  both  the  condition 
and  the  proof  of  a  God.  For  we  have  only  to  infer,  what 
analogy  entitles  us  to  do,  that  intelligence  holds  the  same 
relative  supremacy  in  the  universe  which  it  holds  in  us, 
and  the  first  positive  condition  of  a  Deity  is  established 
in  the  establishment  of  the  absolute  priority  of  a  free 
creative  intelligence."  ^ 

§  20.  Thus,  according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  the  whole 

^  Lectures  on  Metapliysics,  vol.  i.  pp.  25-31. 


24  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

question  as  to  tlie  being  of  a  God  depends  npon  that  as 
to  whether  our  "  intelligence  be  a  free  power," — or,  as  he 
elsewhere  states  it  himself,  "  Theology  is  wholly  dependent 
upon  Psychology,  for  with  the  proof  of  the  moral  nature 
of  man  stands  or  falls  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  a 
Deity."  It  will  be  observed  that  I  am  not  at  present 
engaged  with  the  legitimacy  of  this  author's  decision  upon 
the  comparative  merits  of  the  different  arguments  in  favour 
of  Theism  :  I  am  merely  showing  the  high  opinion  he  enter- 
tained of  the  particular  argument  before  us.  He  posi- 
tively af&rms  that,  unless  the  freedom  of  the  human  will 
be  a  matter  of  experience,  Atheism  is  the  sole  alternative. 
Doubtless  most  well-informed  readers  will  feel  that  the 
solitary  basis  thus  provided  for  Theism  is  a  very  insecure 
one,  while  many  such  readers  will  at  once  conclude  that  if 
this  is  the  only  basis  which  reason  can  provide  for  Theism 
to  stand  upon.  Theism  is  without  any  rational  basis  to 
stand  upon  at  all.  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  the 
last-mentioned  opinion  is  the  one  to  which  I  myself  sub- 
scribe, for  I  am  quite  unable  to  understand  how  any  one  at 
the  present  day,  and  with  the  most  moderate  powers  of 
abstract  thinking,  can  possibly  bring  himself  to  embrace 
the  theory  of  Free-will.  I  may  add  that  I  cannot  but 
believe  that  those  who  do  embrace  this  theory  with  an 
honest  conviction,  must  have  failed  to  understand  the 
issue  to  which  modern  thought  has  reduced  the  question. 
Here,  however,  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  this  question. 
It  will  be  sufficient  for  my  purpose  to  show  that  even  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  himself  considered  it  a  very  difficult  one ; 
and  although  he  thought  upon  the  whole  that  the  wiU 
must  be  free,  he  nevertheless  allowed — nay,  insisted — that 
he  was  unable  to  conceive  how  it  could  be  so.  Such  in- 
ability in  itself  does  not  of  course  show  the  Free-wiU 
theory  to  be  untrue ;  and  I  merely  point  out  the  circum- 
stance that  Hamilton  allowed  the  supposed  fact  unthink- 
able, in  order  to  show  how  very  precarious,  even  in  his 
eyes,  the  argument  which  we  are  considering  must  have 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  25 

appeared.  Let  us  then,  for  this  purpose,  contemplate  his 
attitude  with  regard  to  it  a  little  more  closely.  He  says, 
"It  would  have  been  better  to  show  articulately  that 
Liberty  and  E"ecessity  are  both  incomprehensible,  as  be- 
yond the  limits  of  legitimate  thought ;  but  that  though  the 
Free-agency  of  Man  cannot  be  speculatively  proved,  so 
neither  can  it  be  speculatively  disproved ;  while  we  may 
claim  for  it  as  a  fact  of  real  actuality,  though  of  incon- 
ceivable possibility,  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  that 
we  are  morally  free,  as  we  are  morally  accountable  for 
our  actions.  In  this  manner  the  whole  question  of  free- 
and  bond-will  is  in  theory  abolished,  leaving,  however, 
practically  our  Liberty,  and  all  the  moral  instincts  of  Man 
entire."  ^ 

From  this  passage  it  is  clear  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
regarded  these  two  counter-theories  as  of  precisely  equiva- 
lent value  in  everything  save  "the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness ; "  or,  as  he  elsewhere  states  it,  "  as  equally 
unthinkable,  the  two  counter,  the  two  one-sided,  schemes 
are  thus  theoretically  balanced.  But,  practically,  our 
consciousness  of  the  moral  law  .  .  .  gives  a  decisive 
preponderance  to  the  doctrine  of  freedom  over  the  doctrine 
of  fate." 

But  the  whole  question  concerning  the  freedom  of  the 
will  has  now  come  to  be  as  to  whether  or  not  conscious- 
ness does  give  its  verdict  on  the  side  of  freedom.  Sup- 
posing we  grant  that  "we  are  warranted  to  rely  on  a 
deliverance  of  consciousness,  when  that  deliverance  is 
that  a  thing  is,  although  we  may  be  unable  to  think  how 
it  can  be,"  2  in  this  case  the  question  still  remains, 
whether  our  opponents  have  rightly  interpreted  the 
deliverance  of  their  consciousness.  I,  for  one,  am  quite 
persuaded  that  I  never  perform  any  action  without  some 
appropriate  motive,  or  set  of  motives,  having  induced 
me  to  perform  it.  However,  I  am  not  discussing  this 
question,  and  I  have  merely  made  the  above  quotations 

1  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  vol.  ii.  p.  542.  2  j^qq^  qH  ^  ^  ^^2. 


26  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  appears 
to  identify  the  theory  of  Free-will  with  the  fad  that  we 
possess  a  moral  sense.  He  argues  throughout  as  though 
the  theory  he  advocates  were  the  only  one  that  can 
explain  a  given  "  fact  of  real  actuality."  But  no  one  with 
whom  we  have  to  deal  questions  the  fact  of  our  having  a 
moral  sense ;  and  to  identify  this  "  deliverance  of  conscious- 
ness "  with  belief  in  the  theory  that  volitions  are  uncaused, 
is,  or  would  now  be,  merely  to  abandon  the  only  questions 
in  dispute. 

It  is  very  instructive,  from  this  point  of  view,  to  observe 
the  dilemma  into  which  Hamilton  found  himself  driven 
by  this  identification  of  genuine  fact  with  spurious 
theory.  He  believed  that  the  fact  of  man  possessing  an 
ethical  faculty  could  only  be  explained  by  the  theory  that 
man's  will  was  not  determined  by  motives ;  for  otherwise 
man  could  not  be  the  author  of  his  own  actions.  But 
when  he  considered  the  matter  in  its  other  aspect,  he 
found  that  his  theory  of  Free-will  was  as  little  compatible 
with  moral  responsibility  as  was  the  opposing  theory  of 
"  Bond-will ; "  for  not  only  did  he  candidly  confess  that  he 
could  not  conceive  of  will  as  acting  without  motives,  but 
he  further  allowed  the  unquestionable  truth  "  that,  though 
inconceivable,  a  motiveless  volition  would,  if  conceived, 
be  conceived  as  morally  worthless."  ^  I  say  this  is  very 
instructive,  because  it  shows  that  in  Hamilton's  view  each 
theory  was  alike  irreconcilable  with  "  the  deliverance  of 
consciousness,"  and  that  he  only  chose  the  one  in 
preference  to  the  other,  because,  although  not  any  more 
conceivable  a  solution,  it  seemed  to  him  a  more  possible 
one.2 

§  21.  Such,  then,  is  the  speculative  basis  on  which, 
according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  our  belief  in  a  Deity  can 
alone  be  grounded. 

1  Appendix     to     Discussions,    pp.     he  devotes  to  the  freedom  of  the  will 
6i4»  615.  in  his  Examination,  does  not  notice 

2  Mill,  in  the  lengthy  chapter  which     this  point. 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  27 

Those  who  at  the  present  day  are  still  confused  enough 
in  their  notions  regarding  the  Free- will  question  to  suppose 
that  any  further  rational  question  remains,  may  here  be 
left  to  ruminate  over  this  holus,  and  to  draw  from  it  such 
nourishment  as  they  can  in  support  of  their  belief  in  a 
God ;  but  to  those  who  can  see  as  plainly  as  daylight  that 
the  doctrine  of  Determinism  not  only  harmonises  with  all 
the  facts  of  observation,  but  alone  affords  a  possible  con- 
dition for,  and  a  satisfactory  explanation  of,  the  existence 
of  our  ethical  faculty, — to  such  persons  the  question  will 
naturally  arise  : — "  Although  Hamilton  was  wrong  in  iden- 
tifying a  known  fact  with  a  false  theory,  yet  may  he  not 
have  been  right  in  the  deductions  which  he  drew  from  the 
fact  ? "  In  other  words,  granting  that  his  theory  of  Free- 
will was  wrong,  does  not  his  argument  from  the  existence 
of  a  moral  sense  in  man  to  the  existence  of  a  moral 
Governor  of  the  Universe  remain  as  intact  as  ever  ?  Now, 
it  is  quite  true  that  whatever  degree  of  cogency  the  argu- 
ment from  the  presence  of  the  moral  sense  may  at  any 
time  have  had,  this  degree  remains  unaffected  by  the 
explosion  of  erroneous  theories  to  account  for  such 
presence.  We  have,  therefore,  still  to  face  the  fact  that 
the  moral  sense  of  man  undoubtedly  exists. 

§  22.  The  question  we  have  to  determine  is.  What 
evidence  have  we  to  show  that  the  moral  part  of  man  was 
created  in  the  image  of  God;  and  if  there  is  any  such 
evidence,  what  counter-existence  is  there  to  show  that  the 
moral  existence  of  man  may  be  due  to  natural  causes  ? 
In  deciding  this  question,  just  as  in  deciding  any  other 
question  of  a  purely  scientific  character,  we  must  be  guided 
in  our  examination  by  the  Law  of  Parcimony ;  we  must  not 
assume  the  agency  of  supernatural  causes  if  we  can  dis- 
cover the  agency  of  natural  causes ;  neither  must  we  merge 
the  supposed  mystery  directly  into  the  highest  mystery, 
until  we  are  quite  sure  that  it  does  not  admit  of  being  proxi- 
mately explained  by  the  action  of  proximate  influences. 

Now,  whether  or  not  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  as  to  the 


28  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

origin  and  development  of  the  moral  sense  be  considered 
satisfactory,  there  can,  I  think,  be  very  little  doubt  in  any 
impartial  mind  which  duly  considers  the  subject,  that  in 
some  way  or  other  the  moral  sense  has  been  evolved.  The 
body  of  scientific  evidence  which  has  now  been  collected 
in  favour  of  the  general  theory  of  evolution  is  simply 
overwhelming ;  and  in  the  presence  of  so  large  an  analogy, 
it  would  require  a  vast  amount  of  contradictory  evidence 
to  remove  the  presumption  that  human  conscience,  like 
everything  else,  has  been  evolved.  I^ow,  for  my  own  part, 
I  am  quite  unable  to  distinguish  any  such  evidence,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  in  support  of  the  a  20TioTi  presumption 
that  conscience  has  been  evolved,  I  cannot  conceal  from 
myself  that  there  is  a  large  amount  of  a  posteriori  confirma- 
tion. I  am  quite  unable  to  distinguish  anything  in  my  sense 
of  right  and  wrong  which  I  cannot  easily  conceive  to  have 
been  brought  about  during  the  evolution  of  my  intelli- 
gence from  lower  forms  of  psychical  life.  On  the  con- 
trary, everything  that  I  can  find  in  my  sense  of  right  and 
wrong  is  precisely  what  I  should  expect  to  find  on  the 
supposition  of  this  sense  having  been  moulded  by  the 
progressive  requirements  of  social  development.  Eead  in 
the  light  of  evolution.  Conscience,  in  its  every  detail,  is 
deductively  explained. 

And,  as  though  there  were  not  sufficient  evidence  of 
this  kind  to  justify  the  conclusion  drawn  from  the  theory 
of  evolution,  the  doctrine  of  utilitarianism — separately 
conceived  and  separately  worked  out  on  altogether 
independent  grounds  —  the  doctrine  of  utilitarianism 
comes  in  with  irresistible  force  to  confirm  that  a  priori 
conclusion  by  the  widest  and  most  unexceptionable  of 
inductions.! 

1  If  more  evidence  can  be  wanted,  otjiers)  and  the  idea  of  punishment 

it  is  supplied  in  some  suggestive  facts  are  presented  to  the  mind  together, 

of  Psychology.    For  example,  "From  and  the  intense  character  of  the  im- 

our  earliest  childhood,    the   idea  of  pressions   causes  the   association   be- 

doing  wrong  (that  is,  of  doing  what  tween   them    to    attain    the  highest 

is  forbidden,  or  what  is  injurious  to  degree  of  closeness  and  intimacy.     Is 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND,  29 

In  the  supernatural  interpretation  of  the  facts,  the  whole 
stress  of  the  argument  comes  upon  the  character  of  con- 
science as  a  spontaneously  admonishing  influence  luliich  acts 
independently  of  our  own  volition.  For  it  is  from  this 
character  alone  that  the  inference  can  arise  that  conscience 
is  the  delegate  of  the  will  of  another.  Thus,  to  render  the 
whole  argument  in  the  singularly  beautiful  words  of  Dr. 
Newman  : — "  If,  as  is  the  case,  we  feel  responsibility,  are 
ashamed,  are  frightened  at  transgressing  the  voice  of  con- 
science, this  implies  that  there  is  One  to  whom  we  are 
responsible,  before  whom  we  are  ashamed,  whose  claims 
upon  us  we  fear.  If,  on  doing  wrong,  we  feel  the  same 
tearful,  broken-hearted  sorrow  which  overwhelms  us  on 
hurting  a  mother ;  if,  on  doing  right,  we  enjoy  the  same 
seeming  serenity  of  mind,  the  same  soothing,  satisfactory 
delight,  which  follows  on  one  receiving  praise  from  a 
father, — we  certainly  have  within  us  the  image  of  some 
person  to  whom  our  love  and  veneration  look,  in  whose 
smile  we  find  our  happiness,  for  whom  we  yearn,  towards 
whom  we  direct  our  pleadings,  in  whose  anger  we  waste 
away.  These  feelings  in  us  are  such  as  require  for  their 
exciting  cause  an  intelligent  being  ;  we  are  not  affectionate 
towards  a  stone,  nor  do  we  feel  shame  before  a  horse  or  a 
dog;  we  have  no  remorse  or  compunction  in  breaking 
mere  human  law.  Yet  so  it  is ;  conscience  emits  all  these 
painful  emotions,  confusion,  foreboding,  self-condemna- 
tion ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  sheds  upon  us  a  deep 
peace,  a  sense  of  security,  a  resignation,  and  a  hope  which 
there  is  no  sensible,  no  earthly  object  to  elicit.      'The 

it  strange,  or  unlike  the  usual  pro-  association  has  been  created  between 
cesses  of  the  human  mind,  that  in  these  directly,  without  the  help  of 
these  circumstances  we  should  retain  any  intervening  idea.  This  is  quite 
the  feeling  and  forget  the  reason  on  enough  to  make  the  sjiontaneous  feel- 
which  it  is  grounded?  But  why  do  ings  of  mankind  regard  punishment 
I  speak  of  forgetting  ?  In  luost  cases  and  a  wrong-doer  as  naturally  fitted 
the  reason  has  never,  in  our  early  to  each  other — as  a  conjunction  appro- 
education,  been  presented  to  the  priate  in  itself,  independently  of  any 
mind.  The  only  ideas  presented  consequences,"  &c. — Mill,  Examina- 
have  been  those  of  wrong  and  tion  of  Hamilton,  p.  599. 
punishment,     and     an     inseparable 


30  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

wicked  flees  when  no  one  pnrsuetli ; '  then  why  does  he 
flee  ?  whence  his  terror  ?  Who  is  it  that  he  sees  in  soli- 
tude, in  darkness,  in  the  hidden  chambers  of  his  heart  ? 
If  the  cause  of  these  emotions  does  not  belong  tothis  visible 
world,  the  Object  to  which  his  perception  is  directed  must 
be  supernatural  and  divine ;  and  thus  the  phenomena  of 
conscience  as  a  dictate  avail  to  impress  the  imagination 
with  the  picture  of  a  Supreme  Governor,  a  Judge,  holy, 
just,  powerful,  all-seeing,  retributive."  ^ 

Now  I  have  quoted  this  passage  because  it  seems  to  me 
to  convey  in  a  concise  form  the  whole  of  the  argument 
from  Conscience.  But  how  tremendous  are  the  inferences 
which  are  drawn  from  the  facts !  As  the  first  step  in  our 
criticism,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  two  very  different 
orders  of  feelings  are  here  treated  by  Dr.  Newman.  There 
is  first  the  pure  or  uncompounded  ethical  feelings,  which 
spring  directly  from  the  moral  sense  alone,  and  which  all 
men  experience  in  varying  degrees.  And  next  there  are 
what  we  may  term  the  etliico'theological  feelings,  which 
can  only  spring  from  a  blending  of  the  moral  sense  with 
a  belief  in  a  personal  God,  or  other  supernatural  agents. 
The  former  class  of  feelings,  or  the  uncompounded  ethical 
class,  have  exclusive  reference  to  the  moral  obligations 
that  subsist  between  ourselves  and  other  human  beings, 
or  sentient  organisms.  The  latter  class  of  feehngs,  or  the 
ethico-theological  class,  have  reference  to  the  moral  obliga- 
tions that  are  believed  to  subsist  between  ourselves  and 
the  Deity,  or  other  supernatural  beings.  Now,  in  order 
not  to  lose  sight  of  this  all-important  distinction,  I  shall 
criticise  Dr.  Newman's  rendering  of  the  ordinary  argument 
from  Conscience  in  each  of  these  two  points  of  views 
separately.  To  begin,  then,  with  the  uncompounded 
ethical  feelings. 

Such  emotions  as  attend  the  operation  of  conscience  in 
those  who  follow  its  light  alone  without  any  theories  as 
to  its  supernatural  origin,  are  all  of  the  character  of  rcason- 

1  Grammar  of  Assent,  pp.  io6,  107. 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND,  31 

dhU  or  exjolicaUe  emotions.  Granting  that  fellow-feeling 
has  been  for  the  benefit  of  the  race,  and  therefore  that  it 
has  been  developed  by  natural  causes,  certainly  there  is 
nothing  mysterious  in  the  emotions  that  attend  the  violat- 
ing or  the  following  of  the  dictates  of  conscience.  For  con- 
science is,  by  this  naturalistic  supposition,  nothing  more  than 
an  organised  body  of  certain  psychological  elements,  which, 
by  long  inheritance,  have  come  to  inform  us,  by  way  of  intui- 
tive feeling,  how  we  should  act  for  the  interests  of  society ; 
so  that,  if  this  hypothesis  is  correct,  there  cannot  be  any- 
thing more  mysterious  or  supernatural  in  the  working  of 
conscience  than  there  is  in  the  working  of  any  of  our  other 
faculties.  That  the  disagreeable  feeling  of  self-reproach , 
as  distinguished  from  religious  feeling,  should  follow  upon 
a  violation  of  such  an  organised  body  of  psychological 
elements,  cannot  be  thought  surprising,  if  it  is  remem- 
bered that  one  of  these  elements  is  natural  fellow-feel- 
ing, and  the  others  the  elements  which  lead  us  to  know 
directly  that  we  have  violated  the  interests  of  other  persons. 
And  as  regards  the  mere  fact  that  the  working  of  con- 
science is  independent  of  the  will,  surely  this  is  not  more 
than  we  find,  in  varying  degrees,  to  be  true  of  all  our 
emotions;  and  conscience,  according  to  the  evolution 
theory,  has  its  root  in  the  emotions.  Hence,  it  is  no  more 
an  argument  to  say  that  the  irrepressible  character  of  con- 
science refers  us  to  a  God  of  morality,  than  it  would  be  to  say 
that  the  sometimes  resistless  force  of  the  ludicrous  refers 
us  to  a  god  of  laughter.  Love,  again,  is  an  emotion  which 
cannot  be  subdued  by  volition,  and  in  its  tendency  to  per- 
sist bears  just  such  a  striking  resemblance  to  the  feelings 
of  morality  as  we  should  expect  to  find  on  the  supposition 
of  the  former  having  played  an  important  part  in  the  gen- 
esis of  the  latter.  The  dietating  character  of  conscience, 
therefore,  is  clearly  in  itself  of  no  avail  as  pointing  to  a 
superhuman  Dictator.  Thus,  for  example,  to  take  Dr. 
Newman's  own  illustration,  why  should  we  feel  such  tear- 
ful, broken-hearted  sorrow  on  intentionally  or  carelessly 


32  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

hurting  a  motlier?  We  see  no  shadow  of  a  reason  for 
resorting  to  any  supernatural  hypothesis  to  explain  the 
fact — love  between  mother  and  offspring  being  an  essential 
condition  to  the  existence  of  higher  animals.  Yet  this  is 
a  simple  case  of  truly  conscientious  feeling,  where  the 
thought  of  any  personal  cause  of  conscience  need  not  be 
entertained,  and  is  certainly  not  necessary  to  explain  the 
effects.  And  similarly  with  all  cases  of  conscientious  feel- 
ing, excejpt  in  cases  where  it  refers  directly  to  its  supposed 
author.  But  these  latter  cases,  or  the  ethico-theological 
class  of  feelings,  are  in  no  way  surprising.  If  the  moral 
sense  has  had  a  natural  genesis  in  the  actual  relations  be- 
tween man  and  man,  as  soon  as  an  ideal  "  image  "  of  "  a 
holy,  just, powerful,  all-seeing,  retributive  "  God  is  firmly  be- 
lieved to  have  an  objective  existence,  as  a  matter  of  course 
moral  feelings  must  become  transferred  to  the  relations 
which  are  believed  to  obtain  between  ourselves  and  this 
most  holy  God.  Indeed,  it  is  these  very  feelings  which, 
in  the  absence  of  any  proof  to  the  contrary,  must  be  con- 
cluded, in  accordance  with  the  law  of  parcimony,  to  have 
generated  this  idea  of  God  as  "  holy,  just,"  and  good.  And 
the  mere  fact  that,  when  the  complex  system  of  religious 
belief  has  once  been  built  up,  conscience  is  strongly  wrought 
upon  by  that  belief  and  its  accompanying  emotions,  is 
surely  a  fact  the  very  reverse  of  mysterious.  Suppose,  for 
the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  moral  sense  has  been 
evolved  from  the  social  feelings,  and  should  we  not  cer- 
tainly expect  that,  when  the  belief  in  a  moral  and  all-seeing 
God  is  superadded,  conscience  should  be  distracted  at  the 
thought  of  offending  him,  and  experience  a  "soothing, 
satisfactory  delight"  in  the  belief  that  we  are  pleasing 
him?  And  as  to  the  argument,  ''Why  does  the  wicked 
flee  when  none  pursueth  ?  whence  his  terror  ? "  the 
question  admits  of  only  too  easy  an  answer.  Indeed,  the 
form  into  which  the  question  is  thrown  would  almost  seem 
— were  it  not  written  by  Dr.  Newman — to  imply  a  sar- 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND.  33 

castic  reference  to  the  power  of  superstition.  ''  Who  is  it 
that/'  not  only  Dr.  [N'ewman,  but  the  haunted  savage,  the 
mediaeval  sorcerer,  or  the  frightened  child,  "  sees  in  soli- 
tude, in  darkness,  in  the  hidden  chambers  of  his  heart  ? " 
Who  but  the  "  image "  of  his  own  thought  ?  "  If  the 
cause  of  these  emotions  does  not  belong  to  this  visible 
world,  the  Object  to  which  his  perception  is  directed  must 
be  supernatural  and  divine."  Assuredly;  but  what  an 
inference  from  what  an  assumption  !  Whether  or  not  the 
moral  sense  has  been  developed  by  natural  causes,  "  these 
emotions"  of  terror  at  the  thought  of  offending  beings 
"  supernatural  and  divine  "  are  not  of  such  unique  occur- 
rence "  in  the  visible  world  "  as  to  give  Dr.  Newman  the 
monopoly  of  his  particular  "  Object."  With  a  deeper  mean- 
ing, therefore,  than  he  intends  may  we  repeat,  "  The  pheno- 
mena of  conscience  as  a  dictate  avail  to  impress  the  ima- 
gination with  the  'picture  of  a  Supreme  Governor."  But 
criticism  here  is  positively  painful.  Let  it  be  enough  to 
say  that  those  of  us  who  do  not  already  believe  in  any 
such  particular  "  Object " — be  it  ghost,  shape,  demon,  or 
deity — are  strangers,  utter  and  complete,  to  any  such 
supernatural  pursuers.  The  fact,  therefore,  of  these  vari- 
ous religious  emotions  being  associated  with  conscience  in 
the  minds  of  theists,  can  in  itself  be  no  proof  of  Theism, 
seeing  that  it  is  the  theory  of  Theism  which  itself  engen- 
ders these  emotions ;  those  who  do  not  believe  in  this 
theory  experiencing  none  of  these  feelings  of  personal 
dread,  responsibility  to  an  unknown  God,  and  the  feelings 
of  doing  injury  to,  or  of  receiving  praise  from,  a  parent. 
To  such  of  us  the  violation  of  conscience  is  its  own  punish- 
ment, as  the  pursuit  of  virtue  is  its  own  reward.  For  we 
know  that  not  more  certainly  than  fire  will  burn,  any  viola- 
tion of  the  deeply-rooted  feelings  of  our  humanity  will 
leave  a  gaping  wound  which  even  time  may  not  always 
heal.  And  when  it  is  shown  us  that  our  natural  dread  of 
fire  is  due  to  a  supernatural  cause,  we  may  be  prepared  to 

c 


34  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE 

entertain  the  argument  tliat  our  natural  dread  of  sin,  as 
distinguished  from  our  dread  of  God,  is  likewise  due  to 
such  a  cause.  But  until  this  can  be  done  we  must,  as 
reasonable  men,  wliose  minds  have  heen  t^^ained  in  the  school 
of  nature,  forbear  to  allow  that  the  one  fact  is  of  any  greater 
cogency  than  the  other,  so  far  as  the  question  of  a  super- 
natural cause  of  either  is  concerned.  For,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  the  law  of  parcimony  forbids  us  to  ascribe  "  the 
phenomena  of  conscience  as  a  dictate  "  to  a  supernatural 
cause,  until  the  science  of  psychology  shall  have  proved  that 
they  cannot  have  been  due  to  natural  causes.  But,  as  we 
have  also  seen,  the  science  of  psychology  is  now  beginning, 
as  quick  and  thoroughly  as  can  be  expected,  to  prove  the 
very  converse ;  so  that  the  probability  is  now  overwhelm- 
ing that  our  moral  sense,  like  all  our  other  faculties,  has 
been  evolved.  Therefore,  while  the  burden  of  proof  really 
lies  on  the  side  of  Theism — or  with  those  who  account  for 
the  natural  phenomena  of  conscience  by  the  hypothesis  of 
a  supernatural  origin — this  burden  is  now  being  rapidly 
discharged  by  the  opposite  side.  That  is  to  say,  while  the 
proofs  which  are  now  beginning  to  substantiate  the  natu- 
ralistic hypothesis  are  all  in  full  accord  with  the  ordinary 
lines  of  scientific  explanations,  the  vague  and  feeble  re- 
flections of  those  who  still  maintain  that  Conscience  is  evi- 
dence of  Deity,  are  all  such  as  run  counter  to  the  very 
truisms  of  scientific  method. 

In  the  face  of  all  the  facts,  therefore,  I  find  it  impossible 
to  recognise  as  valid  any  inference  which  is  drawn  from 
the  existence  of  our  moral  sense  to  the  existence  of  a  God ; 
althous^h,  of  course,  all  inferences  drawn  from  the  exist- 
ence  of  our  moral  sense  to  the  character  of  a  God  already 
believed  to  exist  remain  unaffected  by  the  foregoing  con- 
siderations.i 

1  Throu.sjhout  these  considerations  the  erroneous   inferences  which   are 

I  have  confined  myself  to  the  positive  drawn  from  the  good  qualities  of  our 

side  of  the  subject.     My  argument  moral  nature,  I  thought  it  desirable, 

being  of  the  nature  of  a  criticism  on  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  not  to  bur- 


EXISTENCE  OF  THE  HUMAN  MIND. 


35 


den  that  argument  by  the  additional 
one  as  to  the  source  of  the  evil  quali- 
ties of  that  nature.  This  additional 
argument,  however,  will  be  found 
briefly  stated  at  the  close  of  my  sup- 
plementary essay  on  Professor  Flint's 
"  Theism."    On  reading  that  addi- 


tional argument,  I  think  that  any 
candid  and  unbiassed  mind  must  con- 
clude that,  alike  in  what  it  is  not 
as  well  as  in  what  it  is,  our  moral  na- 
ture points  to  a  natural  genesis,  as 
distinguished  from  a  supernatural 
cause. 


(     36    ) 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  DESIGN. 

^2^.  The  argument  from  Design,  as  presented  by  Mill,  is 
merely  a  resuscitation  of  it  as  presented  by  Paley.  True 
it  is  that  the  logical  penetration  of  the  former  enabled 
him  to  perceive  that  the  latter  had  "  put  the  case  much 
too  strongly ; "  although,  even  here,  he  has  failed  to  see 
wherein  Paley 's  error  consisted.  He  says  :— "  If  I  found 
a  watch  on  an  apparently  desolate  island,  I  should  indeed 
infer  that  it  had  been  left  there  by  a  human  being ;  but 
the  inference  would  not  be  from  the  marks  of  design,  but 
because  I  already  know  by  direct  experience  that  watches 
are  made  by  men."  Now  I  submit  that  this  misses  the 
whole  point  of  Paley's  meaning;  for  it  is  evident  that 
there  would  be  no  argument  at  all  unless  this  author  be 
understood  to  say  what  he  clearly  enough  expresses,  viz., 
that  the  evidence  of  design  supposed  to  be  afforded  by  the 
watch  is  supposed  to  be  afibrded  by  examination  of  its 
mechanism  only,  and  not  by  any  previous  knowledge  as 
to  how  that  particular  mechanism  called  a  watch  is  made. 
Paley,  I  take  it,  only  chose  a  watch  for  his  example  be- 
cause he  knew  that  no  reader  would  dispute  the  fact  that 
watches  are  constructed  by  design  :  except  for  the  purpose 
of  pointing  out  that  mechanism  is  in  some  cases  admitted 
to  be  due  to  intelligence,  for  all  the  other  purposes  of  his 
argument  he  might  as  well  have  chosen  for  his  illustration 
any  case  of  mechanism  occurring  in  nature.  What  the 
real  fallacy  in  Paley's  argument  is,  is  another  question, 
and  this  I  shall  now  endeavour  to  answer;  for,  as  Mill's 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  37 


argument  is  clearly  the  same  in  kind  as  that  of  Paley  and 
his  numberless  followers,  in  examining  the  one  I  am  also 
examining  the  other. 

§  24.  In  nature,  then,  we  see  innumerable  examples 
of  apparent  design :  are  these  of  equal  value  in  testifying 
to  the  presence  of  a  designing  intelligence  as  are  similar 
examples  of  human  contrivance,  and  if  not,  why  not  ? 
The  answer  to  the  first  of  these  questions  is  patent.  If 
such  examples  were  of  the  same  value  in  the  one  case  as 
they  are  in  the  other,  the  existence  of  a  Deity  would  be, 
as  Paley  appears  to  have  thought  it  was,  demonstrated  by 
the  fact.  A  brief  and  yet  satisfactory  answer  to  the 
second  question  is  not  so  easy,  and  we  may  best  approach 
it  by  assuming  the  existence  of  a  Deity.  If,  then,  there 
is  a  God,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  every  apparent 
contrivance  in  nature  is  an  actual  contrivance,  in  the 
same  sense  as  is  any  human  contrivance.  The  eye  of  a 
vertebrated  animal,  for  instance,  exhibits  as  much  ap- 
parent design  as  does  a  watch ;  but  no  one — at  the  present 
day,  at  least — will  undertake  to  affirm  that  the  evidence  of 
divine  thought  furnished  by  one  example  is  as  conclusive 
as  is  the  evidence  of  human  thought  furnished  by  the 
other — and  this  even  assuming  a  Deity  to  exist.  Why  is 
this  ?  The  reason,  I  think,  is,  that  we  know  by  our  per- 
sonal experience  what  are  our  own  relations  to  the  material 
world,  and  to  the  laws  which  preside  over  the  action  of 
physical  forces;  while  we  can  have  no  corresponding 
knowledge  of  the  relations  subsisting  between  the  Deity 
and  these  same  objects  of  our  own  experience.  Hence, 
to  suppose  that  the  Deity  constructed  the  eye  by  any 
such  process  of  thought  as  we  know  that  men  construct 
watches,  is  to  make  an  assumption  not  only  incapable  of 
proof,  but  destitute  of  any  assignable  degree  of  likeli- 
hood. Take  an  example.  The  relation  in  which  a  bee 
stands  to  the  external  world  is  to  a  large  extent  a  matter 
of  observation,  and,  therefore,  no  one  imagines  that  the 
formation  of  its  scientifically-constructed  cells  is  due  to 


38  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN. 

any  profound  study  on  tlie  bee's  part.  Whatever  the 
origin  of  the  cell-making  instinct  may  have  been,  its 
nature  is  certainly  not  the  same  as  it  would  have  been  in 
man,  supposing  him  to  have  had  occasion  to  construct 
honeycombs.  It  may  be  said  that  the  requisite  calcu- 
lations have  been  made  for  the  bees  by  the  Deity ;  but, 
even  if  this  assumption  were  true,  it  would  be  nothing  to 
the  point,  which  is  merely  that  even  within  the  limits  of 
the  animal  kingdom  the  relations  of  intelligence  to  the 
external  world  are  so  diverse,  that  the  same  results  may 
be  accomplished  by  totally  different  intellectual  processes. 
And  as  this  example  is  parallel  to  the  case  on  which  we 
are  engaged  in  everything  save  the  observability  of  the 
relations  involved,  it  supplies  us  with  the  exact  measure 
of  the  probability  we  are  trying  to  estimate.  Hence  it  is 
evident  that  so  long  as  we  remain  ignorant  of  the  element 
essential  to  the  argument  from  design  in  its  Paleyerian 
form — viz.,  knowledge  or  presumption  of  the  relations  sub- 
sisting between  an  hypothetical  Deity  and  his  creation — 
so  long  must  that  argument  remain,  not  only  unassignably 
weak,  but  incapable  of  being  strengthened  by  any  number 
of  examples  similar  in  kind. 

§  25.  To  put  the  case  in  another  way.  The  root  fallacy 
in  Paley's  argument  consisted  in  reasoning  from  a  parti- 
cular to  an  universal.  Because  he  knew  that  design  was 
the  cause  of  adaptation  in  some  cases,  and  because  the 
phenomena  of  life  exhibited  more  instances  of  adaptation 
than  any  other  class  of  phenomena  in  nature,  he  pointed 
to  these  phenomena  as  affording  an  exceptional  kind  of 
proof  of  the  presence  in  nature  of  intelligent  agency.  Yet, 
if  it  is  admitted — and  of  this,  even  in  Paley's  days,  there 
was  a  strong  analogical  presumption — that  the  phenomena 
of  life  are  throughout  their  history  as  much  subject  to  law 
as  are  any  other  phenomena  whatsoever, — that  the  method 
of  the  divine  government,  supposing  such  to  exist,  is  the 
same  here  as  elsewhere ;  then  nothing  can  be  clearer  than 
that  any  amount  of  observable  adaptation  of  means  to 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  39 

ends  within  this  class  of  phenomena  cannot  afford  any- 
different  kind  of  evidence  of  design  than  is  afforded  by 
any  other  class  of  phenomena  whatsoever.  Either  we 
know  the  relations  of  the  Deity  to  his  creation,  or  we  do 
not.  If  we  do,  then  we  must  know  whether  or  not  every 
physical  change  which  occurs  in  accordance  with  law — i.e.^ 
every  change  occurring  within  experience,  and  so,  until 
contrary  evidence  is  produced,  presumably  every  change 
occurring  beyond  experience — was  separately  planned  by 
the  Deity.  If  w^e  do  not,  then  we  have  no  more  reason  to 
suppose  that  any  one  set  of  physical  changes  rather  than 
another  has  been  separately  planned  by  him,  unless  we 
could  point  (as  Paley  virtually  pointed)  to  one  particular 
set  of  changes  and  assert.  These  are  not  subject  to  the 
same  method  of  divine  government  which  we  observe 
elsewhere,  or,  in  other  words,  to  law.  If  it  is  retorted  that 
in  some  way  or  other  all  these  wonderful  adaptations  must 
ultimately  have  been  due  to  intelligence,  this  is  merely  to 
shift  the  argument  to  a  ground  which  we  shall  presently 
have  to  consider :  all  we  are  now  engaged  upon  is  to  show 
that  we  have  no  right  to  found  arguments  on  the  assumed 
mode,  manner,  or  process  by  which  the  supposed  intelligence 
is  thought  to  have  operated.  We  can  here  see,  then,  more 
clearly  where  Paley  stumbled.  He  virtually  assumed  that 
the  relations  subsisting  between  the  Deity  and  the  uni- 
verse were  such,  that  the  exceptional  adaptations  met  with 
in  the  organised  part  of  the  latter  cannot  have  been  due 
to  the  same  intellectual  processes  as  was  the  rest  of  the 
universe— or  that,  if  they  were,  still  they  yielded  better 
evidence  of  having  been  due  to  these  processes  than  does 
the  rest  of  the  universe.  And  it  is  easy  to  perceive  that 
his  error  arose  from  his  pre-formed  belief  in  special  creation. 
So  long  as  a  man  regards  every  living  organism  which  he 
sees  as  the  lineal  descendant  of  a  precisely  similar  organ- 
ism originally  struck  out  by  the  immediate  fiat  of  Deity, 
so  long  is  he  justified  in  holding  his  axiom,  "  Contrivance 
must   have   had   a   contriver."      For  "  adaptation "   then 


40  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN. 

"becomes  to  our  minds  the  synonym  of  "  contrivance  " — it 
being  utterly  inconceivable  that  the  numberless  adaptations 
found  in  any  living  organism  could  have  resulted  in  any 
other  way  than  by  intelligent  contrivance,  at  the  time 
when  this  organism  was  in  the  first  instance  suddenly 
introduced  into  its  complex  conditions  of  life.  Still,  as 
an  argument,  this  is  of  course  merely  reasoning  in  a  circle  : 
we  adopt  a  hypothesis  which  presupposes  the  existence  of 
a  Deity  as  the  first  step  in  the  proof  of  his  existence.  I 
do  not  say  that  Paley  committed  this  error  expressly,  but 
merely  that  if  it  had  not  been  for  his  pre-formed  con- 
viction as  to  the  truth  of  the  special-creation  theory,  he 
would  probably  not  have  written  his  "  Natural  Theology." 
§  26.  Thus  let  us  take  a  case  of  his  own  choosing,  and 
the  one  which  is  adduced  by  him  as  typical  of  "  the 
application  of  the  argument."  "I  know  of  no  better 
method  of  introducing  so  large  a  subject  than  that  of 
comparing  a  single  thing  with  a  single  thing ;  an  eye,  for 
example,  with  a  telescope.  As  far  as  the  examination  of 
the  instrument  goes,  there  is  precisely  the  same  proof 
that  the  eye  was  made  for  vision  as  there  is  that  the 
telescope  was  made  for  assisting  it.  They  are  both  made 
upon  the  same  principles,  both  being  adjusted  to  the 
laws  by  which  the  transmission  and  refraction  of  rays  of 
light  are  regulated.  I  speak  not  of  the  origin  of  the  laws 
themselves ;  but  these  laws  being  fixed,  the  construction 
in  both  cases  is  adapted  to  them.  For  instance:  these 
laws  require,  in  order  to  produce  the  same  effect,  that  the 
rays  of  light,  in  passing  through  water  into  the  eye, 
should  be  refracted  by  a  more  convex  surface  than  when 
it  passes  out  of  air  into  the  eye.  Accordingly  we  find 
that  the  eye  of  a  fish,  in  that  part  of  it  called  the  crystal- 
line lens,  is  much  rounder  than  the  eye  of  terrestrial 
animals.  What  plainer  manifestation  of  design  can  there 
be  than  this  difference  ? "  But  what,  let  us  ask,  is  the 
proximate  cause  of  this  difference?  'The  immediate 
volition   of   the    Deity,    manifested  in  special   creation,' 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  41 

virtually  answers  Paley;  while  we  of  to-day  are  able  to 
reply,  '  The  agency  of  natural  laws,  to  wit,  inheritance, 
variation,  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  probably  of  other 
laws  as  yet  not  discovered.'  Now,  of  course,  according  to 
the  former  of  these  two  premises,  there  can  be  no  more 
legitimate  conclusion  than  that  the  difference  in  question 
is  due  to  intelligent  and  special  design ;  but,  according  to 
the  other  premise,  it  is  equally  clear  that  no  conclusion 
can  be  more  unwarranted ;  for,  under  the  latter  view,  the 
greater  rotundity  of  the  crystalline  lens  in  a  fish's  eye 
no  more  exhibits  the  presence  of  any  special  design  than 
does  the  adaptation  of  a  river  to  the  bed  which  it  has 
itself  been  the  means  of  excavating.  When,  therefore, 
Paley  goes  on  to  ask: — "How  is  it  possible,  under  cir- 
cumstances of  such  close  affinity,  and  under  the  opera- 
tion of  equal  evidence,  to  exclude  contrivance  from  the 
case  of  the  eye,  yet  to  acknowledge  the  proof  of  contriv- 
ance having  been  employed,  as  the  plainest  and  clearest  of 
all  propositions,  in  the  case  of  the  telescope  ? "  the  answer 
is  sufficiently  obvious,  namely,  that  the  "  evidence  "  in  the 
two  cases  is  not  "  equal ; " — any  more  than  is  the  existence, 
say,  of  the  Nile  of  equal  value  in  point  of  evidence  that 
it  was  designed  for  traffic,  as  is  the  existence  of  the  Suez 
Canal  that  it  was  so  designed.  And  the  mere  fact  that 
the  problem  of  achromatism  was  solved  by  "the  mind  of 
a  sagacious  optician  inquiring  how  this  matter  was 
managed  in  the  eye,"  no  more  proves  that  "  this  could  not 
be  in  the  eye  without  purpose,  which  suggested  to  the 
optician  the  only  effectual  means  of  attaining  that  pur- 
pose," than  would  the  fact,  say,  of  the  winnowing  of  corn 
having  suggested  the  fanning-machine  prove  that  air 
currents  were  designed  for  the  purpose  of  eliminating 
chaff  from  grain.  In  short,  the  real  substance  of  the 
argument  from  Design  must  eventually  merge  into  that 
which  Paley,  in  the  above-quoted  passage,  expressly  passes 
over — viz.,  "  the  origin  of  the  laws  themselves ; "  for  so 
long  as  there  is  any  reason  to  suppose  that  any  apparent 


42  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN. 

"  adaptation "  to  a  certain  set  of  "  fixed  laws  "  is  itself 
due  to  the  influence  of  other  "  fixed  laws,"  so  long  have 
we  as  little  right  to  say  that  the  latter  set  of  fixed  laws 
exhibit  any  better  indications  of  intelligent  adaptation  to 
the  former  set,  than  the  former  do  to  that  of  the  latter — 
the  eye  to  light,  than  light  to  the  eye.  Hence  I  conceive 
that  Mill  is  entirely  wrong  when  he  says  of  Paley's 
argument,  "  It  surpasses  analogy  exactly  as  induction 
surpasses  it,"  because  "  the  instances  chosen  are  particular 
instances  of  a  circumstance  which  experience  shows  to 
have  a  real  connection  with  an  intellierent  origin — the  fact 
of  conspiring  to  an  end."  Experience  shows  us  this,  but 
it  shows  us  more  besides ;  it  shows  us  that  there  is  no 
necessary  or  uniform  connection  between  an  "intelligent 
origin  "  and  the  fact  of  apparent  "  means  conspiring  to  an 
[apparent]  end."  If  the  reader  will  take  the  trouble  to 
compare  this  quotation  just  made  from  Mill,  and  the  long 
train  of  reasoning  that  follows,  with  an  admirable  illustra- 
tion in  Mr.  Wallace's  "  Natural  Selection,"  he  will  be  well 
rewarded  by  finding  all  the  steps  in  Mr.  Mill's  reasoning 
so  closely  paralleled  by  the  caricature,  that  but  for  the 
respective  dates  of  publication,  one  might  have  thought 
the  latter  had  an  express  reference  to  the  former.i  True, 
Mr.  Mill  closes  his  argument  with  a  brief  allusion  to  the 
"  principle  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,"  observing  that 
"  creative  forethought  is  not  absolutely  the  only  link  by 
which  the  origin  of  the  wonderful  mechanism  of  the  eye 
may  be  connected  with  the  fact  of  sight."  I  am  surprised, 
however,  that  a  man  of  Mr.  Mill's  penetration  did  not  see 
that  whatever  view  we  may  take  as  to  "  the  adequacy  of 
this  principle  {i.e.,  Natural  Selection)  to  account  for  such 
truly  admirable  combinations  as  some  of  those  in  nature," 
the  argument  from  Design  is  not  materially  affected.     So 

1  The  illustration  to  whicli  I  refer  occupy  the  lowest  grounds,  and  get 

is  that  of  the  watershed  of  a  country  broader  and  deeper  as  they  advance  ; 

being  precisely  adapted  to  draining  pebbles,  gravel,  and  sand  all  occupy 

purposes.     The  rivers   just  fit  their  the  best  teleological  situations,  &c., 

own    particular    beds:     the    latter  &c. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  43 

far  as  this  argument  is  concerned,  the  issue  is  not  Design 
mrsus  Natural  Selection,  but  it  is  Design  mrsus  Natural 
Law.  By  all  means,  "  leaving  this  remarkable  speculation 
{i.e.,  Mr.  Darwin's)  to  whatever  fate  the  progress  of  dis- 
covery may  have  in  store  for  it,"  and  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  "in  the  present  state  of  knowledge  the 
adaptations  in  nature  afford  a  large  balance  of  probability 
in  favour  of  creation  by  intelligence."  For  whatever  we 
may  think  of  this  special  theory  as  to  the  mode,,  there  can 
be  no  longer  any  reasonable  doubt,  "  in  the  present  state  of 
our  knowledge,"  as  to  the  truth  of  the  general  theory  of 
Evolution  ;  and  the  latter,  if  accepted,  is  as  destructive  to 
the  argument  from  Design  as  would  the  former  be  if 
proved.  In  a  word,  it  is  the  fad  and  not  the  method  of 
Evolution  which  is  subversive  of  Teleology  in  its  Paley- 
erian  form. 

§  27.  We  have  come  then  to  this: — Apparent  intel- 
lectual adaptations  are  perfectly  valid  indications  of 
design,  so  long  as  their  authorship  is  known  to  be 
confined  to  human  intelligence;  for  then  we  know 
from  experience  what  are  our  relations  to  these  laws, 
and  so  in  any  given  case  can  argue  a  posteriori  that 
such  an  adaptation  to  such  a  set  of  laws  by  such  an 
intelligence  can  only  have  been  due  to  such  a  process. 
But  when  we  overstep  the  limits  of  experience,  we  are 
not  entitled  to  argue  anything  a  priori  of  any  other 
intelHgence  in  this  respect,  even  supposing  any  such 
intelligence  to  exist.  The  analogy  by  which  the  unknown 
relations  are  inferred  from  the  known  is  "infinitely 
precarious  ; "  seeing  that  two  of  the  analogous  terms — to 
wit,  the  divine  intelligence  and  the  human — may  differ 
to  an  immeasurable  extent  in  their  properties — nay,  are 
supposed  thus  to  differ,  the  one  being  supposed  omniscient, 
omnipotent,  &c.,  and  the  other  not.  And,  as  a  final  step, 
we  may  now  see  that  the  argument  from  Design,  in  its  last 
resort,  resolves  itself  into  a  petitio  principii.  For,  ulti- 
mately, the  only  point  which  the  analogical  argument  in 


44  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN. 

question  is  adduced  to  prove  is,  that  the  relations  subsist- 
ing between  an  Unknown  Cause  and  certain  physical 
forces  are  so  far  identical  with  the  relations  known  to 
subsist  between  human  intelligence  and  these  same  forces, 
that  similar  intellectual  processes  are  required  in  the  two 
cases  to  account  for  the  production  of  similar  effects — and 
hence  that  the  Unknown  Cause  is  intelligent.  But  it  is 
evident  that  the  analogy  itself  can  have  no  existence, 
except  upon  the  presupposition  that  these  two  sets  of 
relations  are  thus  identical.  The  point  which  the  analogy 
is  adduced  to  prove  is  therefore  postulated  by  the  fact  of 
its  being  adduced  at  all,  and  the  whole  argument  resolves 
itself  into  a  case  of  petitio  principii. 


(    45     ) 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  ARGUMENT   FROM   GENERAL   LAWS. 

§  28.  Turning  now  to  an  important  error  of  Mr. 
Mill's  in  respect  of  omission,  I  firmly  believe  that  all 
competent  writers  who  have  ever  undertaken  to  support 
the  argument  from  Design,  have  been  moved  to  do  so  by 
their  instinctive  appreciation  of  the  much  more  important 
argument,  which  Mill  does  not  mention  at  all  and  which 
we  now  proceed  to  consider — the  argument  from  General 
Laws.  That  is  to  say,  I  cannot  think  that  any  one  compe- 
tent writer  ever  seriously  believed,  had  he  taken  time  to 
analyse  his  beliefs,  that  the  cogency  of  his  argument 
lay  in  assuming  any  knowledge  concerning  the  process  of 
divine  thought ;  he  must  have  really  believed  that  it  lay 
entirely  in  his  observation  of  the  product  of  divine  thought 
— or  rather,  let  us  say,  of  divine  intelligence,  Now  this 
is  the  whole  difference  between  the  argument  from  Design 
and  the  argument  from  General  Laws.  The  argument 
from  Design  says.  There  must  be  a  God,  because  such  and 
such  an  organic  structure  must  have  been  due  to  such  and 
such  an  intellectual  process.  The  argument  from  General 
Laws  says.  There  must  be  a  God,  because  such  and  such  an 
organic  structure  must  in  some  way  or  other  have  heen  ulti- 
mately dice  to  intelligence.  Nor  does  this  argument  end 
here.  Not  only  must  such  and  such  an  organic  structure 
have  been  ultimately  due  to  intelligence,  but  every  such 
structure — nay,  every  phenomenon  in  the  universe — must 
have  been  the  same ;  for  all  phenomena  are  alike  subject  to 
the  same  method  of  sequence.     The  argument  is  thus  a 


46       THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  VVS. 

cumulative  one ;  for  as  there  is  no  single  known  exception  to 
this  universal  mode  of  existence,  the  united  effect  of  so  vast 
a  body  of  evidence  is  all  but  irresistible,  and  its  tendency 
is  clearly  to  point  us  to  some  one  explanatory  cause.     The 
scope  of  this  argument  is  therefore  co-extensive  with  the 
universe ;  it  draws  alike  upon  all  phenomena  with  which 
experience  is  acquainted.     For  instance,  it  contains  all  the 
phenomena  covered  by  the  Design  argument,  just  as  a  genus 
contains  any  one  of  its  species ;  it  being  manifest,  from  what 
was  said  in  the  last  section,  that  if  the  general  doctrine  of 
Evolution  is  accepted,  the  argument  from  Design  must  of 
necessity  merge  into  that  from  General  Laws.     And  this 
wide  basis,  we  may  be  sure,  must  be  the  most  legitimate 
one  whereon  to  rest  an  argument  in  favour  of  Theism.     If 
there  is  any  such  thing  as  such  an  argument  at  all,  the 
most  unassailable  field  for  its  display  must  be  the  universe 
as  a  whole,  seeing  that  if  we  separate  any  one  section  of 
the  universe  from   the   rest,  and  suppose  that  we  here 
discover  a  different  kind  of  testimony  to  intelligence  from 
that  which   we   can   discover   elsewhere,   we  may  from 
analogy  be  abundantly  sure  that  on  the  confines  of  our 
division  there  must  be  second  causes  and  general  laws  at 
work  (whether  discoverable  or  not),  which  are  the  imme- 
diate agents  in  the  production  of  the   observed  results. 
Of  course  I  do  not  deny  that  some  classes  of  phenomena 
afford  us  more  and  better  proofs  of  intellectual  agency 
than  do  others,  in  the  sense  of  the  laws  in  operation  being 
more  numerous,  subtle,  and  complex ;  but  it  will  be  seen 
that  this  is  a  different  interpretation  of  the  evidence  from 
that  against  which  I  am  contending.     Thus,  if  there  are 
tokens  of  divine  intention  (as  distinguished  from  design) 
to  be  met  with  in  the  eye, — if  it  is  inconceivable  that  so 
"  nice   and  intricate  a  structure "  should  exist  without 
intelligence  as  its  ultimate  cause ;  then  the  discovery  of 
natural  selection,  or  of  any  other  law,  as  the  manner  in 
which  this  intelligence  wrought  in  no  wise  attenuates  the 
proof  as  to  the  fact  of  an  intelligent  cause.     On  the  con- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS.       47 

trary,  it  tends  rather  to  confirm  it ;  for,  besides  the  evidence 
before  existing,  there  is  added  that  which  arises  from  the 
conformity  of  the  method  to  that  which  is  observable  in 
the  rest  of  the  universe. 

Thus,  notwithstanding  what  Hamilton,  Chalmers,  and 
others  have  said,  I  cannot  but  feel  that  the  ubiquitous 
action  of  general  laws  is,  of  all  facts  supplied  by  experi- 
ence, the  most  cogent  in  its  bearing  upon  teleology.  If 
perpetual  and  uninterrupted  uniformity  of  method  does 
not  indicate  the  existence  of  a  presiding  intelligence,  it 
becomes  a  question  whether  any  other  kind  of  method 
— short  of  the  intelligently  miraculous — could  possibly  do 
so;  seeing  that  the  further  the  divine  modus  operandi 
(supposing  such  to  exist)  were  removed  from  absolute 
uniformity,  the  greater  would  be  the  room  for  our 
interpreting  it  as  mere  fortuity.  But  forasmuch  as  the 
progress  of  science  has  shown  that  within  experience  the 
method  of  the  Supreme  Causality  is  absolutely  uniform, 
the  hypothesis  of  fortuity  is  rendered  irrational ;  and  let 
us  think  of  this  Supreme  Causality  as  we  may,  the  fact 
remains  that  from  it  there  emanates  a  directive  influence 
of  uninterrupted  consistency,  on  a  scale  of  stupendous 
magnitude  and  exact  precision,  worthy  of  our  highest 
possible  conceptions  of  Deity. 

§  29.  Had  it  been  my  lot  to  have  lived  in  the  last 
generation,  I  doubt  not  that  I  should  have  regarded  the 
foregoing  considerations  as  final :  I  should  have  concluded 
that  there  was  an  overwhelming  balance  of  rational  pro- 
bability in  favour  of  Theism ;  and  I  think  I  should  also 
have  insisted  that  this  balance  of  rational  probability 
would  require  to  continue  as  it  was  till  the  end  of  time.  I 
should  have  maintained,  in  some  such  words  as  the  follow- 
ing, in  which  the  Eev.  Baden  Powell  convej^s  this  argu- 
ment : — ''  The  very  essence  of  the  whole  argument  is  the 
invariable  preservation  of  the  principle  of  order:  not 
necessarily  such  as  we  can  directly  recognise,  but  the 
universal  conviction   of  the   unfaiKng   subordination   of 


48       THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS. 

everything  to  some  grand  principles  of  laio,  however  im- 
perfectly apprehended  in  our  partial  conceptions,  and  the 
successive  subordination  of  such  laws  to  others  of  still 
higher  generality,  to  an  extent  transcending  our  concep- 
tions, and  constituting  the  true  chain  of  universal  causa- 
tion which  culminates  in  the  sublime  conception  of  the 
Cosmos. 

''  It  is  in  immediate  connection  with  this  enlarged  view 

o 

of  universal  immutable  natural  order  that  I  have  regarded 
the  narrow  notions  of  those  who  obscure  the  sublime  pros- 
pect by  imagining  so  unworthy  an  idea  as  that  of  occa- 
sional interruptions  in  the  physical  economy  of  the  world. 

"  The  only  instance  considered  was  that  of  the  alleged 
sudden  supernatural  origination  of  new  species  of  organised 
beings  in  remote  geological  epochs.  It  is  in  relation  to 
the  broad  principle  of  law,  if  once  rightly  apprehended, 
that  such  inferences  are  seen  to  be  wholly  unwarranted 
by  science,  and  such  fancies  utterly  derogatory  and  in- 
admissible in  philosophy ;  while,  even  in  those  instances 
properly  understood,  the  real  scientific  conclusions  of  the 
invariable  and  indissoluble  chain  of  causation  stand  vindi- 
cated in  the  sublime  contemplations  with  which  they  are 
thus  associated. 

"  To  a  correct  apprehension  of  the  whole  argument,  the 
one  essential  requisite  is  to  have  obtained  a  complete  and 
satisfactory  grasp  of  this  one,  grand  'principle  of  law  per- 
vading nature,  or  rather  constituting  the  very  idea  of 
nature; — which  forms  the  vital  essence  of  the  whole  of 
inductive  science,  and  the  sole  assurance  of  those  higher 
inferences  from  the  inductive  study  of  natural  causes 
which  are  the  vindications  of  a  supreme  intelligence  and 
a  moral  cause. 

"  TJie  whole  of  the  ensuing  discussion  must  stand  'or  fall 
with  the  admission  of  this  grand  principle.  Those  who  are 
not  prepared  to  embrace  it  in  its  full  extent  may  probably 
not  accept  the  conclusions ;  but  they  must  be  sent  back 
to  the  school  of  inductive  science,  where  alone  it  must  be 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS.       49 

independently  imbibed  and  thoroughly  assimilated  with 
the  mind  of  the  student  in  the  first  instance. 

"  On  the  slightest  consideration  of  the  nature,  the 
foundations,  and  general  results  of  inductive  science,  .  .  . 
we  recognise  the  powers  of  intellect  fitly  employed  in  the 
study  of  nature,  .  .  .  pre-eminently  leading  us  to  per- 
ceive in  nature,  and  in  the  invariable  and  universal 
constancy  of  its  laws,  the  indications  of  universal,  un- 
changeable, and  recondite  arrangement,  dependence,  and 
connection  in  reason.  .  .  . 

"  We  thus  see  the  importance  of  taking  a  more  enlarged 
view  of  the  great  argument  of  natural  theology ;  and  the 
necessity  for  so  doing  becomes  the  more  apparent  when 
we  reflect  on  the  injury  to  which  these  sublime  inferences 
are  exposed  from  the  narrow  and  unworthy  form  in  which 
the  reasoning  has  been  too  often  conducted.  .  .  . 

"  The  satisfactory  view  of  the  whole  case  can  only  be 
found  in  those  more  enlarged  conceptions  which  are 
furnished  by  the  grand  contemplation  of  cosmical  order 
and  unity,  and  which  do  not  refer  to  inferences  from  the 
'past,  but  to  proofs  of  the  ever-present  mind  and  reason  in 
nature. 

"  If  we  read  a  book  which  it  requires  much  thought  and 
exercise  of  reason  to  understand,  but  which  we  find  dis- 
closes more  and  more  truth  and  reason  as  we  proceed  in 
the  study,  and  contains  clearly  more  than  we  can  at 
present  comprehend,  then  undeniably  we  properly  say 
that  thought  and  reason  exist  in  that  look  irrespectively  of 
our  minds,  and  equally  so  of  any  question  as  to  its  author 
or  origin.  Such  a  book  confessedly  exists,  and  is  ever 
open  to  us  in  the  natural  world.  Or,  to  put  the  case 
under  a  slightly  different  form: — When  the  astronomer, 
the  physicist,  the  geologist,  or  the  naturalist  notes  down 
a  series  of  observed  facts  or  measured  dates,  he  is  not  an 
author  expressing  his  own  ideas, — he  is  a  mere  amanuensis 
taking  down  the  dictations  of  nature :  his  observation 
book  is  the  record  of  the  thoughts  of  another  mind :  he 

D 


so       THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS. 

has  but  set  down  literally  what  he  himself  does  not  under- 
stand, or  only  very  imperfectly.  On  further  examination, 
and  after  deep  and  anxious  study,  he  perhaps  begins  to 
decipher  the  meaning,  by  perceiving  some  law  which  gives 
a  signification  to  the  facts ;  and  the  further  he  pursues  the 
investigation  up  to  any  more  comprehensive  theory,  the 
more  fully  he  perceives  that  there  is  a  higher  reason,  of 
which  his  own  is  but  the  humbler  interpreter,  and  into 
whose  depths  he  may  penetrate  continually  further,  to  dis- 
cover yet  more  profound  and  invariable  order  and  system, 
always  indicating  still  deeper  and  more  hidden  abysses 
yet  unfathomed,  but  throughout  which  he  is  assured  the 
same  recondite  and  immutable  arrangement  ever  prevails. 
"  That  which  requires  thought  and  reason  to  understand 
must  be  itself  thought  and  reason.  That  which  mind 
alone  can  investigate  or  express  must  be  itself  mind. 
And  if  the  highest  conception  attained  is  but  partial,  then 
the  mind  and  reason  studied  is  greater  than  the  mind  and 
reason  of  the  student.  If  the  more  it  be  studied  the  more 
vast  and  complex  is  the  necessary  connection  in  reason 
disclosed,  then  the  more  evident  is  the  vast  extent  and 
compass  of  the  intelligence  thus  partially  manifested,  and 
its  reality,  as  existing  in  the  immutably  connected  order  of 
ohjects  examined,  independently  of  the  mind  of  the  investi- 


gator. 


"  But  considerations  of  this  kind,  just  and  transcen- 
dently  important  as  they  are  in  themselves,  give  us  no  aid 
in  any  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  the  order  of  things  thus 
investigated,  or  the  nature  or  other  attributes  of  the  mind 
evinced  in  them. 

"  The  real  argument  for  universal  intelligence,  manifested 
in  the  universality  of  order  and  law  in  the  material  world, 
is  very  different  from  any  attempt  to  give  a  form  to  our 
conceptions,  even  by  the  language  of  analogy,  as  to  the 
nature  or  mode  of  existence  or  operation  of  that  intelligence 
[i.e.,  as  I  have  stated  the  case,  the  argument  can  only  rest 
on  a  study  of  the  products,  as  distinguished  from  the  _2?ro- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS.        5 1 

cesses  of  such  intelligence]  :  and  still  more  different  from 
any  extension  of  our  inference  from  what  is  to  what  may 
have  heen,  from  present  order  to  a  supposed  origination, 
first  adjustment,  or  planning  of  that  order. 

"  By  keeping  these  distinctions  steadily  in  view,  we 
appreciate  properly  both  the  limits  and  the  extent  and 
compass    of    what    we    may   appropriately    call    COSMO- 

THEOLOGY."  ^ 

I  have  quoted  these  passages  at  length,  because  they 
convey  in  a  more  forcible,  guarded,  and  accurate  manner 
than  any  others  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  the 
strictly  rational  standing  of  this  great  subject  prior  to 
the  date  at  which  the  above-quoted  passage  was  written. 
Therefore,  as  I  have  said,  if  it  had  been  my  lot  to  have 
lived  in  the  last  generation,  I  should  certainly  have  rested 
in  these  "sublime  conceptions"  as  in  an  argument  supreme 
and  irrefutable.  I  should  have  felt  that  the  progress  of 
physical  knowledge  could  never  exert  any  other  influence 
on  Theism  than  that  of  ever  tending  more  and  more  to  con- 
firm that  magnificent  belief,  by  continuously  expanding  our 
human  thoughts  into  progressively  advancing  conceptions, 
ever  grander  and  yet  more  grand,  of  that  tremendous  Origin 
of  Things — the  Mind  of  God.  Such  would  have  been  my 
hope — such  would  have  been  my  prayer.  But  now,  how 
changed !  Never  in  the  history  of  man  has  so  terrific  a 
calamity  befallen  the  race  as  that  which  all  who  look 
may  now  behold  advancing  as  a  deluge,  black  with  de- 
struction, resistless  in  might,  uprooting  our  most  cherished 
hopes,  engulfing  our  most  precious  creed,  and  burying  our 
highest  life  in  mindless  desolation.  Science,  whom  erst- 
while we  thought  a  very  Angel  of  God,  pointing  to  that 
great  barrier  of  Law,  and  proclaiming  to  the  restless  sea  of 
changing  doubt, "  Hitherto  shalt  thou  come,  but  no  further, 
and  here  shall  thy  proud  waves  be  stayed," — even  Science 
has  now  herself  thrown  down  this  trusted  barrier;  the 

1  "  Order  of  Nature,"  by  tlie  Eev.  Badeu  Powell,  M.A.,  F.E.S.,  &c.,  1859, 
pp.  228-241. 


52        THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS. 

flood-gates  of  infidelity  are  open,  and  Atheism  overwhelm- 
ing is  upon  us. 

§  30.  All  and  every  law  follows  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence from  the  persistence  of  force  and  the  primary 
qualities  of  matter.  1  That  this  must  be  so  is  evident  if 
we  consider  that,  were  it  not  so,  force  could  not  be  per- 
manent nor  matter  constant.  For  instance,  if  action  and 
reaction  were  not  invariably  equal  and  opposite,  force 
would  not  be  invariably  persistent,  seeing  that  in  no  case 
can  the  formula  fail,  unless  some  one  or  other  of  the  forces 
concerned,  or  parts  of  them,  disappear.  And  as  with  a 
simple  law  of  this  kind,  so  with  every  other  natural  law 
and  inter-operation  of  laws,  howsoever  complex  such  inter- 
operation  may  be ;  for  it  is  manifest  that  if  in  any  case 
similar  antecedents  did  not  determine  similar  consequents, 
on  one  or  other  of  these  occasions  some  quantum  of  force, 
or  of  matter,  or  of  both,  must  have  disappeared — or,  which 
is  the  same  thing,  the  law  of  causation  cannot  have  been 
constant.  Every  natural  law,  therefore,  may  be  defined 
as  the  formula  of  a  sequence,  which  must  either  ensue 
upon  certain  forces  of  a  given  intensity  impinging  upon 
certain  given  quantities,  kinds,  and  forms  of  matter,  or 

1 1  think  it  desirable  to  state  that  I  in  a  discussion  of  this  kind,  provided 
perceived  this  great  truth  before  I  was  that  the  terms  are  universally  under- 
aware  that  it  had  been  perceived  also  stood  to  mean  what  they  are  intended 
by  Mr.  Spencer.  His  statement  of  to  mean ;  and  I  think  that  the  sig- 
it  now  occurs  in  the  short  chapter  nification  which  Mr.  Spencer  attaches 
oi  First  Principles  entitled  "Rela-  to  his  term,  "  persistence  of  force,"  is 
tions  between  Forces."  So  far  as  I  sufficiently  precise.  Therefore,  adopt- 
am  able  to  ascertain,  no  one  has  ing  his  usage,  whenever  throughout 
hitherto  considered  this  important  the  following  pages  I  speak  of  force  as 
doctrine  in  its  immediate  relation  to  persisting,  what  I  intend  to  be  un- 
the  question  of  Theism.  derstood  is,  that  there  is  a  something 

In  using  the  term  "  persistence  of  —call    it    force,   or   energy,    or  x — 

force,"  I  am  aware  that  I  am  using  which,  so  far  as  experience  or  imagi- 

a    term    which    is    not    unopen    to  nation  can  extend,  is,  in  its  relation 

criticism.       But    as    Mr.     Spencer's  to  us,  ubiquitous  and  illimitable  ;  or, 

writings  have  brought  this  term  into  in  other  words,   that  it   universally 

such  general  use  among  speculative  presents  the  property  of  permanence, 

thinkers,  it  seemed  to  me  undesirable  (See,  for  a  more  detailed  explanation, 

to  modify  it.     Questions  of  mere  ter-  supplementary  essay  "  On  the  Final 

minology  are  without  any  importance  Mystery  of  Things.") 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS.       53 

else,  by  not  ensuing,  prove  that  the  force  or  the  matter 
concerned  were  not  of  a  permanent  nature. 

§  31.  The  argument,  then,  which  was  elaborated  in 
§  29,  and  which  has  so  long  and  so  generally  received 
the  popular  sanction  in  the  common-sense  epitome, 
that  in  the  last  record  there  must  be  mind  in  external 
nature,  since  "  that  which  it  requires  thought  and  reason 
to  understand  must  itself  be  thought  and  reason," — this 
argument,  I  say,  must  now  for  ever  be  abandoned  by 
reasonable  men.  No  doubt  it  would  be  easy  to  point  to 
several  speculative  thinkers  who  have  previously  com- 
bated this  argument,^  and  from  this  fact  some  readers  will 
perhaps  be  inclined  to  judge,  from  a  false  analogy,  that  as 
the  argument  in  question  has  withstood  previous  assaults, 
it  need  not  necessarily  succumb  to  the  present  one.  Be 
it  observed,  however,  that  the  present  assault  differs  from 
all  previous  assaults,  just  as  demonstration  diffiers  from 
speculation.  What  has  hitherto  been  but  mere  guess  and 
unwarrantable  assertion  has  now  become  a  matter  of  the 
greatest  certainty.  That  the  argument  from  General  Laws 
is  a  futile  argument,  is  no  longer  a  matter  of  unverifiable 
opinion :  it  is  as  sure  as  is  the  most  fundamental  axiom  of 
science.  That  the  argument  will  long  remain  in  illogical 
minds,  I  doubt  not ;  but  that  it  is  from  henceforth  quite 
inadmissible  in  accurate  thinking,  there  can  be  no  ques- 
tion. For  the  sake,  however,  of  impressing  this  fact  still 
more  strongly  upon  such  readers  as  have  been  accustomed 
to  rely  upon  this  argument,  and  so  find  it  difficult  thus 

1  Hamilton  may  here  be  especially  the  opi^ortunity  of  alluding  to  this 
noticed,  because  he  went  so  far  as  to  remarkable  feature  in  Sir  William 
maintain  that  the  phenomena  of  the  Hamilton's  philosophy,  showing  as 
external  world,  taken  by  themselves,  it  does  that  same  prophetic  fore- 
would  ground  a  valid  argument  to  stalling  of  the  results  which  have 
the  negation  of  God.  Although  I  since  followed  from  the  discovery  of 
cannot  but  think  that  this  position  the  conservation  of  energy,  as  was 
was  a  conspicuously  irrational  one  shown  by  his  no  less  remarkable 
for  any  competent  thinker  to  occupy  theory  of  causation.  (See  supplemen- 
before  the  scientific  doctrine  of  the  tary  essay  "  On  the  Final  Mystery  of 
correlation  of  the  forces  had  been  Things.") 
enunciated,  nevertheless  I  cannot  lose 


54        THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS. 

abruptly  to  reverse  the  whole  current  of  their  thoughts, 
— for  the  sake  of  such,  I  shall  here  add  a  few  remarks  with 
the  view  of  facilitating  the  conception  of  an  universal 
Order  existing  independently  of  Mind. 

§  32.  Interpreting  the  mazy  nexus  of  phenomena  only 
by  the  facts  which  science  has  revealed,  and  what  con- 
clusion are  we  driven  to  accept?  Clearly,  looking  to 
vdiat  has  been  said  in  the  last  two  sections,  that  from  the 
time  when  the  process  of  evolution  first  began, — from  the 
time  before  the  condensation  of  the  nebula  had  showed 
any  signs  of  commencing, — every  subsequent  change  or 
event  of  evolution  was  necessarily  hound  to  ensue;  else 
force  and  matter  have  not  been  persistent.  How  then, 
it  will  be  asked,  did  the  vast  nexus  of  natural  laws 
which  is  now  observable  ever  begin  or  continue  to  be  ? 
In  this  way.  When  the  first  womb  of  things  was  preg- 
nant with  all  the  future,  there  would  probably  have  been 
existent  at  any  rate  not  more  than  one  of  the  formulae 
which  we  now  call  natural  laws.  This  one  law,  of  course, 
would  have  been  the  law  of  gravitation.  Here  we  may 
take  our  stand.  It  does  not  signify  whether  there  ever 
was  a  time  when  gravitation  was  not, — i.e.,  if  ever  there 
was  a  time  when  matter,  as  we  noiv  know  it,  was  not  in  ex- 
istence ; — for  if  there  ever  was  such  a  time,  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt,  but  every  reason  to  conclude,  that  the 
evolution  of  matter,  as  we  now  know  it,  was  accomplished 
in  accordance  with  law.  Similarly,  we  are  not  concerned 
with  the  question  as  to  how  the  law  of  gravitation  came 
to  be  associated  with  matter;  for  it  is  overwhelmingly 
probable,  from  the  extent  of  the  analogy,  that  if  our  know- 
ledge concerning  molecular  physics  were  sufficiently  great, 
the  existence  of  the  law  in  question  would  be  found  to 
follow  as  a  necessary  deduction  from  the  primary  qualities 
of  matter  and  force,  just  as  we  can  now  see  that,  when 
present,  its  peculiar  quantitative  action  necessarily  follows 
from  the  primary  qualities  of  space. 

Starting,  then,  with  these  data,— matter,  force,  and  the 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS.       55 

law  of  gravitation, — what  must"  happen  ?  We  have  the 
strongest  scientific  reason  to  believe  that  the  matter  of 
the  solar  system  primordially  existed  in  a  highly  diffused 
or  nebulous  form.  By  mutual  gravitation,  therefore,  all 
the  substance  of  the  nebula  must  have  begun  to  concen- 
trate upon  itself,  or  to  condense.  Now,  from  this  point 
onwards,  I  wish  it  to  be  clearly  understood  that  the  mere 
consideration  of  the  supposed  facts  not  admitting  of 
scientific  proof,  or  of  scientific  explanation  if  true,  in  no 
wise  affects  the  certainty  of  the  doctrine  which  these 
facts  are  here  adduced  to  establish.  Fully  granting  that 
the  alleged  facts  are  not  beyond  dispute,  and  that,  even 
if  true,  innumerable  other  unknown  and  unknowable  facts 
must  have  been  associated  with  them — fully  admitting, 
in  short,  that  our  ideas  concerning  the  genesis  of  the  solar 
system  are  of  the  crudest  and  least  trustworthy  character ; 
still,  if  it  be  admitted,  what  at  the  present  day  only 
ignorance  or  prejudice  can  deny,  viz.,  that,  as  a  whole, 
evolution  has  been  the  method  of  the  universe ;  then  it 
follows  that  the  doctrine  here  contended  for  is  as  certainly 
true  as  it  would  be  were  we  fully  acquainted  with  every 
cause  and  every  change  which  has  acted  and  ensued 
throughout  the  whole  process  of  the  genesis  of  things. 

ISTow,  bearing  this  caveat  in  mind,  we  have  next  to  ob- 
serve that  when  once  the  nebula  began  to  condense,  new 
relations  among  its  constituent  parts  would,  for  this  reason, 
begin  to  be  established.  "  Given  a  rare  and  widely  dif- 
fused mass  of  nebulous  matter,  .  .  .  what. are  the  suc- 
cessive changes  that  will  take  place  ?  Mutual  gravita- 
tion will  approximate  its'^atoms,  but  their  approximation 
will  be  opposed  by  atomic  repulsion,  the  overcoming  of 
which  implies  the  evolution  of  heat."  That  is  to  say,  the 
condensation  of  the  nebula  as  a  whole  of  necessity  implies 
at  least  the  origination  of  these  new  material  and  dyna- 
mical relations  among  its  constituent  parts,  "  As  fast  as, 
this  heat  partially  escapes  by  radiation,  further  approxima- 
tion will  take  place,  attended  by  further  evolution  of  heat, 


56        THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS. 

and  so  on  continuously:  the  processes  not  occurring 
separately,  as  here  described,  but  simultaneously,  unin- 
terruptedly, and  with  increasing  activity."  Hence  the 
newly  established  relations  continuously  acquire  new 
increments  of  intensity.  But  now  observe  a  more  impor- 
tant point.  The  previous  essential  conditions  remaining 
unaltered — viz.,  the  persistence  of  matter  and  force,  as 
well  as,  or  rather  let  us  say  and  consequently,  the  law  of 
gravitation — these  conditions,  I  say,  remaining  constant, 
and  the  newly  established  relations  would  necessarily  of 
themselves  give  origin  to  neiv  laws.  For  whenever  two 
given  quantities  of  force  and  matter  met  in  one  of  the 
novel  relations,  they  would  of  necessity  give  rise  to  novel 
effects;  and  whenever,  on  any  future  occasion,  similar 
quantities  of  force  and  matter  again  so  met,  precisely 
similar  effects  would  of  necessity  require  to  occur:  but 
the  occurrence  of  similar  effects  under  similar  conditions 
is  all  that  we  mean  by  a  natural  law. 

Continuing,  then,  our  quotation  from.  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer's  terse  and  lucid  exposition  of  the  nebular  theory, 
we  find  this  doctrine  virtually  embodied  in  the  next 
sentences: — "Eventually  this  slow  movement  of  the 
atoms  towards  their  common  centre  of  gravity  will  bring 
about  phenomena  of  another  order. 

"  Arguing  from  the  known  laws  of  atomic  combination, 
it  will  happen  that,  when  the  nebulous  mass  has  reached 
a  particular  stage  of  condensation — when  its  internally 
situated  atoms  have  approached  to  within  certain  dis- 
tances, have  generated  a  certain  amount  of  heat,  and  are 
subject  to  a  certain  mutual  pressure  (the  heat  and  pressure 
increasing  as  the  aggregation  progresses),  some  of  them 
will  suddenly  enter  into  chemical  union.  Whether  the 
binary  atoms  so  produced  be  of  kinds  such  as  we  know, 
which  is  possible,  or  whether  they  be  of  kinds  simpler 
than  any  we  know,  which  is  more  probable,  matters  not 
to  the  argument.  It  suffices  that  molecular  combinations 
of  some  species  will  finally  take  place."  We  have,  then, 
here  a  new  and  important  change  of  relations.     Matter, 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS.       57 

primordially  uniform,  lias  itself  become  heterogeneous ; 
and  in  as  many  places  as  it  has  thus  changed  its  state,  it 
must,  in  virtue  of  the  fact,  give  rise  to  other  hitherto  novel 
relations,  and  so,  in  many  cases,  to  new  laws.^ 

It  would  be  tedious  and  unnecessary  to  trace  this 
genesis  of  natural  law  any  further :  indeed,  it  would  be 
quite  impossible  so  to  trace  it  for  any  considerable 
distance  without  feeling  that  the  ever-multiplying  mazes 
of  relations  renders  all  speculation  as  to  the  actual 
processes  quite  useless.  This  fact,  however,  as  before 
insisted,  in  no  wise  affects  the  only  doctrine  which  I 
here  enunciate — viz.,  that  the  self-generation  of  natural 
law  is  a  necessary  corollary  from  the  persistence  of  matter 
and  force.  And  that  this  must  be  so  is  now,  I  hope, 
sufficiently  evident.  Just  as  in  the  first  dawn  of  things, 
when  the  protOTbinary  compounds  of  matter  gave  rise  to 
new  relations  together  with  their  appropriate  laws,  so 
throughout  the  whole  process  of  evolution,  as  often  as 
matter  acquired  a  hitherto  novel  state,  or  in  one  of  its 
old  states  entered  into  hitherto  novel  relations,  so  often 
would  non-existent  or  even  impossible  laws  become  at 
once  possible  and  necessary.  And  in  this  way  I  cannot 
see  that  there  is  any  reason  to  stop  until  we  arrive  at  all 
the  marvellous  complexity  of  things  as  they  are.  For 
aught  that  speculative  reason  can  ever  from  henceforth 
show  to  the  contrary,  the  evolution  of  all  the  diverse 
phenomena  of  inorganic  nature,  of  life,  and  of  mind, 
appears  to  be  as  necessary  and  as  self-determined  as  is 
the  being  of  that  mysterious  Something  which  is  Every- 
thing,— the  Entity  we  must  all  believe  in,  which  without 
condition  and  beyond  relation  holds  its  existence  in 
itself. 

§  33.  Does  it  still  seem  incredible  that,  notwithstanding 
it  requires  mental  processes  to  interpret  external  nature, 
external  nature  may  nevertheless  be  destitute  of  mind  ? 
Then  let  us  look  at  the  subject  on  its  obverse  aspect. 

1  [Mr.  N.  Lockyer's  work  is  now  supplying  important  evidence  on  these 
points. — 1878.] 


58        THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  WS. 

According  to  the  theory  of  evolution — which,  be  it 
always  remembered,  is  no  mere  gratuitous  supposition, 
but  a  genuine  scientific  theory — human  intelligence,  like 
everything  else,  has  been  evolved.  N"ow  in  what  does  the 
evolution  of  intelligence  consist  ?  Any  one  acquainted 
with  the  writings  of  our  great  philosopher  can  have  no 
hesitation  in  answering :  Clearly  and  only  in  the  establish- 
ment of  more  and  more  numerous  and  complex  internal 
or  psychological  relations.  In  other  words,  the  law  of 
intelligence  being  "that  the  strengths  of  the  inner  co- 
hesions between  psychical  states  must  be  proportionate  to 
the  persistences  of  the  outer  relations  symbolised,"  it 
follows  that  the  development  of  intelligence  is  "  secured 
by  the  one  simple  principle  that  experience  of  the  outer 
relations  p?'oc^Mces  inner  cohesions,  and  makes  the  inner 
cohesions  strong  in  proportion  as  the  outer  relations  are 
persistent."  Now  the  question  before  us  at  present  is 
merely  this  : — Must  we  not  infer  that  these  outer  relations 
are  regulated  by  mind,  seeing  that  order  is  undoubtedly 
apparent  among  them,  and  that  it  requires  mental  pro- 
cesses on  our  part  to  interpret  this  order  ?  The  only 
legitimate  answer  to  this  question  is,  that  these  outer 
relations  may  be  regulated  by  mind,  but  that,  in  view  of 
the  evolution  theory,  we  are  certainly  not  entitled  to  infer 
that  they  are  so  regulated,  merely  because  it  requires 
mental  processes  on  our  part  to  interpret  their  orderly 
character.  For  if  it  is  true  that  the  human  mind  was 
itself  evolved  by  these  outer  relations — ever  continuously 
moulded  into  conformity  with  them  as  the  prime  condi- 
tion of  its  existence — then  its  process  of  interpreting 
them  is  but  reflecting  (as  it  were)  in  consciousness  these 
outer  relations  by  which  the  inner  ones  were  originally 
produced.  Granting  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  an  objective 
macrocosm  exists,  and  if  we  can  prove  or  render  probable 
that  this  objective  macrocosm  is  of  itself  sufficient  to 
evolve  a  subjective  microcosm,  I  do  not  see  any  the 
faintest   reason  for  the  latter  to  conclude  that   a  self- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS.      59 

conscious  intelligence  is  inherent  in  the  former,  merely 
because  it  is  able  to  trace  in  the  macrocosm  some  of  those 
orderly  objective  relations  by  which  its  own  corresponding 
subjective  relations  were  originally  produced.  If  it  is 
said  that  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  how,  apart  from 
mind,  the  orderly  objective  relations  themselves  can  ever 
have  originated,  I  reply  that  this  is  merely  to  shift  the 
ground  of  discussion  to  that  which  occupied  us  in  the  last 
section  :  all  we  are  now  engaged  upon  is, — Granting  that 
the  existence  of  such  orderly  relations  is  actual,  whether 
with  or  without  mind  to  account  for  them  ;  and  granting 
also  that  these  relations  are  of  themselves  sufficient  to  pro- 
duce corresponding  subjective  relations ;  then  the  mere 
fact  of  our  conscious  intelligence  being  able  to  discover 
numerous  and  complex  outer  relations  answering  to  those 
which  they  themselves  have  caused  in  our  intelligence, 
does  not  warrant  the  latter  in  concluding  that  the  causal 
connection  between  intelligence  and  non-intelligence  has 
ever  been  reversed — that  these  outer  relations  in  turn  are 
caused  by  a  similar  conscious  intelligence.  How  such  a 
thing  as  a  conscious  intelligence  is  possible  is  another  and 
wholly  unanswerable  question  (though  not  more  so  than 
that  as  to  the  existence  of  force  and  matter,  and  would 
not  be  rendered  less  so  by  merging  the  fact  in  a  hypothe- 
tical Deity) ;  but  granting,  as  we  must,  that  such  an 
entity  does  exist,  and  supposing  it  to  have  been  evolved 
by  natural  causes,  then  it  would  appear  incontestably 
to  follow,  that  whether  or  not  objective  existence  is  pre- 
sided over  by  objective  mind,  our  subjective  mind  would 
alike  and  equally  require  to  read  in  the  facts  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  an  indication,  whether  true  or  false,  of  some 
such  presiding  agency.  The  subjective  mind  being,  by 
the  supposition,  but  the  obverse  aspect  of  the  sum  total  of 
such  among  objective  relations  as  have  had  a  share  in  its 
production,  when,  as  in  observation  and  reflection,  this 
obverse  aspect  is  again  inverted  upon  its  die,  it  naturally 
fits  more  or  less  exactly  into  all  the  prints. 


6o        THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS. 

§  34.  This  last  illustration,  however,  serves  to  introduce 
us  to  another  point.  The  supposed  evidence  from  which 
the  existence  of  mind  in  nature  is  inferred  does 
not  always  depend  upon  such  minute  correspondences 
between  subjective  method  and  objective  method  as  the 
illustration  suggests.  Every  natural  theologian  has 
experienced  more  or  less  difficulty  in  explaining  the  fact, 
that  while  there  is  a  tolerably  general  similarity  between 
the  contrivances  due  to  human  thought  and  the  apparent 
contrivances  in  nature  which  he  regards  as  due  to  divine 
thought,  the  similarity  is  nevertheless  onhj  general.  For 
instance,  if  a  man  has  occasion  to  devise  any  artificial 
appliance,  he  does  so  with  the  least  possible  cost  of  labour 
to  himself,  and  with  the  least  possible  expenditure  of 
material.  Yet  it  is  obvious  that  in  nature  as  a  whole 
no  such  economic  considerations  obtain.  Doubtless  by 
superficial  minds  this  assertion  will  be  met  at  first  with 
an  indignant  denial:  they  have  been  accustomed  to 
accumulate  instances  of  this  very  principle  of  economy  in 
nature  ;  perhaps  written  about  it  in  books,  and  illustrated 
it  in  lectures, — totally  ignoring  the  fact  that  the  instances 
of  economy  in  nature  bear  no  proportion  at  all  to  the  in- 
stances of  prodigality.  Conceive  of  the  force  which  is 
being  quite  uselessly  expended  by  all  the  wind-currents 
which  are  at  this  moment  blowing  over  the  face  of 
Europe.  Imagine  the  energy  that  must  have  been  dis- 
sipated during  the  secular  cooling  of  this  single  planet. 
Eeebly  try  to  think  of  what  the  sun  is  radiating  into 
space.  If  it  is  retorted  that  we  are  incompetent  to  judge 
of  the  purposes  of  the  Almighty,  I  reply  that  this  is  but 
to  abandon  the  argument  from  economy  whenever  it  is 
found  untenable :  we  presume  to  be  competent  judges  of 
almighty  purposes  so  long  as  they  appear  to  imitate  our 
own ;  but  so  soon  as  there  is  any  divergence  observable, 
we  change  front.  By  thus  selecting  all  the  instances  of 
economy  in  nature,  and  disregarding  all  the  vastly  greater 
instances  of  reckless  waste,  we  are  merely  laying  ourselves 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LA  IVS.      6i 

open  to  the  charge  of  an  unfair  eclecticism.  And  this 
formal  refutation  of  the  argument  from  economy  admits 
of  being  further  justified  in  a  strikingly  substantial 
manner;  for  if  all  the  examples  of  economy  in  nature 
that  were  ever  observed,  or  admit  being  observed,  were 
collected  into  one  view,  I  undertake  to  affirm  that,  without 
exception,  they  would  be  found  to  marshal  themselves  in 
one  great  company — the  subjects  whose  law  is  survival  of 
the,  fittest.  One  question  only  will  I  here  ask.  Is  it 
possible  at  the  present  day  for  any  degree  of  prejudice, 
after  due  consideration,  to  withstand  the  fact  that  the 
solitary  exceptions  to  the  universal  prodigality  so  pain- 
fully conspicuous  in  nature  are  to  be  found  where  there 
is  also  to  be  found  a  full  and  adequate  physical  explana- 
tion of  their  occurrence  ? 

^.  But,  again,  prodigality  is  only  one  of  several  particulars 
wherein  the  modes  and  the  means  of  the  supposed 
divine  intelligence  differ  from  those  of  its  human  counter- 
part. Comparative  anatomists  can  point  to  organic 
structures  which  are  far  from  being  theoretically  perfect : 
even  the  mind  of  man  in  these  cases,  notwithstandiuEc 
its  confessed  deficiencies  in  respect  both  of  cognitive  and 
cogitative  powers,  is  competent  to  suggest  improvements  to 
an  intelligence  supposed  to  be  omniscient  and  all- wise ! 
And  what  shall  we  say  of  the  numerous  cases  in  which 
the  supposed  purposes  of  this  intelligence  could  have  been 
attained  by  other  and  less  roundabout  means  ?  In  short, 
not  needlessly  to  prolong  discussion,  it  is  admitted,  even 
by  natural  theologians  themselves,  that  the  difficulties  of 
reconciling,  even  approximately,  the  supposed  processes  of 
divine  thought  with  the  known  processes  of  human 
thought  are  quite  insuperable.  The  fact  is  expressed  by 
such  writers  in  various  ways, — e.g.,  that  it  would  be  pre- 
sumptuous in  man  to  expect  complete  conformity  in  all 
cases ;  that  the  counsels  of  God  are  past  finding  out ;  that 
his  ways  are  not  as  our  ways,  and  so  on.  Observing  only, 
as  before,  that   in   thus   ignorin£r   adverse   cases  natural 


62        THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS. 

tlieologians  are  guilty  of  an  unfair  eclecticism,  it  is  evident 
that  all  such  expressions  concede  the  fact,  that  even  in 
those  provinces  of  nature  where  the  evidence  of  super- 
human intelligence  appears  most  plain,  the  resemblance  of 
its  apparent  products  to  those  of  human  intelligence  con- 
sists in  a  general  approximation  of  method  rather  than 
in  any  precise  similarity  of  particulars:  the  likeness  is 
generic  rather  than  specific. 

ISTow  this  is  exactly  what  we  should  expect  to  be  the 
case,  if  the  similarity  in  question  be  due  to  the  cause 
which  the  present  section  endeavours  to  set  forth.  If  all 
natural  laws  are  self-evolved,  and  if  human  intelligence  is 
but  a  subjective  photograph  of  certain  among  their  inter- 
relations, it  seems  but  natural  that  when  this  photograph 
compares  itself  with  the  whole  external  world  from  parts 
of  which  it  was  taken,  its  subjective  lights  and  shadows 
should  be  found  to  correspond  with  some  of  the  objective 
lights  and  shadows  much  more  perfectly  than  with  others. 
Still  there  would  doubtless  be  sufficient  general  conformity 
to  lead  the  thinking  photograph  to  conclude  that  the  great 
world  of  objective  reality,  instead  of  being  the  cause  of 
such  conformity  as  exists,  was  itself  the  effect  of  some 
common  cause, — that  it  too  was  of  the  nature  of  a  pic- 
ture. Dropping  the  figure,  if  it  is  true  that  human 
intelligence  has  been  evolved  by  natural  law,  then  in 
view  of  all  that  has  been  said  it  must  now,  I  think,  be 
tolerably  apparent,  that  as  hy  the  hypothesis  hioman  intelli- 
gence Ms  ahvays  heen  required  to  think  and  to  act  in  con- 
formity with  law,  human  intelligence  must  at  last  he  in 
danger  of  confusing  or  identifying  the  fact  of  action  in 
conformity  with  law  ivith  the  existence  and  the  action  of  a 
self-conscious  intelligence.  Reading  then  in  external  nature 
innumerable  examples  of  action  in  conformity  with  law, 
human  intelligence  falls  hack  itpon  the  unwarrantcchle  iden- 
tification, and  out  of  the  hare  fact  that  law  exists  in  nat^tre 
concludes  tlmt  hcyond  nature  there  is  an  Intelligent  Law- 
giver. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  GENERAL  LAWS.       (,^ 

§  35.  From  what  has  been  said  in  the  last  five  sections, 
it  manifestly  follows  that  all  the  varied  phenomena  of  the 
universe  not  only  may,  but  must,  depend  upon  the  persist- 
ence of  force  and  the  primary  qualities  of  matter.^  Be  it 
remembered  that  the  object  of  the  last  three  sections  was 
merely  to  ''facilitate  conception "  of  the  fact  that  it  does 
not  at  all  follow,  because  the  phenomena  of  external 
nature  admit  of  being  intelligently  inquired  into,  there- 
fore they  are  due  to  an  intelligent  cause.  The  last  three 
sections  are  hence  in  a  manner  parenthetical,  and  it  is  of 
comparatively  little  importance  whether  or  not  they  have 
been  successful  in  their  object;  for,  from  what  went 
before,  it  is  abundantly  manifest  that,  whether  or  not  the 
subjective  side  of  the  question  admits  of  satisfactory 
elucidation,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  objective  side 
of  it  is  as  certain  as  are  the  fundamental  axioms  of  science. 
It  does  not  admit  of  one  moment's  questioning  that  it  is  as 
certainly  true  that  all  the  exquisite  beauty  and  melodious 
harmony  of  nature  follow  as  necessarily  and  as  inevitably 
from  the  persistence  of  force  and  the  primary  qualities  of 
matter,  as  it  is  certainly  true  that  force  is  persistent,  or 
that  matter  is  extended  and  impenetrable.  No  doubt  this 
generalisation  is  too  vast  to  be  adequately  conceived,  but 
there  can  be  equally  little  doubt  that  it  is  necessarily  true. 
If  matter  and  force  have  been  eternal,  so  far  as  human 
mind  can  soar  it  can  discover  no  need  of  a  superior  mind 
to  explain  the  varied  phenomena  of  existence.  Man  has 
truly  become  in  a  new  sense  the  measure  of  the  universe, 
and  in  this  the  latest  and  most  appalling  of  his  soundings, 
indications  are  returned  from  the  infinite  voids  of  space 
and  time  by  which  he  is  surrounded,  that  his  intelligence, 
with  all  its  noble  capacities  for  love  and  adoration,  is  yet 
alone— destitute  of  kith  or  kin  in  all  this  universe  of  beino- 

1  It  will  of  course  be  observed  that  if  matter  and  force  are  identical, 
the  unification  is  complete. 


(     64    ) 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  LOGICAL  STANDING  OF  THE  QUESTION  AS  TO 
THE  BEING  OF  A  GOD. 

§  36.  But  the  discussion  must  not  end  here.  Inexorable 
logic  has  forced  us  to  conclude  that,  viewing  the  question 
as  to  the  existence  of  a  God  only  by  the  light  which 
modern  science  has  shed  upon  it,  there  no  longer  appears 
to  be  any  semblance  of  an  argument  in  its  favour.  Let  us 
then  turn  upon  science  herself,  and  question  her  right  to 
be  our  sole  guide  in  this  matter.  Undoubtedly  we  have 
no  alternative  but  to  conclude  that  the  hypothesis  of 
mind  in  nature  is  now  logically  proved  to  be  as  certainly 
superfluous  is  the  very  basis  of  all  science  is  certainly 
true.  There  can  no  longer  be  any  more  doubt  that  the 
existence  of  a  God  is  wholly  unnecessary  to  explain  any  of 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  than  there  is  doubt  that 
if  I  leave  go  of  my  pen  it  will  fall  upon  the  table.  Nay, 
the  doubt  is  even  less  than  this,  because  while  the 
knowledge  that  my  pen  will  fall  if  I  allow  it  to  do  so  is 
founded  chiefly  upon  empirical  knowledge  (I  could  not 
predict  with  a  priori  certainty  that  it  would  so  fall,  for 
the  pen  might  be  in  an  electrical  state,  or  subject  to  some 
set  of  unknown  natural  laws  antagonistic  to  gravity), 
the  knowledge  that  a  Deity  is  superfluous  as  an  explana- 
tion of  anything,  being  grounded  on  the  doctrine  of  the 
persistence  of  force,  is  grounded  on  an  a  priori  necessity 
of  reason — i.e.,  if  this  fact  were  not  so,  our  science,  our 
thought,  our  very  existence  itself,  would  be  scientifically 
impossible. 


QUESTION  AS  TO  THE  BEING  OF  A  GOD.        65 

But  now,  having  thus  stated  the  case  as  strongly  as  I 
am  able,  it  remains  to  question  how  far  the  authority  of 
science  extends.  Even  our  knowledge  of  the  persistence 
of  force  and  of  the  primary  qualities  of  matter  is  but  of 
relative  significance.  Deeper  than  the  foundations  of  our 
experience,  "  deeper  than  demonstration — deeper  even 
than  definite  cognition, — deep  as  the  very  nature  of 
mind,"  ^  are  these  the  most  ultimate  of  known  truths ;  but 
where  from  this  is  our  warrant  for  concluding  with 
certainty  that  these  known  truths  are  everywhere  and 
eternally  true  ?  It  will  be  said  that  there  is  a  strong 
analogical  probability.  Perhaps  so,  but  of  this  next: 
I  am  not  now  speaking  of  probability ;  I  am  speak- 
ing of  certainty;  and  unless  we  deny  the  doctrine  of 
the  relativity  of  knowledge,  we  cannot  but  conclude  that 
there  is  no  absolute  certainty  in  this  case.  As  I  deem 
this  consideration  one  of  great  importance,  I  shall  pro- 
ceed to  develop  it  at  some  length.  It  will  be  observed, 
then,  that  the  consideration  really  amounts  to  this : — 
Although  it  must  on  all  hands  be  admitted  that  the  fact 
of  the  theistic  hypothesis  not  being  required  to  explain 
any  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  is  a  fact  which  has  been 
demonstrated  scientifically,  nevertheless  it  must  likewise 
on  all  hands  be  admitted  that  this  fact  has  not,  and  cannot 
be,  demonstrated  logically.  Or  thus,  although  it  is  un- 
questionably true  that  so  far  as  science  can  penetrate  she 
cannot  discern  any  speculative  necessity  for  a  God,  it  may 
nevertheless  be  true  that  if  science  could  penetrate  further 
she  might  discern  some  such  necessity.  JSTow  the  present 
discussion  would  clearly  be  incomplete  if  it  neglected  to 
define  as  carefully  this  the  logical  standing  of  our  subject, 
as  it  has  hitherto  endeavoured  to  define  its  scientific 
standing.  As  a  final  step  in  our  analysis,  therefore,  we 
must  altogether  quit  the  region  of  experience,  and,  ignoring 
even  the  very  foundations  of  science  and  so  all  the  most 
certain   of  relative  truths,  pass  into   the   transcendental 

1  Herbert  Spencer. 

E 


66  THE  LOGICAL  STANDING  OF  THE 

region  of  purely  formal  considerations.  In  this  region 
theist  and  atheist  must  alike  consent  to  forego  all  their 
individual  predilections,  and,  after  regarding  the  subject  as 
it  were  in  the  abstract  and  by  the  light  of  pure  logic  alone, 
finally  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  transcendental 
probability  of  the  question  before  them.  Disregarding 
the  actual  probability  which  they  severally  feel  to  exist  in 
relation  to  their  own  individual  intelligences,  they  must 
apply  themselves  to  ascertain  the  probability  which  exists 
in  relation  to  those  fundamental  laws  of  thought  which 
preside  over  the  intelligence  of  our  race.  In  fine,  it  will 
now,  I  hope,  be  understood  that,  as  we  have  hitherto  been 
endeavouring  to  determine,  by  deductions  drawn  from  the 
very  foundations  of  all  possible  science,  the  relative  pro- 
bability as  to  the  existence  of  a  God,  so  we  shall  next 
apply  ourselves  to  the  task  of  ascertaining  the  absolute 
probability  of  such  existence — or,  more  correctly,  what  is 
the  strictly  formal  probability  of  such  existence  when  its 
possibility  is  contemplated  in  an  absolute  sense. 

§  37.  To  begin  then.  In  the  last  resort,  the  value  of 
every  probability  is  fixed  by  "  ratiocination."  In  endea- 
vouring, therefore,  to  fix  the  degree  of  strictly  formal 
probability  that  is  present  in  any  given  case,  our  method 
of  procedure  should  be,  first  to  ascertain  the  ultimate 
ratios  on  which  the  probability  depends,  and  then  to 
estimate  the  comparative  value  of  these  ratios.  Now  I 
think  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  value  of  any  pro- 
bability in  this  its  last  analysis  is  determined  by  the 
number,  the  importance,  and  the  definiteness  of  the  rela- 
tions known,  as  compared  with  those  of  the  relations 
unknown ;  and,  consequently,  that  in  all  cases  where  the 
sum  of  the  unknown  relations  is  larger,  or  more  important, 
or  more  indefinite  than  is  the  sum  of  the  known  relations, 
it  is  an  essential  principle  that  the  value  of  the  proba- 
bility decreases  in  exact  proportion  to  the  decrease  in  the 
similarity  between  the  two  sets  of  relations,  whether 
this  decrease  consists  in  the  number,  in  the  importance,  or 


QUESTION  AS  TO  THE  BEING  OF  A  GOD.       67 

in  the  definiteness  of  the  relations  involved.  This  rule  or 
canon  is  self-evident  as  soon  as  pointed  out,  and  has  been 
formulated  by  Professor  Bain  in  his  "  Logic  "  when  treating 
of  Analogy,  but  not  with  sufficient  precision ;  for,  while 
recognising  the  elements  of  number  and  importance,  he 
has  overlooked  that  of  definiteness.  This  element,  how- 
ever, is  a  very  essential  one — indeed  the  most  essential  of 
the  three;  for  there  are  many  analogical  inferences  in 
which  either  the  character  or  the  extent  of  the  unknown 
relations  is  quite  indefinite ;  and  it  is  obvious  that,  when- 
ever this  is  the  case,  the  value  of  the.  analogy  is  propor- 
tionably  diminished,  and  diminished  in  a  much  more 
material  particular  than  it  is  when  the  diminution  of 
value  arises  from  a  mere  excess  of  the  unknown  relations 
over  the  known  ones  in  respect  of  their  number  or  of  their 
importance.  For  it  is  evident  that,  in  the  latter  case,  how- 
ever little  value  the  analogy  may  possess,  the  exact  degree 
of  such  value  admits  of  being  determined ;  while  it  is  no 
less  evident  that,  in  the  former  case,  we  are  precluded 
from  estimating  the  value  of  the  analogy  at  all,  and  this 
just  in  proportion  to  the  indefiniteness  of  the  unknown 
relations. 

§  38.  Now  the  particular  instance  with  which  we  are 
concerned  is  somewhat  peculiar.  Notwithstanding  we 
have  the  entire  sphere  of  human  experience  from  Avhich 
to  argue,  we  are  still  unable  to  gauge  the  strictly  logical 
probability  of  any  argument  whatsoever ;  for  the  unknown 
relations  in  this  case  are  so  wholly  indefinite,  both  as  to 
their  character  and  extent,  that  any  attempt  to  insti- 
tute a  definite  comparison  between  them  and  the  known 
relations  is  felt  at  once  to  be  absurd.  The  question  dis- 
cussed, being  the  most  ultimate  of  all  possible  questions, 
must  eventually  contain  in  itself  all  that  is  to  man 
unknown  and  unknowable;  the  whole  orbit  of  human 
knowledge  is  here  insuflicient  to  obtain  a  parallax  whereby 
to  institute  the  required  measurements. 

§  39.  I  think  it  is  desirable  to  insist  upon  this  truth  at 


68  THE  LOGICAL  STANDING  OF  THE 

somewliat  greater  length,  and,  for  the  sake  of  impressing 
it  still  more  deeply,  I  shall  present  it  in  another  form. 
^"0  one  can  for  a  single  moment  deny  that,  beyond  and 
around  the  sphere  of  the  Knowable,  there  exists  the  un- 
fathomable abyss  of  the  Unknowable.  I  do  not  here  use 
this  latter  word  as  embodying  any  theory :  I  merely  wish 
it  to  state  the  undoubted  fact,  which  all  must  admit,  viz., 
that  beneath  all  our  possible  explanations  there  lies  a 
great  Inexplicable.  Now  let  us  see  what  is  the  effect  of 
making  this  necessary  admission.  In  the  first  place,  it 
clearly  follows  that,  while  our  conceptions  as  to  what  the 
Unknowable  contains  may  or  may  not  represent  the  truth, 
it  is  certain  that  we  can  never  discover  whether  or  not  they 
do.  Further,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  determine  even  a  defi- 
nite probability  as  to  the  existence  (much  less  the  nature) 
of  anything  which  we  may  suppose  the  Unknowable  to 
contain.  We  may,  of  course,  perceive  that  such  and  such 
a  supposition  is  more  conceivable  than  such  and  such ;  but, 
as  already  indicated,  the  fact  does  not  show  that  the  one 
is  in  itself  more  definitely  ^^'^obable  than  the  other,  unless 
it  has  been  previou,sly  shown,  either  that  the  capacity  of 
our  conceptions  is  a  fully  adequate  measure  of  the  Possible, 
or  that  the  proportion  between  such  capacity  and  the 
extent  of  the  Possible  is  a  proportion  that  can  be  deter- 
mined. In  either  of  these  cases,  the  Conceivable  would 
be  a  fair  measure  of  the  Possible :  in  the  former  case,  an 
exact  equivalent  {e.g.,  in  any  instance  of  contradictory 
propositions,  the  most  conceivable  would  certainly  be 
true) ;  in  the  latter  case,  a  measure  any  degree  less  than 
an  exact  equivalent  —  the  degree  depending  upon  the 
then  ascertainable  disparity  between  the  extent  of  the 
Possible  and  the  extent  of  the  Conceivable.  Now  the 
Unknowable  (including  of  course  the  Inconceivable  Exis- 
tent) is  a  species  of  the  Possible,  and  in  its  name  carries 
the  declaration  that  the  disparity  between  its  extent  and 
the  extent  of  the  Conceivable  {i.e.,  the  other  species  of  the 
Possible)  is  a  disparity  that  cannot  be  determined.    We  are 


QUESTION  AS  TO  THE  BEING  OF  A  GOD.       69 

hence  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  the  most  apparently  pro- 
bable of  all  propositions,  if  predicated  of  anything  within 
the  Unknowable,  may  not  in  reality  be  a  whit  more  so  than 
is  the  most  apparently  improbable  proposition  which  it  is 
possible  to  make ;  for  if  it  is  admitted  (as  of  course  it 
must  be)  that  we  are  necessarily  precluded  from  compar- 
ing the  extent  of  the  Conceivable  with  that  of  the  Un- 
knowable, then  it  necessarily  follows  that  in  no  case 
whatever  are  we  competent  to  judge  how  far  an  apparent 
probability  relating  to  the  latter  province  is  an  actual 
probability.  In  other  words,  did  we  know  the  proportion 
subsisting  between  the  Conceivable  and  the  Unknowable 
in  respect  of  relative  extent  and  character,  and  so  of  in- 
herent probabilities,  we  should  then  be  able  to  estimate 
the  actual  value  of  any  apparent  probability  relating  to 
the  latter  province ;  but,  as  it  is,  our  ability  to  make  this 
estimate  varies  inversely  as  our  inability  to  estimate  our 
ignorance  in  this  particular.  And  as  our  ignorance  in 
this  particular  is  total — i.e.,  since  we  cannot  even  approxi- 
mately determine  the  proportion  that  subsists  between 
the  Conceivable  and  the  Unknowable, — the  result  is  that 
our  ability  to  make  the  required  estimate  in  any  given 
case  is  absolutely  nil. 

§  40,  I  have  purposely  rendered  this  presentation  in 
terms  of  the  highest  abstraction,  partly  to  avoid  the  possi- 
bility of  any  one,  whatever  his  theory  of  things  may  be, 
finding  anything  at  which  to  object,  and  partly  in  order 
that  my  meaning  may  be  understood  to  include  all  things 
which  are  beyond  the  range  of  possible  knowledge.  Most 
of  all,  therefore,  must  this  presentation  (if  it  contains  any- 
thing of  truth)  apply  to  the  question  regarding  the  exist- 
ence of  Deity ;  for  the  Ens  Bealissimum  must  of  all  things 
be  furthest  removed  from  the  range  of  possible  knowledge. 
Hence,  if  this  presentation  contains  anything  of  truth — 
and  of  its  rigidly  accurate  truth  I  think  there  can  be  no 
question — the  assertion  that  the  Self-existing  Substance 
is  a  Personal  and  Intelligent  Being,  and  the  assertion  that 


70  THE  LOGICAL  STANDING  OF  THE 

this  Substance  is  an  Impersonal  and  Non-Intelligent 
Being,  are  alike  assertions  wholly  destitute  of  any  assign- 
able degree  of  logical  probability.  I  say  assignable  degree 
of  logical  probability,  because  that  some  degree  of  such 
probability  may  exist  I  do  not  undertake  to  deny.  All  I 
assert  is,  that  if  we  are  here  able  to  institute  any  such 
probability  at  all,  we  are  unable  logically  to  assign  to  it 
any  determinate  degree  of  value.  Or,  in  other  words, 
although  we  may  establish  some  probability  in  a  sense 
relative  to  ourselves,  we  are  unable  to  know  how  far  this 
probability  is  a  probability  in  an  absolute  sense.  Or  again, 
the  case  is  not  as  though  we  were  altogether  unacquainted 
with  the  Possible.  Experience  undoubtedly  affords  us 
some  information  regarding  this,  although,  comparatively 
speaking,  we  are  unable  to  know  how  much.  Conse- 
quently, we  must  suppose  that,  in  any  given  case,  it  is  more 
likely  that  the  Conceivable  should  be  Possible  than  that 
the  Inconceivable  should  be  so,  and  that  the  Conceivably 
Probable  should  exist  than  that  the  Conceivably  Impro- 
bable should  do  so  :  in  neither  case,  however,  can  we  know 
vjhat  degree  of  such  likelihood  is  present. 

§  41.  From  the  foregoing  considerations,  then,  it  would 
appear  that  the  only  attitude  which  in  strict  logic  it  is 
admissible  to  adopt  towards  the  question  concerning  the 
being  of  a  God  is  that  of  "  suspended  judgment."  For- 
mally speaking,  it  is  alike  illegitimate  to  affirm  or  to  deny 
Intelligence  as  an  attribute  of  the  Ultimate.  And  here  I 
would  desire  it  to  be  observed,  that  this  is  the  attitude 
which  the  majority  of  scientifically-trained  philosophers 
actually  have  adopted  with  regard  to  this  matter.  I  am 
not  aware,  however,  that  any  one  has  yet  endeavoured  to 
formulate  the  justification  of  this  attitude  ;  and  as  I  think 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  above  presentation  con- 
tains in  a  logical  shape  the  whole  of  such  justification,  I 
cannot  but  think  that  some  important  ends  will  have  been 
secured  by  it.  For  we  are  here  in  possession,  not  merely 
of  a  vague  and  general  impression  that  the  Ultimate  is 


QUESTION  AS  TO  THE  BEING  OF  A  GOD.       71 

super-scientific,  and  so  beyond  the  range  of  legitimate 
predication;  but  we  are  also  in  possession  of  a  logical 
formula  whereby  at  once  to  vindicate  the  rationality  of 
our  opinion,  and  to  measure  the  precise  degree  of  its 
technical  value. 


(      72      ) 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  ARGUMENT   FROM   METAPHYSICAL   TELEOLOGY. 

§  42.  Let  lis  now  proceed  to  examine  the  effect  of  the 
formal  considerations  which  have  been  adduced  in  the 
last  chapter  on  the  scientific  considerations  which  were 
dealt  with  in  the  previous  chapters.  In  these  previous 
chapters  the  proposition  was  clearly  established  that,  just 
as  certainly  as  the  fundamental  data  of  science  are  true, 
so  certainly  is  it  true  that  the  theory  of  Theism  in  any 
shape  is,  scientifically  considered,  superfluous;  for  these 
chapters  have  clearly  shown  that,  if  there  is  a  God,  his 
existence,  considered  as  a  cause  of  things,  is  as  certainly 
unnecessary  as  it  is  certainly  true  that  force  is  persistent 
and  that  matter  is  indestructible.  But  after  this  pro- 
position had  been  carefully  justified,  it  remained  to  show 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  compelled 
us  to  carry  our  discussion  into  a  region  of  yet  higher 
abstraction.  Tor  although  we  observed  that  the  essential 
qualities  of  matter  and  of  force  are  the  most  ultimate  data 
of  human  knowledge,  and  although,  by  showing  how  far 
the  question  of  Theism  depended  on  these  data,  we  carried 
the  discussion  of  that  question  to  the  utmost  possible 
limits  of  scientific  thought,  it  still  devolved  on  us  to  con- 
template the  fact  that  even  these  the  most  ultimate  data 
of  science  are  only  known  to  be  of  relative  significance. 
And  the  bearing  of  this  fact  to  the  question  of  Theism 
was  seen  to  be  most  important.  Tor,  without  waiting  to 
recapitulate  the  substance  of  a  chapter  so  recently  con- 
cluded,  it    will   be   remembered   that   its   effect  was  to 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  73 

establish  this  position  beyond  all  controversy — viz.,  that 
when  ideas  which  have  been  formed  by  our  experience 
within  the  region  of  phenomenal  actuality  are  projected 
into  the  region  of  ontological  possibility,  they  become 
utterly  worthless;  seeing  that  we  can  never  have  any 
means  whereby  to  test  the  actual  value  of  whatever  trans- 
cendental probabilities  they  may  appear  to  establish. 
Therefore  it  is  that  even  the  most  ultimate  of  relative 
truths  with  which,  as  we  have  seen,  the  question  of 
Theism  is  so  vitally  associated,  is  almost  without  mean- 
ing when  contemplated  in  an  absolute  sense.  What,  then, 
is  the  effect  of  these  metaphysical  considerations  on  the 
position  of  Theism  as  we  have  seen  it  to  be  left  by  the 
highest  generalisations  of  physical  science  ?  Let  us  con- 
template this  question  with  the  care  which  it  deserves. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  evident  that  the  effect  of  these 
purely  formal  considerations  is  to  render  all  reasonings 
on  the  subject  of  Theism  equally  illegitimate,  unless  it  is 
constantly  borne  in  mind  that  such  reasonings  can  only 
be  of  relative  signification.  Thus,  as  a  matter  of  pure 
logic,  these  considerations  are  destructive  of  all  assignable 
validity  of  any  such  reasoning  whatsoever.  Still,  even  a 
strictly  relative  probability  is,  in  some  undefinable  degree, 
of  more  value  than  no  probability  at  all,  as  we  have  seen 
these  same  formal  considerations  to  show  (see  §  40) ;  and, 
moreover,  even  were  this  not  so,  the  human  mind  will 
never  rest  until  it  attains  to  the  furthest  probability  which 
to  its  powers  is  accessible.  Therefore,  if  we  do  not  forget 
the  merely  relative  nature  of  the  considerations  which 
are  about  to  be  adduced,  by  adducing  them  we  may  at  the 
same  time  satisfy  our  own  minds  and  abstain  from  violat- 
ing the  conditions  of  sound  logic. 

The  shape,  then,  to  which  the  subject  has  now  been 
reduced  is  simply  this : — Seeing  that  the  theory  of  Evolu- 
tion in  its  largest  sense  has  shown  the  theory  of  Theism 
to  be  superfluous  in  a  scientific  sense,  does  it  not  follow 
that  the  theory  of  Theism  is  thus  shown  to  be  superfluous 


74  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

in  any  sense  ?  Eor  it  would  seem  from  the  discussion,  so 
far  as  it  has  hitherto  gone,  that  the  only  rational  basis  on 
which  the  theory  of  Theism  can  rest  is  a  basis  of  tele- 
ology ;  and  if,  as  has  been  clearly  shown,  the  theory  of 
evolution,  by  deducing  the  genesis  of  natural  law  from 
the  primary  data  of  science,  irrevocably  destroys  this 
basis,  does  it  not  follow  that  the  theory  of  evolution  has 
likewise  destroyed  the  theory  which  rested  on  that  basis  ? 
N'ow  I  conclude,  as  stated  at  the  close  of  Chapter  IV.,  that 
the  question  here  put  must  certainly  be  answered  in  the 
affirmative,  so  far  as  its  scientific  aspect  is  concerned. 
But  w^hen  we  consider  the  question  in  its  purely  logical 
aspect,  as  we  have  done  in  Chapter  V.,  the  case  is  other- 
wise. For  although,  so  far  as  the  utmost  reach  of 
scientific  vision  enables  us  to  see,  we  can  discern  no 
evidence  of  Deity,  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that  beyond 
the  range  of  such  vision  Deity  does  not  exist.  Science 
indeed  has  proved  that  if  there  is  a  Divine  Mind  in  nature, 
and  if  by  the  hypothesis  such  a  Mind  exerts  any  causa- 
tive influence  on  the  phenomena  of  nature,  such  influence 
is  exerted  beyond  the  sphere  of  experience.  And  this 
achievement  of  science,  be  it  never  forgotten,  is  an  achieve- 
ment of  prodigious  importance,  effectually  destroying,  as 
it  does,  all  vestiges  of  a  scientific  teleology.  But  be  it 
now  carefully  observed,  although  all  vestiges  of  a  scientific 
teleology  are  thus  completely  and  permanently  ruined, 
the  formal  considerations  adduced  in  the  last  chapter 
supply  the  conditions  for  constructing  what  may  be 
termed  a  metaphysical  teleology.  I  use  these  terms  ad- 
visedly, because  I  think  they  will  serve  to  bring  out  with 
great  clearness  the  condition  to  which  our  analysis  of  the 
teleological  argument  has  now  been  reduced. 

§  43.  In  the  first  place,  let  it  be  understood  that  I 
employ  the  terms  "  scientific  "  and  "  metaphysical "  in  the 
convenient  sense  in  which  they  are  employed  by  Mr. 
Lewes,  viz.,  as  respectively  designating  a  theory  that  is 
verifiable  and  a  theory  that  is  not.     Consequently,  by  the 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  ys 

term  "  scientific  teleology  "  I  mean  to  denote  a  form  of 
teleology  which  admits  either  of  being  proved  or  dis- 
proved, while  by  the  term  "  metaphysical  teleology "  I 
mean  to  denote  a  form  of  teleology  which  does  not  admit 
either  of  being  proved  or  of  being  disproved.  Now,  with 
these  significations  clearly  understood,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  forms  of  teleology  which  we  have  hitherto  con- 
sidered belong  entirely  to  the  scientific  class.  That  the 
Paleyerian  form  of  the  argument  did  so  is  manifest,  first 
because  this  argument  itself  treats  the  problem  of  Theism 
as  a  problem  that  is  susceptible  of  scientific  demonstra- 
tion, and  next  because  we  have  seen  that  the  advance  of 
science  has  proved  this  argument  susceptible  of  scientific 
refutation.  In  other  words,  from  the  supposed  axiom, 
"  There  cannot  be  apparent  design  without  a  designer," 
adaptations  in  nature  become  logically  available  as  purely 
scientific  evidence  of  an  intelligent  cause ;  and  that  Paley 
himself  regarded  them  exclusively  in  this  light  is  manifest, 
both  from  his  own  "  statement  of  the  argument,"  and  from 
the  character  of  the  evidence  by  which  he  seeks  to 
establish  the  argument  when  stated — witness  the  typical 
passage  before  quoted  (§  26).  On  the  other  hand,  we 
have  clearly  seen  that  this  Paleyerian  system  of  natural 
theology  has  been  effectually  demolished  by  the  scientific 
theory  of  natural  selection — the  fundamental  axiom  of  the 
former  having  been  shown  by  the  latter  to  be  scientifically 
untrue.  Hence  the  term  "  scientific  teleology  "  is  without 
question  applicable  to  the  Paleyerian  system. 

Nor  is  the  case  essentially  different  with  the  more 
refined  form  of  the  teleological  argument  which  we  have 
had  to  consider — the  argument,  namely,  from  General 
Laws.  For  here,  likewise,  we  have  clearly  seen  that  the 
inference  from  the  ubiquitous  operation  of  General  Laws 
to  the  existence  of  an  omniscient  Law-maker  is  quite  as 
illegitimate  as  is  the  inference  from  apparent  Design  to 
the  existence  of  a  supreme  Designer.  In  other  words, 
science,  by  establishing  the  doctrine  of  the  persistence  of 


76  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

force  and  tlie  indestructibility  of  matter,  has  effectually 
disproved  the  hypothesis  that  the  presence  of  Law  in 
nature  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  prove  the  existence  of  an 
intelligent  Law-giver. 

Thus  it  is  that  scientific  teleology  in  any  form  is  now 
and  for  ever  obsolete.  But  not  so  with  what  I  have 
termed  metaphysical  teleology.  For  as  we  have  seen 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  precludes 
us  from  asserting,  or  even  from  inferring,  that  beyond  the 
region  of  the  Knowable  Mind  does  not  exist,  it  remains 
logically  possible  to  institute  a  metaphysical  hypothesis 
that  beyond  this  region  of  the  Knowable  Mind  does 
exist.  There  being  a  necessary  absence  of  any  positive 
information  whereby  to  refute  this  metaphysical  hypo- 
thesis, any  one  who  chooses  to  adopt  it  is  fully  justified 
in  doing  so,  provided  only  he  remembers  that  the  purely 
metaphysical  quality  whereby  the  hypothesis  is  ensured 
against  disproof,  likewise,  and  in  the  same  degree,  pre- 
cludes it  from  the  possibility  of  proof.  He  must  re- 
member that  it  is  no  longer  open  to  him  to  point  to  any 
particular  set  of  general  laws  and  to  assert,  these  pro- 
claim Intelligence  as  their  cause  ;  for  we  have  repeatedly 
seen  that  the  known  states  of  matter  and  force  themselves 
afford  sufficient  explanation  of  the  facts  to  which  he 
points.  And  he  must  remember  that  the  only  reason 
why  his  hypothesis  does  not  conflict  with  any  of  the 
truths  known  to  science,  is  because  he  has  been  careful  to 
rest  that  hypothesis  upon  a  basis  of  purely  formal  con- 
siderations, which  lie  beyond  even  the  most  fundamental 
truths  of  which  science  is  cognisant. 

Thus,  for  example,  he  may  present  his  metaphysical 
theory  of  Theism  in  some  such  terms  as  these : — '  Fully 
conceding  what  reason  shows  must  be  conceded,  and 
there  still  remains  this  possible  supposition — viz.,  that 
there  is  a  presiding  Mind  in  nature,  which  exerts  its 
causative  influence  beyond  the  sphere  of  experience,  thus 
rendering  it  impossible  for  us  to  obtain  scientific  evidence 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  jj 

of  its  action.  For  such  a  Mind,  exerting  sucli  an  influence 
beyond  experience,  may  direct  affairs  within  experience 
by  methods  conceivable  or  inconceivable  to  us — producing, 
possibly,  innumerable  and  highly  varied  results,  which  in 
turn  may  produce  their  effects  within  experience,  their 
introduction  being  then,  of  course,  in  the  ordinary  way  of 
natural  law.  For  instance,  there  can  be  no  question  that 
by  the  intelligent  creation  or  dissipation  of  energy,  all 
the  phenomena  of  cosmic  evolution  might  have  been 
directed,  and,  for  aught  that  science  can  show  to  the 
contrary,  thus  only  rendered  possible.  Hence  there  is  at 
least  one  nameable  way  in  which,  even  in  accordance 
with  observed  facts,  a  Supreme  Mind  could  be  competent 
to  direct  the  phenomena  of  observable  nature.  But  we 
are  not  necessarily  restricted  to  the  limits  of  the  nameable 
in  this  matter,  so  that  it  is  of  no  argumentative  importance 
whether  or  not  this  suggested  method  is  the  method  which 
the  supposed  Mind  actually  adopts,  seeing  that  there 
may  still  be  other  possible  methods,  which,  nevertheless, 
we  are  unable  to  sus^crest.' 

Doubtless  the  hypothesis  of  Theism,  as  thus  presented, 
will  be  deemed  by  many  persons  but  of  very  slender 
probability.  I  am  not,  however,  concerned  with  whatever 
character  of  probability  it  may  be  supposed  to  exhibit. 
I  am  merely  engaged  in  carefully  presenting  the  only 
hypothesis  which  can  be  presented,  if  the  theory  as  to 
an  Intelligent  Author  of  nature  is  any  longer  to  be 
maintained  on  grounds  of  a  rational  teleology.  ISTo  doubt, 
scientifically  considered,  the  hypothesis  in  question  is 
purely  gratuitous ;  for,  so  far  as  the  light  of  science  can 
penetrate,  there  is  no  need  of  any  such  hypothesis  at  all. 
Thus  it  may  well  seem,  at  first  sight,  that  no  hypothesis 
could  well  have  less  to  recommend  it ;  and,  so  far  as  the 
presentation  has  yet  gone,  it  is  therefore  fully  legitimate 
for  an  atheist  to  reply : — '  All  that  this  so-called  meta- 
physical theory  amounts  to  is  a  wholly  gratuitous 
assumption.     No  doubt  it  is  always  difficult,  and  usually 


78  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

impossible,  logically  or  unequivocally  to  prove  a  negative. 
If  my  adversary  chose  to  imagine  that  nature  is  presided 
over  by  a  demon  with  horns  and  hoofs,  or  by  a  dragon 
with  claws  and  tail,  I  should  be  as  unable  to  disprove 
this  his  supposed  theory  as  I  am  now  unable  to  disprove 
his  actual  theory.  But  in  all  cases  reasonable  men  ought 
to  be  guided  in  their  beliefs  by  such  positive  evidence  as 
is  available ;  and  if,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  alternative 
belief  is  wholly  gratuitous — adopted  not  only  without  any 
evidence,  but  against  all  that  great  body  "of  evidence 
which  the  sum-total  of  science  supplies — surely  we  ought 
not  to  hesitate  for  one  moment  in  the  choice  of  our 
creed  ? ' 

ISTow  all  this  is  quite  sound  in  principle,  provided  only 
that  the  metaphysical  theory  of  Theism  is  wholly  gratui- 
tous, in  the  sense  of  being  utterly  destitute  of  evidential 
support.  That  it  is  destitute  of  aU  scientific  support,  we 
have  already  and  repeatedly  seen;  but  the  question 
remains  as  to  whether  it  is  similarly  destitute  of  meta- 
physical  support. 

§  44.  To  this  question,  then,  let  us  next  address  our- 
selves. From  the  theistic  pleading  which  we  have  just 
heard,  it  is  abundantly  manifest  that  the  formal  conditions 
of  a  metaphysical  teleology  are  present:  the  question 
now  before  us  is  as  to  whether  or  not  any  actual  evidence 
exists  in  favour  of  such  a  theory.  In  order  to  discuss 
this  question,  let  us  begin  by  allowing  the  theist  to 
continue  his  pleading.  'You  have  shown  me,'  he  may 
say,  '  that  a  scientific  or  demonstrable  system  of  teleology 
is  no  longer  possible,  and,  therefore,  as  I  have  already 
conceded,  I  must  take  my  stand  on  a  metaphysical  or  non- 
demonstrable  system.  But  I  reflect  that  the  latter  term 
is  a  loose  one,  seeing  that  it  embraces  all  possible  degrees 
of  evidence  short  of  actual  proof.  The  question,  therefore, 
I  conceive  to  be.  What  amount  of  evidence  is  there  in 
favour  of  this  metaphysical  system  of  teleology  ?  And 
this  question  I  answer  by  the  following  considerations : — 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  79 

As  general  laws  separately  have  all  been  shown  to  be 
the  necessary  outcome  of  the  primary  data  of  science,  it 
certainly  follows  that  general  laws  collectively  must  be 
the  same — i.e.,  that  the  whole  system  of  general  laws 
must  be,  so  far  as  the  lights  of  our  science  can  penetrate, 
the  necessary  outcome  of  the  persistence  of  force  and  the 
indestructibility  of  matter.  But  you  have  also  clearly 
shown  me  that  these  lights  are  of  the  feeblest  conceivable 
character  when  they  are  brought  to  illuminate  the  final 
mystery  of  things.  I  therefore  feel  at  liberty  to  assert, 
that  if  there  is  any  one  principle  to  be  observed  in  the 
collective  operation  of  general  laws  which  cannot  con- 
ceivably be  explained  by  any  cause  other  than  that  of 
intelligent  guidance,  I  am  still  free  to  fall  back  on  such 
a  principle  and  to  maintain — Although  the  collective 
operation  of  general  laws  follows  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence from  the  primary  data  of  science,  this  one 
principle  which  pervades  their  united  action,  and  which 
cannot  be  conceivably  explained  by  any  hypothesis  other 
than  that  of  intelligent  guidance,  is  a  principle  which  still 
remains  to  be  accounted  for ;  and  as  it  cannot  conceivably 
be  accounted  for  on  grounds  of  physical  science,  I  may 
legitimately  account  for  it  on  grounds  of  metaphysical 
teleology.  Now  I  cannot  open  my  eyes  without  per- 
ceiving such  a  principle  everywhere  characterising  the 
collective  operation  of  general  laws.  Universally  I  behold 
in  nature,  order,  beauty,  harmony, — that  is,  a  perfect 
correlation  among  general  laws.  But  this  ubiquitous 
correlation  among  general  laws,  considered  as  the  cause  of 
cosmic  harmony,  itself  requires  some  explanatory  cause 
such  as  the  persistence  of  force  and  the  indestructibility 
of  matter  cannot  conceivably  be  made  to  supply.  For 
unless  we  postulate  some  one  integrating  cause,  the 
greater  the  number  of  general  laws  in  nature,  the  less 
likelihood  is  there  of  such  laws  being  so  correlated  as  to 
produce  harmony  by  their  combined  action.  And  for- 
asmuch   as   the  only  cause   that  I  am   able  to  imagine 


8o  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

as  competent  to  produce  sucb.  effects  is  that  of  intelli- 
gent guidance,  I  accept  the  metaphysical  hypothesis  that 
beyond  the  sphere  of  the  Knowable  there  exists  an  Un- 
known God.i 

'  If  it  is  retorted  that  the  above  argument  involves  an 
absurd  contradiction,  in  that  while  it  sets  out  with  an 
explicit  avowal  of  the  fact  that  the  collective  operation  of 
general  laws  follows  as  a  necessary  consequence  from  the 
primary  data  of  physical  science,  it  nevertheless  after- 
wards proceeds  to  explain  an  effect  of  such  collective 
operation  by  a  metaphysical  hypothesis ;  I  answer 
that  it  was  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting 
this  retort  that  I  threw  my  argument  into  the  above 
form.  For  the  position  which  I  wish  to  establish  is  this, 
that  fully  accepting  the  logical  cogency  of  the  reasoning 
whereby  the  action  of  every  law  is  deduced  from  the 
primary  data  of  science,  I  wish  to  show  that  when  this 
train  of  reasoning  is  followed  to  its  ultimate  term,  it  leads 
us  into  the  presence  of  a  fact  for  which  it  is  inadequate  to 
account.  If,  then,  my  contention  be  granted — viz.,  that  to 
human  faculties  it  is  not  conceivable  how,  in  the  absence 
of  a  directing  intelligence,  general  laws  could  be  so  corre- 

1  It  may  here  be  observed  that  the  throughout  this  present  essay  I  have 

above  discussion  would  not  be  affected  use^    the    words    "Natural    Law," 

by   the    view   of   Professor   ClifiEord  "Supreme   Law-giver,"    &c.,   in   an 

and  others,  that  natural  law  is  to  be  apparently  unguarded  sense,  merely 

regarded  as  having  a  subjective  rather  in  order  to  avoid  needless  obscurity, 

than  an  objective  signification— that  Fully  sensible  as  I  am  of  the  mis- 

what  we  call  a  natural  law  is  merely  leading  nature  of  the  analogy  which 

an  arbitrary  selection  made  by  our-  these    words    embody,    I    have    yet 

selves  of  certain  among  natural  pro-  adopted  them  for  the  sake  of  per. 

cesses.     The  discussion  would  not  be  spicuity  —  being     careful,    however, 

affected  by   this   view,   because  the  never    to    allow    the    false    analogy 

argument  is  really  based  upon   the  which  they  express  to  enter  into  an 

existence  of  a  cosmos  as  distinguished  argument    on    either    side     of     the 

from  a  chaos  ;  and  therefore  it  would  question.     Thus,  even    where    it    is 

be  rather  an   intensification  of  the  said  that  the  existence  of  Natural 

argument   than    otherwise   to   point  Law  points   to   the   existence   of    a 

out  that,  for  the  maintenance  of   a  Supreme  Law-maker,  the  argument 

cosmos,  natural  laws,  as  conceived  by  might  equally  well  be  phrased  :  The 

us,  would  be  inadequate.     And  this  existence  of  an  orderly  cosmos  points 

seems  a  fitting  place  to  make  the  to    the    existence     of    a    disposing 

almost     superfluous     remark,     that  mind. 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  8i 

lated  as  to  produce  universal  harmony — then  I  have 
brought  the  matter  to  this  issue : — Notwithstanding  the 
scientific  train  of  argument  being  complete  in  itself,  it  still 
leaves  us  in  the  presence  of  a  fact  which  it  cannot  con- 
ceivably explain ;  and  it  is  this  unexplained  residuum — 
this  total  product  of  the  operation  of  general  laws — that  I 
appeal  to  as  the  logical  justification  for  a  system  of  meta- 
physical teleology — a  system  which  offers  the  only  con- 
ceivable explanation  of  this  stupendous  fact. 

'  And  here  I  may  further  observe,  that  the  scientific  train 
of  reasoning  is  of  the  kind  which  embodies  what  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  calls  "symbolic  conceptions  of  the 
illegitimate  order."  ^  That  is  to  say,  we  can  see  how  such 
simple  laws  as  that  action  and  reaction  are  equal  and 
opposite  may  have  been  self-evolved,  and  from  this  fact 
we  go  on  generalising  and  generalising,  until  we  land  our- 
selves in  wholly  symbolic  and — a  paradox  is  here  legiti- 
mate— inconceivable  conceptions.  Now  the  farther  we 
travel  into  this  res^ion  of  unrealisable  ideas,  the  less  trust- 
worthy  is  the  report  that  we  are  able  to  bring  back.  The 
method  is  in  a  sense  scientific ;  but  when  even  scientific 
method  is  projected  into  a  region  of  really  super-scientific 
possibility,  it  ceases  to  have  that  character  of  undoubted 
certainty  which  it  enjoys  when  dealing  with  verifiable 
subjects  of  inquiry.  The  demonstrations  are  formal,  but 
they  are  not  real. 

'Therefore,  looking  to  this  necessarily  suspicious 
character  of  the  scientific  train  of  reasoning,  and  then 
observing  that,  even  if  accepted,  it  leaves  the  fact  of  cos- 
mic harmony  unexplained,  I  maintain  that  whatever  pro- 
bability the  phenomena  of  nature  may  in  former  times 
have  been  thought  to  establish  in  favour  of  the  theory  as 
to  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  tliat  probability  has 
been  in  no  wise  annihilated — nor  apparently  can  it  ever 
be  annihilated — by  the  advance  of  science.  And  not 
only  so,  but  I  question  whether  this  probability  has  been 

1  First  Principles,  pp.  27-29. 


82  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

even  seriously  impaired  by  such  advance,  seeing  that 
although  this  advance  has  i^vealed  a  speculative  raison 
d'itre  of  the  mechanical  precision  of  nature,  it  has  at  the 
same  time  shown  the  baffling  complexity  of  nature ;  and 
therefore,  in  view  of  what  has  just  been  said,  leaves  the 
balance  of  probability  concerning  the  existence  of  a  God 
very  much  where  it  always  was.  For  stay  awhile  to 
contemplate  this  astounding  complexity  of  harmonious 
nature  !  Think  of  how  much  we  already  know  of  its 
innumerable  laws  and  processes,  and  then  think  that  this 
knowledge  only  serves  to  reveal,  in  a  glimmering  way, 
the  huge  immensity  of  the  unknown.  Try  to  picture  the 
nieshwork  of  contending  rhythms  which  must  have  been 
before  organic  nature  was  built  up,  and  then  let  us  ask, 
Is  it  conceivable,  is  it  credible,  that  all  this  can  have  been 
the  work  of  blind  fate  ?  Must  we  not  feel  that  had  there 
not  been  intelligent  agency  at  work  somewhere,  other  and 
less  terrifically  intricate  results  would  have  ensued  ? 
And  if  we  further  try  to  symbolise  in  thought  the  un- 
imaginable complexity  of  the  material  and  dynamical 
chauges  in  virtue  of  which  that  thought  itself  exists, — if 
we  then  extend  our  symbols  to  represent  all  the  history 
of  all  the  orderly  changes  which  must  have  taken  place 
to  evolve  human  intelligence  into  what  it  is, — and  if  we 
still  further  extend  our  symbols  to  try  if  it  be  possible, 
even  in  the  language  of  symbols,  to  express  the  number 
and  the  subtlety  of  those  natural  laws  which  now  preside 
over  the  human  will ; — in  the  face  of  so  vast  an  assump- 
tion as  that  all  this  has  been  self-evolved,  I  am  content 
still  to  rest  in  the  faith  of  my  forefathers.' 

§  45.  Now  I  think  it  must  be  admitted  that  we  have  here 
a  valid  argument.  That  is  to  say,  the  considerations  which 
we  have  just  adduced  must,  I  think,  in  fairness  be  allowed 
to  have  established  this  position: — That  the  system  of 
metaphysical  teleology  for  which  we  have  supposed  a 
candid  theist  to  plead,  is  something  more  than  a  purely 
gratuitous  system — that  it  does  not  belong  to  the  same 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  83 

category  of  baseless  imaginings  as  that  to  which  the 
atheist  at  first  sight,  and  in  view  of  the  scientific  deduc- 
tions alone,  might  be  inclined  to  assign  it.  For  we  have 
seen  that  our  supposed  theist,  while  fully  admitting  the 
formal  cogency  of  the  scientific  train  of  reasoning,  is 
nevertheless  able  to  point  to  a  fact  which,  in  his  opinion, 
lies  without  that  train  of  reasoninsj.  For  he  declares  that 
it  is  beyond  his  powers  of  conception  to  regard  the  com- 
plex harmony  of  nature  otherwise  than  as  a  product  of 
some  one  integrating  cause;  and  that  the  only  cause  of 
which  he  is  able  to  conceive  as  adequate  to  produce  such 
an  effect  is  that  of  a  conscious  Intelligence.  Pointing, 
therefore,  to  this  complex  harmony  of  nature  as  to  a  fact 
which  cannot  to  his  mind  be  conceivably  explained  by 
any  deductions  from  physical  science,  he  feels  that  he  is 
justified  in  explaining  this  fact  by  the  aid  of  a  meta- 
physical hypothesis.  And  in  so  doing  he  is  in  my  opinion 
perfectly  justified,  at  any  rate  to  this  extent — that  his 
antagonist  cannot  fairly  dispose  of  this  metaphysical 
hypothesis  as  a  purely  gratuitous  hypothesis.  How  far  it 
is  a  probable  hypothesis  is  another  question,  and  to  this 
question  we  shall  now  address  ourselves. 

§  46.  If  it  is  true  that  the  deductions  from  physical 
science  cannot  be  conceived  to  explain  some  among  the 
observed  facts  of  nature,  and  if  it  is  true  that  these 
particular  facts  admit  of  being  conceivably  explained  by 
the  metaphysical  hypothesis  in  question,  then,  beyond  all 
controversy,  this  metaphysical  hypothesis  must  be  pro- 
visionally accepted.  Let  us  then  carefully  examine  the 
premises  which  are  thus  adduced  to  justify  acceptance  of 
this  hypothesis  as  their  conclusion. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  not — cannot — be  denied,  even  by 
a  theist,  that  the  deductions  from  physical  science  do 
embrace  the  fact  of  cosmic  harmony  in  their  explanation, 
seeing  that,  as  they  explain  the  operation  of  general  laws 
collectively,  they  must  be  regarded  as  also  explaining 
every  effect  of  such  operation.     And  this,  as  we  have  seen, 


84  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

is  a  consideration  to  which  our  imaginary  theist  was  not 
blind.  How  then  did  he  meet  it  ?  He  met  it  by  the  con- 
siderations— 1st.  That  the  scientific  train  of  reasoning 
evolved  this  conclusion  only  by  employing,  in  a  wholly 
unrestricted  manner,  "  symbolic  conceptions  of  the  illegi- 
timate order;"  and,  2d.  That  when  the  conclusion  thus 
illegitimately  evolved  was  directly  confronted  with  the 
fact  of  cosmic  harmony  which  it  professes  to  explain,  he 
found  it  to  be  beyond  the  powers  of  human  thought  to 
conceive  of  such  an  effect  as  due  to  such  a  cause.  [N'ow, 
as  already  observed,  I  consider  these  strictures  on  the 
scientific  train  of  reasoning  to  be  thoroughly  valid.  There 
can  be  no  question  that  the  highly  symbolic  character  of 
the  conceptions  which  that  train  of  reasoning  is  compelled 
to  adopt,  is  a  source  of  serious  weakness  to  the  conclusions 
w^hich  it  ultimately  evolves ;  while  there  can,  I  think,  be 
equally  little  doubt  that  there  does  not  live  a  human 
being  who  would  venture  honestly  to  affirm,  that  he  can 
really  conceive  the  fact  of  cosmic  harmony  as  exclusively 
due  to  the  causes  which  the  scientific  train  of  reasoning 
assigns.  But  freely  conceding  this  much,  and  an  atheist 
may  reply,  that  although  the  objections  of  his  antagonist 
against  this  symbolic  method  of  reasoning  are  undoubtedly 
valid,  yet,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  this  is  the  only 
method  of  scientific  reasoning  which  is  available.  If, 
therefore,  he  expresses  his  obligations  to  his  antagonist 
for  pointing  out  a  source  of  weakness  in  this  method  of 
reasoning — a  source  of  weakness,  be  it  observed,  which 
renders  it  impossible  for  him  to  estimate  the  actual,  as 
distinguished  from  the  apparent,  probability  of  the  conclu- 
sion attained — this  is  all  that  he  can  be  expected  to  do  :  he 
cannot  be  expected  to  abandon  the  only  scientific  method 
of  reasoning  available,  in  favour  of  a  metaphysical  method 
which  only  escapes  the  charge  of  symbolism  by  leaping 
with  a  single  bound  from  a  known  cause  (human  intel- 
ligence) to  the  inference  of  an  unknowable  cause  (Divine 
Intelligence).     For  the  atheist  may  well  point  out  that, 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  85 

however  objectionable  his  scientific  method  of  reasoning 
may  be  on  account  of  the  symbolism  which  it  involves,  it 
must  at  any  rate  be  preferable  to  the  metaphysical  method, 
in  that  its  symbols  throughout  refer  to  known  causes.l 
With  regard,  then,  to  this  stricture  on  the  scientific  method 
of  reasoning,  I  conclude  that  although  the  caveat  which  it 
contains  should  never  be  lost  sight  of  by  atheists,  it  is  not 
of  sufficient  cogency  to  justify  theists  in  abandoning  a 
scientific  in  favour  of  a  metaphysical  mode  of  reasoning. 

How  then  does  it  fare  with  the  other  stricture,  or  the  con- 
sideration that,  "  when  the  conclusion  thus  illegitimately  2 
evolved  is  confronted  with  the  fact  of  cosmic  harmony 
which  it  professes  to  explain,  we  find  it  to  be  beyond  the 
powers  of  human  thought  to  conceive  of  such  an  effect  as 
due  to  such  a  cause  "  ?  The  atheist  may  answer,  in  the 
first  place,  that  a  great  deal  here  turns  on  the  precise 
meanino;  which  we  assim  to  the  word  "  conceive."  For 
we  have  just  seen  that,  by  employing  "  symbolic  concep- 
tions," we  are  able  to  frame  what  we  may  term  a  formal 
conception  of  universal  harmony  as  due  to  the  persistence 
of  force  and  the  primary  qualities  of  matter.  That  is  to 
say,  we  have  seen  that  such  universal  harmony  as  nature 
presents  must  be  regarded  as  an  effect  of  the  collective 
operation  of  general  laws  ;  and  we  have  previously  arrived 

I  It  may  be  here  observed  that  this  known,  the  determinate  value  of  sym- 

quality  of  indefiniteness  on  the  part  bols  of  thought  varies  inversely  as  the 

of  such  reasoning  is  merely  a  practical  distance— or,  not  improbably,  as  the 

outcome  of  the  theoretical  considera-  square    of    the    distance— from    the 

tions  adduced  in  Chapter  V.      For  as  sphere  of  the  known  at  which  they 

we  there  saw  that  the  ratio  between  are  applied. 

the  known  and  the  unknown  is  in  ^  i.e.,  illegitimate  in  a  relative 
this  case  wholly  indefinite,  it  follows  sense.  The  conclusion  is  legitimate 
that  any  symbols  derived  from  the  enough  in  a  formal  sense,  and  as 
region  of  the  known— even  though  establishing  a  probability  of  some 
such  symbols  be  the  highest  generali-  unassignable  degree  of  value.  But  it 
ties  which  the  latter  region  affords—  would  be  illegitimate  if  this  quality 
must  be  wholly  indefinite  when  pro-  of  indefiniteness  were  disregarded, 
jected  into  the  region  of  the  unknown,  and  the  conclusion  supposed  to  pos- 
Or  rather  let  us  say,  that  as  the  region  sess  the  same  character  of  actual  pro- 
of the  unknown  is  but  a  progressive  bability  as  it  has  of  formal  defi-ui- 
continuation  of   the   region    of    the  tion. 


86  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

at  a  formal   conception  of  general  laws  as   singly   and 
collectively  the  product  of  self-evolution.     Consequently, 
the  word  "conceive,"  as  used  in  the  theistic  argument, 
must  be  taken  to  mean  our  ability  to  frame  what  we  may 
term  a  material  conception,  or  a  representation  in  thought 
of  the  whole  history  of  cosmic  evolution,  which  represen- 
tation shall  be  in  some  satisfactory  degree  intellectually 
realisable.      Observing,   then,   this   important    difference 
between  an  inconceivability  which  arises  from  an  impossi- 
bility of  establishing  relations  in  thought  between  certain 
abstract  or  syiiibolic  conceptions,  and  an  inconceivability 
which  arises  from  a  mere  failure  to  realise  in  imagination 
the  results  which  must  follow  among  external  relations 
if  the  symbolically  conceivable  combinations  among  them 
ever  took  place,  an  atheist  may  here  argue  as  follows ;  and 
it  does  not  appear  that  there  is  any  legitimate  escape  from 
his  reasonings. 

'I  first  consider  the  undoubted  fact  that  the  existence 
of  a  Supreme  Mind  in  nature  is,  scientifically  considered, 
unnecessary;    and,    therefore,   that   the   only   reason   we 
require  to  entertain  the  supposition  of  any  such  existence 
at  all  is,  that  the  complexity  of  nature  being  so  great,  we 
are  unable  adequately  to  conceive  of  its  self-evolution — 
notwithstanding  our  reason  tells  us  plainly  that,  given  a 
self-existing  universe  of  force  and  matter,  and  such  self- 
evolution  becomes  abstractedly  possible.     I  then  reflect 
that  this  is  a  negative  and  not  a  positive  ground  of  belief. 
If   the  hypothesis   of   self- evolution   is   true,  we  should 
a  priori  expect  that  by  the  time  evolution  had  advanced 
sufficiently  far  to  admit  of  the  production  of  a  reasoning 
intelligence,  the  complexity  of  nature  must  be  so  great 
that  the  nascent  reasoning  powers  would  be  completely 
baffled  in  their  attempts  to  comprehend  the  various  pro- 
cesses going  on  around  them.     This  seems  to  be  about  the 
state  of  things  which  we  now  experience.     Still,  as  reason 
advances  more  and  more,  we  may  expect,  both  from  general 
d_^n(}n  principles  and  from  particular  historical  analogies, 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  87 

that  more  and  more  of  the  processes  of  nature  will  admit 
of  being  interpreted  by  reason,  and  that  in  proportion  as 
our  ability  to  understand  the  frame  and  the  constitution  of 
things  progresses,  so  our  ability  to  conceive  of  them  as 
all  naturally  and  necessarily  evolved  will  likewise  and 
concurrently  progress.  Thus,  for  example,  how  vast  a 
number  of  the  most  intricate  and  delicate  correlations  in 
nature  have  been  rendered  at  once  intelligible  and  con- 
ceivably due  to  non-intelligent  causes,  by  the  discovery  of 
a  single  principle  in  nature — the  principle  of  natural  selec- 
tion. 

'  In  the  adverse  argument,  conceivability  is  again  made 
the  unconditional  test  of  truth,  just  as  it  was  in  the  argu- 
ment against  the  possibility  of  matter  thinking.  We  reject 
the  hypothesis  of  self-evolution,  not  because  it  is  the  more 
remote  one,  but  simply  because  we  experience  a  subjective 
incapacity  adequately  to  frame  the  requisite  generalisa- 
tions in  thought,  or  to  frame  them  with  as  much  clearness 
as  we  could  wish.  Yet  our  reason  tells  us  as  plainly  as  it 
tells  us  any  general  truth  which  is  too  large  to  be  presented 
in  detail,  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  things 
themselves,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  antagonistic  to  the  sup- 
position of  their  having  been  self-evolved.  Only  on  the 
ground,  therefore,  of  our  own  intellectual  deficiencies ;  only 
because  as  yet,  by  the  self-evolutionary  hypothesis,  the  inner 
order  does  not  completely  answer  to  the  outer  order ;  only 
because  the  number  and  complexity  of  subjective  relations 
have  not  yet  been  able  to  rival  those  of  the  objective 
relations  producing  them;  only  on  this  ground  do  we 
refuse  to  assent  to  the  obvious  deductions  of  our  reason.^ 

1  In  order  not  to  burden  the  text  general  statement  of    the   atheistic 

•with  details,  I  have  presented  these  position    includes    all    more    special 

reflections     in    their    most    general  considerations  as  a  genus  includes  its 

terms.     Thus,  if  it  be  granted  that  species  ;  and  therefore  it  would  not 

cosmic    harmony    results    from     the  signify,    for    the     purposes    of    the 

combined  action  of  general  laws,  and  atheistic   argument,   whether  or  not 

that   these   laws   are   the    necessary  any  such  more  special  considerations 

result   of   the   primary   qualities    of  are  possible.     Nevertheless,  for  the 

force    and    matter,    this    the    most  sake   of   completeness,   I    may  here 


88 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 


'  And  here  I  may  observe,  further,  that  the  presumption 
in  favour  of  atheism  which  these  deductions  establish 
is  considerably  fortified  by  certain  d  joosteriori  considera- 
tions which  we  cannot  afford  to  overlook.  In  particular, 
I  reflect  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  theistic  theory  is 
born  of  highly  suspicious  parentage, — that  Fetichism,  or 
the   crudest  form  of  the  theory  of   personal   agency  in 


observe,  that  we  are  not  wholly  with- 
out indications  in  nature  of  the 
physical  causation  whereby  the  effect 
of  cosmic  harmony  is  iDroduced.  The 
universal  tendency  of  motion  to  be- 
come rhythmical  —  itself,  as  Mr. 
Spencer  was  the  first  to  show,  a  ne- 
cessary consequence  of  the  persistence 
of  force — is,  so  to  speak,  a  conserva- 
tive tendency  :  it  sets  a  premium 
against  natural  cataclysms.  But  a 
more  important  consideration  is  this, 
— tliat  during  the  evolution  of  natural 
law  in  the  way  suggested  in  Chapter 
IV. ,  as  every  newly  evolved  law  came 
into  existence  it  must  have  been, 
as  it  were,  grafted  on  the  stock  of  all 
pre-existing  natural  laws,  and  so 
would  not  enter  the  cosmic  system  as 
an  element  of  confusion,  but  rather  as 
an  element  of  further  progress.  For 
instance,  when,  with  the  origin  of 
organic  nature,  the  law  of  natural  se- 
lection entered  upon  the  cosmos,  it 
was  grafted  upon  the  pre-existing 
stock  of  other  natural  laws,  and  so 
combined  within  them  in  unity. 
And  a  little  thought  will  show  that 
it  was  impossible  that  it  should  do 
otherwise  ;  for  it  was  impossible  that 
natural  selection  could  ever  produce 
organisms  which  would  ever  be  able 
by  their  existence  to  conflict  with  the 
pre-existing  system  of  astronomic  or 
geologic  laws  ;  seeing  that  organisms, 
being  a  product  of  later  evolution 
than  these  laws,  would  either  have 
to  be  adapted  to  them  or  perish. 
And  hence  the  new  law  of  natural 
selection,  which  consists  in  so  adapt- 
ing organisms  to  the  pre-existing  laws 
that   they  must  either    conform  to 


them  or  die.  Now,  I  have  chosen 
the  case  of  natural  selection,  because, 
as  alluded  to  in  the  text,  it  is  the 
law  of  all  others  which  is  the  most 
conspicuously  effective  in  producing 
the  harmonious  complexity  of  nature. 
But  the  same  kind  of  considerations 
may  be  seen  to  apply  to  most  of  the 
other  general  laws  with  which  we  are 
acquainted,  particularly  if  we  bear 
in  mind  that  the  general  outcome  of 
their  united  action  as  we  observe  it — 
the  cosmic  harmony  on  which  so  much 
stress  is  laid — is  not  perfectly  har- 
monious. Cataclysms — whether  it  be 
the  capture  of  an  insect,  or  the  ruin 
of  a  star— although  events  of  com- 
paratively rare  occurrence  if  at  any 
given  time  we  take  into  account  the 
total  number  of  insects  or  the  total 
number  of  stars,  are  events  whicli 
nevertheless  do  occasionally  happen. 
And  the  fact  that  even  cataclysms 
take  place  in  accordance  with  so-called 
natural  law,  serves  but  to  emphasise 
the  consideration  on  which  we  are 
engaged— viz.,  that  the  total  result 
of  the  combined  action  of  general 
laws  is  not  such  as  to  j^roduce  perfect 
order.  Lastly,  if  the  answer  is  made 
that  human  ideas  of  perfect  order 
may  not  correspond  with  the  highest 
ideal  of  such  order,  I  observe  that  to 
make  such  an  answer  is  merely  to 
abandon  the  subject  of  discussion  ; 
for  if  a  theist  rests  his  argument  on 
the  basis  of  our  human  conception  of 
order,  he  is  not  free  to  maintain  his 
argument  and  at  the  same  time  to 
abandon  its  basis  at  whatever  point 
the  latter  mny  be  shown  untenable. 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  89 

external  nature,  admits  of  being  easily  traced  to  the  laws 
of  a  primitive  psychology;  that  the  step  from  this  to 
Polytheism  is  easy ;  and  that  the  step  from  this  to  Mono- 
theism is  necessary.  If  it  is  objected  to  this  view  that  it 
does  not  follow  that  because  some  theories  of  personal 
agency  have  proved  themselves  false,  therefore  all  such 
theories  must  be  so — I  answer,  Unquestionably  not ;  but 
the  above  considerations  are  not  adduced  in  order  to 
negative  the  theistic  theory :  they  are  merely  adduced  to 
show  that  the  human  mind  has  hitherto  undoubtedly 
exhibited  an  undue  and  a  vicious  tendency  to  interpret 
the  objective  processes  of  nature  in  terms  of  its  own  sub- 
jective processes  ;  and  as  we  can  see  quite  well  that  the 
current  theory  of  personal  agency  in  nature,  whether  or  not 
true,  is  a  necessary  outcome  of  intellectual  evolution,  I 
think  that  the  fact  of  so  abundant  an  historical  analogy 
ousht  to  be  allowed  to  lend  a  certain  degree  of  antecedent 
suspicion  to  this  theory — although,  of  course,  the  suspicion 
is  of  a  kind  which  would  admit  of  immediate  destruction 
before  any  satisfactory  positive  evidence  in  favour  of  the 
theory.l 

'  But  what  is  '  the  satisfactory  positive  evidence  '  that 
is  offered  me?  Nothing,  save  an  alleged  subjective  in- 
capacity on  the  part  of  my  opponent  adequately  to  con- 
ceive of  the  fact  of  cosmic  harmony  as  due  to  physical 
causation  alone.  Now  I  have  already  commented  on 
the  weakness  of  his  position;  but  as  my  opponent  will 
doubtless  resort  to  the  consideration  that  inconceivability 
of  an  opposite  is,  after  all,  the  best  criterion  of  truth  which 
at  any  given  stage  of  intellectual  evolution  is  available,  I 
will  now  conclude  my  overthrow  by  pointing  out  that,  even 
if  we  take   the  argument  from   teleology  in   its   widest 

1  [Since  the  above  was  written,  the  more  connected  and  conclusive  man- 
first  volume  of  Mr.  Spencer's  "Soci-  ner  than  has  ever  been  shown  before, 
ology "  has  been  published  ;  and  how  strictly  natural  is  the  growth  of 
those  who  may  not  as  yet  have  read  all  superstitious  and  religions— i.e., 
the  first  half  of  that  work  are  here  of  all  the  theories  of  personal  agency 
strongly  recommended  to  do  so  ;  for  in  nature. — 1878.] 
Mr.   Spencer  has  there  shown,  in  a 


90  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

possible  sense — the  argument,  I  mean,  from  the  general 
order  and  beauty  of  nature,  as  well  as  the  gross  con- 
stituent part  of  it  from  design — even  taking  this  argument 
in  its  widest  sense  and  upon  its  own  ground  (which 
ground,  I  presume,  it  is  now  sufficiently  obvious  can  only 
be  that  of  the  inconceivability  of  its  negation),  I  will  con- 
clude my  examination  of  this  argument  by  showing  that 
it  is  quite  as  inconceivable  to  predicate  cosmic  harmony 
an  effect  of  Intelligence,  as  it  is  to  predicate  it  an  effect  of 
Non-intelligence  ;  and  therefore  that  the  argument  from 
inconceivability  admits  of  being  turned  with  quite  as 
terrible  a  force  upon  Theism  as  it  can  be  made  to  exert 
upon  Atheism. 

' "  In  metaphysical  controversy,  many  of  the  propositions 
propounded  and  accepted  as  quite  believable  are  absolutely 
inconceivable.  There  is  a  perpetual  confusing  of  actual 
ideas  with  what  are  nothing  but  pseud-ideas.  I^o  distinc- 
tion is  made  between  propositions  that  contain  real 
thoughts  and  propositions  that  are  only  the  forms  of 
thoughts.  A  thinkable  proposition  is  one  of  which  the 
two  terms  can  he  hrought  together  in  consciousness  under  the 
relation  said  to  exist  hetween  them.  But  very  often,  when 
the  subject  of  a  proposition  has  been  thought  of  as  some- 
thing known,  and  when  the  predicate  of  a  proposition  has 
been  thought  of  as  something  known,  and  when  the  rela- 
tion alleged  between  them  has  been  thought  of  as  a 
known  relation,  it  is  supposed  that  the  proposition  itself 
has  been  thought.  The  thinking  separately  of  the  ele- 
ments of  a  proposition  is  mistaken  for  the  thinking  of 
them  in  the  combination  which  the  proposition  affirms. 
And  hence  it  continually  happens  that  propositions  which 
cannot  be  rendered  into  thought  at  aU  are  supposed  to  be 
not  only  thought  but  believed.  The  proposition  that 
Evolution  is  caused  by  Mind  is  one  of  this  nature.  The 
two  terms  are  separately  intelligible;  but  they  can  be 
regarded  in  the  relation  of  effect  and  cause  only  so  long 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  91 

as  no  attempt  is  made  to  put  them  together  in  this 
relation. 

' "  The  only  thing  which  any  one  knows  as  Mind  is  the 
series  of  his  own  states  of  consciousness ;  and  if  he  thinks 
of  any  mind  other  than  his  own,  he  can  think  of  it  only 
in  terms  derived  from  his  own.  If  I  am  asked  to  frame  a 
notion  of  Mind  divested  of  all  those  structural  traits 
under  which  alone  I  am  conscious  of  mind  in  myself,  I 
cannot  do  it.  I  know  nothing  of  thought  save  as  carried 
on  in  ideas  originally  traceable  to  the  effects  wrought  by 
objects  on  me.  A  mental  act  is  an  unintelligible  phrase  if  I 
am  not  to  regard  it  as  an  act  in  which  states  of  conscious- 
ness are  severally  known  as  like  other  states  in  the  series 
that  has  gone  by,  and  in  which  the  relations  between 
them  are  severally  known  as  like  past  relations  in  the 
series.  If,  then,  I  have  to  conceive  evolution  as  caused 
by  an  '  originating  Mind,'  I  must  conceive  this  Mind  as 
having  attributes  akin  to  those  of  the  only  mind  I  know, 
and  without  which  I  cannot  conceive  mind  at  all. 

* "  I  will  not  dwell  on  the  many  incongruities  hence 
resulting,  by  asking  how  the  '  originating  Mind '  is  to  be 
thought  of  as  having  states  produced  by  things  objective 
to  it,  as  discriminating  among  these  states,  and  classing 
them  as  like  and  unlike ;  and  as  preferring  one  objective 
result  to  another.  I  will  simply  ask.  What  happens  if 
we  ascribe  to  the  '  orimnatino-  Mind '  the  character 
absolutely  essential  to  the  conception  of  mind,  that  it 
consists  of  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness  ?  Put  a 
series  of  states  of  consciousness  as  cause  and  the  evolv- 
ing universe  as  effect,  and  then  endeavour  to  see  the  last 
as  flowing  from  the  first.  I  find  it  possible  to  imagine  in 
some  dim  way  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness  serving  as 
antecedent  to  any  one  of  the  movements  I  see  going  on ; 
for  my  own  states  of  consciousness  are  often  indirectly 
the  antecedents  to  such  movements.  But  how  if  I 
attempt  to  think  of  such  a  series  as  antecedent  to  all 
actions  throughout  the  universe — to  the  motions  of  the 


92  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

multitudinous  stars  throughout  space,  to  the  revolutions 
of  all  their  planets  round  them,  to  the  gyrations  of  all 
these  planets  on  their  axes,  to  the  infinitely  multiplied 
physical  processes  going  on  in  each  of  these  suns  and 
planets?  I  cannot  think  of  a  single  series  of  states  of 
consciousness  as  causing  even  the  relatively  small  groups 
of  actions  going  on  over  the  earth's  surface.  I  cannot 
think  of  it  even  as  antecedent  to  all  the  various  winds 
and  the  dissolving  clouds  they  bear,  to  the  currents  of  all 
the  rivers,  and  the  grinding  actions  of  all  the  glaciers  ; 
still  less  can  I  think  of  it  as  antecedent  to  the  infinity  of 
processes  simultaneously  going  on  in  all  the  plants  that 
cover  the  globe,  from  scattered  polar  lichens  to  crowded 
tropical  palms,  and  in  all  the  millions  of  quadrupeds  that 
roam  among  them,  and  the  millions  of  millions  of  insects 
that  buzz  about  them.  Even  a  single  small  set  of  these 
multitudinous  terrestrial  changes  I  cannot  conceive  as 
antecedent  a  single  series  of  states  of  consciousness — 
cannot,  for  instance,  think  of  it  as  causing  the  hundred 
thousand  breakers  that  are  at  this  instant  curling  over  on 
the  shores  of  England.  How,  then,  is  it  possible  for  me  to 
conceive  an  'originating  Mind,'  which  I  must  represent 
to  myself  as  a  single  series  of  states  of  consciousness, 
working  the  infinitely  multiplied  sets  of  changes  simul- 
taneously  going  on  in  worlds  too  numerous  to  count,  dis- 
persed throughout  a  space  that  baffles  imagination  ? 

' "  If,  to  account  for  this  infinitude  of  physical  changes 
everywhere  going  on,  '  Mind  must  be  conceived  as  there ' 
'under  the  guise  of  simple  Dynamics,'  then  the  reply 
is,  that,  to  be  so  conceived,  Mind  must  be  divested 
of  all  attributes  by  which  it  is  distinguished ;  and  that, 
when  thus  divested  of  its  distinguishing  attributes,  the 
conception  disappears — the  word  Mind  stands  for  a 
blank.  .  .  . 

'  "  Clearly,  therefore,  the  proposition  that  an  '  originat- 
ing Mind '  is  the  cause  of  evolution  is  a  proposition  that 
can  be  entertained  so  long  only  as  no  attempt  is  made  to 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  93 

unite  in  thous^ht  its  two  terms  in  the  allecjed  relation. 
That  it  should  be  accepted  as  a  matter  of  faitli  may  be  a 
defensible  position,  provided  good  cause  is  shown  why  it 
should  be  so  accepted ;  but  that  it  should  be  accepted  as 
a  matter  of  tender  standing — as  a  statement  making  the 
order  of  the  universe  comprehensible — is  a  quite  inde- 
fensible position." '  1 

§  47.  We  have  now  heard  the  pleading  on  both  sides 
of  the  ultimate  issue  to  which  it  is  possible  that  the 
argument  from  teleology  can  ever  be  reduced.  It  there- 
fore devolves  on  us  very  briefly  to  adjudicate  upon  the 
contending  opinions.  And  this  it  is  not  difficult  to  do ; 
for  throughout  the  pleading  on  both  sides  I  have  been 
careful  to  exclude  all  arguments  and  considerations  which 
are  not  logically  valid.  It  is  therefore  impossible  for 
me  now  to  pass  any  criticisms  on  the  pleading  of  either 
side  which  have  not  already  been  passed  by  the  pleading 
of  the  other.  But  nevertheless,  in  my  capacity  of  an 
impartial  judge,  I  feel  it  desirable  to  conclude  this 
chapter  with  a  few  general  considerations. 

In  the  first  place,  I  think  that  the  theist^s  antecedent 
objection  to  a  scientific  mode  of  reasoning  on  the  score 
of  its  symbolism,  may  be  regarded  as  fairly  balanced  by 
the  atheist's  antecedent  objection  to  a  metaphysical  mode 
of  reasoning  on  the  score  of  its  postulating  an  unknow- 
able cause.  And  it  must  be  allowed  that  the  force  of  this 
antecedent  objection  is  considerably  increased  by  the  re- 
flection that  the  kind  of  unknowable  cause  which  is  thus 
postulated  is  that  which  the  human  mind  has  always 
shown  an  overweening  tendency  to  postulate  as  a  cause 
of  natural  phenomena. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  neither  disputant  has  the  right 
to  regard  the  a  priori  standing  of  his  opponent's  theory 
as  much  more  suspicious  than  that  of  his  own ;  for  it  is 
obvious  that  neither  disputant  has  the  means  whereby  to 
estimate  the  actual  value  of  these  antecedent  objections. 

1  Herbert  Spencer's  Essays,  vol.  iii.  pp.  246-249  (1874). 


94  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

With  regard,  then,  to  the  a  posteriori  evidence  in  favour 
of  the  rival  theories,  I  think  that  the  final  test  of  their 
validity — i.e.,  the  inconceivability  of  their  respective 
negations — fails  equally  in  the  case  of  both  theories  ;  for 
in  the  case  of  each  theory  any  proposition  which  embodies 
it  must  itself  contain  an  infinite,  i.e.,  an  inconceivable — 
term.  Thus,  whether  w^e  speak  of  an  Infinite  Mind  as 
the  cause  of  evolution,  or  of  evolution  as  due  to  an  infinite 
duration  of  physical  processes,  we  are  alike  open  to  the 
charge  of  employing  unthinkable  propositions. 

Hence,  two  unthinkables  are  presented  to  our  choice ;  one 
of  which  is  an  eternity  of  matter  and  of  force,i  and  the  other 
an  Infinite  Mind,  so  that  in  this  respect  again  the  two 
theories  are  tolerably  parallel ;  and  therefore,  all  that  can 
be  concluded  with  rigorous  certainty  upon  the  subject  is, 
that  neither  theory  has  anything  to  gain  as  against  the 
other  from  an  appeal  to  the  test  of  inconceivability. 

Yet  we  have  seen  that  this  is  a  test  than  which  none 
can  be  more  ultimate.  What  then  shall  we  say  is  the 
final  outcome  of  this  discussion  concerning  the  rational 
standing  of  the  teleological  argument  ?  The  answer,  I 
think,  to  this  question  is,  that  in  strict  reasoning  the 
teleological  argument,  in  its  every  shape,  is  inadequate 
to  form  a  basis  of  Theism ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the 


1  This   is   the   truly   inconceivable  infinite  in  respect  of   its  powers   of 

element  in  the  physical  theory.     As  supervision,    direction,  &c.  ;  but  the 

I   have   shown   in   the    pleading    on  statement  also  involves   a  necessary 

the  side  of  Atheism,   the    supposed  alternative      between      two      addi- 

inconceivability   of   cosmic   harmony  tional     inconceivable    propositions — 

being  due  to  mindless  forces,  is  not  viz.,    either  that  such  a  Mind  must 

of  such  a  kind  as  wholly  refuses  to  have   been   eternal,    or  that  it  must 

be    surmounted    by    symbolic     con-  have  come  into  existence  without  a 

ceptions    of    a    sufficiently    abstract  cause.     In  this  respect,  therefore,  it 

character.     But  it  is  impossible,  by  would  seem  that  the  theory  of  Athe- 

the   aid   of   any   symbols,  to   gain  a  ism  has  the  advantage   over  that  of 

conception   of  an   eternal   existence.  Theism  ;  for  while  the  former  theory 

And   I   may  here   point  out,  that  if  is  under  the  necessity  of  embodying 

Mind    is    said    to    be    the   cause   of  only  a  single  inconceivable  term,  the 

evolution,    not  only  does   th^   s  ate-  latter  theory  is  under  tlie  necessity 

ment  involve  the  inconceivable  pro-  of  embodying  two  such  terms, 
position  that  such  a   Miud  must   be 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  95 

logical  cogency  of-  this  argument  is  insufficient  to  justify 
a  wholly  impartial  mind  in  accepting  the  theory  of  Theism 
on  so  insecure  a  foundation.  Nevertheless,  if  the  further 
question  were  directly  put  to  me,  'After  having  heard 
the  pleading  both  for  and  against  the  most  refined  ex- 
pression of  the  argument  from  teleology,  with  what  degree 
of  strictly  rational  probability  do  you  accredit  it  ? ' — I 
should  reply  as  follows : — '  The  question  which  you  put  I 
take  to  be  a  question  which  it  is  wholly  impossible  to 
answer,  and  this  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  degree 
of  even  rational  probability  may  here  legitimately  vary 
with  the  character  of  the  mind  which  contemplates  it.' 
This  statement,  no  doubt,  sounds  paradoxical ;  but  I  think 
it  is  justified  by  the  following  considerations.  When  we 
say  that  one  proposition  is  more  conceivable  than  another, 
we  may  mean  either  of  two  very  different  things,  and  this 
quite  apart  from  the  distinction  previously  drawn  be- 
tween symbolic  conceptions  and  realisable  conceptions. 
For  we  may  mean  that  one  of  the  two  propositions  pre- 
sents terms  which  cannot  possibly  be  rendered  into 
thought  at  all  in  the  relation  which  the  proposition 
alleges  to  subsist  between  them;  or  we  may  mean  that 
one  of  the  two  propositions  presents  terms  in  a  relation 
which  is  more  congruous  with  the  habitual  tenor  of  our 
thoughts  than  does  the  other  proposition.  Thus,  as  an 
example  of  the  former  usage,  we  may  say,  It  is  more 
conceivable  that  two  and  two  should  make  four  than 
that  two  and  two  should  make  five ;  and,  as  an  example 
of  the  latter  usage,  we  may  say,  It  is  more  conceiv- 
able that  a  man  should  be  able  to  walk  than  that  he 
should  be  able  to  fly.  Now,  for  the  sake  of  distinction, 
I  shall  call  the  first  of  these  usages  the  test  of  absolute 
inconceivability,  and  the  second  the  test  of  relative  in- 
conceivability. Doubtless,  when  the  word  "inconceiva- 
bility "  is  used  in  the  sense  of  relative  inconceivability,  it 
is  incorrectly  used,  unless  it  is  qualified  in  some  way; 
because,  if  used  without  qualification,  there  is  danger  of 


96 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 


its  being  confused  with  inconceivability  in  its  absolute 
sense.  Nevertheless,  if  used  with  some  qualifying  epithet, 
it  becomes  quite  unexceptionable.  For  the  process  of  con- 
ception being  in  all  cases  the  process  of  establishing 
relations  in  thought,  we  may  properly  say,  It  is  relatively 
more  conceivable  that  a  man  should  walk  than  that  a 
man  should  fly,  since  it  is  more  easy  to  establish  the 
necessary  relations  in  thought  in  the  case  of  the  former 
than  in  the  case  of  the  latter  proposition.  The  only 
difference,  then,  between  what  I  have  called  absolute 
inconceivability  and  what  I  have  called  relative  incon- 
ceivability consists  in  this — that  while  the  latter  admits 
of  degrees,  the  former  does  not.i 


1  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  treated 
of  this  subject  in  his  memorable  con- 
troversy with  Mill  on  the  "Universal 
Postulate  "  (see  Psychology,  §  427), 
and  refuses  to  entertain  the  term 
"  Inconceivable  "  as  applicable  to  any 
propositions  other  than  those  where- 
in "the  terms  cannot,  by  any  effort, 
be  brought  before  consciousness  in 
that  relation  which  the  proposition 
asserts  between  them."  That  is  to 
say,  he  limits  the  term  "  Inconceiv- 
able "  to  that  which  is  absolutely 
inconceivable  ;  and  he  then  proceeds 
to  affirm  that  all  propositions  "which 
admit  of  being  framed  in  thought, 
but  which  are  so  much  at  variance 
with  experience,  in  which  its  terms 
have  habitually  been  otherwise  unit- 
ed, that  its  terms  cannot  be  put  in 
the  alleged  relation  without  effort," 
ought  properly  to  be  termed  "  in- 
credible''' propositions.  Now  I  can- 
not see  that  the  class  "Incredible 
propositions "  is,  as  this  definition 
asserts,  identical  with  the  class  which 
I  have  termed  "  Relatively  inconceiv- 
able "  projiositions.  For  example,  it 
is  a  familiar  observation  that,  on  look- 
ing at  the  setting  sun,  we  experience 
an  almost,  if  not  quite,  insuperable 
difficulty  in  conceiving  the  sun's  ap- 
parent motion  as  due  to  our  own 
actual  motion,  and  yet  we  experience 


no  difficulty  in  believing  it.  Con- 
versely, I  entertain  but  little  diffi- 
culty in  conceiving — i.e.,  imagining— 
a  shark  with  a  mammalian  heart,  and 
yet  it  would  require  extremely  strong 
evidence  to  make  me  believe  that  such 
an  animal  exists.  The  truth  appears 
to  be  that  our  language  is  deficient 
in  terms  whereby  to  distinguish  be- 
tween that  which  is  wholly  incon- 
ceivable from  that  which  is  with 
difficulty  conceivable.  This,  it  seems 
to  me,  was  the  principal  reason  of 
the  dispute  between  Spencer  and 
Mill  above  alluded  to, — the  former 
writer  having  always  used  the  word 
"Inconceivable"  in  the  sense  of 
"  Absolutely  inconceivable,"  and  the 
latter  having  apparently  used  it — 
in  his  Logic  and  elsewhere — in  both 
senses.  I  have  endeavoured  to  remedy 
this  defect  in  the  language  by  intro- 
ducing the  qualifying  words,  "Abso- 
lutely "  and  "Eelatively,"  which, 
although  not  appropriate  words,  are 
the  best  that  I  am  able  to  supply. 
The  conceptive  faculty  of  the  indi- 
vidual having  been  determined  by  the 
experience  of  the  race,  that  which  is 
inconceivable  by  the  intelligence  of 
the  race  may  be  said  to  be  inconceiv- 
able to  tlie  intelligence  of  the  indi- 
vidual in  an  absolute  sense  ;  no  effort 
on  his  part  can  enable  him  to  sur- 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY,  97 

With  this  distinction  clearly  understood,  I  may  now 
proceed  to  observe  that  in  everyday  life  we  constantly 
apply  the  test  of  relative  inconceivability  as  a  test  of 
truth.  And  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  this  test  of 
relative  inconceivability  is,  for  all  practical  purposes,  as 
valid  a  test  of  truth  as  is  the  test  of  absolute  conceiv- 
ability.  For  as  every  man  is  more  or  less  in  harmony 
with  his  environment,  his  habits  of  thought  with  regard 
to  his  environment  are  for  the  most  part  stereotyped  cor- 
rectly ;  so  that  the  most  ready  and  the  most  trustworthy 
gauge  of  probability  that  he  has  is  an  immediate  appeal 
to  consciousness  as  to  whether  he  feels  the  probability. 
Thus  every  man  learns  for  himself  to  endow  his  own 
sense  of  probability  with  a  certain  undefined  but  massive 
weight  of  authority.  Now  it  is  this  test  of  relative  con- 
ceivability  which  all  men  apply  in  varying  degrees  to  the 
question  of  Theism.  For  if,  from  education  and  organised 
habits  of  thought,  the  probability  in  this  matter  appears 
to  a  man  to  incline  in  a  certain  direction,  when  this  pro- 
bability is  called  in  question,  the  whole  body  of  this 
organised  system  of  thought  rises  in  opposition  to  the 
questioning,  and  being  individually  conscious  of  this 
strong  feeling  of  subjective  opposition,  the  man  declares 
the  sceptical  propositions  to  be  more  inconceivable  to  him 
than  are  the  counter-propositions.  And  in  so  saying  he 
is,  of  course,  perfectly  right.  Hence  I  conceive  that  the 
acceptance  or  the  rejection  of  metaphysical  teleology  as 
probable  will  depend  entirely  upon  individual  habits  of 
thought.     The  test  of  absolute   inconceivability  making 

mount  the  organically  imposed  con-  which  the  individual  intelligence  has 

ditions    of    his    conceptive    faculty,  been  subjected,  there  is  nothing  in 

But     that    which     is     inconceivable  the  conditions  of  human  intelligence 

merely  to  one  individual  or  genera-  as   such   to  prevent  the  thing  from 

tion,  while  it  is  not  inconceivable  to  being  conceived.     [While   this  work 

the    intelligence    of    the    race,    m^y  has  been  passing  through  the  press,  I 

properly  be  said  to  be  inconceivable  have  found  that  Mr,  G.  H.  Lewes  has 

to  the  intelligence  of  that  individual  already  employed  the  above  terms  in 

or  generation  only  in  a  relative  sense  ;  precisely  the  same  sense  as  that  which 

apart  from  the  special  conditions  to  is  above  explained. — 1878.] 

G 


98  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

equally  for  and  against  the  doctrine  of  Theism,  disputants 
are  compelled  to  fall  back  on  the  test  of  relative  incon- 
ceivability ;  and  as  the  direction  in  which  the  more 
inconceivable  proposition  will  here  seem  to  lie  will  be 
determined  by  previous  habits  of  thought,  it  follows  that 
while  to  a  theist  metaphysical  teleology  will  appear  a 
probable  argument,  to  an  atheist  it  will  appear  an  impro- 
bable one.  Thus  to  a  theist  it  will  no  doubt  appear  more 
conceivable  that  the  Supreme  Mind  should  be  such  that 
in  some  of  its  attributes  it  resembles  the  human  mind, 
while  in  other  of  its  attributes — among  which  he  will 
place  omnipresence,  omnipotence,  and  directive  agency 
— it  transcends  the  human  mind  as  greatly  as  the  latter 
"  transcends  mechanical  motion ; "  and  therefore  that 
althoudi  it  is  true,  as  a  matter  of  los^ical  terminolocjy,  that 
we  ought  to  designate  such  an  entity  "Not  mind"  or 
"  Blank,"  still,  as  a  matter  of  psychology,  we  may  come 
nearer  to  the  truth  by  assimilating  in  thought  this  entity 
w^ith  the  nearest  analogies  which  experience  supplies,  than 
by  assimilating  it  in  thought  with  any  other  entity — 
such  as  force  or  matter — which  are  felt  to  be  in  all  likeli- 
hood still  more  remote  from  it  in  nature.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  an  atheist  it  will  no  doubt  appear  more  conceiv- 
able, because  more  simple,  to  accept  the  dogma  of  an 
eternal  self-existence  of  something  which  we  call  force 
and  matter,  and  with  this  dogma  to  accept  the  implication 
of  a  necessary  self- evolution  of  cosmic  harmony,  than  to 
resort  to  the  additional  and  no  less  inconceivable  supposi- 
tion of  a  self-existing  Agent  which  must  be  regarded  both  as 
Mind  and  as  ISTot-mind  at  the  same  time.  But  in  both  cases, 
in  whatever  degree  this  test  of  relative  inconceivability  of  a 
negative  is  held  by  the  disputants  to  be  valid  in  solving 
the  problem  of  Theism,  in  that  degree  is  each  man  entitled 
to  his  respective  estimate  of  the  probability  in  question. 
And  thus  we  arrive  at  the  judgment  that  the  rational 
probability  of  Theism  legitimately  varies  with  the  charac- 
ter of  the  mind  which  contemplates  it.     For,  as  the  test  of 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  99 

absolute  inconceivability  is  equally  anniliilative  in  which- 
ever direction  it  is  applied,  the  test  of  relative  inconceiv- 
ability is  the  only  one  that  remains ;  and  as  the  formal 
conditions  of  a  metaphysical  teleology  are  undoubtedly 
present  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  formal  conditions  of  a 
physical  explanation  of  cosmic  harmony  are  no  less  un- 
doubtedly present  on  the  other  hand,  it  follows  that  a 
theist  and  an  atheist  have  an  equal  right  to  employ  this 
test  of  relative  inconceivability.  And  as  there  is  no  more 
ultimate  court  of  appeal  whereby  to  decide  the  question 
than  the  universe  as  a  whole,  each  man  has  here  an 
equal  argumentative  right  to  abide  by  the  decision  which 
that  court  awards  to  him  individually — to  accept  what- 
ever probability  the  sum-total  of  phenomena  appears  to 
present  to  his  particular  understanding.  And  it  is  need- 
less to  say  that  experience  shows,  even  among  well- 
informed  and  accurate  reasoners,  how  large  an  allowance 
must  thus  be  made  for  personal  equations.  To  some  men 
the  facts  of  external  nature  seem  to  proclaim  a  God  with 
clarion  voice,  while  to  other  men  the  same  facts  bring  no 
whisper  of  such  a  message.  All,  therefore,  that  a  logician 
can  here  do  is  to  remark,  that  the  individuals  in  each 
class — provided  they  bear  in  mind  the  strictly  relative 
character  of  their  belief — have  a  similar  right  to  be  re- 
garded as  holding  a  rational  creed :  the  grounds  of  belief 
in  this  case  logically  vary  w^ith  the  natural  disposition 
and  the  subsequent  training  of  different  minds.^ 

It  only  remains  to  show  that  disputants  on  either  side 

1  I  should  here  like  to  have  added  physical     science.       The     question, 

some  consideration  on  Sir  W.  Hamil-  however,  is,   "Which  class  of  studies 

ton's  remarks  concerning  the  effect  ought    to    be    considered    the   more 

of  training  upon  the   mind   in   this  authoritative  in  this  matter?     I  cer- 

connection  ;  but,  to  avoid  being  tedi-  tainly  cannot  see  what  title  classics, 

OU.S,   I   shall  condense  what  I  have  history,  political  economy,  &c.,  have 

to  say  into  a  few  sentences.     "What  to  be  regarded  at  all ;  and  although 

Hamilton    maintains    is    very   true,  the  mental  and  moral  sciences  have 

viz.,  that  the  study  of  classics,  moral  doubtless  a  better  claim,  still  I  think 

and  mental  philosophy,  &c.,  renders  they  must  be  largely  subordinate  to 

the  mind  more  capable  of  believing  those  sciences  which  deal  with  the 

in  a  God  than   does   the   study  of  whole    domain    of    nature    besides. 


loo  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM 

are  apt  to  endow  this  test  of  relative  inconceivability 
with  far  more  than  its  real  logical  worth.  Being  ac- 
customed to  apply  this  test  of  truth  in  daily  life,  and 
there  finding  it  a  trustworthy  test,  most  men  are  apt  to 
forget  that  its  value  as  a  test  must  clearly  diminish  in 
proportion  to  the  distance  from  experience  at  which  it  is 
applied.  This,  indeed,  we  saw  to  be  the  case  even  with 
the  test  of  absolute  inconceivability  (see  Chapter  V.),  but 
much  more  must  it  be  the  case  with  this  test  of  relative 
inconceivability.  For,  without  comment,  it  is  manifest 
that  our  acquired  sense  of  probability,  as  distinguished 
from  our  innate  sense  of  possibility,  with  regard  to  any 
particular  question  of  a  transcendental  nature,  cannot  be 
at  all  comparable  with  its  value  in  the  case  of  ordinary 
questions,  with  respect  to  which  our  sense  of  probability 
is  being  always  rectified  by  external  facts.  Although, 
therefore,  it  is  true  that  both  those  who  reject  and  those 
who  retain  a  belief  in  Theism  on  grounds  of  relative  con- 
ceivability  are  equally  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  display- 
ing a  rational  attitude  of  mind,  in  whatever  degree  either 
party  considers  their  belief  as  of  a  higher  validity  than 
the  grounds  of  psychology  from  which  it  takes  its  rise,  in 
that  degree  must  the  members  of  that  party  be  deemed 
irrational.  In  other  words,  not  only  must  a  man  be  care- 
ful not  to  confuse  the  test  of  relative  inconceivability 
with  that  of  absolute  conceivability — not  to  suppose  that 
his  sense  of  probability  in  this  matter  is  determined  by 
an  innate  psychological  inability  to  conceive  a  proposition, 
when  in  reality  it  is  only  determined  by  the  difficulty  of 
dissociating  ideas  which  have  long  been  habitually  asso- 
ciated;— but  he  must  also  be  careful  to  remember  that 
the  test  of  relative  inconceivability  in  this  matter  is  only 

Further,   I  should  say  that  there  is  because  we  so  seldom  find  classics, 

no  very  strong  affirmative  influence  &c.,  and  physical  science  united  ;  the 

created  on  the  mind  in  this  respect  negative  influence   of  the  latter,  in 

by  any  class  of  studies  ;  and  that  the  the   case   of    classical    minds,   being 

only  reason  why  we  so  generally  find  therefore  generally  absent. 
Theism  and  classics,  &c.,  united,  is 


METAPHYSICAL  TELEOLOGY.  loi 

valid  as  justifying  a  belief  of  the  most  diffident  possible 
kind. 

And  from  tins  the  practical  deduction  is — tolerance. 
Let  no  man  think  that  he  has  any  argumentative  right  to 
expect  that  the  mere  subjective  habit  or  tone  of  his  own 
mind  should  exert  any  influence  on  that  of  his  fellow ; 
but  rather  let  him  always  remember  that  the  only  legiti- 
mate weapons  of  his  intellectual  warfare  are  those  the 
material  of  which  is  derived  from  the  external  world,  and 
only  the/orm  of  which  is  due  to  the  forging  process  of  his 
own  mind.  And  if  in  battle  such  weapons  seem  to  be 
unduly  blunted  on  the  hardened  armoury  of  traditional 
beliefs,  or  on  the  no  less  hardened  armoury  of  confirmed 
scepticism,  let  him  remember  further  that  he  must  not 
too  confidently  infer  that  the  fault  does  not  lie  in  the 
character  of  his  own  weapons.  To  drop  the  figure,  let 
none  of  us  forget  in  how  much  need  we  all  stand  of  this 
caution : — Knowing  how  greatly  the  value  of  arguments  is 
affected,  even  to  the  most  impartial  among  us,  by  the 
frame  of  mind  in  which  we  regard  them,  let  all  of  us  be 
jealously  careful  not  to  over-estimate  the  certainty  that  our 
frame  or  habit  of  mind  is  actually  superior  to  that  of  our 
neighbour.  And,  in  conclusion,  it  is  surely  needless  to 
insist  on  the  yet  greater  need  there  is  for  most  of  us  to 
bear  in  mind  this  further  caution : — Knowing  with  what 
great  subjective  opposition  arguments  are  met  when  they 
conflict  with  our  established  modes  of  thought,  let  us  all 
be  jealously  careful  to  guard  the  sanctuary  of  our  judg- 
ment from  the  polluting  tyranny  of  habit. 


(      102      ) 


CHAPTER  VII. 

GENERAL   SUMMARY  AND    CONCLUSIONS. 

§  48.  Our  analysis  is  now  at  an  end,  and  a  very  few 
words  will  here  suffice  to  convey  an  epitomised  recollection 
of  the  numerous  facts  and  conclusions  which  we  have 
found  it  necessary  to  contemplate.  We  first  disposed  of 
the  conspicuously  absurd  supposition  that  the  origin  of 
things,  or  the  mystery  of  existence,  admits  of  being  ex- 
plained by  the  theory  of  Theism  in  any  further  degree 
than  by  the  theory  of  Atheism.  'Next  it  was  shown  that 
the  argument  "  Our  heart  requires  a  God "  is  invalid, 
seeing  that  such  a  subjective  necessity,  even  if  made  out, 
could  not  be  sufficient  to  prove — or  even  to  render  pro- 
bable— an  objective  existence.  And  with  regard  to  the 
further  argument  that  the  fact  of  our  theistic  aspirations 
point  to  God  as  to  their  explanatory  cause,  it  became 
necessary  to  observe  that  the  argument  could  only  be 
admissible  after  the  possibility  of  the  operation  of  natural 
causes  had  been  excluded.  Similarly  the  argument  from 
the  supposed  intuitive  necessity  of  individual  thought 
was  found  to  be  untenable,  first,  because,  even  if  the  sup- 
posed necessity  were  a  real  one,  it  would  only  possess  an 
individual  applicability;  and  second,  that,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  it  is  extremely  improbable  that  the  supposed  necessity 
is  a  real  necessity  even  for  the  individual  who  asserts  it, 
while  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  it  is  not  such  to  the 
vast  majority  of  the  race.  The  argument  from  the 
general  consent  of  mankind,  being  so  obviously  fallacious 
both  as  to  facts  and  principles,  was  passed  over  without 


GENERAL  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS.     103 

comment;  while  the  argument  from  a  first  cause  was 
found  to  involve  a  logical  suicide.  Lastly,  the  argument 
that,  as  human  volition  is  a  cause  in  nature,  therefore  all 
causation  is  probably  volitional  in  character,  was  shown 
to  consist  in  a  stretch  of  inference  so  outrageous  that  the 
argument  had  to  be  pronounced  worthless. 

Proceeding  next  to  examine  the  less  superficial  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  Theism,  it  was  first  shown  that  the 
syllogism.  All  known  minds  are  caused  by  an  unknown 
mind ;  our  mind  is  a  known  mind ;  therefore  our  mind  is 
caused  by  an  u.nknown  mind, — is  a  syllogism  that  is  inad- 
missible for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  "it  does  not 
account  for  mind  (in  the  abstract)  to  refer  it  to  a  prior 
mind  for  its  origin ; "  and  therefore,  although  the  hypo- 
thesis, if  admitted,  would  be  an  explanation  of  hnoiun  mind, 
it  is  useless  as  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  the  un- 
known mind,  the  assumption  of  which  forms  the  basis  of 
that  explanation.  Again,  in  the  next  place,  if  it  be  said 
that  mind  is  so  far  an  entity  sui  generis  that  it  must  be 
either  self-existing  or  caused  by  another  mind,  there  is  no 
assignable  w^arrant  for  the  assertion.  And  this  is  the 
second  objection  to  the  above  syllogism;  for  anything 
within  the  whole  range  of  the  possible  may,  for  aught 
that  we  can  tell,  be  competent  to  produce  a  self-conscious 
intelligence.  Thus  an  objector  to  the  above  syllogism 
need  not  hold  any  theory  of  things  at  all ;  but  even  as 
opposed  to  the  definite  theory  of  materialism,  the  above 
syllogism  has  not  so  valid  an  argumentative  basis  to  stand 
upon.  We  know  that  what  w^e  call  matter  and  force  are 
to  all  appearance  eternal,  while  we  have  no  corresponding 
evidence  of  a  "  mind  that  is  even  apparently  eternal." 
Turther,  within  experience  mind  is  invariably  associated 
with  highly  differentiated  collocations  of  matter  and  dis- 
tributions of  force,  and  many  facts  go  to  prove,  and  none 
to  negative,  the  conclusion  that  the  grade  of  intelligence 
invariably  depends  upon,  or  at  least  is  associated  with, 
a  corresponding  grade  of  cerebral  development.     There  is 


I04  GENERAL  SUMMARY 

thus  both  a  qualitative  and  a  quantitative  relation  between 
intelligence  and  cerebral  organisation.  And  if  it  is  said 
that  matter  and  motion  cannot  produce  consciousness 
because  it  is  inconceivable  that  they  should,  we  have  seen 
at  some  length  that  this  is  no  conclusive  con.sideration  as 
applied  to  a  subject  of  a  confessedly  transcendental  nature, 
and  that  in  the  present  case  it  is  particularly  inconclusive, 
because,  as  it  is  speculatively  certain  that  tlie  substance 
of  mind  must  be  unknowable,  it  seems  a  'priori  probable 
that,  whatever  is  the  cause  of  the  unknowable  reality,  this 
cause  should  be  more  difficult  to  render  into  thought  in 
that  relation  than  would  some  other  hypothetical  substance 
which  is  imagined  as  more  akin  to  mind.  And  if  it  is 
said  that  the  more  conceivable  cause  is  the  more  probable 
cause,  we  have  seen  that  it  is  in  this  case  impossible  to 
estimate  the  validity  of  the  remark.  Lastly,  the  state- 
ment that  the  cause  must  contain  actually  all  that  its 
effects  can  contain,  was  seen  to  be  inadmissible  in  logic 
and  contradicted  by  everyday  experience;  while  the 
argument  from  the  supposed  freedom  of  the  will  and  the 
existence  of  the  moral  sense  was  negatived  both  deductively 
by  the  theory  of  evolution,  and  inductively  by  the  doctrine 
of  utilitarianism.  On  the  whole,  then,  with  regard  to  the 
argument  from  the  existence  of  the  human  mind,  we  were 
compelled  to  decide  that  it  is  destitute  of  any  assignable 
weight,  there  being  nothing  more  to  lead  to  the  conclusion 
that  our  mind  has  been  caused  by  another  mind,  than  to 
the  conclusion  that  it  has  been  caused  by  anything  else 
whatsoever. 

With  regard  to  the  argument  from  Design,  it  was 
observed  that  Mill's  presentation  of  it  is  merely  a  resus- 
citation of  the  argument  as  presented  by  Paley,  Bell, 
and  Chalmers,  And  indeed  we  saw  that  the  first-named 
writer  treated  this  whole  subject  with  a  feebleness  and 
inaccuracy  very  surprising  in  him ;  for  while  he  has  failed 
to  assign  anything  like  due  weight  to  the  inductive 
evidence  of  organic  evolution,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  rush 


AND  CONCLUSIONS.  105 

into  a  supernatural  explanation  of  biological  phenomena. 
Moreover,  he  has  failed  signally  in  his  analysis  of  the 
Design  argument,  seeing  that,  in  common  with  all  previous 
writers,  he  failed  to  observe  that  it  is  utterly  impossible 
for  us  to  know  the  relations  in  which  the  supposed 
Designer  stands  to  the  Designed, — much  less  to  argue 
from  the  fact  that  the  Supreme  Mind,  even  supposing  it  to 
exist,  caused  the  observable  products  by  any  particular 
intellectual  process.  In  other  words,  all  advocates  of  the 
Design  argument  have  failed  to  perceive  that,  even  if 
we  grant  nature  to  be  due  to  a  creating  Mind,  still  we 
have  no  shadow  of  a  right  to  conclude  that  this  Mind 
can  only  have  exerted  its  creative  power  by  means  of  such 
and  such  cogitative  operations.  How  absurd,  therefore, 
must  it  be  to  raise  the  supposed  evidence  of  such  cogita- 
tive operations  into  evidences  of  the  existence  of  a  creating 
Mind !  If  a  tlieist  retorts  that  it  is,  after  all,  of  very  little 
importance  whether  or  not  we  are  able  to  divine  the 
methods  of  creation,  so  long  as  \hQ  facts  are  there  to  attest 
that,  in  some  way  or  other,  the  observable  phenomena  of 
nature  must  be  due  to  Intelligence  of  some  kind  as  their 
ultimate  cause,  then  I  am  the  first  to  endorse  this  re- 
mark. It  has  always  appeared  to  me  one  of  the  most 
unaccountable  things  in  the  history  of  speculation  that  so 
many  competent  writers  can  have  insisted  upon  Design 
as  an  argument  for  Theism,  when  they  must  all  have 
known  perfectly  well  that  they  have  no  means  of  ascer- 
taining the  subjective  psychology  of  that  Supreme  Mind 
whose  existence  the  argument  is  adduced  to  demonstrate. 
The  truth  is,  that  the  argument  from  teleology  must,  and 
can  only,  rest  upon  the  observable  ^ac^s  of  nature,  without 
reference  to  the  intellectual  processes  by  which  these  facts 
may  be  supposed  to  have  been  accomplished.  But,  look- 
ing to  the  "  present  state  of  our  knowledge,"  this  is  merely 
to  change  the  teleological  argument  from  its  gross 
Paleyerian  form,  into  the  argument  from  the  ubiquitous 
operation  of  general  laws.     And  we  saw  that  this  trans- 


io6  GENERAL  SUMMARY 

formation  is  now  a  rational  necessity.  How  far  the  great 
principle  of  natural  selection  may  have  been  instrumental 
in  the  evolution  of  organic  forms,  is  not  here,  as  Mill 
erroneously  imagined,  the  question ;  the  question  is  simply 
as  to  whether  we  are  to  accept  the  theory  of  special 
creation  or  the  theory  of  organic  evolution.  And  forasmuch 
as  no  competent  judge  at  the  present  time  can  hesitate  for 
one  moment  in  answering  this  question,  the  argument 
from  a  proximate  teleology  must  be  regarded  as  no  longer 
having  any  rational  existence. 

How  then  does  it  fare  with  the  last  of  the  arguments — 
the  argument  from  an  ultimate  teleology  ?  Doubtless  at 
first  sight  this  argument  seems  a  very  powerful  one,  inas- 
much as  it  is  a  generic  argument,  which  embraces  not  only 
biological  phenomena,  but  all  the  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse. But  nevertheless  we  are  constrained  to  acknow- 
ledge that  its  apparent  power  dwindles  to  nothing  in  view 
of  the  indisputable  fact  that,  if  force  and  matter  have  been 
eternal,  all  and  every  natural  law  must  have  resulted  by 
way  of  necessary  consequence.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  I  dwelt  at  considerable  length  and  with  much  earnest- 
ness upon  this  truth,  not  only  because  of  its  enormous 
importance  in  its  bearing  upon  our  subject,  but  also  be- 
cause no  one  has  hitherto  considered  it  in  that  relation. 

The  next  step,  however,  was  to  mitigate  the  severity  of 
the  conclusion  that  was  liable  to  be  formed  upon  the  utter 
and  hopeless  collapse  of  all  the  possible  arguments  in 
favour  of  Theism.  Having  fully  demonstrated  that  there 
is  no  shadow  of  a  positive  argument  in  support  of  the 
theistic  theory,  there  arose  the  danger  that  some  persons 
might  erroneously  conclude  that  for  this  reason  the  theistic 
theory  must  be  untrue.  It  therefore  became  necessary  to 
point  out,  that  although,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  nature  does 
not  require  an  Intelligent  Cause  to  account  for  any  of  her 
phenomena,  yet  it  is  possible  that,  if  we  could  see  farther, 
we  should  see  that  nature  could  not  be  what  she  is  unless 
she  had  owed  her  existence  to  an  Intelligent  Cause.     Or, 


AND  CONCLUSIONS.  107 

in  other  words,  the  probability  there  is  that  an  Intelligent 
Cause  is  unnecessary  to  explain  any  of  the  phenomena  of 
nature,  is  only  equal  to  the  probability  there  is  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  force  is  everywhere  and 
eternally  true. 

As  a  final  step  in  our  analysis,  therefore,  we  altogether 
quitted  the  region  of  experience,  and  ignoring  even  the 
very  foundations  of  science,  and  so  all  the  most  certain 
of  relative  truths,  we  carried  the  discussion  into  the 
transcendental  region  of  purely  formal  considerations. 
And  here  we  laid  down  the  canon,  "  that  the  value  of  any 
probability,  in  its  last  analysis,  is  determined  by  the 
number,  the  importance,  and  the  definiteness  of  the 
relations  known,  as  compared  with  those  of  the  relations 
unknown;"  and,  consequently,  that  in  cases  where  the 
unknown  relations  are  more  numerous,  more  important,  or 
more  indefinite  than  are  the  known  relations,  the  value  of 
our  inference  varies  inversely  as  the  difference  in  these 
respects  between  the  relations  compared.  From  which 
canon  it  followed,  that  as  the  problem  of  Theism  is  the 
most  ultimate  of  all  problems,  and  so  contains  in  its 
unknown  relations  all  that  is  to  man  unknown  and  un- 
knowable, these  relations  must  be  pronounced  the  most 
indefinite  of  all  relations  that  it  is  possible  for  man  to 
contemplate  ;  and,  consequently,  that  although  we  have 
here  the  entire  range  of  experience  from  which  to  argue, 
we  are  unable  to  estimate  the  real  value  of  any  argument 
whatsoever.  The  unknown  relations  in  our  attempted 
induction,  being  wholly  indefinite,  both  in  respect  of  their 
number  and  importance,  as  compared  with  the  known 
relations,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  determine  any  definite 
probability  either  for  or  against  the  being  of  a  God. 
Therefore,  although  it  is  true  that,  so  far  as  human  science 
can  penetrate  or  human  thought  infer,  we  can  perceive  no 
evidence  of  God,  yet  we  have  no  right  on  this  account  to 
conclude  that  there  is  no  God.  The  probability,  therefore, 
that  nature  is  devoid  of  Deity,  while  it  is  of  the  strongest 


io8  GENERAL  SUMMARY 

kind  if  regarded  scientifically — amounting,  in  fact,  to  a 
scientific  demonstration, — is  nevertheless  wholly  worthless 
if  regarded  logically.  ISTotwithstanding  it  is  as  true  as  is 
the  fundamental  basis  of  all  science  and  of  all  experience 
that,  if  there  is  a  God,  his  existence,  considered  as  a  cause 
of  the  universe,  is  superfluous,  it  may  nevertheless  be 
true  that,  if  there  had  never  been  a  God,  the  universe 
could  never  have  existed. 

Hence  these  formal  considerations  proved  conclusively 
that,  no  matter  how  great  the  probability  of  Atheism  might 
appear  to  be  in  a  relative  sense,  we  have  no  means  of 
estimating  such  probability  in  an  absolute  sense.  From 
which  position  there  emerged  the  possibility  of  another 
argument  in  favour  of  Theism — or  rather  let  us  say,  of 
a  reappearance  of  the  teleological  argument  in  another 
form.  For  it  may  be  said,  seeing  that  these  formal 
considerations  exclude  legitimate  reasoning  either  for  or 
against  Deity  in  an  absolute  sense,  while  they  do  not 
exclude  such  reasoning  in  a  relative  sense,  if  there  yet 
remain  any  theistic  deductions  which  may  properly  be 
drawn  from  experience,  these  may  now  be  adduced  to 
balance  the  atheistic  deductions  from  the  persistence  of 
force.  For  although  the  latter  deductions  have  clearly 
shown  the  existence  of  Deity  to  be  superfluous  in  a 
scientific  sense,  the  formal  considerations  in  question 
have  no  less  clearly  opened  up  beyond  the  sphere  of 
science  a  possible  locus  for  the  existence  of  Deity;  so 
that  if  there  are  any  facts  supplied  by  experience  for 
which  the  atheistic  deductions  appear  insufiicient  to 
account,  we  are  still  free  to  account  for  them  in  a  relative 
sense  by  the  hypothesis  of  Theism.  And,  it  may  be  urged, 
we  do  find  such  an  unexplained  residuum  in  the  correla- 
tion of  general  laws  in  the  production  of  cosmic  harmony. 
It  signifies  nothing,  the  argument  may  run,  that  we  are 
unable  to  conceive  the  methods  whereby  the  supposed 
Mind  operates  in  producing  cosmic  harmony ;  nor  does  it 
signify  that  its  operation   must  now  be  relegated  to  a 


AND  CONCLUSIONS.  109 

super- scientific   province.      What   does   signify   is   that, 
taking  a  general  view  of  nature,  we  find  it  impossible  to 
conceive   of   the   extent  and  variety  of   her  harmonious 
processes  as  other  than  products  of  intelligent  causation. 
jSTow  this  sublimated  form  of  the  teleological  argument,  it 
will  be  remembered,  I  denoted  a  metaphysical  teleology, 
in  order  sharply  to  distinguish  it  from  all  previous  forms 
of  that  argument,  which,  in  contradistinction  I  denoted 
scientific   teleologies.     And   the   distinction,   it   will    be 
remembered,  consisted  in  this — that  while  all  previous 
forms  of  teleology,  by  resting  on  a  basis  w^hich  was  not 
beyond  the  possible  reach  of  science,  laid  themselves  open 
to   the    possibility    of    scientific    refutation,   the    meta- 
physical system  of  teleology,  by  resting  on  a  basis  which 
is  clearly  beyond  the  possible  reach  of  science,  can  never 
be  susceptible   of   scientific   refutation.     And   that   this 
metaphysical   system   of  teleology  does   rest  on  such  a 
basis  is  indisputable ;  for  while  it  accepts  the  most  ulti- 
mate truths  of  which  science  can  ever  be  cognisant — viz., 
the  persistence  of  force  and  the  consequently  necessary 
genesis  of  natural  law, — it  nevertheless  maintains   that 
the  necessity  of  regarding  Mind  as  the  ultimate  cause  of 
things  is  not  on  this  account  removed;  and,  therefore, 
that  if  science  now  requires  the  operation  of  a  Supreme 
Mind  to  be  posited  in  a  super-scientific  sphere,  then  in  a 
super-scientific  sphere  it  ought  to  be  posited.     ISTo  doubt 
this  hypothesis  at  first  sight  seems  gratuitous,  seeing  that, 
so  far  as  science  can  penetrate,  tliere  is  no  need  of  any 
such  hypothesis  at  all — cosmic  harmony  resulting  as   a 
physically   necessary   consequence    from    the    combined 
action  of  natural  laws,  which  in  turn  result  as  a  physically 
necessary  consequence  of  the  persistence  of  force  and  the 
primary   qualities   of   matter.     But   although   it  is  thus 
indisputably  true  that  metaphysical  teleology  is  wholly 
gratuitous  if  considered  scientifically,  it  may  not  be  true 
that  it  is  wholly  gratuitous  if  considered  psychologically. 
In  other  w^ords,  if  it  is  more  conceivable  that  Mind  should 


no  GENERAL  SUMMARY 

be  the  ultimate  cause  of  cosmic  harmony  than  that  the 
persistence  of  force  should  be  so,  then  it  is  not  irrational 
to  accept  the  more  conceivable  hypothesis  in  preference 
to  the  less  conceivable  one,  provided  that  the  choice  is 
made  with  the  diffidence  which  is  required  by  the  con- 
siderations adduced  in  Chapter  V. 

I  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  hypothesis  of  metaphy- 
sical teleology,  although  in  a  physical  sense  gratuitous, 
may  be  in  a  psychological  sense  legitimate.  But  as  against 
the  fundamental  position  on  which  alone  this  argument 
can  rest — viz.,  the  position  that  the  fundamental  postulate 
of  Atheism  is  more  inconcdvaUe  than  is  the  fundamen- 
tal postulate  of  Theism — we  have  seen  two  important 
objections  to  lie. 

For,  in  the  first  place,  the  sense  in  which  the  word 
"  inconceivable  "  is  here  used  is  that  of  the  impossibility 
of  framing  realisctble  relations  in  the  thought ;  not  that  of 
the  impossibility  of  framing  ahstract  relations  in  thought. 
In  the  same  sense,  though  in  a  lower  degree,  it  is  true 
that  the  complexity  of  the  human  organisation  and  its 
functions  is  inconceivable  ;  but  in  this  sense  the  word 
''inconceivable"  has  much  less  weight  in  an  argument 
than  it  has  in  its  true  sense.  And,  without  waiting  as^ain 
to  dispute  (as  we  did  in  the  case  of  the  speculative 
standing  of  Materialism)  how  far  even  the  genuine  test 
of  inconceivability  ought  to  be  allowed  to  make  against 
an  inference  which  there  is  a  body  of  scientific  evidence  to 
substantiate,  we  went  on  to  the  second  objection  against 
this  fundamental  position  of  metaphysical  teleology. 
This  objection,  it  will  be  remembered,  was,  that  it  is  as 
impossible  to  conceive  of  cosmic  harmony  as  an  effect  of 
Mind,  as  it  is  to  conceive  of  it  as  an  effect  of  mindless 
evolution.  The  argument  from  inconceivability,  there- 
fore, admits  of  being  turned  with  quite  as  terrible  an 
effect  on  Theism,  as  it  can  possibly  be  made  to  exert  on 
Atheism. 

Hence  this  more  refined  form  of  teleology  which  we 


AND  CONCLUSIONS.  in 

are  considering,  and  which  we  saw  to  be  the  last  of  the 
possible  arguments  in  favour  of  Theism,  is  met  on  its 
own  ground  by  a  very  crushing  opposition :  by  its  meta- 
physical character  it  has  escaped  the  opposition  of  physical 
science,  only  to  encounter  a  new  opposition  in  the  region 
of  pure  psychology  to  which  it  fled.  As  a  conclusion  to 
our  whole  inquiry,  therefore,  it  devolved  on  us  to  deter- 
mine the  relative  magnitudes  of  these  opposing  forces. 
And  in  doing  this  we  first  observed  that,  if  the  supporters 
of  metaphysical  teleology  objected  a  'priori  to  the  method 
whereby  the  genesis  of  natural  law  was  deduced  from 
the  datum  of  the  persistence  of  force,  in  that  this  method 
involved  an  unrestricted  use  of  illegitimate  symbolic  con- 
ceptions ;  then  it  is  no  less  open  to  an  atheist  to  object 
a  priori  to  the  method  whereby  a  directing  Mind  was 
inferred  from  the  datum  of  cosmic  harmony,  in  that 
this  method  involved  the  postulation  of  an  unknowable 
cause, — and  this  of  a  character  which  the  whole  history 
of  human  thought  has  proved  the  human  mind  to  exhibit 
an  overweening  tendency  to  postulate  as  the  cause  of 
natural  phenomena.  On  these  grounds,  therefore,  I 
concluded  that,  so  far  as  their  respective  standing  a  priori 
is  concerned,  both  theories  may  be  regarded  as  about 
equally  suspicious.  And  similar  with  regard  to  their 
standing  a  posteriori;  for  as  both  theories  require  to 
embody  at  least  one  infinite  term,  they  must  each  alike 
be  pronounced  absolutely  inconceivable.  But,  finally,  if 
the  question  were  put  to  me  which  of  the  two  theories  I 
regarded  as  the  more  rational,  I  observed  that  this  is  a 
question  which  no  one  man  can  answer  for  another.  For 
as  the  test  of  absolute  inconceivability  is  equally  destruc- 
tive of  both  theories,  if  a  man  wishes  to  choose  between 
them,  his  choice  can  only  be  determined  by  what  I  have  de- 
signated relative  inconceivability — i.e.,  in  accordance  with 
the  verdict  given  by  his  individual  sense  of  probability 
as  determined  by  his  previous  habits  of  thought.  And 
forasmuch  as  the  test  of  relative  inconceivability  may  be 


112  GENERAL  SUMMARY 

held  in  this  matter  legitimately  to  vary  with  the  char- 
acter of  the  mind  which  applies  it,  the  strictly  rational 
probability  of  the  question  to  which  it  is  applied  varies 
in  like  manner.  Or,  otherwise  presented,  the  only 
alternative  for  any  man  in  this  matter  is  either  to 
discipline  himself  into  an  attitude  of  pure  scepticism,  and 
thus  to  refuse  in  thought  to  entertain  either  a  probability 
or  an  improbability  concerning  the  existence  of  a  God; 
or  else  to-  incline  in  thought  towards  an  affirmation  or  a 
negation  of  God,  according  as  his  previous  habits  of 
thought  have  rendered  such  an  inclination  more  facile  in 
the  one  direction  than  in  the  other.  And  althoug^h,  under 
such  circumstances,  I  should  consider  that  man  the  more 
rational  who  carefully  suspended  his  judgment,  I  conclude 
that  if  this  course  is  departed  from,  neither  the  meta- 
physical teleologist  nor  the  scientific  atheist  has  any 
perceptible  advantage  over  the  other  in  respect  of 
rationality.  For  as  the  formal  conditions  of  a  metaphy- 
sical teleology  are  undoubtedly  present  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  formal  conditions  of  a  speculative  atheism  are 
as  undoubtedly  present  on  the  other,  there  is  thus  in  both 
cases  a  logical  vacuum  supplied  wherein  the  pendulum 
of  thought  is  free  to  swing  in  whichever  direction  it  may 
be  made  to  swing  by  the  momentum  of  preconceived  ideas. 
§  49.  Such  is  the  outcome  of  our  investigation,  and  con- 
sidering the  abstract  nature  of  the  subject,  the  immense 
divergence  of  opinion  w^hich  at  the  present  time  is  mani- 
fested with  regard  to  it,  as  well  as  the  confusing  amount 
of  good,  bad,  and  indifferent  literature  on  both  sides  of  the 
controversy  which  is  extant ; — considering  these  things,  I 
do  not  think  that  the  result  of  our  inquiry  can  be  justly 
complained  of  on  the  score  of  its  lacking  precision.  At  a 
time  like  the  present,  when  traditional  beliefs  respecting 
Theism  are  so  generally  accepted  and  so  commonly  con- 
cluded, as  a  matter  of  course,  to  have  a  large  and  valid 
basis  of  induction  whereon  to  rest,  I  cannot  but  feel  that 
a  perusal  of  this  short  essay,  by  showing  how  very  concise 


AND  CONCLUSIONS.  113 

the  scientific  status  of  tlie  subject  really  is,  will  do  more 
to  settle  the  minds  of  most  readers  as  to  the  exact  stand- 
ing at  the  present  time  of  all  the  probabilities  of  the 
question,  than  could  a  perusal  of  all  the  rest  of  the 
literature  upon  this  subject.  And,  looking  to  the  present 
condition  of  speculative  philosophy,  I  regard  it  as  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  have  clearly  shown  that  the  advance 
of  science  has  now  entitled  us  to  assert,  without  the  least 
hesitation,  that  the  hypothesis  of  Mind  in  nature  is  as 
certainly  superfluous  to  account  for  any  of  the  phenomena 
of  nature,  as  the  scientific  doctrine  of  the  persistence  of 
force  and  the  indestructibility  of  matter  is  certainly  true. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  any  one  is  inclined  to  complain 
that  the  logical  aspect  of  the  question  has  not  proved  itself 
so  unequivocally  definite  as  has  the  scientific,  I  must  ask 
him  to  consider  that,  in  any  matter  which  does  not  admit 
of  actual  demonstration,  some  margin  must  of  necessity 
be  left  for  variations  of  individual  opinion.  And,  if  he 
bears  this  consideration  in  mind,  I  feel  sure  that  he  can- 
not properly  complain  of  my  not  having  done  my  utmost 
in  this  case  to  define  as  sharply  as  possible  the  character 
and  the  limits  of  this  margin. 

§  54.  And  now,  in  conclusion,  I  feel  it  is  desirable  to  state 
that  any  antecedent  bias  with  regard  to  Theism  which 
I  individually  possess  is  unquestionably  on  the  side  of 
traditional  beliefs.  Fit  is  therefore  with  the  utmost  sorrow 
that  I  find  mysen  compelled  to  accept  the  conclusions 
here  worked  out ;  and  nothing  would  have  induced  me  to 
publish  them,  save  the  strength  of  my  conviction  that  it 
is  the  duty  of  every  member  of  society  to  give  his  fellows 
the  benefit  of  his  labours  for  whatever  they  may  be  worthj 
Just  as  I  am  confident  that  truth  must  in  the  end  be  the 
most  profitable  for  the  race,  so  I  am  persuaded  that  every 
individual  endeavour  to  attain  it,  provided  only  that  such 
endeavour  is  unbiassed  and  sincere,  ought  without  hesi- 
tation to  be  made  the  common  property  of  all  men,  no 
matter   in  what  direction   the   results  of   its   promulga- 

H 


114     GENERAL  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS. 

tion  may  appear  to  tend.     And  so  far  as  the  ruination  of 
individual  happiness  is  concerned,  no  one  can  have  a  more 
lively  perception  than  myself  of  the  possibly  disastrous 
tendency  of  my  work.     So  far  as  I  am  individually  con- 
cerned, the  result  of  this  analysis  has  been  to  show  that, 
whether  I   regard  the  problem  of   Theism  on  the  lower 
plane  of  strictly  relative  probability,  or  on  the  higher  plane 
of   purely  formal  considerations,  it  equally  becomes  my 
obvious  duty  to  stifle  all  belief  of  the  kind  which  I  con- 
ceive to  be  the  noblest,  and  to  discipline  my  intellect  with 
regard   to   this   matter   into   an   attitude   of    the   purest 
scepticism.     And  forasmuch  as  I  am  far  from  being  able 
to  agree  with  those  who  affirm  that  the  twilight  doctrine 
of  the  "new  faith"  is  a  desirable  substitute  for  the  wan- 
ing splendour  of  "  the  old,"(I_  am  not  ashamed  to  confess 
that   with   this   virtual  necration   of   God   the    universe 
to   me   has   lost   its   soul   of   lovelinessjj    and    although 
from  henceforth  the  precept  to  "  work  while  it  is  day " 
will   doubtless   but   gain   an   intensified   force  from  the 
terribly  intensified  meaning  of  the  words  that  "  the  night 
Cometh  when  no  man  can  work,"  yet  when  at  times  {T 
think,  as  think  at  times  I  must,  of  the  appalling  contrasT* 
between  the  hallowed  glory  of  that  creed  which  once  was 
mine,  and  the  lonely  mystery  of  existence  as  now  I  find 
it,  —  at   such  times    I    shall  ever   feel   it   impossible   to 
avoid  the  sharpest  pang  of  which  my  nature  is  suscep- 
tible.     For  whether   it   be    due   to   my  intelligence  not 
being  sufficiently  advanced  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
the   age,  or  whether  it  be  due  to  the  memory  of   those 
sacred  associations  which  to  me  at  least  were  the  sweetest 
that  life  has  given,  I  cannot  but  feel  that  for  me,  and  for 
others  who  think  as  I  do,  there  is  a  dreadful  truth  in  those 
words  of  Hamilton, — Philosophy  having  become  a  medita- 
tion, not  merely  of  death,  but  of  annihilation,  the  precept 
Icnow  thy  self  \\d,^  become  transformed  into  the  terrific  oracle 
to  (Edipus —  *— 

"  Mayest  thou  ne'er  know  the  truth  of  what  thou  art."  I ' 


APPENDIX 

AND 

SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSAYS. 


(     117    ) 


APPENDIX 


A  CKITICAL  EXPOSITION  OF  A  FALLACY  IN  LOCKE'S 
USE  OF  THE  AEGUMENT  AGAINST  THE  POSSI- 
BILITY OF  MATTER  THINKING  ON  GROUNDS  OF 
ITS  BEING  INCONCEIVABLE  THAT  IT  SHOULD. 

Lest  it  should  be  thought  that  I  am  doing  injustice  to 
the  Views  of  this  illustrious  theist,  T  here  quote  his  own 
words  : — "  We  have  the  ideas  of  matter  and  thinking,  but 
possibly  shall  never  be  able  to  know  whether  any  mere 
material  being  thinks  or  no,  it  being  impossible  for  us,  by 
the  contemplation  of  our  own  ideas,  without  revelation,  to 
discover  whether  omnipotency  has  not  given  to  some 
systems  of  matter  fitly  disposed  a  power  to  perceive  and 
think,  or  else  joined  and  fixed  to  matter  so  disposed  a 
thinking  immaterial  substance ;  it  being,  in  respect  of  our 
notions,  not  much  more  remote  from  our  comprehension 
to  conceive  that  God  can,  if  He  pleases,  superadd  to  mat- 
ter a  faculty  of  thinking,  than  that  He  should  superadd  to 
it  another  substance  with  a  faculty  of  thinking ;  since  we 
know  not  wherein  thinking  consists,  nor  to  what  sort  of 
substance  the  Almighty  has  been  pleased  to  give  that 
power,  which  cannot  be  in  any  created  being,  but  merely 
by  the  good  pleasure  and  bounty  of  the  Creator.  Eor  I 
see  no  contradiction  in  it  that  the  first  eternal  thinking 
being  should,  if  he  pleased,  give  to  certain  systems  of 
created  senseless  matter,  put  together  as  he  thinks  fit, 
some  degrees  of  sense,  perception,  and  thought :  though, 
as  I  think,  I  have  proved,  lib.  iv.,  ch.  lo  and  14,  &c.,  it 


1/8  A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION. 

is  no  less  than  a  contradiction  to  suppose  matter  (which 
is  evidently  in  its  own  nature  void  of  sense  and  thought) 
should  be  that  eternal  first-thinking  being.  What  cer- 
tainty of  knowledge  can  any  one  have  that  some  percep- 
tions, such  as,  e.g.,  pleasure  and  pain,  should  not  be  in 
some  bodies  themselves,  after  a  certain  manner  modified 
and  moved,  as  well  as  that  they  should  be  in  an  imma- 
terial substance  upon  the  motion  of  the  parts  of  body  ? 
Body,  as  far  as  we  can  conceive,  being  able  only  to  strike' 
and  affect  body;  and  motion,  according  to  the  utmost 
reach  of  our  ideas,  being  able  to  produce  nothing  but 
motion :  so  that  w^hen  w^e  allow  it  to  produce  pleasure  or 
pain,  or  the  idea  of  a  colour  or  sound,  we  are  fain  to  quit 
our  reason,  go  beyond  our  ideas,  and  attribute  it  wholly 
to  the  good  pleasure  of  our  Maker.  For  since  we  must 
allow  He  has  annexed  effects  to  motion  which  we  can  no 
way  conceive  motion  able  to  produce,  what  reason  have  we 
to  conclude  that  He  could  not  order  them  as  well  to  be 
produced  in  a  subject  we  cannot  conceive  capable  of  them, 
as  well  as  in  a  subject  we  cannot  conceive  the  motion  of 
matter  can  any  way  operate  upon  ?  I  say  not  this,  that  I 
would  any  way  lessen  the  belief  of  the  soul's  immateriality, 
&c.  .  .  .  It  is  a  point  which  seems  to  me  to  be  put  out 
of  the  reach  of  our  knowledge ;  and  he  who  will  give 
himself  leave  to  consider  freely,  and  look  into  the  dark 
and  intricate  part  of  each  hypothesis,  will  scarce  find  his 
reason  able  to  determine  him  fixedly  for  or  against  the 
soul's  materiality.  Since  on  which  side  soever  he  views 
it,  either  as  an  unextended  substance  or  as  a  thinking 
extended  matter,  the  difiiculty  to  conceive  either  will, 
whilst  either  alone  is  in  his  thoughts,  still  drive  him  to 
the  contrary  side.  An  unfair  way  which  some  men  take 
with  themselves,  who,  because  of  the  inconceivableness  of 
something  they  find  in  one,  throw  themselves  violently 
into  the  contrary  hypothesis,  though  altogether  as  unin- 
telligible to  an  unbiassed  understanding." 

This  passage,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say,  is  one  of  the 


A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION.  119 

most  remarkable  in  the  whole  range  of  philosophical 
literature,  in  respect  of  showing  how  even  the  strongest 
and  most  candid  intellect  may  have  its  reasoning  faculty 
impaired  by  the  force  of  a  preformed  conviction.  Here  we 
have  a  mind  of  unsurpassed  penetration  and  candour, 
which  has  left  us  side  by  side  two  parallel  trains  of 
reasoning.  In  the  one,  the  object  is  to  show  that  the 
author's  preformed  conviction  as  to  the  being  of  a  God  is 
justifiable  on  grounds  of  reason;  in  the  other,  the  object 
is  to  show  that,  granting  the  existence  of  a  God,  and  it  is 
not  impossible  that  he  may  have  endowed  matter  with  the 
faculty  of  thinking.  Now,  in  the  former  train  of  reason- 
ing, the  whole  proof  rests  entirely  upon  the  fact  that  "  it 
is  impossible  to  conceive  that  ever  bare  incogitative  matter 
should  produce  a  thinking  intelligent  beiog."  Clearly,  if 
this  proposition  is  true,  it  must  destroy  one  or  other  of  the 
trains  of  reasoning;  for  it  is  common  to  them  both,  and 
in  one  of  them  it  is  made  the  sole  ground  for  concluding 
that  matter  cannot  think,  while  in  the  other  it  is  made 
compatible  with  the  supposition  that  matter  may  think. 
This  extraordinary  inconsistency  no  doubt  arose  from  the 
fact  that  the  author  was  antecedently  persuaded  of  the 
existence  of  an  Omnipotent  Mind,  and  having  been  long 
accustomed  in  his  intellectual  symbols  to  regard  it  pre- 
sumptuous in  him  to  impose  any  limitations  on  this 
almighty  power,  when  he  asked  himself  whether  it  would 
be  possible  for  this  almighty  power,  if  it  so  willed,  to 
endow  matter  with  the  faculty  of  thinking,  he  argued  that 
it  might  be  possible,  notwithstanding  his  being  unable  to 
conceive  the  possibility.  But  when  he  banished  from  his 
mind  the  idea  of  this  personal  and  almighty  power,  and 
with  that  idea  banished  all  its  associations,  he  then  felt 
that  he  had  a  right  to  argue  more  freely,  and  forthwith 
made  his  conceptive  faculty  a  test  of  abstract  possibility. 
Yet  the  sum  total  of  abdract  possibility,  in  relation  to 
him,  must  ham  been  the  saync  in  the  two  cases  ;  so  that 
in  whichever  of  the  two  trains  of  reasoninsj  his  argument 


I20  A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION. 

was  sound,  in  tlie  other  it  must  certainly  have  been 
null. 

We  may  well  feel  amazed  that  so  able  a  thinker  can 
have  fallen  into  so  obvious  an  error,  and  afterwards  have 
persisted  in  it  through  pages  and  pages  of  his  work.  It 
will  be  instructive,  however,  to  those  who  rely  upon  Locke's 
exposition  of  the  argument  from  Inconceivability  to  see 
how  effectually  he  has  himself  destroyed  it.  For  this  pur- 
pose, therefore,  I  shall  make  some  further  quotations  from 
the  same  train  of  reasoning.  The  statement  of  Locke's 
opinion  that  the  Almighty  could  endow  matter  with  the 
faculty  of  thinking  if  He  so  willed,  called  down  some 
remonstrances  and  rebukes  from  the  then  Bishop  of  Wor- 
cester. Locke's  reply  was  a  very  lengthy  one,  and  from 
it  the  following  extracts  are  taken.  I  merely  request  the 
reader  throughout  to  substitute  for  the  words  God,  Creator, 
Almighty,  Omnipotency,  &c,,  the  words  Summum  genus 
of  Possibility. 

"  But  it  is  further  urcred  that  we  cannot  conceive  how 

o 

matter  can  think.  I  grant  it,  but  to  argue  from  thence 
that  God  therefore  cannot  give  to  matter  a  faculty  of 
thinking  is  to  say  God's  omnipotency  is  limited  to  a  narrow 
compass  because  man's  understanding  is  so,  and  brings 
down  God's  infinite  power  to  the  size  of  our  capacities.  .  .  . 
"  If  God  can  give  no  power  to  any  parts  of  matter  but 
what  men  can  account  for  from  the  essence  of  matter  in 
general ;  if  all  such  qualities  and  properties  must  destroy 
the  essence,  or  change  the  essential  properties  of  matter, 
which  are  to  our  conceptions  above  it,  and  we  cannot 
conceive  to  be  the  natural  consequence  of  that  essence ; 
it  is  plain  that  the  essence  of  matter  is  destroyed,  and  its 
essential  properties  changed,  in  most  of  the  sensible  parts 
of  this  our  system.  For  it  is  visible  that  all  the  planets 
have  revolutions  about  certain  remote  centres,  which  I 
would  have  any  one  explain  or  make  conceivable  by  the 
bare  essence,  or  natural  powers  depending  on  the  essence 
of  matter  in  general,  without  something  added  to  that 


A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION,  121 

essence  wliicli  we  cannot  conceive;  for  tlie  moving  of 
matter  in  a  crooked  line,  or  the  attraction  of  matter  by 
matter,  is  all  that  can  be  said  in  the  case ;  either  of  which 
it  is  above  our  reach  to  derive  from  the  essence  of  matter 
or  body  in  general,  though  one  of  these  two  must  unavoid- 
ably be  allowed  to  be  superadded,  in  this  instance,  to  the 
essence  of  matter  in  general.  The  omnipotent  Creator 
advised  not  with  us  in  the  making  of  the  world,  and  His 
ways  are  not  the  less  excellent  because  they  are  past 
finding  out.  .  .  . 

"  In  all  such  cases,  the  superinducement  of  greater  per- 
fections and  nobler  qualities  destroys  nothing  of  the 
essence  or  perfections  that  were  there  before,  unless  there 
can  be  showed  a  manifest  repugnancy  between  them ;  but 
all  the  proof  offered  for  that  is  only  that  we  cannot  con- 
ceive how  matter,  without  such  superadded  perfections, 
can  produce  such  effects;  which  is,  in  truth,  no  more 
than  to  say  matter  in  general,  or  every  part  of  matter,  as 
matter,  has  them  not,  but  is  no  reason  to  prove  that  God, 
if  He  pleases,  cannot  superadd  them  to  some  parts  of 
matter,  unless  it  can  be  proved  to  be  a  contradiction 
that  God  should  give  to  some  parts  of  matter  qualities 
and  perfections  which  matter  in  general  has  not,  though 
we  cannot  conceive  how  matter  is  invested  with  them,  or 
how  it  operates  by  virtue  of  those  new  endowments ;  nor 
is  it  to  be  wondered  that  we  cannot,  whilst  we  limit  all 
its  operations  to  those  qualities  it  had  before,  and  would 
explain  them  by  the  known  properties  of  matter  in  gen- 
eral, without  any  such  induced  perfections.  For  if  this 
be  a  right  rule  of  reasoning,  to  deny  a  thing  to  be  because 
we  cannot  conceive  the  manner  how  it  comes  to  be,  I 
shall  desire  them  who  use  it  to  stick  to  this  rule,  and  see 
what  work  it  will  make  both  in  divinity  as  well  as  philo- 
sophy, and  whether  they  can  advance  anything  more  in 
favour  of  scepticism. 

"  For  to  keep  within  the  present  subject  of  the  power 
of    thinking    and   self-motion   bestowed  by   omnipotent 


122  A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION. 

power  in  some  parts  of  matter:  the  objection  to  tliis  is, 
I  cannot  conceive  how  matter  should  think.  What  is  the 
consequence  ?  Ergo,  God  cannot  give  it  a  power  to  think. 
Let  this  stand  for  a  good  reason,  and  then  proceed  in  other 
cases  by  the  same. 

"You  cannot  conceive  how  matter  can  attract  matter 
at  any  distance,  much  less  at  the  distance  of  1,000,000 
miles ;  ergo,  God  cannot  give  it  such  a  power :  you  cannot 
conceive  how  matter  should  feel  or  move  itself,  or  affect 
any  material  being,  or  be  moved  by  it ;  ergo,  God  cannot 
give  it  such  powers :  which  is  in  effect  to  deny  gravity, 
and  the  revolution  of  the  planets  about  the  sun ;  to  make 
brutes  mere  machines,  without  sense  or  spontaneous 
motion;  and  to  allow  man  neither  sense  nor  voluntary 
motion. 

"  Let  us  apply  this  rule  one  degree  further.  You  can- 
not conceive  how  an  extended  solid  substance  should 
think,  therefore  God  cannot  make  it  think :  can  you  con- 
ceive how  your  own  soul  or  any  substance  tliinks  ?  You 
find,  indeed,  that  you  do  think,  and  so  do  I ;  but  I  want 
to  be  told  how  the  action  of  thinking  is  performed :  this, 
I  confess,  is  beyond  my  conception ;  and  I  would  be  glad 
any  one  who  conceives  it  would  explain  it  to  me. 

"  God,  I  find,  has  given  me  this  faculty  ;  and  since  I 
cannot  but  be  convinced  of  His  power  in  this  instance, 
which,  though  I  every  moment  experience  in  myself,  yet  I 
cannot  conceive  the  manner  of,  what  would  it  be  less 
than  an  insolent  absurdity  to  deny  His  power  in  other 
like  cases,  only  for  this  reason,  because  I  cannot  conceive 
the  manner  how  ?  .  .  . 

"  That  Omnipotency  cannot  make  a  substance  to  be 
solid  and  not  solid  at  the  same  time,  I  think  with  due 
reverence  [diffidence  ?  ^]  we  may  say ;  but  that  a  solid 
substance  may  not  have  qualities,  perfections,  and  powers, 

^  The    qualities    named    are    only     be  destitute  of  meaning  in  an  absolute 
known  in  a  relative  sense,  and  there-     sense, 
fore  the  apparent  contradiction  may 


A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION.  123 

which  have  no  natural  or  visibly  necessary  connection 
with  solidity  and  extension,  is  too  much  for  us  (who  are 
but  of  yesterday,  and  know  nothing)  to  be  positive  in. 

"If  God  cannot  join  things  together  by  connections 
inconceivable  to  us,  we  must  deny  even  the  consistency 
and  being  of  matter  itself;  since  every  particle  of  it 
having  some  bulk,  has  its  parts  connected  by  ways 
inconceivable  to  us.  So  that  all  the  difficulties  that  are 
raised  against  the  thinking  of  matter,  from  our  ignorance 
or  narrow  conceptions,  stand  not  at  all  in  the  way  of  the 
power  of  God,  if  He  pleases  to  ordain  it  so ;  nor  prove 
anything  against  His  having  actually  endowed  some 
parcels  of  matter,  so  disposed  as  He  thinks  fit,  with  a 
faculty  of  thinking,  till  it  can  be  shown  that  it  contains  a 
contradiction  to  suppose  it. 

"Though  to  me  sensation  be  comprehended  under 
thinking  in  general,  in  the  foregoing  discourse  I  have 
spoke  of  sense  in  brutes  as  distinct  from  thinking; 
because  your  lordship,  as  I  remember,  speaks  of  sense  in 
brutes.  But  here  I  take  liberty  to  observe,  that  if  your 
lordship  allows  brutes  to  have  sensation,  it  will  follow, 
either  that  God  can  and  doth  give  to  some  parcels  of 
matter  a  power  of  perception  and  thinking,  or  that  all 
animals  have  immaterial,  and  consequently,  according  to 
your  lordship,  immortal  souls,  as  well  as  men ;  and  to  say 
that  fleas  and  mites,  &c.,  have  immortal  souls  as  well  as 
men,  will  possibly  be  looked  on  as  going  a  great  way  to 
serve  an  hypothesis.  .  .  . 

"  It  is  true,  I  say,  '  That  bodies  operate  by  impulse,  and 
nothing  else,'  and  so  I  thought  when  I  writ  it,  and  can 
yet  conceive  no  other  way  of  their  operation.  But  I  am 
since  convinced,  by  the  judicious  Mr.  Newton's  incompar- 
able book,  that  it  is  too  bold  a  presumption  to  limit  God's 
power  in  this  point  by  my  narrow  conceptions.  The 
gravitation  of  matter  towards  matter,  by  way  unconceiv- 
able to  me,  is  not  only  a  demonstration  that  God  can,  if 
He  pleases,  put  into  bodies  powers  and  ways  of  operation 


124  A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION. 

above  what  can  be  derived  from  our  idea  of  body,  or  can 
be  explained  by  what  we  know  of  matter,  but  also  an 
unquestionable  and  everywhere  visible  instance  that  He 
has  done  so.  And  therefore,  in  the  next  edition  of  my 
book,  I  will  take  care  to  have  that  passage  rectified.  .  .  . 

"As  to  self-consciousness,  your  lordship  asks,  'What 
is  there  like  self-consciousness  in  matter  ? '  Nothing  at 
all  in  matter  as  matter.  But  that  God  cannot  bestow  on 
some  parcels  of  matter  a  power  of  thinking,  and  with  it 
self-consciousness,  will  never  be  proved  by  asking  how 
is  it  possible  to  apprehend  that  mere  body  should 
perceive  that  it  doth  perceive?  The  weakness  of  our 
apprehension  I  grant  in  the  case :  I  confess  as  much  as 
you  please,  that  we  cannot  conceive  how  an  unsolid 
created  substance  thinks;  but  this  weakness  of  our 
apprehension  reaches  not  the  power  of  God,  whose 
weakness  is  stronger  than  anything  in  man." 

Lastly,  Locke  turns  upon  his  opponent  the  power  of  the 
odium  theologicum. 

"  Let  it  be  as  hard  a  matter  as  it  w^ill  to  give  an  account 
what  it  is  that  should  keep  the  parts  of  a  material  soul 
together  after  it  is  separated  from  the  body,  yet  it  will 
be  always  as  easy  to  give  an  account  of  it  as  to  give  an 
account  what  it  is  that  shall  keep  together  a  material  and 
immaterial  substance.  And  yet  the  difficulty  that  there 
is  to  give  an  account  of  that,  I  hope,  does  not,  with  your 
lordship,  weaken  the  credibility  of  the  inseparable  union 
of  soul  and  body  to  eternity ;  and  I  persuade  myself  that 
the  men  of  sense,  to  whom  your  lordship  appeals  in  this 
case,  do  not  find  their  belief  of  this  fundamental  point 
much  weakened  by  that  difficulty.  .  .  .  But  you  will 
say,  you  speak  only  of  the  soul ;  and  your  words  are,  that 
it  is  no  easy  matter  to  give  an  account  how  the  soul 
should  be  capable  of  immortality  unless  it  be  a  material 
substance.  I  grant  it,  but  crave  leave  to  say,  that  there  is 
not  any  one  of  these  difficulties  that  are  or  can  be  raised 
about  the  manner  how  a  material  soul  can  be  immortal, 


A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION.  125 

wliich  do  not  as  well  reach  the  immortality  of  the 
body.  .  .  . 

"  But  your  lordship,  as  I  guess  from  your  following 
words,  would  argue  that  a  material  substance  cannot  be  a 
free  agent ;  whereby  I  suppose  you  only  mean  that  you 
cannot  see  or  conceive  how  a  solid  substance  should  begin, 
stop,  or  change  its  own  motion.  To  which  give  me  leave 
to  answer,  that  when  you  can  make  it  conceivable  how 
any  created,  finite,  dependent  substance  can  move  itself, 
I  suppose  you  will  find  it  no  harder  for  God  to  bestow 
this  power  on  a  solid  than  an  unsolid  created  substance. 
.  .  .  But  though  you  cannot  see  how  any  created 
substance,  solid  or  not  solid,  can  be  a  free  agent  (pardon 
me,  my  lord,  if  I  put  in  both,  till  your  lordship  please  to 
explain  it  of  either,  and  show  the  manner  how  either  of 
them  can  of  itself  move  itself  or  anything  else),  yet  I  do 
not  think  you  will  so  far  deny  men  to  be  free  agents, 
from  the  difficulty  there  is  to  see  how  they  are  free  agents, 
as  to  doubt  whether  there  be  foundation  enough  for  the 
day  of  judgment." 

Let  us  now,  for  the  sake  of  contrast,  turn  to  some 
passages  which  occur  in  the  other  train  of  reasoning. 

"  If  we  suppose  only  matter  and  motion  first  or  eternal, 
thought  can  never  begin  to  be.  For  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  that  matter,  either  with  or  without  motion, 
could  have  originally  in  and  from  itself  sense,  percep- 
tion, and  knowledge ;  as  is  evident  from  hence,  that  then 
sense,  perception,  and  knowledge  must  be  a  property  eter- 
nally inseparable  from  matter  and  every  particle  of  it." 
There  is  a  double  fallacy  here.  In  the  first  place,  con- 
ceivability  is  made  the  unconditional  test  of  possibility ; 
and,  in  the  next  place,  it  is  asserted  that  unless  every 
particle  of  matter  can  think,  no  collocation  of  such 
particles  can  possibly  do  so.  This  latter  fallacy  is  further 
insisted  upon  thus : — "  If  they  will  not  allow  matter  as 
matter,  that  is,  every  particle  of  matter,  to  be  as  well 
cogitative  as  extended,  they  wiU  have  as  hard  a  task  to 


126  A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION. 

make   out   to   their  own  reasons  a  cogitative  beincj  out 
of   incogitative   particles,   as   an   extended   being  out  of 
unextended  parts,  if   I  may  so  speak.  .  .  .     Every  par- 
ticle  of   matter,  as   matter,   is   capable  of   all  the    same 
figures  and  motions  of  any  other ;  and  I  challenge  any  one 
in  his  thoughts  to  add  anything  else  to  one  above  another." 
ISTow,  as  we  have  seen,  Locke  himself  has  shown  in  his  other 
trains  of  argument  that  this  challenge  is  thoroughly  futile 
as  a  refutation  of  possibilities ;  but  the  point  to  which  I  now 
wish  to  draw  attention  is  this — It  does  not  follow  because 
certain  and  highly  complex  collocations  of  material  par- 
ticles may  be  supposed  capable  of  thinking,  that  therefore 
every  particle  of  matter  must  be  regarded  as  having  this 
attribute.     We  have  innumerable  analogies  in  nature  of  a 
certain  collocation  of  matter  and  force  producing  certain 
results  which  another  somewhat  similar  collocation  could 
not  produce :  in  such  cases  we  do  not  assume  that  all  the 
resulting  attributes  of  the  one  collocation  must  be  presented 
also  by  the  other — still  less  that  these  resulting  attributes 
must  belong  to  the  primary  qualities  of  matter  and  force. 
Hence  it  is  not  fair  to  assume  that  thought  must  either 
be  inherent  in  every  particle  of  matter,  or  else  not  pro- 
ducible   by   any   possible    collocation   of   such   particles, 
unless  it  has  previously  been  shown  that  so  to  produce  it 
by  any  possible  collocation  is   in   the   nature  of  things 
impossible.     But  no  one  could  refute  this  fallacy  better 
than   Locke  himself  has  done  in  some  of  the  passages 
already  quoted  from  his  other  train  of  reasoning. 

But  to  continue  the  quotation : — "  If,  therefore,  it  be 
evident  that  something  necessarily  must  exist  from 
eternity,  it  is  also  as  evident  that  that  something  must 
necessarily  be  a  cogitative  being ;  for  it  is  as  impossible 
[inconceivaUe]  that  incogitative  matter  should  produce  a 
cogitative  being,  as  that  nothing,  or  the  negation  of  all 
being,  should  produce  a  positive  being  or  matter."  Again, 
— "For  unthinking  particles  of  matter,  however  put  to- 
gether, can  have  \jMn  he  taught  to  have]  nothing  thereby 


A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION.  127 

•added  to  them,  but  a  new  relation  of  position,  which  it 
is  impossible  [inconceivaUe]  should  give  thought  and  know- 
ledge to  them." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  multiply  these  quotations,  for,  in 
effect,  they  would  all  be  merely  repetitions  of  one  another. 
It  is  enough  to  have  seen  that  this  able  author  undertakes 
to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  a  God,  and  that  his  whole 
demonstration  resolves  itself  into  the  unwarrantable  infer- 
ence, that  as  we  are  unable  to  conceive  how  thought  can  be 
a  property  of  matter,  therefore  a  property  of  matter  thought 
cannot  be.     That  such  an  erroneous  inference  should  occur 
in  any  writings  of  so  old  a  date  as  those  of  Locke  is  not  in 
itself  surprising.     What  is  surprising  is  the  fact,  that  in 
the  same  writings,  and  in  the  course  of  the  same  discussion, 
the  fallacy  of  this  very  inference  is  repeatedly  pointed  out 
and  insisted  upon  in  a  great  variety  of  ways ;  and  it  has 
been  chiefly  for  the  sake  of  showing  the  pernicious  in- 
fluence which  preformed  opinion  may  exert — viz.,  even  to 
blinding  the  eyes  of  one  of  the  most  clear-sighted  and 
thoughtful  men  that  ever  lived  to  a  glaring  contradiction 
repeated  over  and  over  again  in  the  course  of  a  few  pages, 
— it  has  been  chiefly  for  this  reason  that  I  have  extended 
this  Appendix  to  so  great  a  length.     I  shall  now  conclude 
it  by  quoting  some  sentences  which  occur  on  the  very  next 
page  after  that  from  v/hich  the  last  quoted  sentences  were 
taken.     Our  author  here  again  returns  to  his  defence  of 
the  omnipotency  of  God ;  and  as  he  now  again  thus  per- 
sonifies the  sum  total  of  possibility,  his  mind  abruptly  re- 
verts to  all  its  other  class  of  associations.     In  this  case  the 
transition  is  particularly  interesting,  not  only  on  account 
of  its  suddenness,  but  also  because  the  correlations  con- 
templated happen  to  be  exactly  the  same  in  the  two  cases 
— viz.,  matter  as   the   cause  of   mind,  and  mind  as  the 
cause  of  matter.     Eemember  that  on  the  last  page  this 
great  philosopher  supposed  he  had  demonstrated  the  ab- 
stract impossibility  of  matter  being  the  cause  of  mind  on 
the  ground  of  a  causal  connection  being  inconceivable,  let 


128  A  CRITICAL  EXPOSITION, 

US  now  observe  what  he  says  upon  this  page  regarding  the 
abstract  possibility  of  mind  being  the  cause  of  matter. 
''  ISTay,  possibly,  if  we  would  emancipate  ourselves  from 
vulgar  notions,  and  raise  our  thoughts  as  far  as  they  would 
reach  to  a  closer  contemplation  of  things,  we  might  be 
able  to  aim  at  some  dim  and  seeming  conception  how 
matter  might  at  first  be  made  and  begin  to  exist  by  the 
power  of  that  eternal  first  being.  .  .  .  But  you  will  say,  Is 
it  not  impossible  to  admit  of  the  making  anything  out 
of  nothing,  since  we  cannot  possibly  conceive  it  ?  I 
answer — No;  because  it  is  not  reasonable  to  deny  the 
power  of  an  infinite  being  [this  phrase,  in  the  absence  of 
hypothesis,  i.e.,  in  Locke's  other  train  of  reasoning,  is  of 
course  equivalent  to  the  sum-total  of  possibility]  because 
we  cannot  comprehend  its  operations.  We  do  not  deny 
other  effects  upon  this  ground,  because  we  cannot  possibly 
conceive  the  manner  of  their  production.  We  cannot 
conceive  how  anything  but  impulse  of  body  can  move 
body ;  and  yet  that  is  not  a  reason  sufficient  to  make  us 
deny  it  possible,  against  the  constant  experience  we  have 
of  it  in  ourselves,  in  all  our  voluntary  motions,  which 
are  produced  in  us  only  by  the  free  action  or  thought  of 
our  minds,  and  are  not,  nor  can  be,  the  effects  of  the  im- 
pulse or  determination  of  the  blind  matter  in  or  upon  our 
own  bodies;  for  then  it  could  not  be  in  our  power  or 
choice  to  alter  it.  For  example,  my  right  hand  writes, 
whilst  my  left  hand  is  still :  what  causes  rest  in  one  and 
motion  in  the  other  ?  Nothing  but  my  will,  a  thought  in 
my  mind;  my  thought  only  changing,  the  right  hand 
rests,  and  the  left  hands  moves.  This  is  matter  of  fact, 
which  cannot  be  denied  :  explain  this  and  make  it  in- 
telligible, and  then  the  next  step  will  be  to  understand 
creation."  i 

^  All  the'quotations  in  this  Appen-  that  on  "The  extent  of  human  know- 

dix  have  been  taken  from  the  chapter  ledge,"  together  with  the  appended 

on  "  Our  knowledge  of  the  existence  letter  to  the  Bishop  of  "Worcester, 
of  a  God,"  and  from  the  early  part  of 


SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSAYS. 


I. 

COSMIC  THEISM.i 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  doctrine  of  the  Unknowable  is  a 
doctrine  of  so  much  speculative  importance,  that  it  behoves 
all  students  of  philosophy  to  have  clear  views  respecting 
its  character  and  implications.  Mr.  Spencer  has  himself 
so  fully  explained  the  character  of  this  doctrine,  that  no 
attentive  reader  can  fail  to  understand  it ;  but  concerning 
those  of  its  implications  which  may  be  termed  theological 
— as  distinguished  from  religious — Mr.  Spencer  is  silent. 
Within  the  last  two  or  three  years,  however,  there  has 
appeared  a  valuable  work  by  an  able  exponent  of  the  new 
philosophy;  and  in  this  work  the  writer,  adopting  his 
master's  teaching  of  the  Unknowable,  proceeds  to  develop 
it  into  a  definite  system  of  what  may  be  termed  scientific 
theology.  And  not  only  so,  but  he  assures  the  world 
that  this  system  of  scientific  theology  is  the  highest,  the 
purest,  and  the  most  ennobling  form  of  religion  that  man- 
kind has  ever  been  privileged  to  know  in  the  past,  or, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  can  ever  be  destined  to  know 
in  the  future.  It  is  a  system,  we  are  told,  wherein  the 
most  fundamental  truths  of  Theism  are  taught  as  necessary 
deductions  from  the  highest  truths  of  Science ;  it  is  a  system 
wherein  no  single  doctrine  appeals  for  its  acceptance  to  any 

1  A  criticism  of  Mr.  John  Fiske's     pounded  in   his   work  on    "Cosmic 
proposed  system  of    theology  as  ex-     Philosophy" (Macmillan  &  Co.,  1874). 

I 


I30  COSMIC  THEISM, 

principle  of  blind  or  credulous  faith,  but  wherein  every 
doctrine  can  be  fully  justified  by  the  searching  light  of 
reason ;  it  is  a  system  wherein  the  noblest  of  our  aspira- 
tions and  the  most  sublime  of  our  emotions  are  able  to 
find  an  object  far  more  worthy  and  much  more  glorious 
than  has  ever  been  supplied  to  them  by  any  of  the  older 
forms  of  Theism ;  and  it  is  a  system,  therefore,  in  which, 
with  a  greatly  enlarged  and  intensified  meaning,  we  may 
worship  God,  and  all  that  is  within  us  bless  His  holy 
name.  Assuredly  a  proclamation  such  as  this,  emanating 
from  the  most  authoritative  expounders  of  modern  thought, 
as  the  highest  and  the  greatest  result  to  which  a  rigorous 
philosophic  synthesis  has  led,  is  a  proclamation  which 
cannot  fail  to  arrest  our  most  serious  attention.  Nay, 
may  it  not  do  more  than  this  ?  May  it  not  appeal  to 
hearts  which  long  have  ceased  to  worship  ?  May  it  not 
once  more  revive  a  hope — long  banished,  perhaps,  but  still 
the  dearest  which  our  poor  natures  have  experienced — 
that  somewhere,  sometime,  or  in  some  way,  it  may  yet  be 
possible  to  feel  that  God  is  not  far  from  any  one  of  us  ? 
For  to  those  who  have  known  the  anguish  of  a  shattered 
faith,  it  will  not  seem  so  childish  that  our  hearts  should 
beat  the  quicker  when  we  once  more  hear  a  voice  announc- 
ing to  a  world  of  superstitious  idolaters  —  "Whom  ye 
ignorantly  worship,  Him  declare  I  unto  you."  But  i<f,  when 
we  have  listened  to  the  glad  tidings  of  the  new  gospel,  we 
find  that  the  preacher,  though  apparently  in  earnest,  is  not 
worthy  to  be  heard  again  on  this  matter ;  and  if,  as  we 
turn  away,  our  eyes  grow  dim  with  the  memory  of  a 
vanished  dream,  surely  we  may  feel  that  the  preacher 
is  deserving  of  our  blame  for  obtruding  thus  upon  the 
most  sacred  of  our  sorrows. 

Mr.  John  Fiske  is,  as  is  well  known,  an  author  who 
unites  in  himself  the  qualities  of  a  well-read  student  of 
philosophy,  a  clear  and  accurate  thinker,  a  thorough 
master  of  the  principles  which  in  his  recent  work  he 
undertakes  to  explain  and  to  extend,  and  a  writer  gifted 


COSMIC  THEISM. 


131 


in  a  remarkable  degree  with  tlie  power  of  lucid  exposi- 
tion. Such  being  the  intellectual  calibre  of  the  man  who 
elaborates  this  new  system  of  scientific  theology,  I  confess 
that,  on  first  seeing  his  work,  I  experienced  a  faint  hope 
that,  in  the  higher  departments  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Evolution  as  conceived  by  Mr.  Spencer  and  elaborated 
by  his  disciple,  there  might  be  found  some  rational  justi- 
fication for  an  attenuated  form  of  Theism.  But  on  examina- 
tion I  find  that  the  bread  which  these  fathers  have  offered 
us  turns  out  to  be  a  stone ;  and  thinking  that  it  is  desirable 
to  warn  other  of  the  children  —  whether  of  the  family 
Philosophical  or  Theological — against  swallowing  on  trust 
a  morsel  so  injurious,  I  shall  endeavour  to  point  out  what 
I  conceive  to  be  the  true  nature  of  "  Cosmic  Theism." 

Starting  from  the  doctrine  of  the  Eelativity  of  Know- 
ledge, Mr.  Fiske,  following  Mr.  Spencer,  proceeds  to  show 
how  the  doctrine  implies  that  there  must  be  a  mode  of 
Being  to  which  human  knowledge  is  non-relative.  Or,  in 
other  words,  he  shows  that  the  postulation  of  phenomena 
necessitates  the  further  postulation  of  noumena  of  which 
phenomena  are  the  manifestations.  Now  what  may  we 
affirm  of  noumena  without  departing  from  a  scientific  or 
objective  mode  of  philosophising?  We  may  affirm  at 
least  this  much  of  noumena,  that  they  constitute  a  mode 
of  existence  which  need  not  necessarily  vanish  were  our 
consciousness  to  perish ;  and,  therefore,  that  they  now  stand 
out  of  necessary  relation  to  our  consciousness.  Or,  in 
other  words,  so  far  as  human  consciousness  is  concerned, 
noumena  must  be  regarded  as  absolute.  "  But  now,  what 
do  we  mean  by  this  affirmation  of  absolute  reality  inde- 
pendent of  the  conditions  of  the  process  of  knowing  ? 
Do  we  mean  to  .  .  .  affirm,  in  language  savouring 
strongly  of  scholasticism,  that  beneath  the  phenomena 
which  we  call  subjective  there  is  an  occult  substratum 
Mind,  and  beneath  the  phenomena  which  we  call  objective 
there  is  an  occult  substratum  Matter  ?  Our  conclusion 
cannot  be  stated  in  any  such  form.  .  .  .  Our  conclusion  is 


132  COSMIC  THEISM. 

simply  this,  tliat  no  theory  of  phenomena,  external  or 
internal,  can  be  framed  without  postulating  an  Absolute 
Existence  of  which  phenomena  are  the  manifestations. 
And  now  let  us  carefully  note  what  follows.  We  cannot 
identify  this  Absolute  Existence  with  Mind,  since  what 
we  know  as  Mind  is  a  series  of  phenomenal  manifesta- 
tions. .  .  .  Nor  can  we  identify  this  Absolute  Existence 
with  Matter,  since  what  we  know  as  Matter  is  a  series  of 
phenomenal  manifestations.  .  .  .  Absolute  Existence, 
therefore, — the  Eeality  which  persists  independently  of  us, 
and  of  which  Mind  and  Matter  are  the  phenomenal  mani- 
festations,— cannot  be  identified  either  with  Mind  or  with 
Matter.  Thus  is  Materialism  included  in  the  same  con- 
demnation with  Idealism.  .  .  .  See  then  how  far  we  have 
travelled  from  the  scholastic  theory  of  occult  substrata 
underlying  each  group  of  phenomena.  These  substrata 
were  but  the  ghosts  of  the  phenomena  themselves  ;  behind 
the  tree  or  the  mountain  a  sort  of  phantom  tree  or  moun- 
tain, which  persists  after  the  body  of  perception  has  gone 
away  with  the  departure  of  the  percipient  mind.  Clearly 
this  is  no  scientific  interpretation  of  the  facts,  but  is 
rather  a  specimen  of  naive  barbaric  thought  surviving 
in  metaphysics.  The  tree  or  mountain  being  groups  of 
phenomena,  what  we  assert  as  persisting  independently 
of  the  percipient  mind  is  a  something  which  we  are 
unable  to  condition  either  as  tree  or  as  mountain. 

"  And  now  we  come  down  to  the  very  bottom  of  the 
problem.  Since  we  do  postulate  Absolute  Existence,  and 
do  not  postulate  a  particular  occult  substance  underlying 
each  group  of  phenomena,  are  we  to  be  understood  as 
implying  that  there  is  a  single  Being  of  which  all  pheno- 
mena, internal  and  external  to  consciousness,  are  mani- 
festations ?  Such  must  seem  to  be  the  inevitable  con- 
clusion, since  we  are  able  to  carry  on  thinking  at  all  only 
under  the  relations  of  Difference  and  No-difference.  .  .  . 
It  may  seem  that,  since  we  cannot  attribute  to  the 
Absolute  Eeality  any  relations  of  Difference,  we  must 


COSMIC  THEISM.  133 

positively  ascribe  to  it  No-difference.  Or,  what  is  the 
same  thing,  in  refusing  to  predicate  multiplicity  of  it,  do 
we  not  virtually  predicate  of  it  unity  ?  We  do,  simply 
because  we  cannot  think  without  so  doing."  ^ 

A  single  Absolute  Eeality  being  thus  posited,  our 
author  proceeds,  towards  the  close  of  his  work,  to  argue 
that  as  this  Eeality  cannot  be  conceived  as  limited  either 
in  space  or  time,  it  constitutes  a  Being  which  corresponds 
with  our  essential  conception  of  Deity.  True  it  is  devoid 
of  certain  accessory  attributes,  such  as  personality,  intelli- 
gence, and  volition ;  but  for  this  very  reason,  it  is  insisted, 
the  theistic  ideal  as  thus  presented  is  a  purer,  and  there- 
fore a  better,  ideal  than  has  ever  been  presented  before. 
Nay,  it  is  the  highest  possible  form  of  this  ideal,  as  the 
following  considerations  will  show.  In  what  has  consisted 
that  continuous  purification  of  Theism  which  the  history 
of  thought  shows  to  have  been  effected,  from  the  grossest 
form  of  belief  in  supernatural  agency  as  exhibited  in 
Fetichism,  through  its  more  refined  form  as  exhibited  in 
Polytheism,  to  its  still  more  refined  form  as  exhibited  in 
Monotheism  ?  In  nothing  but  in  a  continuous  process  of 
what  Mr.  Fiske  calls  "  deanthropomorphisation."  Conse- 
quently, must  we  not  conclude  that  when  w^e  carry  this  pro- 
cess yet  one  step  further,  and  divest  our  conception  of  Deity 
of  aU  the  yet  lingering  remnants  of  anthropomorphism 
which  occur  in  the  current  conceptions  of  Deity,  we  are  but 
still  further  purifying  that  conception  ?  Assuredly,  the 
attributes  of  personality,  intelligence,  and  so  forth,  are  only 
known  as  attributes  of  Humanity,  and  therefore  to  ascribe 
them  to  Deity  is  but  to  foster,  in  a  more  refined  form,  the 
anthropomorphic  teachings  of  previous  religions.  But  if 
we  carefully  refuse  to  limit  Deity  by  the  ascription  of  any 
human  attributes  whatever,  and  if  the  only  attributes 
which  we  do  ascribe  are  such  as  on  grounds  of  pure  reason 
alone  we  are  compelled  to  ascribe,  must  we  not  conclude 
that  the  form  of  Theism  which  results  is  the  purest  and 
the  most  refined  form  in  which  it  is  possible  for  Theism  to 

^  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  i.  pp.  87-89. 


134  COSMIC  THEISM. 

exist  ?  ''  From  the  anthropomorphic  point  of  view  it  will 
quite  naturally  be  urged  in  objection,  that  this  apparently 
desirable  result  is  reached  through  the  degradation  of 
Deity  from  an  '  intelligent  personality '  to  a  '  blind  force/ 
and  is  therefore  in  -reality  an  undesirable  and  perhaps 
quasi-atheistic  result."  l  But  the  question  which  really 
presents  itself  is,  "theologically  phrased,  whether  the 
creature  is  to  be  taken  as  a  measure  of  the  Creator. 
Scientifically  phrased,  the  question  is  whether  the  highest 
form  of  Being  as  yet  suggested  to  one  petty  race  of 
creatures  by  its  ephemeral  experience  of  what  is  going  on 
in  one  tiny  corner  of  the  universe,  is  necessarily  to  be 
taken  as  the  equivalent  of  that  absolutely  highest  form  of 
Being  in  which  all  the  possibilities  of  existence  are  alike 
comprehended."  2  Therefore,  in  conclusion,  "  whether  or 
not  it  is  true  that,  within  the  bounds  of  the  phenomenal 
universe  the  highest  type  of  existence  is  that  which  we 
know  as  humanity,  the  conclusion  is  in  every  way  forced 
upon  us  that,  quite  independently  of  limiting  conditions 
in  space  or  time,  there  is  a  form  of  Being  which  can 
neither  be  assimilated  to  humanity  nor  to  any  lower  type 
of  existence.  We  have  no  alternative,  therefore,  but  to 
regard  it  as  higher  than  humanity,  even  '  as  the  heavens 
are  higher  than  the  earth,'  and  except  for  the  intellectual 
arrogance  which  the  arguments  of  theologians  show  lurk- 
ing beneath  their  expressions  of  humility,  there  is  no 
reason  why  this  admission  should  not  be  made  unre- 
servedly, without  the  anthropomorphic  qualifications  by 
which  its  effect  is  commonly  nullified.  The  time  is  surely 
coming  when  the  slowness  of  men  in  accepting  such  a  con- 
clusion will  be  marvelled  at,  and  when  the  very  inadequacy 
of  human  language  to  express  Divinity  will  be  regarded  as 
a  reason  for  a  deeper  faith  and  more  solemn  adoration."  3 

I  have  now  sufficiently  detailed  the  leading  principles 
of  Cosmic  Theism  to  render  a  clear  and  just  conception  of 
those  fundamental  parts  of  the  system  which  I  am  about 

^  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  pp.  429,  430. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  441.  3  Ibid.,  pp.  450,  451. 


COSMIC  THEISM.  135 

to  criticise ;  but  it  is  needless  to  say  that,  for  all  minor 
details  of  this  system,  I  must  refer  those  who  may  not 
already  have  perused  them  to  Mr.  Fiske's  somewhat 
elaborate  essays.  In  now  beginning  my  criticisms,  it  may 
be  well  to  state  at  the  outset,  that  they  are  to  be  restricted 
to  the  philosophical  aspect  of  the  subject.  With  matters 
of  sentiment  I  do  not  intend  to  deal, — partly  because  to 
do  so  would  be  unduly  to  extend  this  essay,  and  partly 
also  because  I  believe  that,  so  far  as  the  acceptance  or  the 
rejection  of  Cosmic  Theism  is  to  be  determined  by  senti- 
ment, much,  if  not  all,  will  depend  on  individual  habits 
of  thought.  For  whether  or  not  Cosmic  Theism  is  to  be 
regarded  as  a  religion  adapted  to  the  needs  of  any  indi- 
vidual man,  w^ill  depend  on  what  these  needs  are  felt  to 
be  by  that  man  himself :  we  cannot  assert  magisterially 
that  this  religion  must  be  adapted  to  his  needs  because 
we  have  found  it  to  be  adapted  to  our  own.  And  if  it  is 
retorted  that,  human  nature  being  everywhere  the  same,  a 
form  of  religion  that  is  adapted  to  one  man  must  on  this 
account  be  adapted  to  another,  I  reply  that  it  is  not  so. 
For  if  a  man  who  is  what  Mr.  Fiske  calls  an  "  Anthropo- 
morphic Theist "  finds  from  experience  that  his  system  of 
religion — say  Christianity — creates  and  sustains  a  class  of 
emotions  and  general  habits  of  thought  which  he  feels  to  be 
the  highest  and  the  best  of  which  he  is  capable,  it  is  useless 
for  a  "  Cosmic  Theist "  to  offer  such  a  man  another  system 
of  religion,  in  which  the  conditions  essential  to  the  exist- 
ence of  these  particular  emotions  and  habits  of  thought 
are  manifestly  absent.  For  such  a  man  cannot  but  feel 
that  the  proffered  substitution  would  be  tantamount,  if 
accepted,  to  an  utter  destruction  of  all  that  he  regards 
as  essentially  religious.  He  will  tell  us  that  he  finds  it 
perfectly  easy  to  understand  and  to  appreciate  those  feel- 
ings of  vague  awe  and  "worship  of  the  silent  kind" 
which  the  Cosmic  Theist  declares  to  be  fostered  by  Cosmic 
Theism  ;  but  he  will  also  tell  us  that  those  feelings,  which 
he  has  experienced  with  equal  vividness  under  his  own 


136  COSMIC  THEISM. 

system  of  Anthropomorphic  Theism,  are  to  him  but  as 
non-religious  dross  compared  with  the  unspeakable 
felicity  of  holding  definite  commune  with  the  Almighty 
and  Most  Merciful,  or  of  rendering  worship  that  is  a  glad 
hosanna — a  fearless  shout  of  joy.  On  the  other  hand,  I 
believe  that  it  is  possible  for  philosophic  habits  of  thought 
so  to  discipline  the  mind  that  the  feelings  of  vague  awe 
and  silent  worship  in  the  presence  of  an  appalling  Mystery 
become  more  deep  and  steady  than  a  theist  proper  can 
well  believe.  It  is  therefore  impossible  that  either  party 
can  fully  appreciate  those  sentiments  of  the  other  which 
they  have  never  fully  experienced  themselves ;  for  even 
in  those  cases  where  an  anthropomorphic  theist  has  been 
compelled  to  abandon  his  creed,  as  the  change  must  take 
place  in  mature  life,  his  tone  of  mind  has  been  determined 
before  it  does  take  place;  and  therefore  in  sentiment, 
though  not  in  faith,  he  is  more  or  less  of  a  theist  for  the 
rest  of  his  life  :  the  only  effect  of  the  change  is  to  create  a 
troubled  interference  between  his  desires  and  his  beliefs. 

However,  I  do  not  intend  to  develop  this  branch  of 
the  subject  further  than  thus  to  point  out,  in  a  general 
way,  that  religion-mongers  as  a  class  are  apt  to  show  too 
little  regard  for  the  sentiments,  as  distinguished  from  the 
beliefs,  of  those  to  whom  they  offer  their  wares.  But 
although  I  do  not  intend  to  constitute  myself  a  champion 
of  theology  by  pointing  out  the  defects  of  Cosmic  Theism 
in  the  aspect  which  it  presents  to  current  modes  of  thought, 
there  is  one  such  defect  which  I  must  here  dwell  upon, 
because  we  shall  afterwards  have  occasion  to  refer  to  it. 
A  theologian  may  very  naturally  make  this  objection  to 
Cosmic  Theism  as  presented  by  Mr.  Fiske — viz.,  that  the 
argument  on  which  this  philosopher  throughout  relies  as  a 
self-evident  demonstration  that  the  new  system  of  Theism 
is  a  further  and  a  final  improvement  on  all  the  previous 
systems  of  Theism,  is  a  fallacious  argument.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  this  argument  is,  that  as  the  progress  in  the 
purification  of  Theism  has  throughout  consisted  in  a  process 


COSMIC  THEISM.  137 

of  "  deanthropomorphisation,"  therefore  the  terminal  phase 
in  this  process,  which  Cosmic  Theism  introduces,  must  be 
still  in  the  direction  of  that  progress.  But  to  this  argu- 
ment a  theologian  may  not  unreasonably  object,  that  this 
terminal  phase  differs  from  all  the  previous  phases  in  one 
all-important  feature — viz.,  in  effecting  a  total  abolition 
of  the  anthropomorphic  element.  Before,  therefore,  it  can 
be  shown  that  this  terminal  phase  is  a  further  development 
of  Theism,it  must  be  shown  that  Theism  still  remains  Theism 
after  this  hitherto  characteristic  element  has  been  removed. 
If  it  is  true,  as  Mr.  Fiske  very  properly  insists,  that  all 
the  various  forms  of  belief  in  God  have  thus  far  had  this 
as  a  common  factor,  that  they  ascribed  to  God  the  attributes 
of  Man ;  it  becomes  a  question  whether  we  may  properly 
abstract  this  hitherto  invariable  factor  of  a  belief,  and  still 
call  that  belief  by  the  same  name.  Or,  to  put  the  matter 
in  another  light,  as  cosmists  maintain  that  Theism,  in  all 
the  phases  of  its  development,  has  been  the  product  of  a 
probably  erroneous  theory  of  personal  agency  in  nature, 
when  this  theory  is  expressly  discarded — as  it  is  by  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable — is  it  philosophically  legiti- 
mate for  cosmists  to  render  their  theory  of  things  in  terms 
which  belong  to  the  totally  different  theory  which  they 
discard  ?  No  doubt  it  is  true  that  the  progressive  refine- 
ment of  Theism  has  throughout  consisted  in  a  progressive 
discarding  of  anthropomorphic  qualities ;  but  this  fact  does 
not  touch  the  consideration  that,  when  we  proceed  to  strip 
off  the  last  remnants  of  these  qualities,  we  are  committing 
an  act  which  differs  toto  coelo  from  all  the  previous  acts 
which  are  cited  as  precedents ;  for  by  this  terminal  act  we 
are  not,  as  heretofore,  refining  the  theory  of  Theism — we 
are  completely  transforming  it  by  removing  an  element 
which,  both  genetically  and  historically,  would  seem  to 
constitute  the  very  essence  of  Theism. 

Or  the  case  may  be  presented  in  yet  another  light.  The 
only  use  of  terms,  whether  in  daily  talk  or  in  philosophical 
disquisition,  is  that  of  designating  certain  things  or  attri- 


138  COSMIC  THEISM. 

butes  to  which  by  general  custom  we  agree  to  affix  them ; 
so  that  if  any  one  applies  a  term  to  some  tiling  or  attribute 
which  general  custom  does  not  warrant  him  in  so  applying, 
he  is  merely  laying  himself  open  to  the  charge  of  abusing 
that  term.  Now  apply  these  elementary  principles  to  the 
case  before  us.  We  have  but  to  think  of  the  disc^ust  with 
which  the  vast  majority  of  living  persons  would  regard 
the  sense  in  which  Mr.  Fiske  uses  the  term  "  Theism,"  to 
perceive  how  intimate  is  the  association  of  that  term  with 
the  idea  of  a  Personal  God.  Such  persons  will  feel  strongly 
that,  by  this  final  act  of  purification,  Mr.  Fiske  has  simply 
purified  the  Deity  altogether  out  of  existence.  And  I 
scarcely  think  it  is  here  competent  to  reply  that  all 
previous  acts  of  purification  were  at  first  similarly  regarded 
as  destructive,  because  it  is  evident  that  none  of  these 
previous  acts  affected,  as  this  one  does,  the  central  core  of 
Theism.  And,  lastly,  if  it  should  be  still  further  objected, 
that  by  declaring  the  theory  of  Personal  Agency  the  cen- 
tral core  of  Theism,  I  am  begging  the  question  as  to  the 
appropriateness  of  Mr.  Fiske's  use  of  the  word  "  Theism," — 
seeing  he  appears  to  regard  the  essential  meaning  of  this 
word  to  be  that  of  a  postulation  of  merely  Causal  Agency, 
— I  answer.  More  of  this  anon;  but  meanwhile  let  it  be 
observed  that  any  charge  of  question-begging  lies  rather 
at  the  door  of  Mr.  Piske,  in  that  he  assumes,  without  any 
expressed  justification,  that  the  essence  of  Theism  dom 
consist  in  such  a  postulation  and  in  nothing  more.  And 
as  he  unquestionably  has  against  him  the  present  world 
of  theists  no  less  than  the  history  of  Theism  in  the  past, 
I  do  not  see  how  he  is  to  meet  this  charge  except  by  con- 
fessing to  an  abuse  of  the  term  in  question. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  examine  the  structure  of  Cosmic 
Theism.  We  are  all,  I  suppose,  at  one  in  allowing  that 
there  are  only  three  "  verbally  intelligible  "  theories  of  the 
universe, — viz.,  that  it  is  self-existent,  or  that  it  is  self- 
created,  or  that  it  has  been  created  by  some  other  and  ex- 
ternal Being.     It  is  usual  to  call  the  first  of  these  theories 


COSMIC  THEISM.  139 

Atheism,  the  second  Pantheism,  and  the  third  Theism. 
Now  as  there  are  here  three  distinct  nameable  theories,  it 
is  necessary,  if  the  term  "  Cosmic  Theism  "  is  to  be  justified 
as  an  appropriate  term,  that  the  particular  theory  which  it 
designates  should  be  shown  to  be  in  its  essence  theistic — 
i.e.,  that  the  theory  should  present  those  distinguishing 
features  in  virtue  of  which  Theism  differs  from  Atheism 
on  the  one  hand,  and  from  Pantheism  on  the  other.  Now 
what  are  these  features  ?  The  postulate  of  an  Eternal 
Self-existincy  Somethinsr  is  common  to  Theism  and  to 
Atheism.  Here  Atheism  ends.  Theism,  however,  is 
generally  said  to  assume  Personality,  Intelligence,  and 
Creative  Power  as  attributes  of  the  single  self-existing 
substance.  Lastly,  Pantheism  assumes  the  Something 
now  existing  to  have  been  self-created.  To  which,  then, 
of  these  distinct  theories  is  Cosmic  Theism  most  nearly 
allied  ?  Por  the  purpose  of  answering  this  question,  I 
shall  render  that  theory  in  terms  of  a  formula  which  Mr. 
Eiske  presents  as  a  full  and  complete  statement  of  the 
theory : — "  There,  exists  a  POWEE,  to  ivhich  710  limit  in 
space  or  time  is  conceivable,  of  which  all  phenomena,  as 
presented  in  consciousness,  are  manifestations,  hut  luhich  ive 
can  only  knoiv  through  these  manifestations!'  But  although 
the  word  "  Power  "  is  here  so  strongly  emphasised,  we  are 
elsewhere  told  that  it  is  not  to  be  res^arded  as  having  more 
than  a  strictly  relative  or  symbolic  meaning ;  so  that,  in 
point  of  fact,  some  more  neutral  word,  such  as  "  Some- 
thing," "  Being,"  or  "  Substance,"  ought  in  strictness  to  be 
here  substituted  for  the  word  "  Power."  Well,  if  this  is 
done,  we  have  the  postulation  of  a  Being  which  is  self- 
existing,  infinite, 'and  eternal — relatively,  at  all  events, 
to  our  powers  of  conception.  Thus  far,  therefore,  it  would 
seem  that  we  are  still  on  the  common  standing-ground  of 
Atheism,  Pantheism,  and  Theism;  for  as  it  is  not,  so  far  as 
I  can  see,  incumbent  on  Pantheism  to  affirm  that  "  thought 
is  a  measure  of  things,"  the  apparent  or  relative  eternity 
which  the  Primal  Something  must  be  supposed  to  present 


I40  '     COSMIC  THEISM. 

may  not  be  actual  or  ahsolute  eternity.  Nevertheless,  as 
Mr.  Fiske,  by  predicating  Divinity  of  the  Primal  Some- 
thing, implicitly  attributes  to  it  the  quality  of  an  eternal 
self-existence,  I  infer  that  Cosmic  Theism  may  be  con- 
cluded at  this  point  to  part  company  with  Pantheism. 
There  remain,  then.  Theism  and  Atheism. 

ISTow  undoubtedly,  at  first  sight.  Cosmic  Theism  appears 
to  differ  from  Atheism  in  one  all-important  particular. 
Por  we  have  seen  that,  by  means  of  a  subtle  though 
perfectly  logical  argument,  Cosmic  Philosophy  has  evolved 
this  conclusion — that  all  phenomena  as  presented  in  con- 
sciousness are  manifestations  of  a  not  improbable  Single 
Self-existing  Power,  of  whose  existence  these  manifesta- 
tions alone  can  make  us  cognisant.  Prom  which  it 
apparently  follows,  that  this  hypothetical  Power  must  be 
regarded  as  existing  out  of  necessary  relation  to  the 
phenomenal  universe ;  that  it  is,  therefore,  beyond  question 
"  Absolute  Being ; "  and  that,  as  such,  we  are  entitled  to 
call  it  Deity.  But  in  the  train  of  reasoning  of  which  this 
is  a  very  condensed  epitome,  it  is  evident  that  the  legiti- 
macy of  denominating  this  Absolute  Being  Deity,  must 
depend  on  the  exact  meaning  which  we  attach  to  the 
word  "Absolute" — and  this,  be  it  observed,  quite  apart 
from  the  question,  before  touched  upon,  as  to  whether 
Personality  and  Intelligence  are  not  to  be  considered  as 
attributes  essential  to  Deity.  In  what  sense,  then,  is  the 
word  "  Absolute  "  used  ?  It  is  used  in  this  sense.  As 
from  the  relativity  of  knowledge  we  cannot  know  things 
in  themselves,  but  only  symbolical  representations  of  such 
things,  therefore  things  in  themselves  are  absolute  to 
consciousness  :  but  analysis  shows  that  we  cannot  con- 
ceivably predicate  Difference  among  things  in  themselves, 
so  that  we  are  at  liberty,  with  due  diffidence,  to  predicate 
of  them  ISTo-difference :  hence  the  noumena  of  the  school- 
men admit  of  being  collected  into  a  sunimum  genus  of 
noumenal  existence;  and  since,  before  their  colligation 
noumena  were  severally  absolute,  after  their  colligation 


COSMIC  THEISM.  141 

they  become  collectively  absolute:  therefore  it  is  legiti- 
mate to  designate  this  sum-total  of  noumenal  existence, 
"  Absolute  Being."  Now  there  is  clearly  no  exception  to 
be  taken  to  the  formal  accuracy  of  this  reasoning;  the 
only  question  is  as  to  whether  the  "Absolute  Being" 
which  it  evolves  is  absolute  in  the  sense  required  by 
Theism.  I  confess  that  to  me  this  Being  appears  to  be 
absolute  in  a  widely  different  sense  from  that  in  which 
Deity  must  be  regarded  as  absolute.  For  this  Being  is 
thus  seen  to  be  absolute  in  no  other  sense  than  as  holdinsr 
— to  quote  from  Mr.  Fiske — "  existence  independent  of  the 
conditions  of  the  process  of  knowing."  In  other  words, 
it  is  absolute  only  as  standing  out  of  necessary  relation  to 
human  consciousness.  But  Theism  requires,  as  an  essential 
feature,  that  Deity  should  be  absolute  as  standing  out  of 
necessary  relation  to  all  else.  Before,  therefore,  the 
Absolute  Being  of  Cosmism  can  be  shown,  by  the 
reasoning  adopted,  to  deserve,  even  in  part,  the  appella- 
tion of  Deity,  it  must  be  shown  that  there  is  no  other 
mode  of  Being  in  existence  save  our  own  subjective  con- 
sciousness and  the  Absolute  Eeality  which  becomes 
objective  to  it  through  the  world  of  phenomena.  But 
any  attempt  to  establish  this  position  would  involve  a 
disregard  of  the  doctrine  that  knowledge  is  relative ;  and 
to  do  this,  it  is  needless  to  say,  would  be  to  destroy  the 
basis  of  the  argument  whereby  the  Absolute  Being  of 
Cosmism  was  posited. 

Or,  to  state  this  part  of  the  criticism  in  other  words,  as 
the  first  step  in  justifying  the  predication  of  Deity,  it 
must  be  shown  that  the  Being  of  which  the  predication  is 
made  is  absolute,  and  this  not  merely  as  independent  of 
human  consciousness,  but  as  independent  of  the  whole 
noumenal  universe — Deity  itself  alone  excepted.  That  is, 
the  Being  of  which  Deity  is  predicated  must  be  Uncondi- 
tioned. Hence  it  is  incumbent  on  Cosmic  Theism  to 
prove,  either  that  the  Causal  Agent  which  it  denominates 
Deity  is  itself  the  whole  noumenal  universe,  or  that  it 


142  COSMIC  THEISM. 

created  the  rest  of  a  noumenal  universe;  else  there  is 
nothing  to  show  that  this  Causal  Agent  was  not  itself 
created — seeing  that,  even  if  we  assume  the  existence  of  a 
God,  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  Causal  Agent  of 
Cosmism  is  that  God. 

It  would  appear  therefore  from  this,  that  whatever  else 
the  Cosmist's  theory  of  things  may  be,  it  certainly  is  not 
Theism ;  and  I  think  that  closer  inspection  will  tend  to 
confirm  this  judgment.     To  this  then  let  us  proceed. 

Mr.  Fiske  is  very  hard  on  the  atheists,  and  so  will 
probably  repudiate  with  scorn  any  insinuations  to  the 
effect  that  his  theory  of  things  is  "quasi-atheistic." 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  to  me  that  he  is  very  unjust  to  the 
atheists,  in  that  while  he  spares  no  pains  to  "  purify  "  and 
"  refine "  the  theory  of  the  theists,  so  as  at  last  to  leave 
nothing  but  what  he  regards  as  the  distilled  essence  of 
Theism  behind ;  he  habitually  leaves  the  theory  of  the 
atheists  as  he  finds  it,  without  making  any  attempt  either 
to  "purify"  it  by  removing  its  weak  and  unnecessary 
ingredients,  or  to  "  refine  "  it  by  adding  such  sublimated 
ingredients  as  modern  speculation  has  supplied.  Thus, 
while  he  despises  the  atheists  of  the  eighteenth  century 
for  their  irrationality  in  believing  in  the  self-existence  of 
a  'phenomenal  universe,  and  reviles  them  for  their  irreligion 
in  denying  that  "the  religious  sentiment  needed  satis- 
faction ;  '^  he  does  not  wait  to  inquire  whether,  in  its 
essential  substance,  the  theory  of  these  men  is  not  the  one 
that  has  proved  iteelf  best  able  to  withstand  the  grinding 
action  of  more  recent  thought.  But  let  us  in  fairness 
ask,  What  was  the  essential  substance  of  that  theory  ? 
Apparently  it  was  the  bare  statement  of  the  unthinkable 
fact  that  Something^  Is.  It  therefore  seems  to  me  useless 
in  Mr.  Fiske  to  lay  so  much  stress  on  the  fact  that  this 
Something  was  originally  identified  by  atheists  with  the 
phenomenal  universe.  It  seems  useless  to  do  this,  because 
such  identification  is  clearly  no  part  of  the  essence  of 
Atheism,  which,  as  just  stated,  I  take  to  consist  in  the  single 


COSMIC  THEISM.  143 

dogma  of  self-existence  as  itself  sufficient  to  constitute  a 
theory  of  things.  And,  if  so,  it  is  a  matter  of  scarcely 
any  moment,  as  regards  that  theory,  whether  we  are 
immediately  cognisant  of  that  which  is  self-existent,  or 
only  become  so  through  the  world  of  phenomena- — the 
vital  point  of  the  theory  being,  that  '  Self-existence, 
wherever  posited,  is  itself  the  only  admissible  explanation 
of  phenomena.  Or,  in  other  words,  it  does  not  seem  that 
there  is  anything  in  the  atheistic  theory,  as  such,  which 
is  incompatible  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Eelativity  of 
Knowledge ;  so  that  whatever  cogency  there  may  be  in 
the  train  of  reasoning  whereby  a  single  Causal  Agent  is 
deduced  from  that  doctrine,  it  would  seem  that  an  atheist 
has  as  much  right  to  the  benefit  of  this  reasoning  as  a 
theist ;  and  there  is  thus  no  more  apparent  reason  why 
this  single  Causal  Agent  should  be  appropriated  as  the 
God  of  Theism,  than  that  it  should  be  appropriated  as 
the  Self-existing  X  of  Atheism.  Indeed,  there  seems  to 
be  less  reason.  For  an  atheist  of  to-day  may  very 
properly  argue : — '  So  far  from  beholding  anything  divine 
in  this  Single  Being  absolute  to  human  consciousness,  it 
is  just  precisely  the  form  of  Being  which  my  theory 
postulates  as  the  Self-existing  All.  In  order  to  constitute 
such  a  Being  God,  it  inust  be  shown,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  to  be  something  more  than  a  merely  Causal  Agent 
which  is  absolute  in  the  grotesquely  restricted  sense  of 
being  independent  of  '  one  petty  race  of  creatures  with  an 
ephemeral  experience  of  what  is  going  on  in  one  tiny 
corner  of  the  universe ; '  it  must  be  shown  to  be  something 
more  than  absolute  even  in  the  wholly  unrestricted  sense 
of  being  Unconditioned;  it  must  be  shown  to  possess 
such  other  attributes  as  are  distinctive  of  Deity.  For  I 
maintain  that  even  Unconditioned  Being,  merely  as  such, 
would  only  then  have  a  right  to  the  name  of  God  when 
it  has  been  shown  that  the  theory  of  Theism  has  a  right 
to  monopolise  the  doctrine  of  Eelativity.' 

In  thus  endeavouring  to  "  purify  "  the  theory  of  Atheism, 


144  COSMIC  THEISM. 

by  divesting  it  of  all  superfluous  accessories,  and  laying 
bare  what  I  conceive  to  be  its  essential  substance ;  it  may 
be  well  to  state  that,  even  apart  from  their  irreligious 
character,  I  have  no  sympathy  with  the  atheists  of  the 
past  century.  I  mean,  that  these  men  do  not  seem  to  me 
to  deserve  any  credit  for  advanced  powers  of  speculation 
merely  because  they  adopted  a  theory  of  things  which  in 
its  essential  features  now  promises  to  be  the  most  endur- 
ing. For  it  is  evident  that  the  strength  of  this  theory 
now  lies  in  its  simplicity, — in  its  undertaking  to  explain,  so 
far  as  explanation  is  possible,  the  sum-total  of  phenomena 
by  the  single  postulate  of  self-existence.  But  it  seems  to 
me  that  in  the  last  century  there  were  no  sufficient  data 
for  rendering  such  a  theory  of  things  a  rational  theory ; 
for  so  long  as  the  quality  of  self-existence  was  supposed 
to  reside  in  phenomena  themselves,  the  very  simplicity  of 
the  theory,  as  expressed  in  words,  must  have  seemed  to 
render  it  inapplicable  as  a  reasonable  theory  of  things. 
The  astounding  variety,  complexity,  and  harmony  which 
are  everywhere  so  conspicuous  in  the  world  of  phenomena 
must  have  seemed  to  necessitate  as  an  explanation 
some  one  integrating  cause ;  and  it  is  impossible  that  in 
the  eighteenth  century  any  such  integrating  cause  can 
have  been  conceivable  other  than  Intelligence.  Therefore 
I  think,  with  Mr.  Fiske,  that  the  atheists  of  the  eighteenth 
century  were  irrational  in  applying  their  single  postulate 
of  self-existence  as  alone  a  sufficient  explanation  of  things. 
But  of  course  the  aspect  of  the  case  is  now  completely 
changed,  when  we  regard  it  in  all  the  flood  of  light  which 
has  been  shed  on  it  by  recent  science,  physical  and 
speculative.  For  the  demonstration  of  the  fact  that 
energy  is  indestructible,  coupled  with  the  corollary  that 
every  so-called  natural  law  is  a  physically  necessary 
consequence  of  that  fact,  clearly  supply  us  with  a 
completely  novel  datum  as  the  ultimate  source  of  experi- 
ence— and  a  datum,  moreover,  which  is  as  different  as  can 
well  be  imagined  from  the  ever-chancjing,  ever-fleeting, 


COSMIC  THEISM.  145 

world  of  phenomena.     We  have,  therefore,  but  to  apply 
the   postulate   of   self-existence   to   this   single  ultimate 
datum,  and  we  have  a  theory  of  things  as  rational  as  the 
Atheism  of  the  last  century  was  irrational.     ^Nevertheless, 
that  this  theory  is  more  akin  to  the  Atheism  of  the  last 
century  than  to  any  other  theory  of  that  time,  is,  I  think, 
unquestionable  ;  for  while  we  retain  the  central  doctrine 
of  self-existence  as  alone  a  scientifically  admissible,  or  non- 
gratuitous,  explanation   of   things,    we   only  change   the 
original   theory  by  transferring   the   application   of   this 
doctrine  from  the  world  of  manifestations  to  that  which 
causes  the  manifestations :  we  do  not  resort  to  any  of  the 
additional  doctrines  whereby  the  other  theories    of  the 
universe  were  distinguished  from  the  theory  of  Atheism 
in  its  original  form.     However,  as  by  our  recognition  of 
the   relativity    of    knowledge    we    are    precluded    from 
dogmatically  denying  any  theory  of  the  universe  that  may 
be  proposed,  it  would  clearly  be  erroneous  to  identify  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable  with  the  theory  of  Atheism : 
all  we  can  say  is,  that,  so  far  as  speculative  thought  can 
soar,  the   permanent   self-existence  of   an  inconceivable 
Something,  which  manifests  itself  to  consciousness  as  force 
and  matter,  constitutes  the  only  datum  that  can  be  shown 
to  be  required  for  the  purposes  of  a  rational  ontology. 

To  sum  up.  In  the  theory  which  Mr.  Fiske  calls 
Cosmic  Theism,  while  I  am  able  to  discern  the  elements 
which  I  think  may  properly  be  regarded  as  common  to 
Theism  and  to  Atheism,  I  am  not  able  to  discern  any  single 
element  that  is  specifically  distinctive  of  Theism.  Still  I 
am  far  from  concluding  that  the  theory  in  question  is  the 
theory  of  Atheism.  All  I  wish  to  insist  upon  is  this — 
that  as  the  Absolute  Being  of  Cosmism  presents  no  other 
qualities  than  such  as  are  required  by  the  renovated  theory 
of  Atheism,  its  postulation  supplies  a  basis,  not  for  Theism, 
but  for  INon-theism :  a  man  with  such  a  postulate  ought 
in  strictness  to  abstain  from  either  affirming  or  denying 
the  existence  of  God.     And  this,  I  may  observe,  appears 

K 


146  COSMIC  THEISM. 

to  be  the  position  which  Mr.  Spencer  himself  has  adopted 
as  the  only  logical  outcome  of  his  doctrine  of  the 
Unknowable — a  position  which,  in  my  opinion,  it  is 
most  undesirable  to  obscure  by  endeavouring  to  give  it  a 
quasi-theistic  interpretation.  I  may  further  observe,  that 
we  here  seem  to  have  a  philosophical  justification  of 
the  theological  sentiment  previously  alluded  to — the 
sentiment,  namely,  that  by  his  attempt  at  a  final  purifi- 
cation of  Theism,  Mr.  Fiske  has  destroyed  those  essential 
features  of  the  theory  in  virtue  of  which  alone  it  exists  as 
Theism.  For  seeing  it  is  impossible,  from  the  relativity 
of  knowledge,  that  the  Absolute  Being  of  Cosmism  can 
ever  be  shown  absolute  in  the  sense  required  by  Theism, 
and,  even  if  it  could,  that  it  would  still  be  but  the 
Unconditioned  Being  of  Atheism ;  it  follows  that  if  this 
Absolute  Being  is  to  be  shown  even  in  part  to  deserve 
the  appellation  of  Deity,  it  must  be  shown  to  possess  the 
only  remaining  attributes  which  are  distinctive  of  Deity — 
to  wit,  personality  and  intelligence.  But  forasmuch  as 
the  final  act  of  purifying  the  conception  of  Deity  consists, 
according  to  Mr.  Fiske,  in  expressly  removing  these 
particular  attributes  from  the  object  of  that  conception, 
does  it  not  follow  that  the  conception  which  remains  is,  as 
I  have  said,  not  theistic,  but  non-theistic  ? 

Here  my  criticism  might  properly  have  ended,  were  it 
not  that  Mr.  Fiske,  after  having  divested  the  Deity  of  all 
his  psychical  attributes,  forthwith  proceeds  to  show  how 
it  may  be  dimly  possible  to  reinvest  him  with  attributes 
that  are  "  quasi-psychicaL"  Mr.  Fiske  is,  of  course,  far 
too  subtle  a  thinker  not  to  see  that  his  previous  argument 
from  relativity  precludes  him  from  assigning  much  weight 
to  the  ontological  speculations  in  which  he  here  indulges, 
seeing  that  in  whatever  degree  the  relativity  of  knowledge 
renders  legitimate  the  non-ascription  to  Deity  of  known 
psychical  attributes,  in  some  such  degree  at  least  must  it 
render  illegitimate  the  ascription  to  Deity  of  unknown 
psychical  attributes.    But  in  the  part  of  his  work  in  which 


COSMIC  THEISM.  147 

he  treats  of  tlie  quasi-psychical  attributes,  Mr.  Fiske  is 
merely  engaged  in  showing  that  the  speculative  standing 
of  the  "  materialists  "  is  inferior  to  that  of  the  "  spirit- 
ualists;" so  that,  as  this  is  a  subject  distinct  from  Theism,  he 
is  not  open  to  the  charge  of  inconsistency.  Well,  feeble  as 
these  speculations  undoubtedly  are  in  the  support  which 
they  render  to  Theism,  it  nevertheless  seems  desirable  to 
consider  them  before  closing  this  review.  The  specula- 
tions in  question  are  quoted  from  Mr.  Spencer,  and  are  as 
follows : — 

"Mind,  as  known  to  the  possessor  of  it,  is  a  circumscribed 
aggregate  of  activities ;  and  the  cohesion  of  these  activities, 
one  with  another,  throughout  the  aggregate,  compels  the 
postulation  of  a  something  of  which  they  are  the  activities. 
But  the  same  experiences  which  make  him  aware  of  this 
coherent  aggregate  of  mental  activities,  simultaneously 
make  him  aware  of  activities  that  are  not  included  in  it — 
outlying  activities  which  become  known  by  their  effects 
on  this  aggregate,  but  which  are  experimentally  proved  to 
be  not  coherent  with  it,  and  to  be  coherent  with  one 
another  {First  Principles,  §§  43,  44).  As,  by  tlie  definition 
of  them,  these  external  activities  cannot  be  brought  within 
the  aggregate  of  activities  distinguished  as  those  of  Mind, 
they  must  for  ever  remain  to  him  nothing  more  than  the 
unknown  correlatives  of  their  effects  on  this  aggregate; 
and  can  be  thought  of  only  in  terms  furnished  by  this 
aggregate.  Hence,  if  he  regards  his  conceptions  of  these 
activities  lying  beyond  Mind  as  constituting  knowledge 
of  them,  he  is  deluding  himself:  he  is  but  representing 
these  activities  in  terms  of  Mind,  and  can  never  do  other- 
wise. Eventually  he  is  obliged  to  admit  that  his  ideas  of 
Matter  and  Motion,  merely  symbolic  of  unknowable  reali- 
ties, are  complex  states  of  consciousness  built  out  of  units 
of  feeling.  But  if,  after  admitting  this,  he  persists  in 
asking  whether  units  of  feeling  are  of  the  same  nature  as 
the  units  of  force  distinguished  as  external,  or  whether  the 
units  of  force  distino^uished  as  external  are  of  the  same 


148  COSMIC  THEISM. 

nature  as  units  of  feeling;  then  the  reply,  still  substan- 
tially the  same,  is  that  we  may  go  further  towards  con- 
ceiving units  of  external  force  to  be  identical  with  units 
of  feeling,  than  we  can  towards  conceiving  units  of  feeling 
to  be  identical  with  units  of  external  force.  Clearly,  if 
units  of  external  force  are  regarded  as  absolutely  unknown 
and  unknowable,  then  to  translate  units  of  feeling  into 
them  is  to  translate  the  known  into  the  unknown,  which 
is  absurd.  And  if  they  are  what  they  are  supposed  to  be 
by  those  who  identify  them  with  their  symbols,  then  the 
difficulty  of  translating  units  of  feeling  into  them  is  insur- 
mountable :  if  Force  as  it  objectively  exists  is  absolutely 
alien  in  nature  from  that  which  exists  subjectively  as 
Feeling,  then  the  transformation  of  Force  into  Feeling 
is  unthinkable.  Either  way,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to 
interpret  inner  existence  in  terms  of  outer  existence.  But 
if,  on  the  other  hand,  units  of  Force  as  they  exist  ob- 
jectively are  essentially  the  same  in  nature  with  those 
manifested  subjectively  as  units  of  Feeling,  then  a  con- 
ceivable hypothesis  remains  open.  Every  element  of  that 
aggregate  of  activities  constituting  a  consciousness  is 
known  as  belonging  to  consciousness  only  by  its  cohesion 
with  the  rest.  Beyond  the  limits  of  this  coherent  aggre- 
gate of  activities  exist  activities  quite  independent  of  it, 
and  which  cannot  be  brought  into  it.  We  may  imagine, 
then,  that  by  their  exclusion  from  the  circumscribed 
activities  constituting  consciousness,  these  outer  activities, 
though  of  the  same  intrinsic  nature,  become  antithetically 
opposed  in  aspect.  Being  disconnected  from  consciousness, 
or  cut  off  by  its  limits,  they  are  thereby  rendered  foreign 
to  it.  Not  being  incorporated  with  its  activities,  or  linked 
with  these  as  they  are  with  one  another,  consciousness 
cannot,  as  it  were,  run  through  them ;  and  so  they  come 
to  be  figured  as  unconscious — are  symbolised  as  having 
the  nature  called  material,  as  opposed  to  that  called  spirit- 
ual. While,  however,  it  thus  seems  an  imaginable  possi- 
bility that  units  of  external  Force  may  be  identical  in 


COSMIC  THEISM.  149 

nature  with  units  of  the  force  known  as  Feeling,  yet  we 
cannot  by  so  representing  them  get  any  nearer  to  a  com- 
prehension of  external  Force.  For,  as  already  shown, 
supposing  all  forms  of  Mind  to  be  composed  of  homoge- 
neous units  of  feeling  variously  aggregated,  the  resolution 
of  them  into  such  units  leaves  us  as  unable  as  before  to 
think  of  the  substance  of  Mind  as  it  exists  in  such  units ; 
and  thus,  even  could  we  really  figure  to  ourselves  all  units 
of  external  Force  as  being  essentially  like  units  of  the 
force  known  as  Feeling,  and  as  so  constituting  a  universal 
sentiency,  we  should  be  as  far  as  ever  from  forming  a 
conception  of  that  which  is  universally  sentient."  1 

Now  while  I  agree  with  Mr.  Fiske  that  we  have  here 
"  the  most  subtle  conclusion  now  within  the  ken  of  the 
scientific  speculator,  reached  without  any  disregard  of  the 
canons  prescribed  by  the  doctrine  of  relativity,"  I  would 
like  to  point  out  to  minds  less  clear-sighted  than  his,  that 
this  same  "  doctrine  of  relativity "  effectually  debars  us 
from  using  this  "  conclusion  "as  an  argument  of  any  as- 
signable value  in  favour  of  Theism.  For  the  value  of  con- 
ceivability  as  a  test  of  truth,  on  which  this  conclusion  is 
founded,  is  here  vitiated  by  the  consideration  that,  whatever 
the  nature  of  Force-units  may  be,  we  can  clearly  perceive 
it  to  be  a  subjective  necessity  of  the  case  that  they  should 
admit  of  being  more  easily  conceived  by  us  to  be  of  the 
nature  of  Feeling-units  than  to  be  of  any  other  nature. 
For  as  units  of  Feeling  are  the  only  entities  of  which  we 
are,  or  can  be,  conscious,  they  are  the  entities  into  which 
units  of  Force  must  be,  so  to  speak,  subjectively  translated 
before  we  can  cognise  their  existence  at  all.  Therefore, 
wliatevcT  the  real  nature  of  Force-units  may  be,  ultimate 
analysis  must  show  that  it  is  more  conceivable  to  identify 
them  in  thought  with  the  only  units  of  which  we  are 
cognisant,  than  it  is  to  think  of  them  as  units  of  which 
we  are  not  cognisant,  and  concerning  which,  therefore, 
conception  is  necessarily  impossible.     Or  thus,  the  only 

^  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol,  i.  pp.  159-161. 


ISO  COSMIC  THEISM. 

alternative  witli  respect  to  the  classifying  of  Force-units 
lies  between  refusing  to  classify  them  at  all,  or  classifying 
them  with  the  only  ultimate  units  with  which  we  are 
acquainted.  But  this  restriction,  for  aught  that  can  ever 
be  shown  to  the  contrary,  arises  only  from  the  subjective 
conditions  of  our  own  consciousness ;  there  is  nothing  to 
indicate  that,  in  objective  reality,  units  of  Force  are  in  any 
wise  akin  to  units  of  Feeling.  Conceivability,  therefore, 
as  a  test  of  truth,  is  in  this  particular  case  of  no  assign- 
able degree  of  value ;  for  as  the  entities  to  which  it  is 
applied  are  respectively  the  highest  known  abstractions  of 
subjective  and  objective  existence,  the  test  of  conceivability 
is  neutralised  by  directly  encountering  the  inconceivable 
relation  that  subsists  between  subject  and  object.  I  think, 
therefore,  it  is  evident  that  these  ontological  speculations 
present  no  sufficient  warrant  for  an  inference,  even  of  the 
slenderest  kind,  that  the  Absolute  Being  of  Cosmism  pos- 
sesses attributes  of  a  nature  quasi-psychical ;  and,  if  so,  it 
follows  that  these  speculations  are  incompetent  to  form 
the  basis  of  a  theory  which,  even  by  the  greatest  stretch 
of  courtesy,  can  in  any  legitimate  sense  be  termed  quasi- 
theistic.i 

1  "We  thus   see  that  the  question  of  the  "circvimscribed  aggregate"  of 

whether  there  may  not  be   "some-  units    forming    the    individual   cou- 

thing    quasi-psychical    in    the    con-  sciousness  into   the  unlimited  abyss 

stitution   of   things  "   is  a   question  of    similar    units    constituting    the  • 

which  does  not  affect  the  position  of  "  Absolute  Being"  of  the  Cosmists,  or 

Theism  as  it  has  been  left  by  a  nega-  the  "Divine  Essence"  of  the  Budd- 

tion  of  the  self-conscious  jiersonality  lusts.      Again,    the    doctrine    in    a 

of  God.     But  as  the  speculations  on  vague  form  pervades  the  philosophy 

which  this  question  has  been  reared  of  Spinoza,  and  is  next  clearly  euun- 

are  in  themselves  of   much   philoso-  ciated  by  Wuudt.     Lastly,  in  a  re- 

phical  interest,  I  may  here  observe  cently  published  veryremarkable  essay 

that,  in   one   form  or  auother,  they  "  On  the  Nature  of  Things  in  Them- 

have  been   dimly   floating   in   men's  selves,"    Professor    Clifford     arrives 

minds  for  a  long  time  past.     Thus,  at  a  similar  doctrine  by  a  different 

excepting    the   degree    of    certainty  route.      The   following   is   the    con- 

with  which  it  is  taught,  we  have  in  elusion  to  which  he  arrives  : — "That 

Mr.  Spencer's  wox'ds  above  quoted  a  element  of  which,  as  we  have  seen, 

reversion  to  tlie  doctrine  of  Buddha  ;  even  the  simplest  feeling  is  a  com- 

f or,  as  "force  is  persistent,"  all  that  plex,    I    shall    call    Mind-stuff.      A 

would  happen   on   death,  supposing  moving  molecule  "of  inorganic  matter 

the  doctriue  true,  would  be  an  escape  does  not  possess  mind   or  conscious- 


COSMIC  THEISM.  151 

On  the  whole,  then,  I  conclude  that  the  term  "  Cosmic 
Theism  "  is  not  an  appropriate  term  whereby  to  denote  the 
theory  of  things  set  forth  in  "  Cosmic  Philosophy ; "  and 
that  it  would  therefore  be  more  judicious  to  leave  the 
doctrine  of  the  Unknowable  as  Mr.  Spencer  has  left  it — 
that  is,  without  theological  implications  of  any  kind.  But 
in  now  taking  leave  of  this  subject,  I  should  like  it  to  be 
understood  that  the  only  reason  why  I  have  ventured  thus 
to  take  exception  to  a  part  of  Mr.  Fiske's  work  is  because 
I  regret  that  a  treatise  which  displays  so  much  of  literary 
excellence  and  philosophic  power  should  lend  itself  to 
promoting  what  I  regard  as  mistaken  views  concerning 
the  ontological  tendencies  of  recent  thought,  and  this  with 
no  other  apparent  motive  than  that  of  unworthily  retain- 
ing in  the  new  philosophy  a  religious  term  the  distinctive 
connotations  of  which  are  considered  by  that  pliilosophy 
to  have  become  obsolete. 

ness,  but  it  possesses  a  small  piece  of    consciousness  ;    that    is    to    say, 

of  mind-stuff.     When  molecules  are  changes  in  the  complex  which  take 

so  combined  together  as  to  form  the  place  at  the  same  time  get  so  linked 

film  on  the  under  side  of  a  jellyfish,  togetlier  that   the  i-epetition  of  one 

the  elements  of  mind-stuff  which  go  implies  the  repetition  of  the  other, 

along  with  them  are  so  combined  as  When  matters  take  the  complex  form 

to  form  the  faint  beginnings  of  Sen-  of  a  living  human  brain,  the  corre- 

tience.     When  the  molecules  are  so  sponding  mind-stuff  takes  the  foi-m  of 

combined  as  to  form  the  brain  and  a  human  consciousness,  having  intel- 

nervous  system  of  a  vertebrate,  the  ligence  and  volition."     (Mind,  Janu- 

corresponding  elements  of  mind-stuff  ary,  1878.) 
are  so  combined  as  to  form  some  kind 


(      152      ) 


II. 

SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSAY  IN  REPLY  TO  A 
RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.^ 

On"  perusing  my  main  essay  several  years  after  its  comple- 
tion, it  occurred  to  me  that  another  very  effectual  way  of 
demonstrating  the  immense  difference  between  the  nature 
of  all  previous  attacks  upon  the  teleological  argument  and 
the  nature  of  the  present  attack,  would  be  briefly  to  review 
the  reasonable  objections  to  which  all  the  previous  attacks 
were  open.  Very  opportunely  a  work  on  Theism  has 
just  been  published  which  states  these  objections  with 
great  lucidity,  and  answers  them  with  much  ability.  The 
work  to  which  I  allude  is  by  the  Rev.  Professor  Elint,  and 
as  it  is  characterised  by  temperate  candDur  in  tone  and 
logical  care  in  exposition,  I  felt  on  reading  it  that  the 
work  was  particularly  well  suited  for  displaying  the 
enormous  change  in  the  speculative  standing  of  Theism 
which  the  foregoing  considerations  must  be  rationally 
deemed  to  have  effected.  I  therefore  determined  on 
throwing  my  supplementary  essay,  which  I  had  previously 
intended  to  write,  into  the  form  of  a  criticism  on  Professor 
Flint's  treatise,  and  I  adopted  this  course  the  more  will- 
ingly because  there  are  several  other  points  dwelt  upon 
in  that  treatise  which  it  seems  desirable  for  me  to  consider 
in  the  present  one,  although,  for  the  sake  of  conciseness, 
I  abstained  from  discussing  them  in  my  previous  essay. 

1  Theism,  by  Robert   Flint,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  Piofessor   of  Divinity  in   the 
University  of  Edinburgh,  &;c. 


SUPPLEMENTA  R  V  ESS  A  V.  153 

With  these  two  objects  in  view,  therefore,  I  undertook  the 
following  criticism.^ 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  needful  to  protest  against  an 
argument  which  our  author  adopts  on  the  authority  of 
Professor  Clark  Maxwell.  The  argument  is  now  a  well- 
known  one,  and  is  thus  stated  by  Professor  Maxwell  in 
his  presidential  address  before  the  British  Association  for 
the  Advancement  of  Science,  1870  : — "  None  of  the  pro- 
cesses of  nature,  since  the  time  when  nature  began,  have 
produced  the  slightest  difference  in  the  properties  of  any 
molecule.  We  are  therefore  unable  to  ascribe  either  the 
existence  of  the  molecules  or  the  identity  of  their  proper- 
ties to  the  operation  of  any  of  the  causes  which  we  call 
natural.  On  the  other  hand,  the  exact  quality  of  each 
molecule  to  all  others  of  the  same  kind  mves  it,  as  Sir 
John  Herschel  has  well  said,  the  essential  character  of  a 
manufactured  article,  and  precludes  the  idea  of  its  being 
eternal  and  self-existent.  Thus  we  have  been  led  along 
a  strictly  scientific  path,  very  near  to  the  point  at  which 
science  must  stop.  Not  that  science  is  debarred  from 
studying  the  external  mechanism  of  a  molecule  which  she 
cannot  take  to  pieces,  any  more  than  from  investigating 
an  organism  which  she  cannot  put  together.  But  in  trac- 
ing back  the  history  of  matter,  science  is  arrested  when 

^  Such  being  the  objects  in  view,  I  Professor  Flint  himself.  This  sense 
have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  ex-  is  distinctly  a  different  one  from  that 
tend  this  criticism  into  anything  which  the  word  bears  in  the  writings 
resembling  a  review  of  Professor  of  the  Paley,  Bell,  and  Chalmers 
Flint's  work  as  a  whole  ;  but,  on  the  school.  For  while  in  the  latter  writ- 
contrary,  I  have  aimed  rather  at  con-  ings,  as  pointed  out  in  Chapter  III., 
fining  my  observations  to  those  parts  the  word  bears  its  natural  meaning  of 
of  his  treatise  which  embody  the  cur-  a  certain  process  of  thought,  in  Pro- 
rent  arguments  from  teleology  alone,  fessor  Flint's  work  it  is  used  rather 
I  may  here  observe,  however,  in  as  expressive  of  a  product  of  intelli- 
general  terms,  that  I  consider  all  his  gence.  In  other  words,  "design,"  as 
arguments  to  have  been  answered  by  used  by  Professor  Flint,  is  synony- 
anticipation  in  the  foregoing  examina-  mous  with  intention,  irrespective  of 
tion  of  Theism.  I  may  also  here  ob-  the  particular  psychological  process 
serve,  that  throughout  the  following  by  which  the  intention  may  have  been 
essay  I  have  used  the  word  "  design  "  put  into  effect, 
in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  by 


154  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSA  V  IN  REPLY 

she  assures  herself,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  molecule  has 
been  made,  and,  on  the  other,  that  it  has  not  been  made 
by  any  of  the  processes  we  call  natural." 

Now  it  is  obvious  that  we  have  here  no  real  argument, 
since  it  is  obvious  that  science  can  never  be  in  a  position 
to  assert  that  atoms,  the  very  existence  of  which  is 
hypothetical,  were  never  "  made  by  any  of  the  processes 
we  call  natural."  The  mere  fact  that  in  the  universe,  as 
we  now  know  it,  the  evolution  of  material  atoms  is  not 
observed  to  be  taking  place  "by  any  of  the  processes  we 
call  natural,"  cannot  possibly  be  taken  as  proof,  or  even 
as  presumption,  that  there  ever  was  a  time  when  the 
material  atoms  now  in  existence  were  created  by  a  super- 
natural cause.  The  fact  cannot  be  taken  to  justify  any 
such  inference  for  the  following  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  assuming  the  atomic  theory  to  be  true,  and  there  is 
nothing  in  the  argument  to  show  that  the  now-existing 
atoms  are  not  self-existing  atoms,  endowed  with  their 
peculiar  and  severally  distinctive  properties  from  all 
eternity.  Doubtless  the  argument  is,  that  as  there  appear 
to  be  some  sixty  or  more  elementary  atoms  constituting 
the  raw  material  of  the  observable  universe,  it  is  incredible 
that  they  can  all  have  owed  their  correlated  properties 
to  any  cause  other  than  that  of  a  designing  and  manu- 
facturing intelligence.  But,  in  the  next  place — and  here 
comes  the  demolishing  force  of  the  criticism — science  is 
not  in  a  position  to  assert  that  these  sixty  or  more  ele- 
mentary atoms  are  in  any  real  sense  of  the  term  elemen- 
tary. The  mere  fact  that  chemistry  is  as  yet  in  too 
undeveloped  a  condition  to  pronounce  whether  or  not  all 
the  forms  of  matter  known  to  her  are  modifications  of 
some  smaller  number  of  elements,  or  even  of  a  single 
element,  cannot  possibly  be  taken  as  a  warrant  for  so 
huge  an  inference  as  that  there  are  really  more  than  sixty 
elements  all  endowed  with  absolutely  distinctive  properties 
by  a  supernatural  cause.  Now  this  consideration,  which 
arises  immediately  from  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  155 

knowledge,  is  alone  amply  sufficient  to  destroy  the  present 
argument.  But  we  must  not  on  this  account  lose  sight 
of  the  fact  that,  even  to  our  strictly  relative  science  in  its 
present  embryonic  condition,  we  are  not  without  decided 
indications,  not  only  that  the  so-called  elements  are  pro- 
bably for  the  most  part  compounds,  but  even  that  matter 
as  a  whole  is  one  substance,  which  is  itself  probably  but 
some  modification  of  energy.  Indeed,  the  whole  tendency 
of  recent  scientific  speculation  is  towards  the  view  that 
the  universe  consists  of  some  one  substance,  which, 
whether  self-existing  or  created,  is  diverse  only  in  its 
relation  to  ignorance.  And  if  this  view  is  correct,  how 
obvious  is  the  inference  which  I  have  elaborated  in  §  32, 
that  all  the  diverse  forms  of  matter,  as  we  know  them,  were 
probably  evolved  by  natural  causes.  So  obvious,  indeed, 
is  this  inference,  that  to  resort  to  any  supernatural  hypo- 
thesis to  explain  the  diverse  properties  of  the  various 
chemical  elements  appears  to  me  a  most  glaring  violation 
of  the  law  of  parcimony — as  much  more  glaring,  for 
instance,  than  the  violation  of  this  law  by  Paley,  as  the 
number  and  variety  of  organic  species  are  greater  than 
the  number  and  variety  of  chemical  species.  And  if  it 
was  illegitimate  in  Paley  to  use  a  mere  absence  of  know- 
ledge as  to  how  the  transmutation  of  apparently  fixed 
species  of  animals  was  effected  as  equivalent  to  the 
possession  of  knowledge  that  such  transmutation  had  not 
been  effected,  how  much  more  illegitimate  must  it  be  to 
commit  a  similar  sin  against  logic  in  the  case  of  the 
chemical  elements,  where  our  classification  is  confessedly 
beset  with  numberless  difficulties,  and  when  we  begin  to 
discern  that  in  all  probability  it  is  a  classification  essenti- 
ally artificial.  Lastly,  the  mere  fact  that  the  transmutation 
of  chemical  species  and  the  evolution  of  chemical  "  atoms  " 
are  processes  which  we  do  not  now  observe  as  occurring 
in  nature,  is  surely  a  consideration  of  a  far  more  feeble 
kind  than  it  is  even  in  the  case  of  biological  species  and 
biological  evolution ;  seeing  that  nature's  laboratory  must 


156  SUPPLEMENTAR  V  ESS  A  V  IN  REPL  V 

be  now  so  inconceivably  different  from  what  it  was 
during  the  condensation  of  the  nebula.  What  an  atrocious 
piece  of  arrogance,  therefore,  it  is  to  assert  that  "  none  of 
the  processes  of  nature,  since  the  time  when  nature  began, 
have  produced  the  slightest  difference  in  the  proj^erties  of 
any  molecule  ! "  IS'o  one  can  entertain  a  higher  respect 
for  Professor  Clark  Maxwell  than  I  do ;  but  a  single  sen- 
tence  of  such  a  kind  as  this  cannot  leave  two  opinions  in 
any  impartial  mind  concerning  his  competency  to  deal 
with  such  subjects. 

I  am  therefore  sorry  to  see  this  absurd  argument 
approvingly  incorporated  in  Professor  Flint's  work.  He 
says,  "  I  believe  that  no  reply  to  these  words  of  Professor 
Clark  Maxwell  is  possible  from  any  one  who  holds  the 
ordinary  view  of  scientific  men  as  to  the  ultimate  con- 
stitution of  matter.  They  must  suppose  every  atom,  every 
molecule,  to  be  of  such  a  nature,  to  be  so  related  to  others 
and  to  the  universe  generally,  that  things  may  be  such  as 
we  see  them  to  be ;  but  this  their  fitness  to  be  built  up 
into  the  structure  of  the  universe  is  a  proof  that  they 
have  been  made  fit,  and  since  natural  forces  could  not 
have  acted  on  them  while  not  yet  existent,  a  supernatural 
power  must  have  created  them,  and  created  them  with  a 
view  to  their  manifold  uses."  Here  the  inference  so  con- 
fidently drawn  would  have  been  a  weak  one  even  were 
we  not  able  to  see  that  the  doctrine  of  natural  evolution 
probably  applies  to  inorganic  nature  no  less  than  to 
organic.  For  the  inference  is  drawn  from  considerations 
of  a  character  so  transcendental  and  so  remote  from 
science,  that  unless  we  wish  to  be  deceived  by  a  merely 
verbal  argument,  we  must  feel  that  the  possibilities  of 
error  in  the  inference  are  so  numerous  and  indefinite,  that 
the  inference  itself  is  well-nigh  worthless  as  a  basis  of 
belief.  But  when  we  add  that  in  Chapter  IV.  of  the  fore- 
going essay  it  has  been  shown  to  be  within  the  legitimate 
scope  of  scientific  reasoning  to  conclude  that  material 
atoms  have  been  progressively  evolved  2^ari  passu  with 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  157 

the  natural  laws  of  chemical  combination,  it  is  evident 
that  any  force  which  the  present  argument  could  ever 
have  had  must  now  be  pronounced  as  neutralised.     Natu- 
ral causes  have  been  shown,  so  far  as  scientific  inference 
can  extend,  as  not  improbably  sufficient  to  produce  the 
observed  effects ;  and  therefore  we  are  no  longer  free  to 
invoke  the  hypothetical  action  of  any  supernatural  cause. 
The  same  observations  apply  to  Professor  Flint's  theistic 
argument  drawn  from  recent  scientific  speculations  as  to 
the  vortex-ring  construction  of  matter.     If  these  specula- 
tions are  sound,  their  only  influence  on  Theism  would  be 
that  of  supplying  a  scientific  demonstration  of  the  sub- 
stantial identity  of  Force  and  Matter,  and  so  of  supplying 
a  still  more  valid  basis  for  the  theory  as  to  the  natural 
genesis  of  matter  from  a  single  primordial  substance,  in 
the  manner  sketched  out  in  Chapter  IV.     For  the  argu- 
ment adduced  by  Professor  Flint,  that  as  the  manner  in 
which  the  vorticial  motion  of  a  ring  is  originated  has  not 
as  yet  been  suggested,  therefore  its  origination  must  have 
been  due  to  a  ''  Diving  impulse,"  is  an  argument  which 
again  uses  the  absence  of  knowledge   as  equivalent  tb 
its  possession.     We  are  in  the  presence  of  a  very  novel 
and  highly  abstruse  theory,  or  rather  hypothesis,  in  physics, 
which  was  originally  suggested  by,  and  has  hitherto  been 
mainly  indebted  to,  empirical  experiments  as  distinguished 
from  mathematical  calculations ;  and  from  the  mere  fact 
that,  in  the   case  of  such  a  hypothesis,  mathematicians 
have  not  as  yet  been  able  to  determine  the  physical  con- 
ditions  required   to   originate   vorticial   motion,   we   are 
expected  to  infer  that  no  such  conditions  can  ever  have 
existed,  and  therefore  that  every  such  vortex  system,  if  it 
exists,  is  a  miracle ! 

And  substantially  the  same  criticism  applies  to  the 
argument  which  Professor  Flint  adduces — the  argument 
also  on  which  Professors  Balfour  and  Tait  lay  so  much 
stress  in  their  work  on  the  Unseen  Universe — the  arc^u- 
ment,  namely,  as  to  tlie  non-eternal  character  of  heat. 


158  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESS  A  Y  IN  REPLY 

The  calculations  on  which  this  argument  depends  would 
only  be  valid  as  sustaining  this  argument  if  they  were 
based  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  universe  as  a  whole  ;  and 
therefore,  as  before,  the  absence  of  requisite  knowledge 
must  not  be  used  as  equivalent  to  its  possession. 

These,  however,  are  the  weakest  parts  of  Professor 
Flint's  work.  I  therefore  gladly  turn  to  those  parts 
which  are  exceedingly  cogent  as  written  from  his  stand- 
point, but  which,  in  view  of  the  strictures  on  the  teleo- 
logical  argument  that  I  have  adduced  in  Chapters  IV. 
and  VI.,  I  submit  to  be  now  wdioUy  valueless. 

"  How  could  matter  of  itself  produce  order,  even  if  it 
were  self-existent  and  eternal  ?  It  is  far  more  unreasonable 
to  believe  that  the  atoms  or  constituents  of  matter  pro- 
duced of  themselves,  without  the  action  of  a  Supreme 
Mind,  this  wonderful  universe,  than  that  the  letters  of 
the  English  alphabet  produced  the  plays  of  Shakespeare, 
without  the  slightest  assistance  from  the  human  mind 
known  by  that  famous  name.  These  atoms  might,  per- 
haps, now  and  then,  here  and  there,  at  great  distances  and 
long  intervals,  produce  by  a  chance  contact  some  curious 
collocation  or  compound ;  but  never  could  they  produce 
order  or  organisation  on  an  extensive  scale,  or  of  a  durable 
character,  unless  ordered,  arranged,  and  adjusted  in  ways 
of  which  intelligence  alone  can  be  the  ultimate  explana- 
tion. To  believe  that  these  fortuitous  and  indirected 
movements  could  oric^inate  the  universe,  and  all  the  har- 
monies  and  utilities  and  beauties  which  abound  in  it, 
evinces  a  credulity  far  more  extravagant  than  has  ever 
been  displayed  by  the  most  superstitious  of  religionists. 
Yet  no  consistent  materialist  can  refuse  to  accept  this 
colossal  chance  hypothesis.  All  the  explanations  of  the 
order  of  the  universe  which  materialists,  from  Democritus 
and  Epicurus  to  Diderot  and  Lange,  have  devised,  rest  on 
the  assumption  that  the  elements  of  matter,  being  eternal, 
must  pass  through  infinite  combinations,  and  that  one  of 
these  must  be  our  present  world — a  special  collocation 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  159 

among  the  countless  millions  of  collocations,  past  and 
future.  Throw  the  letters  of  the  Greek  alphabet,  it  has 
been  said,  an  infinite  number  of  times,  and  you  must 
produce  the  '  Iliad '  and  all  the  Greek  books.  The  theory 
of  probabilities,  I  need  hardly  say,  requires  us  to  believe 
nothing  so  absurd.  .  .  .  But  what  is  the  '  Iliad '  to  the 
hymn  of  creation  and  the  drama  of  providence  ? "  &c. 

Now  this  I  conceive  to  have  been  a  fully  valid  argu- 
ment at  the  time  it  was  published,  and  indeed  the  most 
convincing  of  all  the  arguments  in  favour  of  Theism. 
But,  as  already  so  frequently  pointed  out,  the  considera- 
tions adduced  in  Chapter  IV.  of  the  present  work  are 
utterly  destructive  of  this  argument.  For  this  argument 
assumes,  rightly  enough,  that  the  only  alternative  we 
have  in  choosing  our  hypothesis  concerning  the  final  ex- 
planation of  things  is  either  to  regard  that  explanation 
as  Intelligence  or  as  Fortuity.  This,  I  say,  was  a  legiti- 
mate argument  a  few  months  ago,  because  up  to  that  time 
no  one  had  shown  that  strictly  natural  causes,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  chances,  could  conceivably  be  able  to 
produce  a  cosmos ;  and  although  the  several  previous 
writers  to  whom  Professor  Flint  alludes — and  he  might 
have  alluded  to  others  in  this  connection — entertained  a 
dim  anticipation  of  the  fact  that  natural  causes  might 
alone  be  sufficient  to  produce  the  observed  universe, 
still  these  dim  anticipations  were  worthless  as  arguments 
so  long  as  it  remained  impossible  to  suggest  any  natural 
principle  whereby  such  a  result  could  have  been  conceiv- 
ably effected  by  such  causes.  But  it  is  evident  that  Pro- 
fessor Flint's  time-honoured  argument  is  now  completely 
overthrown,  unless  it  can  be  proved  that  there  is  some 
radical  error  in  the  reasoning  whereby  I  have  endeavoured 
to  show  that  natural  causes  not  only  may,  but  mitst,  have 
produced  existing  order.  The  overthrow  is  complete,  be- 
cause the  very  groundwork  of  the  argument  in  question  is 
knocked  away ;  a  third  possibility,  of  the  nature  of  a  neces- 
sity, is  introduced,  and  therefore  the  alternative  is  no  longer 


i6o  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSA  V  IN  REPLY 

between  Intelligence  and  Fortuity,  but  between  Intelli- 
gence and  ]N"atural  Causation.  Whereas  tbe  overwhelming 
strength  of  the  argument  from  Order  has  hitherto  consisted 
in  the  supposition  of  Intelligence  as  the  one  and  only  con- 
ceivable cause  of  the  integration  of  things,  my  exposition 
in  Chapter  lY.  has  shown  that  such  integration  must  have 
been  due,  at  all  events  in  a  relative  or  proximate  sense, 
to  a  strictly  physical  cause — the  persistence  of  force  and 
the  consequent  self-evolution  of  natural  law.  And  the 
question  as  to  whether  or  not  Intelligence  may  not  have 
been  the  absolute  or  ultimate  cause  is  manifestly  a  ques- 
tion altogether  alien  to  the  argument  from  Order ;  for  if 
existing  order  admits  of  being  accounted  for,  in  a  relative 
or  proximate  sense,  by  merely  physical  causes,  the  argu- 
ment from  a  relative  or  proximate  order  is  not  at  liberty 
to  infer  or  to  assume  the  existence  of  any  higher  or  more 
ultimate  cause.  Although,  therefore,  in  Chapter  V.,  I 
have  been  careful  to  point  out  that  the  fact  of  existing 
order  having  been  due  to  proximate  or  natural  causes 
does  not  actually  disprove  the  possible  existence  of  an 
ultimate  and  supernatural  cause,  still  it  must  be  carefully 
observed  that  this  negative  fact  cannot  possibly  justify 
any  positive  inference  to  the  existence  of  such  a  cause. 

Thus,  upon  the  whole,  it  may  be  said,  without  danger  of 
reasonable  dispute,  that  as  the  argument  from  Order  has 
hitherto  derived  its  immense  weight  entirely  from  the  fact 
that  Intelligence  appeared  to  be  the  one  and  only  cause 
sufficient  to  produce  the  observed  integration  of  the 
cosmos,  this  immense  Vv^eight  has  now  been  completely 
counterpoised  by  the  demonstration  that  other  causes  of 
a  strictly  physical  kind  must  have  been  instrumental,  if 
not  themselves  alone  sufficient,  to  produce  this  integration. 
So  that,  just  as  in  the  case  of  Astronomy  the  demonstra- 
tion of  the  one  natural  principle  of  gravity  was  sufficient 
to  classify  under  one  physical  explanation  several  observed 
facts  which  many  persons  had  previously  attributed  to  su- 
pernatural causes  ;  and  just  as  in  the  more  complex  science 


70  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  i6i 

of  Geology  the  demonstration  of  the  one  principle  of 
uniformitarianism  was  sufficient  to  explain,  without  the 
aid  of  supernaturalism,  a  still  greater  number  of  facts ;  and, 
lastly,  just  as  in  the  case  of  the  still  more  complex  science 
of  Biology  the  demonstration  of  the  one  principle  of 
natural  selection  was  sufficient  to  marshal  under  one 
scientific,  or  natural,  hypothesis  an  almost  incalculable 
number  of  facts  which  were  previously  explained  by 
the  metaphysical  hypothesis  of  supernatural  design  ;  so  in 
the  science  which  includes  all  other  sciences,  and  which  we 
may  term  the  science  of  Cosmology,  I  assert  with  confi- 
dence that  in  the  one  principle  of  the  persistence  of  force  we 
have  a  demonstrably  harmonising  principle,  whereby  all  the 
facts  within  our  experience  admit  of  being  collocated  under 
one  natural  explanation,  without  there  being  the  smallest 
reason  to  attribute  these  facts  to  any  supernatural  cause. 

But  perhaps  the  immense  change  which  these  considera- 
tions must  logically  be  regarded  as  having  produced  in 
the  speculative  standing  of  the  argument  from  teleology 
will  be  better  appreciated  if  I  continue  to  quote  from  Pro- 
fessor Flint's  very  forcible  and  thoroughly  logical  exposi- 
tion of  the  previous  standing  of  this  argument.    He  says : — 

"  To  ascribe  the  origination  of  order  to  law  is  a  manifest 
evasion  of  the  real  problem.  Law  is  order.  Law  is  the 
very  thing  to  be  explained.  The  question  is — Has  law  a 
reason,  or  is  it  without  a  reason  ?  The  unperverted  human 
mind  cannot  believe  it  to  be  without  a  reason." 

I  do  not  know  where  a  more  terse  and  accurate  state- 
ment of  the  case  could  be  found;  and  to  my  mind  the 
question  so  lucidly  put  admits  of  the  direct  answer — Law 
clearly  has  a  reason  of  a  purely  physical  kind.  And 
therefore  I  submit  that  the  following  quotation  which 
Professor  Flint  makes  from  Professor  Jevons,  logical  as  it 
was  when  written,  must  now  be  regarded  as  embodying  an 
argument  which  is  obsolete. 

"  As  an  unlimited  number  of  atoms  can  be  placed  in 
unlimited  space  in  an  unlimited  number  of  modes  of  dis- 


1 62  SUPPLEMENTAR  Y  ESS  A  V  IN  RE  PL  V 

tribution,  there  must,  even  granting  matter  to  have  had  all 
its  laws  from  eternity,  have  been  at  some  moment  in  time, 
out  of  the  unlimited  choices  and  distributions  possible, 
that  one  choice  and  distribution  which  yielded  the  fair 
and  orderly  universe  that  now  exists.  Only  out  of  rational 
choice  can  order  have  come." 

But  clearly  the  alternative  is  now  no  longer  one  between 
chance  and  choice.  If  natural  laws  arise  by  way  of  neces- 
sary consequence  from  the  persistence  of  a  single  self- 
existing  substance,  it  becomes  a  matter  of  scientific 
(though  not  of  logical)  demonstration  that  "  the  fair  and 
orderly  universe  that  now  exists"  is  the  one  and  only 
universe  that,  in  the  nature  of  things,  can  exist.  But  to 
continue  this  interesting  passage  from  Dr.  Flint's  work — 
interesting  not  only  because  it  sets  forth  the  previous 
standing  of  this  subject  with  so  much  clearness,  but  also 
because  the  work  is  of  such  very  recent  publication. 

"  The  most  common  mode,  perhaps,  of  evading  the  pro- 
blem which  order  presents  to  reason  is  the  indication  of  the 
process  by  which  the  order  has  been  realised.  From 
Democritus  to  the  latest  Darwinian  there  have  been  men 
who  supposed  they  had  completely  explained  away  the 
evidences  of  design  in  nature  when  they  had  described  the 
physical  antecedents  of  the  arrangements  appealed  to  as 
evidences.  Aristotle  showed  the  absurdity  of  this  supposi- 
tion more  than  2200  years  ago." 

Now  this  is  a  perfectly  valid  criticism  on  all  such  pre- 
vious non-theistical  arguments  as  were  drawn  from  an 
"  indication  of  the  process  by  which  the  order  has  been 
realised ; "  for  in  all  these  previous  arguments  there  was 
an  absence  of  any  physical  explanation  of  the  lUtimate 
cause  of  the  process  contemplated,  and  so  long  as  this 
ultimate  cause  remained  obscure,  although  the  evidence  of 
design  might  by  these  arguments  have  been  excluded  from 
particular  processes,  the  evidence  of  design  could  not  be 
similarly  excluded  from  the  ultimate  cause  of  these  pro- 
cesses.    Thus,  for  instance,  it  is  doubtless  illogical,  as 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  163 

Professor  Flint  points  out,  in  any  Darwinian  to  argue  that 
because  his  theory  of  natural  selection  supplies  him  with 
a  natural  explanation  of  tlie  process  whereby  organisms 
have  been  adapted  to  their  surroundings,  therefore  this 
process  need  not  itself  have  been  designed.  That  is  to 
say,  in  general  terms,  as  insisted  upon  in  the  foregoing 
essay,  the  discovery  of  a  natural  law  or  orderly  process 
cannot  of  itself  justify  the  inference  that  this  law  or 
method  of  orderly  procedure  is  not  itself  a  product  of 
supernatural  Intelligence  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  very 
existence  of  such  orderly  processes,  considered  only  in 
relation  to  their  products,  must  properly  be  regarded  as 
evidence  of  the  best  possible  kind  in  favour  of  super- 
natural Intelligence,  'provided  that  no  natural  cause  can  he 
suggested  as  adequate  to  explain  the  origin  of  these  processes. 
But  this  is  precisely~what,  the  persistence  of  force,  con- 
sidered as  a  natural  cause,  must  be  pronounced  as  neces- 
sarily competent  to  achieve ;  for  we  can  clearly  see  that  all 
these  processess  obviously  must  and  actually  do  derive 
their  origin  from  this  one  causative  principle.  And 
whether  or  not  behind  this  one  causative  principle  of 
natural  law  there  exists  a  still  more  ultimate  cause  in  the 
form  of  a  supernatural  Intelligence,  this  is  a  question 
altogether  foreign  to  any  argument  from  teleology,  seeing 
that  teleology,  in  so  far  as  it  is  teleology,  can  only  rest  upon 
the  observed  facts  of  the  cosmos  ;  and  if  these  facts  admit 
of  being  explained  by  the  action  of  a  single  causative 
principle  inherent  in  the  cosmos  itself,  teleology  is  not  free 
to  assume  the  action  of  any  causative  principle  of  a  more 
ultimate  character.  Still,  as  I  have  repeatedly  insisted, 
these  considerations  do  not  entitle  us  dogmatically  to  deny 
the  existence  of  some  such  more  ultimate  principle ;  all 
that  these  considerations  do  is  to  remove  any  rational 
argument  from  teleological  sources  that  any  such  more 
ultimate  principle  exists.  Therefore  I  am,  of  course,  quite 
at  one  with  Professor  Flint  where  he  says  Professor 
Huxley  "  admits  that  the  most  thoroughgoing  evolutionist 


1 64  S  UPPLEMENTAR  V  ESS  A  V  IN  REPL  V 

must  at  least  assume  '  a  primordial  molecular  arrangement 
of  which  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  are  the  conse- 
quences/ and  '  is  thereby  at  the  mercy  of  the  theologist, 
who  can  defy  him  to  disprove  that  this  primordial  mole- 
cular arrangement  was  not  intended  to  involve  the  pheno- 
mena of  the  universe.'  Granting  this  much,  he  is  logically 
bound  to  grant  more.  If  the  entire  evolution  of  the  uni- 
verse may  have  been  intended,  the  several  stages  of  its 
evolution  may  have  been  intended,  and  they  may  have 
been  intended  for  their  own  sakes  as  well  as  for  the  sake 
of  the  collective  evolution  or  its  final  result."  Now  that  such 
may  have  been  the  case,  I  have  been  careful  to  insist  in 
Chapter  Y. ;  all  I  am  now  concerned  with  is  to  show  that, 
in  view  of  the  considerations  adduced  in  Chapter  lY.,  there 
is  no  longer  any  evidence'to  prove,  or  even  to  indicate,  that 
such  has  heen  the  case.  And  with  reference  to  this  oppor- 
tune quotation  from  Professor  Huxley  I  may  remark,  that 
the  "  thoroughgoing  evolutionist "  is  now  no  longer  "  at 
the  mercy  of  the  theologian  "  to  any  further  extent  than 
that  of  not  being  able  to  disprove  a  purely  metaphysical 
hypothesis,  which  is  as  certainly  superfluous,  in  any  scien- 
tific sense,  as  the  fundamental  data  of  science  are  certainly 
true. 

It  may  seem  almost  unnecessary  to  extend  this  post- 
script by  pursuing  further  the  criticism  on  Professor  Flint's 
exposition  in  the  light  of  "  a  single  new  reason  ...  for 
the  denial  of  design  "  which  he  challenges ;  but  there  are 
nevertheless  one  or  two  other  points  which  it  seems  desir- 
able to  consider.     Professor  Flint  writes : — 

"  M.  Comte  imamies  that  he  has  shown  the  inference 

o 

from  design,  from  the  order  and  stability  of  the  solar  sys- 
tem, to  be  unwarranted,  when  he  has  pointed  out  the  phy- 
sical conditions  through  w^hich  that  order  and  stability  are 
secured,  and  the  process  by  which  they  have  been  obtained. 
.  .  .  Now  the  assertion  that  the  peculiarities  which  make  the 
solar  system  stable  and  the  earth  habitable  have  flowed 
naturally  and  necessarily  from  the  simple  mutual  gravity 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  165 

of  the  several  parts  of  nebulous  matter  is  one  which 
greatly  requires  proof,  but  which  has  never  received  it. 
In  saying  this,  we  do  not  challenge  the  proof  of  the  nebu- 
lar theory  itself.  That  theory  may  or  may  not  be  true. 
We  are  quite  willing  to  suppose  it  true — to  grant  that  it 
has  been  scientifically  established.  What  we  maintain  is, 
that  even  if  we  admit  unreservedly  that  the  earth  and  the 
whole  system  to  which  it  belongs  once  existed  in  a  nebu- 
lous state,  from  which  they  were  gradually  evolved  into 
their  present  condition  conformably  to  physical  laws,  we 
are  in  no  degree  entitled  to  infer  from  the  admission  the 
conclusion  which  Comte  and  others  have  drawn.  The  man 
who  fancies  that  the  nebular  theory  implies  that  the  law 
of  gravitation,  or  any  other  physical  law,  has  of  itself  deter- 
mined the  course  of  cosmical  evolution,  so  that  there  is  no 
need  for  believing  in  the  existence  and  operation  of  a 
divine  mind,  proves  merely  that  he  is  not  exempt  from 
reasoning  very  illogically.  The  solar  system  could  only 
have  been  evolved  out  of  its  nebulous  state  into  that  which 
it  now  presents  if  the  nebula  possessed  a  certain  size,  mass, 
form,  and  constitution,  if  it  was  neither  too  fluid  nor  too 
tenacious — if  its  atoms  were  all  numbered,  its  elements  all 
weighed,  its  constituents  all  disposed  in  due  relation  to 
one  another;  that  is  to  say,  only  if  the  nebula  was  in 
reality  as  much  a  system  of  order,  which  Intelligence  alone 
could  account  for,  as  the  worlds  which  have  been  de- 
veloped from  it.  The  origin  of  the  nebula  thus  presents 
itself  to  reason  as  a  problem  which  demands  solution  no 
less  than  the  origin  of  the  planets.  All  the  properties  and 
laws  of  the  nebula  require  to  be  accounted  for.  What 
origin  are  we  to  give  them  ?  It  must  be  either  reason  or 
unreason.  We  may  go  back  as  far  as  we  please,  but  at  every 
step  and  stage  of  the  regress  we  must  find  ourselves  con- 
fronted with  the  same  question,  the  same  alternative — 
intelligent  purpose  or  colossal  chance." 

Now,  so  far  as  Comte  is  here  guilty  of  the  fallacy  I  have 
already  dwelt  upon  of  building  a  destructive  argument 


i65  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSA  V  IN  REPLY 

upon  a  demonstration  of  mere  orderly  processes  in  nature, 
as  disting^uislied  from  a  demonstration  of  the  natural  cause 
of  these  processes,  it  is  not  for  me  to  defend  him.  All  we 
can  say  with  regard  to  him  in  this  connection  is,  that, 
having  a  sort  of  scientific  presentiment  that  if  the  know- 
ledge of  his  day  were  sufficiently  advanced  it  would  prove 
destructive  of  supernaturalism  in  the  higher  and  more 
abstruse  provinces  of  physical  speculation,  as  it  had  pre- 
viously proved  in  the  lower  and  less  abstruse  of  these  pro- 
vinces, Comte  allowed  his  inferences  to  outrun  their  legi- 
timate basis.  Being  necessarily  ignorant  of  the  one  gene- 
rating cause  of  orderly  processes  in  nature,  he  improperly 
allowed  himself  to  found  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  these 
processes  alone,  which  could  only  be  properly  founded  on 
the  basis  of  their  cause.  But  freely  granting  this  much  to 
Professor  Flint,  and  the  rest  of  his  remarks  in  this  con- 
nection will  be  found,  in  view  of  the  altered  standing  of 
this  subject,  to  be  open  to  amendment.  For,  in  the  first 
place,  no  one  need  now  resort  to  the  illogical  supposition 
that  "  the  law  of  gravitation  or  any  other  physical  law  has 
of  itself  determined  the  course  of  cosmical  evolution." 
What  we  may  argue,  and  what  must  be  conceded  to  us,  is, 
that  the  common  substratum  of  all  physical  laws  was  at 
one  time  sufficient  to  produce  the  simplest  physical  laws, 
and  that  throughout  the  whole  course  of  evolution  this 
common  substratum  has  always  been  sufficient  to  produce 
the  more  complex  laws  in  the  ascending  series  of  their 
ever-increasing  number  and  variety.  And  hence  it  be- 
comes, obvious  that  the  "  origin  of  the  nebula  "  presents  a 
difficulty  neither  greater  nor  less  than  "  the  origin  of  the 
planets,"  since,  "  if  we  may  go  back  as  far  as  we  please," 
we  can  entertain  no  scientific  doubt  that  we  should  come  to 
a  time,  prior  even  to  the  nebula,  when  the  substance  of  the 
solar  system  existed  merely  as  such — i.e.,  in  an  almost  or 
in  a  wholly  undifferentiated  form,  the  product,  no  doubt, 
of  endless  cycles  of  previous  evolutions  and  dissolutions 
of  formal  differentiations.     Therefore,  although  it  is  un- 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  167 

doubtedly  true  that  "  the  solar  system  could  only  have  been 
evolved  out  of  its  nebulous  state  into  that  which  it  now 
presents  if  the  nebula  possessed"  those  particular  attri- 
butes which  were  necessary  to  the  evolution  of  such  a  pro- 
duct, this  consideration  is  clearly  deprived  of  all  its  force 
from  our  present  point  of  view.  For  unless  it  can  be 
shown  that  there  is  some  independent  reason  for  believing 
these  particular  attributes — which  must  have  been  of  a 
more  and  more  simple  a  character  the  further  we  recede 
in  time — to  have  been  miraculously  imposed,  the  analogy 
is  overwhelming  that  they  all  progressively  arose  hy  way 
of  natural  law.  And  if  so,  the  universe  which  has  been 
thus  produced  is  the  only  universe  in  this  particular  point 
of  space  and  time  which  could  have  been  thus  produced. 
That  it  is  an  orderly  universe  we  have  seen  ad  nauseam  to 
be  no  argument  in  favour  of  its  having  been  a  designed 
universe,  so  long  as  the  cause  of  its  order — general  laws — 
can  be  seen  to  admit  of  a  natural  explanation. 

Thus  there  is  clearly  nothing  to  be  gained  on  the  side  of 
teleology  by  going  back  to  the  dim  and  dismal  birth  of 
the  nebula ;  for  no  "  thoroughgoing  evolutionist "  would 
for  one  moment  entertain  the  supposition  that  natural  law 
in  the  simplest  phases  of  its  development  partook  any 
more  of  a  miraculous  character  than  it  does  in  its  more 
recent  and  vastly  more  complex  phases.  The  absence  of 
knowledge  must  not  be  used  as  equivalent  to  its  presence ; 
and  if  analogy  can  be  held  to  justify  any  inference  what- 
soever, surely  we  may  conclude  with  confidence  that  if 
existing  general  laws  admit  of  being  conceivably  attributed 
to  a  natural  genesis,  the  primordial  laws  of  a  condensing 
nebula  must  have  been  the  same. 

There  is  another  passage  in  Professor  Flint's  work  to 
which  it  seems  desirable  to  refer.  It  begins  thus  :  "  There 
is  the  law  of  heredity :  like  produces  like.  But  why  is 
there  such  a  law  ?  Why  does  like  produce  like  ?  .  .  .  . 
Physical  science  cannot  answer  these  questions ;  but  that 
is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  both  be  asked  and 


i68  SUPPLEMENTAR  V  ESS  A  V  IN  REPL  Y 

answered.  I  can  conceive  of  no  other  intelligent  answer 
being  given  to  them  than  that  there  is  a  God  of  wisdom, 
who  designed  that  the  world  should  be  for  all  ages  the 
abode  of  life,"  &c. 

[N'ow  here  we  have  in  another  form  that  same  vicious 
tendency  to  take  refuge  in  the  more  obscure  cases  of 
physical  causation  as  proofs  of  supernatural  design — the 
obscurity  in  this  case  arising  from  the  complexity  of  the 
causes  and  work,  as  in  the  former  case  it  arose  from  their 
remoteness  in  time.  But  in  both  cases  the  same  answer  is 
patent,  viz.,  that  although  "  physical  science  cannot  answer 
these  questions  "  by  pointing  out  the  precise  sequence  of 
causes  and  effects,  physical  science  is  nevertheless  quite  as 
certain  that  this  precise  sequence  arises  in  its  last  resort 
from  the  persistence  of  force,  as  she  would  be  were  she 
able  to  trace  the  whole  process.  And  therefore,  in  view  of 
the  considerations  set  forth  in  Chapter  lY.  of  this  work,  it 
is  no  longer  open  to  Professor  Flint  or  to  any  other  writer 
logically  to  assert — "  I  can  conceive  of  no  other  intelligent 
answer  being  given  to  "  such  questions  "  than  that  there  is 
a  God  of  wisdom." 

The  same  answer  awaits  this  author's  further  disquisi- 
tion on  other  biological  laws,  so  it  is  needless  to  make  any 
further  quotations  in  this  connection.  But  there  is  one 
other  principle  embodied  in  some  of  these  passages  which 
it  seems  undesirable  to  overlook.  It  is  said,  for  instance, 
"Natural  selection  might  have  had  no  materials,  or 
altogether  insufficient  materials,  to  work  with,  or  the 
circumstances  might  have  been  such  that  the  lowest 
organisms  were  the  best  endowed  for  the  struggle  for  life. 
If  the  earth  were  covered  with  water,  fish  would  survive 
and  higher  creatures  would  perish." 

Now  the  principle  here  embodied — viz.,  that"  had  the 
conditions  of  evolution  been  other  than  they  were,  the 
results  would  have  been  different — is,  of  course,  true ;  but 
clearly,  on  the  view  that  all  natural  laws  spring  from  the 
persistence  of  force,  no  other  conditions  than  those  which 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  169 

actually  occurred,  or  are  now  occurring,  could  ever  have 
occurred, — the  whole  course  of  evolution  must  have  been, 
in  all  its  phases  and  in  all  its  processes,  an  unconditional 
necessity.  But  if  it  is  said,  How  fortunate  that  the  out- 
come, being  unconditionally  necessary,  has  happened  to  be 
so  good  as  it  is ;  I  answer  that  the  remark  is  legitimate 
enough  if  it  is  not  intended  to  convey  an  implication  that 
the  general  quality  of  the  outcome  points  to  beneficent 
design  as  to  its  cause.  Such  an  implication  would  not  be 
legitimate,  because,  in  the  first  place,  we  have  no  means  of 
knowing  in  how  many  cases,  whether  in  planets,  stars,  or 
systems,  the  course  of  evolution  has  failed  to  produce  life 
and  mind — the  one  known  case  of  this  earth,  whether 
or  not  it  is  the  one  success  out  of  millions  of  abor- 
tions, being  of  necessity  the  only  known  case.  In  how 
vastly  greater  a  number  of  cases  the  course  of  evolu- 
tion may  have  been,  so  to  speak,  deflected  by  some 
even  slight,  though  strictly  necessary,  cause  from  produc- 
ing self-conscious  intelligence,  it  is  impossible  to  conjec- 
ture. But  this  consideration,  be  it  observed,  is  not  here 
adduced  in  order  to  disprove  the  assertion  that  telluric 
evolution  has  been  effected  by  Intelligence ;  it  is  merely 
adduced  to  prove  that  such  an  assertion  cannot  rest  on 
the  single  known  result  of  telluric  evolution,  so  long  as 
an  infinite  number  of  the  results  of  evolution  elsewhere 
remain  unknown. 

And  now,  lastly,  it  must  be  observed  that  even  in  the 
one  case  with  which  we  are  acquainted,  the  net  product  of 
evolution  is  not  such  as  can  of  itself  point  us  to  heneficent 
design.  Professor  Flint,  indeed,  in  common  with  theo- 
logians generally,  argues  that  it  does.  I  will  therefore 
briefly  criticise  his  remarks  on  this  subject,  believing,  as  I 
do,  that  they  form  a  very  admirable  illustration  of  what  I 
conceive  to  be  a  general  principle — viz.,  that  minds  which 
already  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  Deity  are,  as  a  rule, 
not  in  a  position  to  view  this  question  of  beneficence 
in  nature  in  a  perfectly  impartial  manner.      For  if  the 


1 70  SUPPLEMENTAR  V  ESS  A  V  IN  REPL  Y 

existence  of  a  Deity  is  presupposed,  a  mind  with  any 
particle  of  that  most  noble  quality — reverence — will 
naturally  hesitate  to  draw  conclusions  that  partake  of  the 
nature  of  blasphemy ;  and  therefore,  unconsciously  perhaps 
to  themselves,  they  endeavour  in  various  ways  to  evade 
the  evidence  which,  if  honestly  and  impartially  considered, 
can  scarcely  fail  to  negative  the  argument  from  beneficence 
in  the  universe. 

Professor  Flint  argues  that  the  "law  of  over-produc- 
tion," and  the  consequent  struggle  for  existence,  being 
"  the  reason  why  the  world  is  so  wonderfully  rich  in  the 
most  varied  forms  of  life,"  is  "  a  means  to  an  end  worthy 
of  Divine  Wisdom."  "Although  involving  privation, 
pain,  and  conflict,  its  final  result  is  order  and  beauty. 
All  the  perfections  of  sentient  creatures  are  represented  as 
due  to  it.  Through  it  the  lion  has  gained  its  strength, 
the  deer  its  speed,  and  the  dog  its  sagacity.  The  inference 
seems  natural  that  these  perfections  were  designed  to  be 
attained  by  it ;  that  this  state  of  struggle  was  ordained  for 
the  sake  of  the  advantages  which  it  is  actually  seen  to 
produce.  The  suffering  which  the  conflict  involves  may 
indicate  that  God  has  made  even  animals  for  some  higher  end 
than  happiness — that  he  cares  for  animal  perfection  as 
well  as  for  animal  enjoyment ;  but  it  affords  no  reason  for 
denying  that  the  ends  which  the  conflict  actually  serves 
it  was  intended  to  serve." 

]N"ow,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  such  an  argument  as 
an  attempted  justification  of  beneficent  design  already  on 
independent  ground  believed  to  exist,  it  is  manifestly  no 
argument  at  all  as  establishing  any  presumption  in  favour 
of  such  design,  unless  it  could  be  shown  that  the  Deity  is 
so  far  limited  in  his  power  of  adapting  means  to  ends 
that  the  particular  method  adopted  in  this  case  was  the 
best,  all  things  considered,  that  he  was  able  to  adopt. 
For  supposing  the  Deity  to  be,  what  Professor  Flint  main- 
tains that  he  is — viz.,  omnipotent — and  there  can  be  no 
inference    more  transparent   than   that    such    wholesale 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  171 

suffering,  for  whatever  ends  designed,  exhibits  an  incal- 
culably greater  deficiency  of  beneficence  in  the  divine 
character  than  that  which  we  know  in  any,  the  very  worst, 
of  human  characters.  For  let  us  pause  for  one  moment 
to  think  of  what  suffering  in  nature  means.  Some 
hundreds  of  millions  of  years  ago  some  millions  of  millions 
of  animals  must  be  supposed  to  have  been  sentient. 
Since  that  time  till  the  present,  there  must  have  been 
millions  and  millions  of  generations  of  millions  of  millions 
of  individuals.  And  throughout  all  this  period  of  incal- 
culable duration,  this  inconceivable  host  of  sentient 
organisms  have  been  in  a  state  of  unceasing  battle,  dread, 
ravin,  pain.  Looking  to  the  outcome,  we  find  that  more 
than  half  of  the  species  which  have  survived  the  ceaseless 
struggle  are  parasitic  in  their  habits,  lower  and  insentient 
forms  of  life  feasting  on  higher  and  sentient  forms ;  we 
find  teeth  and  talons  whetted  for  slaughter,  hooks  and 
suckers  moulded  for  torment — everywhere  a  reign  of  terror, 
hunger,  and  sickness,  with  oozing  blood  and  quivering 
limbs,  with  gasping  breath  and  eyes  of  innocence  that 
dimly  close  in  deaths  of  brutal  torture !  Is  it  said  that 
there  are  compensating  enjoyments  ?  I  care  not  to  strike 
the  balance ;  the  enjoyments  I  plainly  perceive  to  be  as 
physically  necessary  as  the  pains,  and  this  whether  or 
not  evolution  is  due  to  design.  Therefore  all  I  am  con- 
cerned with  is  to  show,  that  if  such  a  state  of  things  is 
due  to  "  omnipotent  design,"  the  omnipotent  designer 
must  be  concluded,  so  far  as  reason  can  infer,  to  be  non- 
beneficent.  And  this  it  is  not  difficult  to  show.  When  I 
see  a  rabbit  panting  in  the  iron  jaws  of  a  spring-trap,  I 
abhor  the  devilish  nature  of  the  being  who,  with  full 
powers  of  realising  what  pain  means,  can  deliberately 
employ  his  noble  faculties  of  invention  in  contriving  a 
thing  so  hideously  cruel.  But.  if  I  could  believe  that 
there  is  a  being  who,  with  yet  higher  faculties  of  thought 
and  knowledge,  and  with  an  unlimited  choice  of  means 
to   secure  his   ends,  has  contrived  untold  thousands   of 


172  SUPPLEMENTAR  V  ESSA  V  IN  REPL  Y 

mechanisms  no  less  diabolical  than  a  spring-trap  ;  I  should 
call  that  being  a  fiend,  were  all  the  world  besides  to  call 
him  God.  Am  I  told  that  this  is  arrogance  ?  It  is  nothing 
of  the  kind ;  it  is  plain  morality,  and  to  say  otherwise  would 
be  to  hide  our  eyes  from  murder  because  we  dread  the 
Murderer.  Am  I  told  that  I  am  not  competent  to  judge 
the  purposes  of  the  Almighty  ?  I  answer  that  if  these  are 
purposes,  I  am  able  to  judge  of  them  so  far  as  I  can  see ; 
and  if  I  am  expected  to  judge  of  his  purposes  when  they 
appear  to  be  beneficent,  I  am  in  consistency  obliged  also 
to  judge  of  them  when  they  appear  to  be  malevolent. 
And  it  can  be  no  possible  extenuation  of  the  latter  to 
point  to  the  "  final  result "  as  ''  order  and  beauty,"  so  long 
as  the  means  adopted  by  the  "  Omnipotent  Designer  "  are 
known  to  have  been  so  revolting.  All  that  we  could 
legitimately  assert  in  this  case  would  be,  that  so  far  as 
observation  can  extend,  "  he  cares  for  animal  perfection  " 
to  the  exclusion  of  "  animal  enjoyment,"  and  even  to  the 
total  disregard  of  animal  suffering.  But  to  assert  this 
would  merely  be  to  deny  beneficence  as  an  attribute 
of  God. 

The  dilemma,  therefore,  which  Epicurus  has  stated  with 
great  lucidity,  and  which  Professor  Flint  quotes,  appears 
to  me  so  obvious  as  scarcely  to  require  statement.  The 
dilemma  is,  that,  looking  to  the  facts  of  organic  nature, 
theists  must  abandon  their  belief,  either  in  the  divine 
omnipotence,  or  in  the  divine  beneficence.  And  yet,  such 
is  the  warping  effect  of  preformed  beliefs  on  the  mind,  that 
even  so  candid  a  writer  as  Professor  Flint  can  thus  write 
of  this  most  obvious  truth  : — 

"  The  late  Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill,  for  no  better  reason 
than  that  nature  sometimes  drowns  men  and  burns  them^ 
and  that  childbirth  is  a  painful  process,  maintained  that 
God  could  not  possibly  be  infinite.  I  shall  not  say  what 
I  think  of  the  shallowness  and  self-conceit  displayed  by 
such  an  argument.  What  it  proves  is  not  the  finiteness  of 
God,  but  the  littleness  of  man.     The  mind  of  man  never 


A   TO  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  173 

shows  itself  so  small  as  when  it  tries  to  measure  the 
attributes  and  limit  the  greatness  of  its  Creator." 

But  the  argument — or  rather  the  truism — in  question 
is  an  attempt  to  do  neither  the  one  nor  the  other;  it 
simply  asserts  the  patent  fact  that,  if  God  is  omnipotent, 
and  so  had  an  unlimited  choice  of  means  whereby  to 
accomplish  the  ends  of  "animal  perfection,"  "animal 
enjoyment,"  and  the  rest;  then  the  fact  of  his  having 
chosen  to  adopt  the  means  which  he  has  adopted  is  a  fact 
which  is  wholly  incompatible  with  his  beneficence.  And 
on  the  other  hand,  if  he  is  beneficent,  the  fact  of  his 
having  adopted  these  means  in  order  that  the  sum  of 
ultimate  enjoyment  might  exceed  the  sum  of  concomi- 
tant pain,  is  a  fact  which  is  wholly  incompatible  with 
his  omnipotence.  To  a  man  who  already  beheves,  on 
independent  grounds,  in  an  omnipotent  and  beneficent 
Deity,  it  is  no  doubt  possible  to  avoid  facing  this 
dilemma,  and  to  rest  content  with  the  assumption  that,  in 
a  sense  beyond  the  reach  of  human  reason,  or  even  of 
human  conception,  the  two  horns  of  this  dilemma  must  be 
united  in  some  transcendental  reconciliation;  but  if  a 
man  undertakes  to  reason  on  the  subject  at  all,  as  he 
must  and  ought  when  the  question  is  as  to  the  existence  of 
such  a  Deity,  then  clearly  he  has  no  alternative  but  to 
allow  that  the  dilemma  is  a  hopeless  one.  With  inverted 
meaning,  therefore,  may  we  quote  Professor  Flint's  words 
against  himself : — "  The  mind  of  man  never  shows  itself 
so  small  as  when  it  tries  to  measure  the  attributes  .... 
of  its  Creator ; "  for  certainly,  if  Professor  Flint's  usually 
candid  mind  has  had  a  Creator,  it  nowhere  displays  the 
"  littleness  "  of  prejudice  in  so  marked  a  degree  as  it  does 
when  "  measuring  his  attributes." 

Thus  in  a  subsequent  chapter  he  deals  at  greater  length 
with  this  difficulty  of  the  apparent  failure  of  beneficence 
in  nature,  arguing,  in  effect,  that  as  pain  and  suffering 
"  serve  many  good  ends  "  in  the  way  of  warning  animals 
of  danger  to  life,  &c.,  therefore  we  ought  to  conclude  that. 


174  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESS  A  Y  IN  REEL  Y 

if  we  could  see  farther,  we  should  see  pain  and  suffering 
to  be  unmitigated  good,  or  nearly  so.  Now  this  argument, 
as  I  have  previously  said,  may  possible  be  admissible  as 
between  Christians  or  others  who  already  believe  in  the 
existence  and  in  the  beneficence  of  God ;  but  it  is  only  the 
blindest  prejudice  which  can  fail  to  perceive  that  the  argu- 
ment is  quite  without  relevancy  when  the  question  is  as  to 
the  evidences  of  such  existence  and  the  evidences  of  such 
character.  For  where  the  fact  of  such  an  existence  and 
character  is  the  question  in  dispute,  it  clearly  can  be  no 
argument  to  state  its  bare  assumption  by  saying  that  if  we 
knew  more  of  nature  we  should  find  the  relative  prepon- 
derance of  good  over  evil  to  be  immeasurably  greater  than 
that  which  we  now  perceive.  The  platform  of  argument  on 
which  the  question  of  "  Theism  "  must  be  discussed  is  that 
of  the  observable  Cosmos ;  and  if,  as  Dr.  Flint  is  constrained 
to  admit,  there  is  a  fearful  spectacle  of  misery  presented 
by  this  Cosmos,  it  becomes  mere  question-begging  to  gloss 
over  this  aspect  of  the  subject  by  any  vague  assumption 
that  the  misery  must  have  some  unobservable  ends  of  so 
transcendentally  beneficent  a  nature,  that  were  they  known 
they  would  justify  the  means.  Indeed,  this  kind  of  dis- 
cussion seems  to  me  worse  than  useless  for  the  purposes 
which  the  Professor  has  in  view ;  for  it  only  serves  by  con- 
trast to  throw  out  into  stronger  relief  the  natural  and  the 
unstrained  character  of  the  adverse  interpretation  of  the 
facts.  According  to  this  adverse  interpretation,  sentiency 
has  been  evolved  by  natural  selection  to  secure  the  bene- 
fits which  are  pointed  out  by  Professor  Flint ;  and  there- 
fore the  fact  of  this,  its  cause,  having  been  a  mindless  cause, 
clearly  implies  that  the  restriction  of  pain  and  suffering 
cannot  be  an  active  principle,  or  a  vera  causa,  as  between 
species  and  species,  though  it  must  be  such  within  the 
limits  of  the  same  organism,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  within 
the  limits  of  the  same  species.  And  this  is  just  what  we 
find  to  be  the  case.  Therefore,  without  the  need  of  resort- 
ing to  wholly  arbitrary  assumptions  concerning  transcen- 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  175 

dental  reconciliations  between  apparently  needless  suffer- 
ing and  a  supposed  almighty  beneficence,  the  non-theistic 
hypothesis  is  saved  by  merely  opening  our  eyes  to  the  ob- 
servable facts  around  us,  and  there  seeing  that  pain  and 
misery,  alike  in  the  benefits  which  they  bring  and  in  the 
frightful  excesses  which  they  manifest,  play  just  that  part 
in  nature  which  this  hypothesis  would  lead  us  to  expect. 

Therefore,  to  sum  up  these  considerations  on  physical 
suffering,  the  case  between  a  theist  and  a  sceptic  as  to  the 
question  of  divine  beneficence  is  seen  to  be  a  case  of  ex- 
treme simplicity.  The  theist  believes  in  such  beneficence 
by  purposely  concealing  from  his  mind  all  adverse  evidence 
— feeling,  on  the  one  side,  that  to  entertain  the  doubt  to 
which  this  evidence  points  would  be  to  hold  dalliance  with 
blasphemy,  and,  on  the  other  side,  that  the  subject  is  of  so 
transcendental  a  nature  that,  in  view  of  so  great  a  risk,  it 
is  better  to  avoid  impartial  reasoning  upon  it.  A  sceptic, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  under  no  such  obligation  to  precon- 
ceived ideas,  and  is  therefore  free  to  draw  unbiassed  infer- 
ences as  to  the  character  of  God,  if  he  exists,  to  the  extent 
which  such  character  is  indicated  by  the  sphere  of  observ- 
able nature.  And,  as  I  have  said,  when  the  subject  is  so 
viewed,  the  inference  is  unavoidable  that,  so  far  as  human 
reason  can  penetrate,  God,  if  he  exists,  must  either  be  non- 
infinite  in  his  resources,  or  non-beneficent  in  his  designs. 
Therefore  it  is  evident  that  when  the  heing  of  God,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  his  character,  is  the  subject  in  dispute. 
Theism  can  gain  nothing  by  an  appeal  to  evidences  of  hene- 
ficent  designs.  If  such  evidences  were  unequivocal,  then 
indeed  the  argument  which  they  would  establish  to  an  intel- 
ligent cause  of  nature  would  be  almost  irresistible  ;  for  the 
fact  of  the  external  world  being  in  harmony  w^ith  the  moral 
nature  of  man  would  be  unaccountable  except  on  the  suppo- 
sition of  both  having  derived  their  origin  from  a  common 
moral  source ;  and  morality  implies  intelKgence.  But  as  it 
is,  all  the  so-called  evidence  of  divine  beneficence  in  nature 
is,  without  any  exception  of  a  kind  that  is  worthless  as 


1 76  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESS  A  V  IN  REEL  V 

proving  design ;  for  all  the  facts  admit  of  being  explained 
equally  well  on  the  supposition  of  their  having  been  due 
to  purely  physical  processes,  acting  through  the  various 
biological  laws  which  we  are  now  only  beginning  to  under- 
stand. And  further  than  this,  so  far  are  these  facts  from 
proving  the  existence  of  a  moral  cause,  that,  in  view  of  the 
alternative  just  stated,  they  even  ground  a  positive  argu- 
ment to  its  negation.  For,  as  we  have  seen,  all  these  facts 
are  just  of  such  a  kind  as  we  should  expect  to  be  the  facts, 
on  the  supposition  of  their  having  been  due  to  natural 
causes — i.e.,  causes  which  could  have  had  no  moral  solici- 
tude for  animal  happiness  as  such.  Let  us  now,  in  conclu- 
sion, dwell  on  this  antithesis  at  somewhat  greater  length. 

If  natural  selection  has  played  any  large  share  in  the 
process  of  organic  evolution,  it  is  evident  that  animal  enjoy- 
ment, being  an  important  factor  in  this  natural  cause, 
must  always  have  been  furthered  to  the  extent  in  which  it 
was  necessary  for  the  adaptation  of  organisms  to  their  en- 
vironment that  it  should.  And  such  we  invariably  find  to 
be  the  limits  within  which  animal  enjoyments  are  confined. 
On  the  other  hand,  so  long  as  the  adaptations  in  question 
are  not  complete,  so  long  must  more  or  less  of  suffering  be 
entailed — the  capacity  for  suffering,  as  for  enjoyment,  being 
no  doubt  itself  a  product  of  natural  selection.  But  as 
all  specific  types  are  perpetually  struggling  together,  it  is 
manifest  that  the  competition  must  prevent  any  consider- 
able number  of  types  from  becoming  so  far  adapted  to 
their  environment  of  other  types  as  to  become  exempt  from 
suffering  as  a  result  of  this  competition.  There  being  no 
one  integrating  cause  of  an  intelligent  or  moral  nature  to 
supply  the  conditions  of  happiness  to  each  organic  type 
without  the  misery  of  this  competition,  such  happiness 
as  animals  have  is  derived  from  the  heavy  expenditure  of 
pain  suffered  by  themselves  and  by  their  ancestry. 

Thus,  whether  we  look  to  animal  pleasures  or  to  animal 
pains,  the  result  is  alike  just  what  we  should  expect  to 
find  on  the  supposition  of  these  pleasures  and  pains  having 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.  177 

been  due  to  necessary  and  physical,  as  distinguished  from 
intelligent  and  moral,  antecedents  ;  for  how  different  is  that 
which  is  from  that  which  might  have  been !  Not  only 
might  beneficent  selection  have  eliminated  the  countless 
species  of  parasites  which  now  destroy  the  health  and 
happiness  of  all  the  higher  organisms;  not  only  might 
survival  of  the  fittest,  in  a  moral  sense,  have  determined 
that  rapacious  and  carnivorous  animals  should  yield  their 
places  in  the  world  to  harmless  and  gentle  ones ;  not  only 
misjht  life  have  been  without  sickness  and  death  without 
pain ; — but  how  might  the  exigences  and  the  welfare 
of  species  have  been  consulted  by  the  structures  and 
the  habits  of  one  another !  But  no !  Amid  all  the 
millions  of  mechanisms  and  habits  in  organic  nature,  all 
of  which  are  so  beautifully  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the 
species  presenting  them,  there  is  no  single  instance  of  any 
mechanism  or  habit  occurring  in  one  species  for  the 
exclusive  benefit  of  another  species  —  although,  as  we 
should  expect  on  the  non-theistic  theory,  there  are  some 
comparatively  few  cases  of  a  mechanism  or  a  habit  which 
is  of  benefit  to  its  possessor  being  also  utilised  by  other 
species.  Yet,  on  the  beneficent-design  theory,  it  is  im- 
possible to  understand  why,  when  all  mechanisms  and 
habits  in  the  same  species  are  invariably  correlated  for  the 
benefit  of  that  species,  there  should  never  be  any  such 
correlation  between  mechanisms  and  habits  of  different 
species.  For  how  magnificent,  how  sublime  a  display  of 
supreme  beneficence  would  nature  have  afforded  if  all  her 
sentient  animals  had  been  so  inter-related  as  to  minister  to 
each  other's  happiness !  Organic  species  might  then  have 
been  likened  to  a  countless  multitude  of  voices,  all  singing 
to  their  Creator  in  one  harmonious  psalm  of  praise.  But, 
as  it  is,  we  see  no  vesticre  of  such  correlation;  every 
species  is  for  itself,  and  for  itself  alone — an  outcome  of  the 
always  and  everywhere  fiercely  raging  struggle  for  life. 

So  much,  then,  for  the  case  of  physical  evil ;  but  Dr. 
Flint  also  treats  of  the  case  of  moral  evil.     Let  us  see 

M 


178  SUPPLEMENTAR  V  ESS  A  V  IN  REPL  V 

what  this  well-equipped  writer  can  make  of  this  old  pro- 
blem in  the  present  year  of  grace.  He  says — "  But  it  will 
be  objected,  could  not  God  have  made  moral  creatures  who 
would  be  certain  always  to  choose  what  is  right,  always  to 
acquiesce  in  His  holy  will  ?  .  .  .  Well,  far  be  it  from  me 
to  deny  that  God  could  have  originated  a  sinless  moral 
system.  .  .  .  But  if  questioned  as  to  why  He  has  not  done 
better,  I  feel  no  shame  in  confessing  my  ignorance.  It 
seems  to  me  that  when  you  have  resolved  the  problem  of 
the  origin  of  moral  evil  into  the  question.  Why  has  God 
not  originated  a  moral  universe  in  which  the  lowest  moral 
being  would  be  as  excellent  as  the  archangels  are  ?  you 
have  at  once  shown  it  to  be  speculatively  incapable  of 
solution  [italics  mine],  and  practically  without  impor- 
tance [!].  The  question  is  one  which  would  obviously 
give  rise  to  another,  Why  has  God  not  created  only  moral 
beings  as  much  superior  to  the  archangels  as  they  are 
superior  to  the  lowest  Australian  aborigines  ?  But  no 
complete  answer  can  be  given  to  a  question  which  may  be 
followed  by  a  series  of  similar  questions  to  which  there 
is  no  end.  We  have,  besides,  neither  the  facts  nor  the 
faculties  to  answer  such  questions."  l 

Now  I  confess  that  this  argument  presents  to  my  mind 
more  of  subtlety  than  sense.  I  had  previously  imagined 
that  the  archangels  were  supposed  to  enjoy  a  condition  of 
moral  existence  which  might  fairly  be  thought  to  remove 
them  from  any  association  with  that  of  the  Australian 
aborigines.  But  as  this  question  is  one  that  belongs  to 
Divinity,  I  am  here  quite  prepared  to  bow  to  Professor 
Flint's  authority — hoping,  however,  that  he  is  prepared  to 
take  the  responsibility  should  the  archangels  ever  care  to 
accuse  me  of  calumny.  But,  as  a  logician,  I  must  be  per- 
mitted to  observe,  that  if  I  ask.  Why  am  I  not  better  than 
I  am  ?  it  is  no  answer  to  tell  me.  Because  the  archangels 
are  not  better  than  they  are.  For  aught  that  I  know  to 
the  contrary,  the  archangels  may  be  morally  J9gr/ec^ — as  an 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  255-257, 


TO  A  RECENT  WORK  ON  THEISM.   '         179 

authority  in  sucli  matters  has  told  us  that  even  "just 
men  "  may  become, — and  therefore,  for  aught  that  I  know 
to  the  contrary,  Professor  Flint's  regress  of  moral  degrees 
ad  infinitum,  may  be  an  ontological  absurdity.  But 
granting,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  archangels  fall 
infinitely  short  of  moral  perfection,  and  I  should  only  be 
able  to  see  in  the  fact  a  hopeless  aggravation  of  my  previous 
difficulty.  If  it  is  hard  to  reconcile  the  supreme  good- 
ness of  God  with  the  moral  turpitude  of  man,  much  more 
would  it  be  hard  to  do  so  if  his  very  angels  are  depraved. 
Therefore,  if  the  reasonable  question  which  I  originally 
put  "  may  be  followed  by  a  series  of  similar  questions  to 
which  there  is  no  end,"  the  goodness  of  God  must  simply 
be  pronounced  a  delusion.  For  the  question  which  I 
originally  put  was  no  mere  flimsy  question  of  a  stupidly 
unreal  description.  My  own  moral  depravity  is  a  matter 
of  painful  certainty  to  me,  and  I  want  to  know  why,  if 
there  is  a  God  of  infinite  power  and  goodness,  he  should 
have  made  me  thus.  And  in  answer  I  am  told  that  my 
question  is  "  practically  without  importance,"  because 
there  may  be  an  endless  series  of  beings  who,  in  their 
several  degrees,  are  in  a  similar  predicament  to  myself. 
Perhaps  they  are ;  but  if  so,  the  moral  evil  with  which  I 
am  directly  acquainted  is  made  all  the  blacker  by  the  fact 
that  it  is  thus  but  a  drop  in  an  infinite  ocean  of  moral  im- 
perfection. When,  therefore,  Professor  Flint  goes  on  to 
say,  "  We  ought  to  be  content  if  we  can  show  that  what 
God  has  done  is  wise  and  right,  and  not  perplex  ourselves 
as  to  why  He  has  not  done  an  infinity  of  other  things,"  I 
answer.  Most  certainly ;  but  can  we  show  that  what  God  has 
done  is  wise  and  right  ?  Unquestionably  not.  That  what 
he  has  done  may  be  wise  and  right,  could  we  see  his  whole 
scheme  of  things,  no  careful  thinker  will  deny  ;  but  to  sup- 
pose it  can  be  shown  that  he  has  done  this,  is  an  instance 
of  purblind  fanaticism  which  is  most  startling  in  a  work 
on  Theism.  "  The  best  world,  we  may  he  assured,  that  our 
fancies  can  feign,  would  in  reality  be  far  inferior  to  the 


i8o  SUPPLEMENTARY  ESS  A  V. 

world  God  has  made,  whatever  imperfections  we  m ay- 
think  we  see  in  it."  Are  we  reading  a  sermon  on  the 
datum  "  God  is  love  "  ?  No ;  but  a  work  on  the  questions, 
Is  there  a  God?  and,  if  so,  Is  he  a  God  of  love  ?  And  yet 
the  work  is  written  by  a  man  who  evidently  tries  to  argue 
fairly.  What  shall  we  say  of  the  despotism  of  preformed 
beliefs  ?  May  we  not  say  at  least  this  much — that  those 
who  endeavour  to  reconcile  their  theories  of  divine  good- 
ness with  the  facts  of  human  evil  might  well  appropriate 
to  themselves  the  words  above  quoted,  "  We  have  neither 
the  facts  nor  the  faculties  to  answer  such  questions "  ? 
Por  the  "  facts  "  indeed  are  absent,  and  the  "  faculties  "  of 
impartial  thought  must  be  absent  also,  if  this  obvious 
truth  cannot  be  seen — that  "  these  questions  "  only  derive 
their  "  speculatively  unanswerable "  character  from  the 
rational  falsity  of  the  manner  by  which  it  is  sought 
to  answer  them.  The  "facts"  of  our  moral  nature,  so 
far  as  honest  reason  can  perceive,  belie  the  hypothesis  of 
Theism ;  and  although  the  "  faculties "  of  man  may  be 
forced  by  prejudice  into  an  acceptance  of  contradictory 
propositions,  the  truth  is  obvious  that  only  by  the  hypo- 
thesis of  Evolution  can  that  old-tied  knot  be  cut — the 
Origin  of  Evil.  The  form  of  Theism  for  which  Dr.  Flint 
is  arguing  is  the  current  form,  viz.,  that  there  is  a  God  who 
combines  in  himself  the  attributes  of  infinite  power  and 
'perfect  goodness — a  God  at  once  omnipotent  and  luliolly 
moral.  But,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  moral  evil  exists  in 
man,  the  proposition  that  Gqd  is  omnipotent  and  the  pro- 
position that  he  is  wholly  moral  become  contradictory ; 
and  therefore  the  fact  of  moral  evil  can  only  be  met,  either 
by  abandoning  one  or  other  of  these  propositions,  or  by 
altogether  rejecting  the  hypothesis  of  Theism. 


(     i8i     ) 


HI. 

THE    SPECULATIVE   STANDING   OF 
MATEEIALISM. 

As  a  continuation  of  my  criticism  on  Mr.  Eiske's  views, 
I  think  it  is  desirable  to  add  a  few  words  concerning  the 
speculative  annihilation  with  which  he  supposes  Mr. 
Spencer's  doctrines  to  have  visited  Materialism.  Of 
course  it  is  a  self-evident  truism  that  the  doctrine  of 
Eelativity  is  destructive  of  Materialism,  if  by  Materialism 
we  mean  a  theory  which  ignores  that  doctrine.  In  other 
words,  the  doctrine  of  Eelativity,  if  accepted,  clearly 
excludes  the  doctrine  that  Matter,  as  known  'phenomenally, 
is  at  all  likely  to  be  a  true  representative  of  whatever 
thing-in-itself  it  may  be  that  constitutes  Mind.  But  this 
position  is  fully  established  by  the  doctrine  of  Eelativity 
alone,  and  is  therefore  not  in  the  least  affected,  either 
by  way  of  confirmation  or  otherwise,  by  Mr.  Spencer's 
extended  doctrine  of  the  Unknowable — it  being  only 
because  the  latter  doctrine  presupposes  the  doctrine  of 
Eelativity  that  it  is  exclusive  of  Materialism  in  the  sense 
which  has  just  been  stated.  So  far,  therefore,  Mr. 
Spencer's  writings  cannot  be  held  to  have  any  special 
bearing  on  the  doctrine  of  Materialism.  Such  a  special 
bearing  is  only  exerted  by  these  writings  when  they 
proceed  to  show  that  "it  seems  an  imaginable  possibility 
that  units  of  external  force  may  be  identical  in  nature 
with  the  units  of  the  force  known  as  feeling."  Let  us 
then  ascertain  how  far  it  is  true  that  the  argument  already 
quoted,  and  which  leads  to  this  conclusion,  is  utterly 
destructive  of  Materialism. 


i82  THE  SPECULATIVE  STANDING 

In  the  first  place,  I  may  observe  that  this  argument 
differs  in  several  instructive  particulars  from  the  anti- 
materialistic  argument  of  Locke,  which  we  have  already 
had  occasion  to  consider.  For  while  Locke  erroneously 
imagined  that  the  test  of  inconceivability  is  of  equivalent 
value  wherever  it  is  applied,  save  only  where  it  conflicts 
with  preconceived  ideas  on  the  subject  of  Theism  (see 
Appendix  A.),  Spencer,  of  course,  is  much  too  careful  a 
thinker  to  fall  into  so  obvious  a  fallacy.  But  again,  it  is 
curious  to  observe  that  in  the  anti-materialistic  argument 
of  Spencer  the  test  of  inconceivability  is  used  in  a  manner 
the  precise  opposite  of  that  in  which  it  is  used  in  the  anti- 
materialistic  argument  of  Locke.  For  while  the  ground  of 
Locke's  argument  is  that  Materialism  must  be  untrue 
because  it  is  inconceivable  that  Matter  (and  Force)  should 
be  of  a  psychical  nature ;  the  ground  of  Spencer's  argu- 
ment is  that  what  we  know  as  Force  (and  Matter)  may 
not  inconceivably  be  of  a  psychical  nature.  For  my  own 
part,  I  think  that  Spencer's  argument  is,  psychologically 
speaking,  the  more  valid  of  the  two ;  but  nevertheless  I 
think  that,  logically  speaking,  it  is  likewise  invalid  to  a 
perceptibly  great,  and  to  a  further  indefinite,  degree.  For 
the  argument  sets  out  with  the  reflection  that  we  can  only 
know  Matter  and  Force  as  symbols  of  consciousness,  while 
we  know  consciousness  directly,  and  therefore  that  we  can 
go  further  in  conceivably  translating  Matter  and  Force 
into  terms  of  Mind  than  vice  versa.  And  this  is  true, 
but  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that  the  truth  is  more 
likely  to  lie  in  the  direction  that  thought  can  most  easily 
travel.  For  although  I  am  at  one  wdth  Mr.  Spencer, 
whom  ]\Ir.  Fiske  follows,  in  regarding  his  test  of  truth — 
viz.,  inconceivability  of  a  negation — as  the  most  ultimate 
test  within  our  reach,  I  cannot  agree  with  him  that  in 
this  particular  case  it  is  the  most  trustworthy  test  within 
our  reach.  I  cannot  do  so  because  the  reflection  is  forced 
upon  me  that,  "  as  the  terms  which  are  contemj)lated  in 
this  particular  case  are  respectively  the  highest  abstrac- 


OF  MA  TERIALISM.  1 83 

tions  of  objective  and  of  subjective  existence,  the  test  of 
truth  iu  question  is  neutralised  by  directly  encountering 
the  inconceivable  relation  that  exists  between  subject  and 
object."  Or,  in  other  words,  as  before  stated,  "  whatever 
the  cause  of  Mind  may  be,  we  can  clearly  perceive  it  to 
be  a  subjective  necessity  of  the  case  that,  in  ultimate 
analysis,  we  should  find  it  more  easy  to  conceive  of  this 
cause  as  resembling  Mind — the  only  entity  of  which  we 
are  directly  conscious — than  to  conceive  of  it  as  any 
other  entity  of  which  we  are  ouly  indirectly  conscious." 
When,  therefore,  Mr.  Spencer  argues  that  "  it  is  impossible 
to  interpret  inner  existence  in  terms  of  outer  existence," 
while  it  is  not  so  impossible  to  interpret  outer  existence 
in  terms  of  inner  existence,  the  fact  is  merely  what  we 
should  in  any  case  expect  a  priori  to  be  the  fact,  and 
therefore  as  a  fact  it  is  not  a  very  surprising  discovery 
a  posteriori.  So  that  when  Mr.  Fiske  proceeds  to  make 
this  fact  the  basis  of  his  argument,  that  because  we  can 
more  conceivably  regard  objective  existence  as  like  in 
kind  to  subjective  existence  than  conversely,  therefore  we 
should  conclude  that  there  is  a  corresponding  probability 
in  favour  of  the  more  conceivable  proposition,  I  demur  to 
his  argument.  For,  fully  accepting  the  fact  on  which  the 
argument  rests,  and  it  seems  to  me,  in  view  of  what  I 
have  said,  that  the  latter  assigns  an  altogether  dispro- 
portionate value  to  the  test  of  inconceivability  in  this  case. 
Far  from  endowing  this  test  with  so  great  an  authority  in 
this  case,  I  should  regard  it  not  only  as  perceptibly  of 
very  small  validity,  but,  as  I  have  said,  invalid  to  a  degree 
which  we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining.  If  it  be  asked, 
What  other  gauge  of  probability  can  we  have  in  this 
matter  other  than  such  a  direct  appeal  to  consciousness  ? 
I  answer,  that  this  appeal  being  here  a  priori  invalid,  we 
are  left  to  fall  back  upon  the  formal  probability  wliich  is 
established  by  an  application  of  scientific  canons  to  objec- 
tive phenomena.  (See  footnote  in  §  14.)  For,  be  it  care- 
fully observed,  Mr.  Spencer,  and  his  disciple  Mr.  Fiske, 


r84  THE  SPECULATIVE  STANDING 

are  not  idealists.  Were  this  the  case,  of  course  the  test 
of  an  immediate  appeal  to  consciousness  would  be  to  them 
the  only  test  available.  But,  on  the  contrary,  as  all  the 
world  knows,  Mr.  Spencer  asserts  the  existence  of  an 
unknown  Eeality,  of  which  all  phenomena  are  the  mani- 
festations. Consequently,  what  we  call  Force  and  Matter 
are,  according  to  this  doctrine,  phenomenal  manifestations 
of  this  objective  Eeality.  That  is  to  say,  for  aught  that 
we  can  know,  Force  and  Matter  may  be  anything  within 
the  whole  range  of  the  possible ;  and  the  only  limitation 
that  can  be  assigned  to  them  is,  that  they  are  modes  of 
existence  which  are  independent  of,  or  objective  to,  our 
individual  consciousness,  but  which  are  uniformly  trans- 
lated into  consciousness  as  Force  and  Matter.  Now  it 
does  not  signify  one  iota  for  the  purposes  of  Materialism 
whether  these  our  symbolical  representations  of  Force  and 
Matter  are  accurate  or  inaccurate  representations  of  their 
corresponding  realities, — unless,  of  course,  some  indepen- 
dent reason  could  be  shown  for  supposing  that  in  their 
reality  they  resemble  Mind.  Call  Force  x  and  Matter  y, 
and  so  long  as  we  are  agreed  that  x  and  y  are  objective 
realities  loliich  are  uniformly  translated  into  consciousness 
as  Force  and  Matter,  the  materialistic  deductions  remain 
unaffected  by  this  mere  change  in  our  terminology  ;  these 
essential  facts  are  allowed  to  remain  substantially  as 
before,  namely,  that  there  is  an  external  something  or 
external  somethings — Matter  and  Force,  or  x  and  y — 
which  themselves  display  no  observable  tokens  of  con- 
sciousness, but  which  are  invariably  associated  with  con- 
sciousness in  a  highly  distinctive  manner. 

I  dw^ell  at  length  upon  this  subject,  because  although 
Mr.  Spencer  himself  does  not  appear  to  attach  much 
weight  to  his  argument,  Mr.  Fiske,  as  we  have  seen, 
elevates  it  into  a  basis  for  "  Cosmic  Theism."  Yet  so  far 
is  this  argument  from  "  ruling  out,"  as  Mr.  Fiske  asserts, 
the  essential  doctrine  of  Materialism — i.e.,  the  doctrine 
that  what  we  know  as  Mind  is  an  effect  of  certain  collo- 


OF  MATERIALISM.  185 

cations  and  distributions  of  ivlmt  we  hnoiv  as  Matter  and 
Force — that  the  argument  might  be  employed  with  ahnost 
the  same  degree  of  effect,  or  absence  of  effect,  to  disprove 
any  instance  of  recognised  causation.  Thus,  for  example, 
the  doctrine  of  Materialism  is  no  more  "ruled  out"  by 
the  reflection  that  what  we  cognise  as  cerebral  matter 
is  only  cognised  relatively,  than  would  the  doctrine  of 
chemical  equivalents  be  "ruled  out"  by  the  parallel 
reflection  that  what  we  cognise  as  chemical  elements  are 
only  cognised  relatively.  I  say  advisedly,  "  with  almost 
the  same  degree  of  effect,"  because,  to  be  strictly  accurate, 
we  ought  not  altogether  to  ignore  the  indefinitely  slender 
presumption  which  Mr.  Spencer's  subjective  test  of  incon- 
ceivability establishes  on  the  side  of  Spiritualism,  as 
against  the  objective  evidcDce  of  causation  on  the  side  of 
Materialism.  As  this  is  an  important  subject,  I  will  be  a 
little  more  explicit.  We  are  agreed  that  Force  and  Matter 
are  entities  external  to  consciousiiess,  of  which  we  can 
possess  only  symbolical  knowledge.  Therefore,  as  we 
have  said.  Force  and  Matter  may  be  anything  within  the 
whole  range  of  the  possible.  But  we  know  that  Mind  is 
a  possible  entity,  while  we  have  no  certain  knowledge  of 
any  other  possible  entity.  Hence  we  are  justified  in  say- 
ing. It  is  possible  that  Force  and  Matter  may  be  identical 
with  the  only  entity  which  we  know  as  certainly  possible ; 
but  forasmuch  as  we  do  not  know  the  sum  of  possible 
entities,  we  have  no  means  of  calculating  the  chances 
there  are  that  what  we  know  as  Force  and  Matter  are 
identical  in  nature  with  Mind.  Still,  that  there  is  a 
chance  we  cannot  dispute ;  all  we  can  assert  is,  that  we 
are  unable  to  determine  its  value,  and  that  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  suppose  we  can  do  so,  even  in  the  lowest 
degree,  by  Mr.  Spencer's  test  of  inconceivability.  Never- 
theless, the  fact  that  there  is  such  a  chance  renders  it  in 
some  indeterminate  degree  more  probable  that  what  we 
know  as  Force  and  Matter  are  identical  with  what  we 
know  as  Mind,  than  that  what  we  know  as  oxygen  and 


1 86  THE  SPECULATIVE  STANDING 

hydrogen  are  identical  with  what  we  know  as  water. 
So  that  to  this  extent  the  essential  doctrine  of  Materialism 
is  "  ruled  out "  in  a  further  degree  by  the  philosophy  of 
the  Unknowable  than  is  the  chemical  doctrine  of  equiva- 
lents. But,  of  course,  this  indefinite  possibility  of  what 
we  know  as  Force  and  Matter  beino-  identical  with  what 
we  know  as  Mind  does  not  neutralise,  in  any  determin- 
able degree,  the  considerations  whereby  JNIaterialism  in  its 
present  shape  infers  that  what  we  know  as  Force  and 
Matter  are  probably  distinct  from  what  we  know  as  Mind. 
But  I  see  no  reason  why  Materialism  should  be  re- 
stricted to  this  "  its  present  shape."  Even  if  we  admit  to 
the  fullest  extent  the  validity  of  Mr.  Spencer's  argument, 
and  conclude  with  Professor  Clifford  as  a  matter  of  proba- 
bility that  ''  the  universe  consists  entirely  of  Mind-stuff," 
I  do  not  see  that  the  admission  would  affect  Materialism 
in  any  essential  respect.  For  here  again  the  admission 
would  amount  to  little  else,  so  far  as  Materialism  is 
directly  concerned,  than  a  change  of  terminology :  in- 
stead of  calling  objective  existence  ''Matter,"  we  call  it 
"  Mind-stuff."  I  say  "  to  little  else,"  because  no  doubt  in 
one  particular  there  is  here  some  change  introduced  in  the 
speculative  standing  of  the  subject.  So  long  as  Matter  and 
Mind,  X  and  y,  are  held  to  be  antithetically  opposed  in 
substance,  so  long  must  Materialism  suppose  that  a  con- 
nection of  causality  subsists  between  the  two,  such  that 
the  former  substance  is  produced  in  some  unaccountable 
way  by  the  latter.  But  when  Matter  and  Mind,  x  and  y, 
are  supposed  to  be  identical  in  substance,  the  need  for  any 
additional  supposition  as  to  a  causal  connection  is  ex- 
cluded. But  unless  we  hold,  what  seems  to  me  an  uncalled- 
for  opinion,  that  the  essential  feature  of  Materialism  con- 
sists in  a  postulation  of  a  causal  connection  between  x 
and  y,  it  would  appear  that  the  only  effect  of  supposing 
x  and  y  to  be  really  but  one  substance  z,  must  be  that  of 
strengthening  the  essential  doctrine  of  Materialism — the 
doctrine,  namely,  that  conscious  intellectual  existence  is 


OF  MA  TERIALISM.  1 87 

necessarily  associated  with  that  form  of  existence  which 
we  know  phenomenally  as  Matter  and  Motion.  If  it  is 
true  that  a  "  a  moving  molecule  of  inorganic  matter  does 
not  possess  mind  or  consciousness,  but  it  possesses  a 
small  piece  of  Mind-stuff,"  then  assuredly  the  central 
position  of  Materialism  is  shown  to  be  impregnable.  For 
while  it  remains  as  true  as  ever  that  mind  and  conscious- 
ness can  only  emerge  when  what  we  know  phenomenally 
as  "  Matter  takes  the  complex  form  of  a  living  brain,"  we 
have  abolished  the  necessity  for  assuming  even  a  causal 
connection  between  the  substance  of  what  we  know  phe- 
nomenally as  Matter  and  the  substance  of  what  we  know 
phenomenally  as  Mind :  we  have  found  that,  in  the  last 
resort,  the  phenomenal  connection  between  what  we  know 
as  Matter  and  what  we  know  as  Mind  is  actually  even 
more  intimate  than  a  connection  of  causality;  we  have 
found  that  it  is  a  substantial  identity. 

To  sum  up  this  discussion.  We  have  considered  the 
bearing  of  modern  speculation  on  the  doctrine  of  Mate- 
rialism in  three  successive  stacjes  of  argument.  First,  we 
had  to  consider  the  bearing  on  Materialism  of  the  simple 
doctrine  of  Eelativity.  Here  we  saw  that  Materialism 
was  only  affected  to  the  extent  of  being  compelled  to 
allow  that  what  we  know  as  Matter  and  Motion  are  not 
known  as  they  are  in  themselves.  But  we  also  saw  that, 
as  the  inscrutable  realities  are  uniformly  translated  into 
consciousness  as  Matter  and  Motion,  it  still  remains  as  true 
as  ever  that  what  we  know  as  Matter  and  Motion  may  be 
the  causes  of  what  we  know  as  Mind.  Even,  therefore, 
if  the  supposition  of  causality  is  taken  to  be  an  essential 
feature  of  Materialism,  Materialism  would  be  in  no  wise 
affected  by  substituting  for  the  words  Matter  and  Motion 
the  symbols  x  and  y. 

The  second  of  the  three  stages  consisted  in  showing  that 
Mr.  Spencer's  argument  as  to  the  possible  identity  of 
Force  and  Feeling  is  not  in  itself  sufficient  to  overthrow 
the  doctrine  that  what  we  know  as  Matter  and  Motion 


i88  THE  SPECULATIVE  STANDING,  ETC. 

may  be  the  cause  of  what  we  know  as  Mind.  For  the 
mere  fact  of  its  being  more  conceivahh  that  units  of  Force 
should  resemble  units  of  Feeling  than  conversely,  is  no 
warrant  for  concluding  that  in  reality  any  corresponding 
probability  obtains.  The  test  of  conceivability,  although 
the  most  ultimate  test  that  is  available,  is  here  rendered 
vague  and  valueless  by  the  a  priori  consideration  that 
whatever  the  cause  of  Mind  may  be  (if  it  has  a  cause),  we 
must  find  it  more  easy  to  conceive  of  this  cause  as 
resembling  Mind  than  to  conceive  of  it  as  resembling  any 
other  entity  of  which  we  are  only  conscious  indirectly. 

Lastly,  in  the  third  place,  we  saw  that  even  if  Mr. 
Spencer's  argument  were  fully  subscribed  to,  and  Mind  in 
its  substantial  essence  were  conceded  to  be  causeless,  the 
central  position  of  Materialism  would  still  remain  un- 
affected. For  Mr.  Spencer  does  not  suppose  that  his 
"  units  of  Force  "  are  themselves  endowed  with  conscious- 
ness, any  more  than  Professor  Clifford  supposes  his 
"  moving  molecules  of  inorganic  matter  "  to  be  thus  en- 
dowed. So  that  the  only  change  which  these  possibilities, 
even  if  conceded  to  be  actualities,  produce  in  the  specu- 
lative standing  of  Materialism,  is  to  show  that  the  raw 
material  of  consciousness,  instead  of  requiring  to  be  caused 
by  other  substances — Matter  and  Force,  x  and  y, — occurs 
ready  made  as  those  substances.  But  the  essential  feature 
of  Materialism  remains  untouched — namely,  that  what  we 
know  as  Mind  is  dependent  (whether  by  way  of  causality 
or  not  is  immaterial)  on  highly  complex  forms  of  ivhat 
we  knoio  as  Matter,  in  association  with  highly  peculiar 
distributions  of  ivliat  we  know  as  Force. 


(     i89    ) 


TV. 

THE  ri:N"AL  MYSTEEY  OF  THINGS. 

Some  physicists  are  inclined  to  dispute  the  fundamental 
proposition  on  which  the  whole  of  Mr.  Spencer's  system 
of  philosophy  may  be  said  to  rest  —  the  proposition, 
namely,  that  the  fact  of  the  "  persistence  of  force  "  con- 
stitutes the  ultimate  basis  of  science.  For  my  own  part, 
I  cannot  but  believe  that  any  disagreement  on  this  matter 
only  arises  from  some  want  of  mutual  understanding ;  and, 
therefore,  in  order  to  anticipate  any  criticisms  to  which 
the  present  work  may  be  open  on  this  score,  I  append 
this  explanatory  note. 

I  readily  grant  that  the  term  "  persistence  of  force  "  is 
not  a  happy  one,  seeing  that  the  word  "  force,"  as  used  by 
physicists,  does  not  at  the  present  time  convey  the  full 
meaning  which  Mr.  Spencer  desires  it  to  convey.  But  I 
think  that  any  impartial  physicist  will  be  prepared  to 
admit  that,  in  the  present  state  of  his  science,  we  are 
entitled  to  conclude  that  energy  of  position  is  merely  the 
result  of  energy  of  motion;  or,  in  other  words,  that 
potential  energy  is  merely  an  expression  of  the  fact  that 
the  universe,  as  a  whole,  is  replete  with  actual  energy, 
whose  essential  characteristic  is  that  it  is  indestructible. 
And  this  may  be  concluded  without  committing  ourselves 
to  any  particular  theory  as  to  the  physical  explanation  of 
gravity ;  all  we  need  assert  is,  that  in  some  way  or  other 
gravity  is  the  result  of  ubiquitous  energy.  And  this,  it 
seems  to  me,  we  must  assert,  or  else  conclude  that  gravity 
can  never  admit  of  a  physical  explanation.     For  all  that 


I90  THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS. 

we  mean  by  a  physical  explanation  is  the  proved  establish- 
ment of  an  equation  between  two  quantities  of  energy ; 
so  that  if  energy  of  position  does  not  admit  of  being 
interpreted  in  terms  of  energy  of  motion,  we  must  con- 
clude that  it  does  not  admit  of  being  interpreted  at  all — 
at  least  not  in  any  physical  sense. 

Throughout  the  foregoing  essays,  therefore,  I  have 
assumed  that  all  forms  of  energy  are  but  relatively  vary- 
ing expressions  of  the  same  fact — the  fact,  namely,  which 
Mr.  Spencer  means  to  express  when  he  says  that  force  is 
persistent.  And  it  seems  to  me  almost  needless  to  show 
that  this  fact  is  really  the  basis  of  all  science.  For  unless 
this  fact  is  assumed  as  a  postulate,  not  only  would  scien- 
tific inquiry  become  impossible,  but  all  experience  would 
become  chaotic.  The  physicist  could  not  prosecute  his 
researches  unless  he  presupposed  that  the  forces  w^hich 
he  measures  are  of  a  permanent  nature,  any  more  than 
could  the  chemist  prosecute  his  researches  unless  he  pre- 
supposed that  the  materials  which  he  estimates  by  energy- 
units  are  likewise  of  a  permanent  nature.  And  similarly 
with  all  the  other  sciences,  as  well  as  with  every 
judgment  in  our  daily  experience.  If,  therefore,  any  one 
should  be  hypercritical  enough  to  dispute  the  position  that 
the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  constitutes  the 
"  ultimate  datum  "  of  science,  I  think  it  will  be  enough 
to  observe  that  if  this  is  not  the  ''  ultimate  datum  "  of 
science,  science  can  have  no  "  ultimate  datum "  at  all. 
For  any  datum  more  ultimate  than  permanent  existence 
is  manifestly  impossible,  while  any  such  datum  as  non- 
permanent  existence  would  clearly  render  science  im- 
possible. Even,  therefore,  if  such  hypercriticism  had  a 
valid  basis  of  apparently  adverse  fact  whereon  to  stand, 
I  should  feel  myself  justified  in  neglecting  it  on  a  jyrioTi 
grounds ;  but  the  only  basis  on  which  such  hypercriticism 
can  rest  is,  not  the  knowledge  of  any  adverse  facts,  but 
the  ignorance  of  certain  facts  which  we  must  either  con- 
clude to  be  facts  or  else  conclude  that  science  can  have 


THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS.  191 

no  ultimate  datum  whereon  to  rest.  In  tlie  foregoing 
essays,  therefore,  I  have  not  scrupled  to  maintain  that  the 
ultimate  datum  of  science  is  destructive  of  teleology  as 
a  scientific  argument  for  Theism ;  because,  unless  we  deny 
the  possibility  of  any  such  ultimate  datum,  and  so  land 
ourselves  in  hopeless  scepticism,  we  must  conclude  that 
there  can  be  no  datum  more  ultimate  than  this — Perman- 
ent Existence ;  and  this  is  just  the  datum  which  we  have 
seen  to  be  destructive  of  teleology  as  a  scientific  argument 
for  Theism. 

It  may  be  well  to  point  out  that  from  this  ultimate 
datum  of  science — or  rather,  let  us  say,  of  experience — 
there  follows  a  deductive  explanation  of  the  law  of 
causation.  For  this  law,  when  stripped  of  all  the 
metaphysical  corruptions  with  which  it  has  been  so 
cumbersomely  clothed,  simply  means  that  a  given  colloca- 
tion of  antecedents  unconditionally  produces  a  certain 
consequent.  But  this  fact,  otherwise  stated,  amounts  to 
nothing  more  than  a  re-statement  of  the  ultimate  datum 
of  experience — the  fact  that  energy  is  indestructible.  For 
if  this  latter  fact  be  granted,  it  is  obvious  that  the  so- 
called  law  of  causation  follows  as  a  deductive  necessity — : 
or  rather,  as  I  have  said,  that  this  law  becomes  but  another 
way  of  expressing  the  same  fact.  This  is  obvious  if  we 
reflect  that  the  only  means  we  have  of  ascertaining  that 
energy  is  not  destructible,  is  by  observing  that  similar 
antecedents  do  invariably  determine  similar  consequents. 
It  is  as  a  vast  induction  from  all  those  particular  cases  of 
sequence-changes  which  collectively  we  call  causation  that 
we  conclude  energy  to  be  indestructible.  And,  obversely, 
having  concluded  energy  to  be  indestructible,  we  can 
plainly  see  that  in  any  particular  cases  of  its  manifestation 
in  sequence-phenomena,  the  unconditional  resemblance 
between  effects  due  to  similar  causes  which  is  formulated 
by  the  law  of  causation  is  merely  the  direct  expression  of 
the  fact  which  we  had  previously  concluded.  It  seems  to 
me,  therefore^  that  the  old-standing  question  concerning 


192  THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS. 

the  nature  of  causation  ought  now  properly  to  be  con- 
sidered as  obsolete.  Doubtless  there  will  long  remain  a 
sort  of  hereditary  tendency  in  metaphysical  minds  to  look 
upon  cause-connection  as  "  a  mysterious  tie  "  between  ante- 
cedent and  consequent ;  but  henceforth  there  is  no  need 
for  scientific  minds  to  regard  this  "  tie  "  as  "  mysterious  " 
in  any  other  sense  than  the  existence  of  energy  is  "  mys- 
terious." To  state  the  law  of  causation  is  merely  to  state 
the  fact  that  energy  is  indestructible. 

And  from  this  there  also  arises  at  once  the  explanation 
and  the  justification  of  our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of 
nature.  If  energy  is,  in  its  relation  to  us,  ubiquitous  and 
persistent,  it  clearly  follows  that  in  all  its  manifestations 
which  collectively  we  call  nature,  similar  preceding  mani- 
festations must  always  determine  similar  succeeding  mani- 
festations; for  otherwise  the  energy  concerned  would 
require  on  one  or  on  both  of  the  occasions,  either  to  have 
become  augmented  by  creation,  or  dissipated  by  annihila- 
tion. Thus  our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature,  as  in 
the  validity  of  the  law  of  causation,  is  merely  an  expres- 
sion of  our  belief  in  the  ubiquitous  and  indestructible 
character  of  energy. 

Such  being  the  case,  we  may  fairly  conclude  that  all 
these  old-standing  "mysteries"  are  now  merged  in  the  one 
mystery  of  existence.  And  deeper  than  this  it  is  manifestly 
impossible  that  they  can  be  merged ;  for  it  is  manifestly 
impossible  that  Existence  in  the  abstract  can  ever  admit 
of  what  we  call  explanation.  Hence  we  can  clearly  see 
that,  in  a  scientific  sense,  there  must  always  remain  a  final 
mystery  of  things.  But  although  we  can  thus  see  that, 
from  the  very  meaning  of  what  we  call  explanation,  it 
follows  that  at  the  base  of  all  our  explanations  there 
must  lie  a  great  Inexplicable,  I  think  that  the  mystery  of 
Existence  in  the  abstract  may  be  rendered  less  appalling 
if  we  reflect  that,  as  opposed  to  Existence,  there  is  only  one 
logical  alternative — Non-existence.  Supposing,  then,  our 
physical  explanations  to  have  reached  their  highest  Limits 


THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS.  193 

by  resolving  all  modes  of  Existence  into  one  mode — force, 
matter,  life,  and  mind,  being  shown  but  different  mani- 
festations of  the  same  Infinite  Existence — the  final  mystery 
of  things  would  then  become  resolved  into  the  simple 
question,  Why  is  there  Existence? — Why  is  there  not 
JN'othing  ? 

Let  us  then  first  ask.  What  is  "  ISTothing "  ?  Is  it  a 
mere  word,  which  presents  no  meaning  as  corresponding 
to  any  objective  reality,  or  has  the  word  a  meaning  not- 
withstanding its  being  an  inconceivable  one  ?  Or,  other- 
wise phrased,  is  Nothing  possible  or  impossible  ?  Now, 
although  in  ordinary  conversation  it  is  generally  taken 
for  granted  that  Nothing  is  possible,  there  is  certainly  no 
more  ground  for  this  supposition  than  there  is  for  its 
converse — viz.,  that  Nothing  is  merely  a  word  which 
signifies  the  negation  of  possibility.  For  analysis  will 
show  that  the  choice  between  these  two  counter-supposi- 
tions can  only  be  made  in  the  presence  of  knowledge 
which  is  necessarily  absent — the  knowledge  whether  the 
universe  of  Existence  is  finite  or  infinite.  If  the  universe 
as  a  whole  is  finite,  the  word  Nothing  would  stand  as  a 
symbol  to  denote  an  unthinkable  blank  of  which  a  finite 
universe  is  the  content.  And  forasmuch  as  Somethinsf  and 
Nothing  would  then  become  actual,  as  distinguished  from 
nominal  correlatives,  we  could  have  no  guarantee  that,  in 
an  absolute  or  transcendental  sense,  it  may  not  be  pos- 
sible, although  it  is  inconceivable,  for  Something  to  be- 
come Nothing  or  Nothing  Something.  Hence,  if  Existence 
is  finite.  No-existence  becomes  possible ;  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  indestructibility  of  Existence  becomes,  for  aught  that 
we  can  tell,  of  a  merely  relative  signification.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  Existence  is  infinite.  No-existence  becomes 
impossible;  and  the  doctrine  of  the  indestructibility  of 
Existence  becomes,  in  a  logical  sense,  of  an  absolute 
signification.  For  it  is  manifest  that  if  the  universe  of 
Existence  is  without  end  in  space  and  time,  the  possibility 
of   No-existence  is  of   necessity  excluded,  and  tlie  word 

N 


194  THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS. 

"Notliing"   thus   becomes   a    mere    negation    of    possi- 
bility.! 

Thus,  if  it  be  conceded  that  the  universe  as  a  whole  is 
infinite  both  in  space  and  time,  the  concession  amounts  to 
an  abolition  of  the  final  mystery  of  things.  For  all  that 
we  mean  by  a  mystery  is  something  that  requires  an  ex- 
planation, and  the  whole  of  the  final  mystery  of  things 
is  therefore  embodied  in  the  question,  "Why  is  there 
Existence? — Why  is  there  not  ISTothing?"  But  if  the 
universe  of  Existence  be  conceded  infinite,  this  question 
is  sufficiently  met  by  the  answer,  "  Because  Existence  is, 
and  N'othing  is  not."  If  it  is  retorted,  But  this  is  no  real 
answer ;  I  reply.  It  is  as  real  as  the  question.  For  to  ask, 
Why  is  there  Existence  ?  is,  upon  the  supposition  which  has 
been  conceded,  equivalent  to  asking,  Why  is  the  possible 
possible  ?  And  if  such  questions  cannot  be  answered,  it 
is  scarcely  right  to  say  that  on  this  account  they  embody 
a  mystery ;  because  the  questions  are  really  not  rational 
questions,  and  therefore  the  fact  of  their  not  admitting  of 
any  rational  answer  cannot  be  held  to  show  that  the 
questions  embody  any  rational  mystery.     That  there  is  a 


1  Let  it  be  observed  that  there  is  a  not  become  extinguished  by  the  ex- 
distinction  between  what  I  may  call  tinctiou  of  the  system,  it  may  not  now 
substantial  and  formal  existence,  stand  in  any  real  relation  to  what  we 
Thus  there  is  no  doubt  that  flowers  call  space  and  time.  I  am  inclined  to 
as  flowers  perish,  or  become  non-  think  that  it  is  upon  the  idea  of  non- 
existent ;  but  the  substances  of  existence  in  this  formal  sense  that  we 
which  they  were  composed  persist,  construct  a  pseud-idea  of  non-exist- 
And,  in  this  connection,  I  may  here  ence  in  a  substantial  sense  ;  but  it 
point  out  that  if  the  universe  is  is  evident  that  if  the  universe  as  a 
infinite  in  space  and  time,  the  whole  is  absolute,  this  pseud-idea 
universe  as  a  whole  would  present  must  represent  an  impossibility, 
substantial  existence  as  standing  And  from  this  it  follows,  that  if 
out  of  relation  to  space  and  time,  existence  is  infinite  in  space  and 
whereas  innumerable  portions  of  the  time,  every  quantum  of  it  with 
universe  present  only  formal  exis-  which  our  experience  comes  into 
tences,  because  standing  in  relation  relation  must  present,  as  its  essential 
both  to  space  and  time.  Thus,  for  quality,  that  quality  which  we  find  to 
instance,  the  solar  system,  as  a  solar  be  presented  by  the  substance  of 
system,  must  have  an  end  in  time  as  things— the  quality,  that  is,  of 
it  has  a  boundary  in  si>ace ;  but  as  persistence, 
the  substance  of  which  it  consists  will 


THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS.  195 

rational  mystery,  in  the  sense  of  there  being  something 
which  can  never  be  explained,  I  do  not  dispute ;  all  I 
assert  is,  that  this  mystery  is  inexplicable  only  because 
there  is  nothing  to  explain  ;  the  mystery  being  ultimate,  to 
ask  for  an  explanation  of  that  which,  being  ultimate,  re- 
quires no  explanation,  is  irrational.  Or,  to  state  the  case  in 
another  way,  if  it  is  asked,  Why  is  there  not  Nothing  ?  it  is  a 
sufficient  answer,  on  supposition  of  the  universe  being  in- 
finite, to  say.  Because  N"othing  is  nothing ;  it  is  merely  a 
word  which  presents  no  meaning,  and  which,  so  far  as 
anything  can  be  conceived  to  the  contrary,  never  can  pre- 
sent any  meaning. 

The  above  discussion  has  proceeded  on  the  supposition  of 
Existence  being  iniinite ;  but  practically  the  same  result 
would  follow  on  the  counter-supposition  of  Existence  being 
finite.  For  although  in  this  case,  as  we  have  seen,  Non- 
entity would  be  included  within  the  range  of  possibility,  it 
would  still  be  no  more  conceivable  as  such  than  is  Entity  ; 
and  hence  the  question.  Why  is  there  not  Nothing  ?  would 
still  be  irrational,  seeing  that,  even  if  the  possibility  which 
the  question  supposes  were  realised,  it  would  in  no  wise 
tend  to  explain  the  mystery  of  Something.  And  even  if  it 
could,  the  final  mystery  would  not  be  thus  excluded ;  it 
would  merely  be  transferred  from  the  mystery  of  Exist- 
ence to  the  mystery  of  Non-existence.  Thus  under  every 
conceivable  supposition  we  arrive  at  the  same  termination 
— viz.,  that  in  the  last  resort  there  must  be  a  final  mystery, 
which,  as  forming  the  basis  of  all  possible  explanations, 
cannot  itself  receive  any  explanation,  and  which  there- 
fore is  really  not,  in  any  proper  sense  of  the  term,  a 
mystery  at  all.  It  is  merely  a  fact  which  itself  requires  no 
explanation,  because  it  is  a  fact  than  which  none  can  be 
more  ultimate.  So  that  even  if  we  suppose  this  ultimate 
fact  to  be  an  Intelligent  Being,  it  is  clearly  impossible 
that  he  should  be  able  to  explain  his  own  existence,  since 
the  possibility  of  any  such  explanation  would  imply  that 
his  existence  could  not  be  ultimate.     In  the  sense,  there- 


196  THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS. 

fore,  of  not  admitting  of  any  explanation,  his  existence 
would  require  to  be  a  mystery  to  himself,  rendering  it 
impossible  for  him  to  state  anything  further  with  regard 
to  it  than  this — "  I  am  that  I  am." 

I  do  not  doubt  that  this  way  of  looking  at  the  subject 
will  be  deemed  unsatisfactory  at  first  sight,  because  it 
seems  to  be,  as  it  were,  a  merely  logical  way  of  cheating 
our  intelligence  out  of  an  intuitively  felt  justification  for 
its  own  curiosity  in  this  matter.  But  the  fault  really  lies 
in  this  intuitive  feeling  of  justification  not  being  itself 
justifiable.  For  this  particular  question,  it  will  be  observed, 
differs  from  all  other  possible  questions  with  which  the 
mind  has  to  deal.  All  other  questions  being  questions 
concerning  manifestations  of  existence  presupposed  as 
existing,  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  to  seek  for  an  explana- 
tion of  one  series  of  manifestations  in  another — i.e.,  to 
refer  a  less  known  group  to  a  group  better  known.  But 
the  case  is  manifestly  quite  otherwise  when,  having 
merged  one  group  of  manifestations  into  another  group, 
and  this  into  another  for  an  indefinite  number  of  stages, 
we  suddenly  make  a  leap  to  the  last  possible  stage  and 
ask,  "  Into  what  group  are  we  to  merge  the  basis  of  all 
our  previous  groups,  and  of  all  groups  which  can  possibly 
be  formed  in  the  future  ?  How  are  we  to  classify  that  which 
contains  all  possible  classes  ?  Where  are  we  to  look  for  an 
explanation  of  Existence  ? "  When  thus  clearly  stated, 
the  question  is,  as  I  have  said,  manifestly  irrational ;  but 
the  point  with  which  I  am  now  concerned  is  this — When 
in  plain  reason  the  question  is  sce?t  to  be  irrational,  why 
in  intuitive  sentiment  should  it  not  be  fdt  to  be  so  ? 
The  answer,  I  think,  is,  that  the  interrogative  faculty 
being  usually  occupied  with  questions  which  admit  of 
rational  answers,  we  acquire  a  sort  of  intellectual  habit  of 
presupposing  every  wherefore  to  have  a  therefore,  and 
thus,  when  eventually  we  arrive  at  the  last  of  all  possible 
wherefores,  which  itself  supplies  the  basis  of  all  possible 
therefores,  we  fail  at  first  to  recognise  the  exceptional 


THE  FINAL  MYSTERY  OF  THINGS.  197 

character  of  our  position.  We  fail  at  first  to  perceive  that, 
from  the  very  nature  of  this  particular  case,  our  where- 
fore is  deprived  of  the  rational  meaning  which  it  had  in 
all  the  previous  cases,  where  the  possibility  of  a  corre- 
sponding therefore  was  presupposed.  And  failing  fully 
to  perceive  this  truth,  our  organised  habit  of  expecting  an 
answer  to  our  question  asserts  itself,  and  we  experience  the 
same  sense  of  intellectual  unrest  in  the  presence  of  tliis 
wholly  meaningless  and  absurd  question,  as  we  experi- 
ence in  the  presence  of  questions  significant  and  rational. 


THE   END. 


PRINTED  BY  BALLANl  YNE,  HANSON  AND  CO- 
EDINBURGH  AND  LONDON 


*^-.--. 


